Summary
stating that it was "join[ing] the majority of other jurisdictions" in concluding that the "period [for filing a claim of lien] commences on the date of completion of the original installation work and is not extended by the later performance of warranty work"
Summary of this case from Massey Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Lee Land Dev., Inc.Opinion
Docket No. 145880.
Submitted December 21, 1993, at Lansing.
Decided March 7, 1994, at 9:35 A.M.
Howard Howard (by Patrick D. Hanes), for Mark Woodman.
Oade, Stroud Kleiman, P.C. (by Ted W. Stroud), for Murl M. Walter and Joyce E. Walter. Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Michael A. Lockman and Kevin Thom, Assistant Attorneys General, for Homeowner Construction Lien Recovery Fund.
Before: SHEPHERD, P.J., and McDONALD and JANSEN, JJ.
Plaintiff appeals from an October 3, 1991, order granting summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) in favor of defendants in this action to enforce a construction lien. We affirm.
The only issue to be determined on appeal is whether the ninety-day period for filing of lien claims provided in the Construction Lien Act, MCL 570.1101 et seq.; MSA 26.316(101) et seq., may be extended by the performance of warranty work. We find that it may not.
The act provides in part:
Notwithstanding section 109 the right of a contractor, subcontractor, laborer, or supplier to a construction lien created by this act shall cease to exist unless, within 90 days after the lien claimant's last furnishing of labor or material for the improvement, pursuant to the lien claimant's contract, a claim of lien is recorded in the office of the register of deeds for each county where the real property to which the improvement was made is located. [MCL 570.1111(1); MSA 26.316(111)(1).]
The act refers to the furnishing of labor or material "for the improvement." As noted by the trial court in this case, the performance of warranty work does not constitute an "improvement." It does not confer any value beyond the value furnished at the time the initial installation work was completed. Moreover, the trial court correctly concluded extension of the filing period would frustrate the statute's attempt to assure clear title after the passage of a reasonable period.
We therefore conclude the trial court properly granted defendants' motion for summary disposition. The ninety-day filing period commences on the date of completion of the original installation work and is not extended by the later performance of warranty work. In so holding we join the majority of other jurisdictions that have addressed this issue under lien laws similar to the Construction Lien Act. See Viking Builders, Inc v Felices, 391 So.2d 302 (Fla App, 1980); P H Broughton Sons, Inc v Mueller Allen Realty Co, Inc, 40 Ill. App.3d 776; 353 N.E.2d 30 (1976); Central Coast Electric, Inc v Mendell, 66 Or. App. 42; 672 P.2d 1224 (1983).
Affirmed.