Opinion
C/A No. 2:17-cv-01467-RMG-KFM
07-11-2017
Terrell J. Woodley, Sr., Plaintiff, v. City of Charleston Police Department, Jory Bradshaw, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF PARTIAL SUMMARY DISMISSAL
The plaintiff, proceeding pro se, brings a civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking monetary damages. The plaintiff is a non-prisoner and files this action in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and submit findings and recommendations to the district court. The undersigned recommends that the City of Charleston Police Department ("the Police Department") be dismissed from the case.
BACKGROUND
The plaintiff alleges that on June 8, 2015, he was driving down Highway 61 and was pulled over by Officer Jory Bradshaw (doc. 1 at 5). He contends that he was not told why he was pulled over; he states that he gave Officer Bradshaw his information and waited for 20 minutes (id.). Officer Bradshaw asked him if he was at the vet to pick up his kitten, went away for another 15 minutes, then informed the plaintiff that the tint on his windows was too dark (id.). The plaintiff asserts that he called the Police Department and asked for Officer Bradshaw's supervisor (id.). The plaintiff believes that Officer Bradshaw heard his phone call over his radio because, after he made the call, Officer Bradshaw twisted his right arm and wrist until the plaintiff heard it crack (id. at 6). The plaintiff contends that he was then placed in handcuffs and put in the back of the police car (id.). He states that the supervisor then came and told him if he felt he had been treated poorly he could file a complaint; the supervisor took the handcuffs off the plaintiff and told him to sit in his car (id.). Officer Bradshaw issued him a ticket for "prohibited sunscreen" (id.). The plaintiff asserts that he filed a complaint with Internal Affairs at the Police Department; however, he was in pain from the injuries he received and was unable to come in and provide a statement (id.). He maintains that he was told he sprained and dislocated his right wrist and continues to experience pain in that arm (id.). The plaintiff seeks damages for pain and suffering, medical bills, false arrest, and punitive damages (id. at 5).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review the complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," is "frivolous or malicious," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, a portion of the pro se pleading remains subject to summary dismissal. The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
This complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 "creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S.Ct. 1497, 1501 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
The Police Department cannot be sued under § 1983 because it is not a person. It is well settled that only "persons" may act under color of state law, so a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a "person." Although suing an entire department may be a lawsuit against a group of people, groups of people are not amenable to suit under § 1983. See Harden v. Green, 27 F. App'x 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding that the medical department of a prison is not a person pursuant to § 1983); Nelson v. Lexington Cnty. Det. Ctr., C/A No. 8:10-2988-JMC, 2011 WL 2066551, at *1 (D.S.C. May 26, 2011) (finding that Food Service Supervisors was a group of people not subject to suit); Dalton v. South Carolina Dep't of Corr., C/A No. 8:09-260-CMC-BHH, 2009 WL 823931, at *2 (D.S.C. March 26, 2009) (dismissing the medical staff of SCDC and Prison Health Services as defendants because they were not persons); Green v. Murdaugh, C/A No. 5:12-1086-RMG-KDW, 2012 WL 1987764, *2 (D.S.C. May 07, 2012), adopted by 2012 WL 1987259 (D.S.C. June 04, 2012) (dismissing because police department was not subject to suit under § 1983). Therefore, the Police Department should be dismissed from this action because the plaintiff fails to state a § 1983 claim against it.
RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the City of Charleston Police Department be dismissed from this action without prejudice and without issuance and service of process. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (as soon as possible after docketing, district courts should review prisoner cases to determine whether they are subject to summary dismissal). This action remains pending against Officer Jory Bradshaw at this time. The plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
s/Kevin F. McDonald
United States Magistrate Judge July 11, 2017
Greenville, South Carolina
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).