Opinion
NO. 2017-CA-000790-MR
08-10-2018
GERALD R. WOODEN APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Gerald R. Wooden, pro se LaGrange, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Andy Beshear Attorney General of Kentucky Joseph A. Beckett Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KELLY MARK EASTON, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 05-CR-00566, 06-CR-00266 & 06-CR-00522 OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: KRAMER, D. LAMBERT, AND MAZE, JUDGES. LAMBERT, D., JUDGE: Gerald R. Wooden appeals the Hardin Circuit Court's order denying his motion to amend his previous motion to set aside his sentence and conviction under Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42. After careful review, we affirm.
On April 4, 2007, Wooden entered a plea of guilty but mentally ill to two counts of first-degree sodomy; two counts of first-degree rape; one count of incest; and seven counts of first-degree sexual abuse. In exchange for his guilty plea, the Commonwealth recommended a sentence totaling thirty years' imprisonment. On June 5, 2007, the trial court entered a judgment sentencing Wooden consistently with his plea deal.
On December 17, 2008, Wooden filed an RCr 11.42 motion alleging his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to adequately investigate the evidence and by failing to request a competency hearing. The trial court denied the motion and was affirmed on appeal. Wooden v. Commonwealth, 2009-CA-000325-MR, 2010 WL 1133242, at *1 (Ky. App. Mar. 26, 2010).
Seven years later, Wooden moved pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 6.02, 15.03, and 15.04 to supplement his original RCr 11.42 motion. Wooden's motion sought to amend his previous RCr 11.42 motion to add a claim that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by forcing him to plead guilty under duress. He also argued his new claim should relate back to the date of his original RCr 11.42 motion, so it would be considered timely and would not be procedurally barred as a successive attempt at post-conviction relief. The trial court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing, finding Wooden could not amend an RCr 11.42 motion the court already denied. This appeal follows.
Wooden's motion cited RCr 6.02, RCr 15.03, and RCr 15.04. His arguments on appeal make clear he was attempting to cite CR 6.02, which permits a court to enlarge the time for filing a motion, as well as CR 15.03 and CR 15.04, which address amendments to pleadings. --------
On appeal, Wooden argues the trial court erred by finding he could not amend his RCr 11.42 motion to add a new ineffective assistance of counsel claim. He also argues his lack of legal training and limited access to legal materials while incarcerated provides excusable neglect for failing to raise his claim of duress earlier.
We review a trial court's denial of RCr 11.42 relief for an abuse of discretion. Teague v. Commonwealth, 428 S.W.3d 630, 633 (Ky. App. 2014). The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court's ruling was "arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles." Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).
RCr 11.42(10) provides a three-year limitations period for motions seeking to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence. The limitations period begins when the judgment becomes final unless the movant proves "the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the movant and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence[.]" RCr 11.42(10)(a). Wooden's latest RCr 11.42 motion was filed more than nine years after the trial court entered a judgment and sentence. Wooden's duress claim is based on facts which would have been known to him at the time he pleaded guilty. Thus, Wooden's latest attempt at RCr 11.42 relief is untimely and procedurally barred.
Wooden cites Roach v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 131 (Ky. 2012), in support of his argument that his duress claim should relate back to the date of his original RCr 11.42 motion. Wooden's reliance on Roach is misplaced. In Roach, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that under CR 15.03 amendments to RCr 11.42 motions relate back to the date of original filing "if the new, otherwise untimely claims are related to the original ones by shared facts such that the claims can genuinely be said to have arisen from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence." Id. at 137 (internal quotations omitted). The only similarity between Wooden's duress claim and the claims asserted in his previous RCr 11.42 motion is that they involve trial counsel's conduct leading to his guilty plea. The Kentucky Supreme Court explicitly held claims do not arise from the same transaction or occurrence under such facts. Id. at 138. Regardless, Wooden cannot amend his previous RCr 11.42 motion because the trial court has already ruled on that motion and been affirmed on appeal.
Even if Wooden's motion was timely, final disposition of the RCr 11.42 motion "shall conclude all issues that reasonably could have been presented in that proceeding." Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 857 (Ky. 1983). Wooden could have, and should have, raised his claim that trial counsel forced him to plead guilty under duress in his first RCr 11.42 motion. By failing to do so, his latest attempt at post-conviction relief is procedurally barred and was appropriately denied by the trial court.
Finally, we reject Wooden's argument that his lack of legal training and limited access to legal materials while incarcerated provides grounds to excuse his untimely and successive attempt at post-conviction relief. RCr 11.42 provides a generous three-year limitation period and does not provide exceptions for excusable neglect. Although Wooden argues these rules are unfair, many inmates in the same predicament have obtained relief under RCr 11.42. "In addition, everyone is presumed to know the law; therefore, ignorance of the law is not an excuse." Department of Revenue, Finance v. Revelation Energy, LLC, 544 S.W.3d 170, 176 (Ky. App. 2018). Under the facts of this case, Wooden has failed to show any reasons to consider the merits of his untimely and successive attempt at post-conviction relief.
Based on the foregoing, the order of the Hardin Circuit Court is affirmed.
MAZE, JUDGE, CONCURS.
KRAMER, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY. BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Gerald R. Wooden, pro se
LaGrange, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Andy Beshear
Attorney General of Kentucky Joseph A. Beckett
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky