Opinion
No. CV 01 0183057 S
December 30, 2002
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Progressive Insurance Company argues, in its motion for summary judgment as to count five of the complaint, that the plaintiff, Wilda Wongsarochana, has no viable claim of recovery for uninsured motorist benefits under her brother's resident relative policy provided by Progressive. The court denies the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
The plaintiff notes that it is unclear whether New York or Connecticut law determines which policy has priority. The plaintiff merely mentions this issue in a footnote and offers no further authority as to why New York law might apply to the present action. It has long been the jurisprudence of Connecticut courts that issues that are inadequately briefed need not be addressed by the Court. "We are not required to review claims that are inadequately briefed. . . . We consistently have held that [a]nalysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly. . . . Where the parties cite no law and provide no analysis of their claims, we do not review such claims." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hill v. Bartels, 73 Conn. App. 588, 590, 808 A.2d 1176 (2002). Accordingly, this court will not address the issue of whether New York law might apply as it has been inadequately briefed.
The following facts are undisputed. On April 4, 1999, the plaintiff, Wilda Wongasarochana, a New York resident, was a passenger in a motor vehicle owned by one defendant, Peter Braid, traveling east on I-95. Braid and Wongsarochana then collided into another defendant's, Peter Kitmiridis, motor vehicle. Kitmiridis had stopped his vehicle and was blocking the two lefthand lanes (apparently due to the driving of an unidentified motorist). As a result of the collision, the plaintiff suffered serious injuries. The plaintiff brought the current action against Kitmiridis, Braid, Allstate Insurance and Progressive. The plaintiff claims that she is entitled to recover uninsured motorist benefits under Braid's policy, uninsured benefits as a named insured under her own New York state policy with Allstate, and uninsured benefits under her brother's New York resident relative policy with Progressive.
General Statutes § 38a-336 (d) provides in relevant part: "If a person insured for uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage is an occupant of a nonowned vehicle covered by a policy also providing uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage, the coverage of the occupied vehicle shall be primary and any coverage for which such person is a named insured shall be secondary. All other applicable policies shall be excess." The Connecticut Supreme Court has stated that this provision "establishes the priority of multiple uninsured motorist policies by providing that the policy of the host motor vehicle is primary, the policy under which the occupant is a named insured is secondary, and all other policies for which the occupant may be an CT Page 15334-hs insured, such as a resident relative, are excess." Sandor v. New Hampshire Insurance Co., 241 Conn. 792, 801, 699 A.2d 96 (1997).
Applying the above rule to the present facts, the priority of uninsured motorist benefits is as follows: Braid's Allstate policy is primary, the plaintiff's Allstate policy is secondary, and the Progressive policy is excess.
Although the plaintiff's Allstate policy and her brother's Progressive policy provide the same amount of uninsured motorist coverage, the priority of each policy is different. Moreover, neither the Progressive policy nor § 38a-336 (d) explicitly state whether the plaintiff would be able to recover under both policies. An issue of fact remains as to what extent each policy is liable to the plaintiff for uninsured motorist benefits.
The defendant argues that pursuant to Mancini v. SafeCo Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV 98 0144967 (July 12, 2001, Doherty, J.), because the plaintiff's primary policy provides the highest coverage available, as a matter of law, the plaintiff CT Page 15334-ht has no viable claim for recovery under the secondary policy. The situation here is factually distinguishable from Mancini because inMancini, the court had already determined that the plaintiff's primary uninsured coverage was one million dollars as a matter of law. Here, it is yet to be established to what extent the primary policy will cover the full extent of uninsured motorist liability (up to $100,000).
Accordingly, because a genuine issue of material fact remains unresolved, Progressive Insurance Company's motion for summary judgment is denied.
BY THE COURT
___________________ D'ANDREA, J.T.R.