Opinion
No. 05-04-00556-CV
Opinion Filed June 16, 2005.
On Appeal from the 366th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 366-2586-03.
Dismissed.
Before Justices O'NEILL, RICHTER, and FRANCIS.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Ranninna Wong sued Community Credit Union (CCU) and EMC Mortgage Corporation (EMC) in different Collin County district courts, challenging a foreclosure sale on her property in Frisco. The suits were consolidated.
CCU filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The order states that it is a "final judgment in the above captioned case" and contains a typical "Mother Hubbard" clause that "[a]ny other relief not herein granted is denied." There was no severence of appellant's claims against CCU from the claims against EMC.
The question before us is whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal. We conclude we do not and dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Unless a judgment disposes of all issues against all parties, it is interlocutory. Heister v. Western Shamrock Corp., 50 S.W.3d 643, 644 (Tex.App.-Waco 2001, no pet.). A "Mother Hubbard" clause does not make a judgment final for appellate purposes. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 203-04 (Tex. 2001). As the Texas Supreme Court has stated:
[W]hen there has not been a conventional trial on the merits, an order or judgment is not final for purposes of appeal unless it actually disposes of every pending claim and party or unless it finally disposes of all claims and all parties. . . . An order that disposes of claims . . . against one of multiple defendants does not adjudicate claims by or against other parties. An order does not dipose of all claims and all parties merely because it is entitled `final,' or because the word `final' appears elsewhere in the order. . . . Rather there must be some other clear indication that the trial court intended the order to completely dispose of the entire case.
Lehman, 39 S.W.3d at 205.
Here, we have no such clear indication to suggest the trial court intended to completely dispose of the case. To the contrary, the record shows that appellant sued two defendants. Only one defendant, CCU, moved for summary judgment. The order granting summary judgment specifically states that the court heard the motion of CCU. The order is entitled, "Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment" (emphasis added), indicating only one defendant's motion was being granted. Although the order also states that it shall constitute "a final judgment in the above captioned cause," we conclude that language does not clearly express the trial court's intention to dispose of appellant's claims against EMC. See Heister, 50 S.W.3d at 643 (concluding judgment under similar circumstances was not final as to all parties).
Because the judgment does not dispose of all claims against all parties, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.