Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-12589 No. 6677
08-15-2018
ELIZABETH M. WOLVERTON, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Appearances: Bradly A. Carlson, Attorney at Law, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Nicholas R. Torres, Assistant District Attorney, Kenai, and Jahna Lindemuth, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
NOTICE Memorandum decisions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding authority for any proposition of law. Trial Court No. 3KN-15-1642 CR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appeal from the District Court, Third Judicial District, Kenai, Martin Fallon, Magistrate Judge. Appearances: Bradly A. Carlson, Attorney at Law, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Nicholas R. Torres, Assistant District Attorney, Kenai, and Jahna Lindemuth, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee. Before: Mannheimer, Chief Judge, and Allard, Judge. Judge ALLARD.
Elizabeth M. Wolverton was convicted, following a jury trial, of driving under the influence and reckless driving. Wolverton raises two claims of error on appeal. She contends first that the trial court's ruling on her Batson challenge was erroneous. She also argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support her conviction for either offense. For the reasons explained here, we find no merit to these claims.
AS 28.35.030(a)(1) and AS 28.35.400, respectively. These two convictions merged at sentencing.
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986) (holding that a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on the basis of race violates a defendant's right to equal protection).
Wolverton's challenge to the trial court's Batson ruling
In Batson v. Kentucky, the United States Supreme Court held that a prosecutor's use of race to eliminate potential jurors violated a defendant's right to equal protection. The Court also established a three-step process for addressing a prosecutor's peremptory jury challenges that appear to be racially motivated. First, the defendant must demonstrate that "the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose." Once this showing has been made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to provide a race-neutral explanation for exercising a peremptory challenge against that potential juror. Third, the trial court must independently evaluate the credibility of the prosecutor's explanation and determine whether the prosecutor's explanation is pretextual. This third step of the Batson analysis is a critical part of the overall process.
Id. at 97-98.
Id. at 94; see also Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240-41 (2005) (holding that a defendant can rely on "all relevant circumstances" in making out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, including evidence outside "the four corners of the case").
Batson, 476 U.S. at 94.
Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477 (2008).
Id.
At Wolverton's trial, the prosecutor exercised one of his peremptory challenges against juror I.P., who was apparently the only Alaska Native on the jury panel. Wolverton objected under Batson, asserting that the peremptory challenge against the only Alaska Native on the jury gave rise to an inference of discrimination. In response to this objection, the prosecutor stated that he made the decision to strike I.P. as a juror because he had gotten "a couple of curious looks" from I.P. during the voir dire process. The prosecutor also stated that I.P had looked at him quizzically while other panel members had nodded in agreement with some of the statements he made during voir dire.
The trial court ruled that the prosecutor's explanation was a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge. The court noted, however, that it found the prosecutor's explanation "subjective" and "thin" because it was based on I.P.'s physical response, as opposed to anything I.P. had said. Wolverton's attorney did not ask for any additional clarification of the court's ruling and did not make any further arguments for why the prosecutor's explanation should not be considered race-neutral or why the prosecutor's explanation was not credible.
On appeal, Wolverton argues that the trial court failed to complete the third step of the Batson analysis. According to Wolverton, the trial court simply accepted the prosecutor's proffered race-neutral reason without directly ruling on the prosecutor's credibility in offering that explanation. She therefore contends that her case should be remanded to the trial court so that the Batson inquiry can be completed.
See Batson, 476 U.S. at 100 (concluding that the remedy for an incomplete ruling on a Batson claim is a remand so that the court can conduct a full hearing on all three steps).
Having carefully reviewed the record, we disagree with Wolverton's characterization of the trial court's ruling. Although the trial court could have expressed its credibility determination more distinctly, we conclude that the trial court's statements indicate that the court did evaluate the prosecutor's credibility and implicitly, if not explicitly, found that the proffered reason for the peremptory challenge was genuine and not pretextual.
See, e.g., Lampley v. Anchorage, 159 P.3d 515, 520 (Alaska App. 2007) (concluding that the trial court implicitly found prosecutor's race-neutral explanation for peremptory challenge was credible).
We also take this opportunity to remind trial judges of the need for a clear record on Batson challenges. As we have previously explained:
Indicating these findings on the record has several salutary effects. First, it fosters confidence in the administration of justice without racial animus. Second, it eases appellate review of a trial court's Batson ruling. Most importantly, it ensures that the trial court has indeed made the crucial credibility determination that is afforded such great respect on appeal.
Saleem v. State, 2013 WL 3895703, at *2 (Alaska App. July 24, 2013) (unpublished) (quoting United States v. Perez, 35 F.3d 632, 636 (1st Cir. 1994)).
Wolverton's insufficiency of the evidence argument
Wolverton also argues that there was insufficient evidence of her intoxication to support her convictions for DUI and the lesser-included offense of reckless driving. (These convictions merged into a single conviction at sentencing.)
When we review a claim of insufficient evidence, we must view the evidence, and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. Viewing the evidence in this light, we then determine whether the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable juror to find that each element of the crime was proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
See Spencer v. State, 164 P.3d 649, 653 (Alaska App. 2007).
Id.
Here, the evidence presented at trial showed the following: Wolverton had driven her car into a ditch, and she had abandoned the car with the motor running and the doors locked. A state trooper discovered the abandoned car in the ditch a short time after the accident. After determining that the car belonged to Wolverton, the trooper went to talk to Wolverton at her nearby residence. Wolverton claimed that the accident was caused by icy roads and bad brakes on her vehicle.
During this contact, one of the troopers smelled alcohol on Wolverton and saw that her eyes were bloodshot and watery. The trooper also noticed that Wolverton was slurring her words and swaying while she was speaking. Wolverton told the trooper that she had only consumed alcohol earlier that day, some nine or ten hours before.
After performing poorly on field sobriety tests, Wolverton was arrested for driving under the influence. A later DataMaster breath test taken at the trooper post indicated that Wolverton's breath alcohol level was .063%.
Wolverton's case went to trial, and Wolverton testified in her own defense. Wolverton testified that she was sober when the accident happened, and that her car spun out of her control because of the icy roads. She explained that when she got out of the car to see what had happened, she inadvertently locked herself out of the vehicle with the engine still running and the keys still in the ignition. She then left the vehicle and walked to her residence to get help from her boyfriend. Wolverton claimed that when she arrived home, she "slammed" a large glass of wine to calm her nerves. She testified that she did not tell the troopers about the glass of wine because she was "panicky." The jury apparently did not find Wolverton's testimony credible and convicted Wolverton of driving under the influence and the lesser-included offense of reckless driving.
On appeal, Wolverton relies heavily on her trial testimony for her claim that the evidence was insufficient. But when we review a claim of insufficiency on appeal, we do not re-weigh the evidence or second-guess the jury's credibility determinations. Viewing this evidence presented at Wolverton's trial in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that the evidence was legally sufficient to support Wolverton's conviction for driving under the influence and the lesser-included offense of reckless driving.
See Morrell v. State, 216 P.3d 574, 576 (Alaska App. 2009) (explaining that an appellate court does not independently weigh the evidence or the credibility of witnesses on appeal). --------
Conclusion
We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.