Opinion
Rehearing Denied Dec. 31, 1974.
Page 646
Tinsley, Frantz & Fleming, P.C., Albert T. Frantz, Lakewood, for petitioners.
John P. Moore, Atty. Gen., John E. Bush, Deputy Atty. Gen., Tennyson W. Grebenar, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for respondent.
VanCISE, Judge.
Petitioners (applicants) requested respondent Banking Board (the Board) to issue a charter for a new state bank to be known as 'Speer Valley State Bank,' proposed for construction within a radius of one-half mile from the intersection of West 28th Avenue and North Speer Boulevard in Denver, Colorado. A public hearing on the application was held by the Banking Board in compliance with C.R.S.1963, 14--9--10(5). North Denver Bank and Coronado National Bank (protestants), both located with a two-mile radius of the proposed bank location, appeared and participated. Numerous exhibits and witnesses were produced by both applicants and protestants. Thereafter, the Board issued its findings and order and denied the application. Applicants seek review, requesting this court to order the Board to issue the requested charter. We affirm the order of the Board.
The Board denied the application on the grounds that the applicants had not met the burden of proof under C.R.S.1963, 14--9--10(3), that the proposed bank would serve a public need and advantage in the area of the community which the bank would serve, or that the volume of business in that area is such that profitable operation of the bank could be reasonable projected. The order contained detailed findings to the effect that: (1) The population of the primary service area is not growing and is less affluent and older than Denver as a whole; (2) the businesses in the area are generally small and serviceoriented and much commercial property is vacant; (3) the market area is highly competitive, with 13 commercial banks located within five minutes driving time of the proposed bank; (4) most of the businessmen and residents in the area are satisfied with and are not interested in changing their present banking connections; (5) the heavy traffic at the proposed bank 'will create no special advantage for the bank,' and '(m)ore likely, it will diminish the attractiveness of the bank for customers using cards'; and (6) where 40 percent of the area residents are Mexican-Americans, and the percentage is increasing, the proximity of the Coronado National Bank, opened primarily to serve the Mexican-American community, will have a negative impact on profitability of the proposed bank. The Board also refused to accept as credible the applicants' deposit and profit and loss projections for the first three years of operations.
The findings and conclusions of the Board are reasonable and are substantiated by evidence supplied by both the applicants and the protestants. This being so, these findings and conclusions are binding on this court. See Academy Boulevard Bank v. Banking Board, 30 Colo.App. 331, 492 P.2d 76. Board, Goldy v. Henry,
Industrial Commission v. Bennett, Bransall v. Industrial Commission,The applicants contend that, in basing its conclusions partly on considerations of relative age, affluence, and race of persons in the area to be served by the proposed bank, on the size of businesses therein, on the presence of some competition, and on conjectural effects of Speer Bank in relation to other banks, 'the Board applied C.R.S.1963, 14--9--10, in a manner which gave it an unconstitutional operation, and in so doing unjustly and arbitrarily denied the application.' We do not agree.
This is not a matter involving impermissible classifications affecting public school financing, as in Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal.3d 584, 96 Cal.Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241, or eligibility to vote, as in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169, or a right to engage in an ordinary private business as in Houston v. Kirschwing, 117 Colo. 92, 184 P.2d 487, or Champlin Refining Co. v. Cruse, 115 Colo. 329, 173 P.2d 213, all cases cited by applicants. The fact that criteria have been established in the exercise of governmental power does not in and of itself result in a denial of equal protection. Wheeler v. Rudolph, 162 Colo. 410, 426 P.2d 762; Antlers Athletic Ass'n v. Hartung, 85 Colo. 125, 274 P. 831. Criteria which offend the equal protection clause are those which are arbitrary, unreasonable, or which bear no rational relation to a governmental purpose. Harding v. Industrial Commission, Colo., 515 P.2d 95; Champlin Refining Co. v. Cruse, Supra.
The present case concerns the business of banking, which bears such a relation to the economic security of the public as to be a proper subject of regulation by the state in the exercise of its police power. Dove Creek State Bank v. Lawrence Warehouse Co., 157 Colo. 263, 402 P.2d 369. The Banking Board is charged by law with acting 'in the interests of promoting and maintaining a sound banking system, the security of deposits and depositors and other customers, the preservation of the liquid position of state banks and in the interest of preventing injurious credit expansions and contractions.' C.R.S.1963, 14--2--16. Here, the Board complied with the requirements of equal protection by considering only factors bearing a rational relation to the questions it must answer in deciding whether to grant the charter application, I.e., whether the proposed bank 'will serve a public need and advantage,' and whether 'the volume of business . . . is such that profitable operation of the bank may be reasonably projected.' C.R.S.1963, 14--9--10(3).
Applicants also contend that the Board improperly made the traffic problem at the proposed location of Speer Bank a factor in its determination against them. On the contrary, convenience of banking is a proper factor to consider in determining whether a proposed bank would serve a public need and advantage. Goldy v. Henry, Supra. We note, however, that the Board placed little, if any, weight on the traffic problem factor in making its ultimate decision.
Inasmuch as we are affirming the order of the Board on the merits, it is not necessary to consider the Board's contention relative to joinder of parties for purposes of review.
Order affirmed.
PIERCE and RULAND, JJ., concur.