Summary
noting that former husband did "not allege a substantial change of circumstances, it was not addressed at the hearing, and the trial court d[id] not mention a substantial change in circumstances in its written order" and that there was "no affirmative allegation that [modification was] in the child's best interests" or any indication that the trial court considered the statutory best interests factors
Summary of this case from J.G.J. v. J.H.Opinion
Case No. 2D18-1645
03-18-2020
Lisa L. WOLF, Appellant, v. Todd O. WOLF, Appellee.
Dineen Pashoukos Wasylik and Jared M. Krukar of DPW Legal, Tampa, for Appellant. Felicia M. Williams of Fathers Rights Law, P.A., Tampa, for Appellee.
Dineen Pashoukos Wasylik and Jared M. Krukar of DPW Legal, Tampa, for Appellant.
Felicia M. Williams of Fathers Rights Law, P.A., Tampa, for Appellee.
SILBERMAN, Judge.
In this postdissolution proceeding, Lisa L. Wolf (the Former Wife) appeals the trial court's final order entitled "Order Granting Former Husband's Second Motion for Contempt for Failure to Comply with Final Judgment and Parenting Plan and Order on Expedited Motion for Modification of Parenting Plan and Cease and Desist." The Former Wife raises four issues on appeal. We affirm without discussion the claimed due process violation. We write to address the remaining three issues and affirm in part, reverse in part, dismiss in part, and remand for further proceedings. We affirm the finding of contempt regarding the Former Wife's refusal to participate in the ordered family therapy and reverse the other two findings of contempt based on a lack of competent, substantial evidence. We also reverse the order to the extent that it improperly awarded make-up time-sharing and improperly modified the parties' Parenting Plan and remand for further proceedings. However, we affirm the order as it relates to the stipulations the parties made at the hearing. We dismiss the appeal to the extent that the order awards entitlement to attorney's fees but no amount to Todd O. Wolf (the Former Husband) on the contempt motion, as that issue is not ripe for review.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The parties entered into a Mediated Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA) and a Parenting Plan that were incorporated into the 2011 Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage (the Final Judgment). The parties' son was born on June 3, 2009. The Parenting Plan provided for shared parental responsibility with a graduated time-sharing arrangement for the Former Husband. At first the Former Husband was to have time-sharing twice a week, graduating to twice a week with one overnight, and beginning January 1, 2013, to twice a week with two overnights per week. The Parenting Plan further provided a schedule of holiday time-sharing.
The Former Husband contended that the Former Wife cut off all timesharing as of December 25, 2014, and that he had never had an overnight with his son. As a result, he filed a motion for contempt in August 2015. After unsuccessful mediation, he filed an amended motion for contempt in December 2015. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order in September 2016 on the amended motion for contempt (the 2016 Order) that specified that the parties and the child would use Dr. Kinsler for family therapy and that the parties would exchange the child around Dr. Kinsler's therapy schedule. The 2016 Order provided the Former Husband with two daytime time-sharing opportunities set around the therapy schedule and two overnights per week. The 2016 Order did not find the Former Wife to be in contempt of court.
On November 8, 2017, the Former Husband filed his second motion for contempt that is at issue here (the Contempt Motion), which alleged a failure to comply with the Final Judgment and Parenting Plan. On December 8, 2017, the Former Husband filed "Former Husband's Expedited Motion for Modification of Parenting Plan and Cease and Desist" (the Modification Motion). Both motions were heard on December 21, 2017.
At the time of the hearing, the child was eight years old. It appears that the child did not have a formal diagnosis of autism, but there were signs that he was on the spectrum and needed further evaluation. At the hearing, the parties' attorneys made significant factual assertions to the trial court on a variety of topics.
In her motion for rehearing, the Former Wife asserted that the child had since been diagnosed with autism and that she had a medical report with detailed recommendations.
Later in the hearing, testimony was taken from the Former Husband and the Former Wife. The trial court then made oral findings as to contempt and stated: "It is the order of this Court that the mother be found in willful contempt, and as such, the Court will award custody of the child to the father immediately. The child shall reside with the father during the Christmas holidays beginning today and through the duration of the Christmas holidays until the weekend of Friday the 12th of January." From then on, the Former Wife was to have the child every other weekend.
In the written order entered on February 23, 2018 (the Order), the trial court found the Former Wife in willful contempt of the Final Judgment and the 2016 Order. The court found that the Former Husband was "entitled to 670.66 days of makeup time-sharing" and that it would be exercised as follows: "The minor child shall reside with the Former Husband from December 21, 2017 until the weekend of Friday, January 12, 2018. The Former Wife will pick the child up from school and return him to the Former Husband no later than Sunday, January 14, 2018 at 5:00 p.m." The trial court ordered that thereafter "[t]he Former Wife shall exercise time-sharing on alternate weekends from Friday after school until Sunday at 5:00 p.m. All other time-sharing shall be afforded to the Former Husband." The Former Wife now appeals the Order.
ANALYSIS
1. Modification of Parenting Plan and Time-sharing Schedule
The Former Wife contends that the trial court ordered a change of custody but failed to follow the statutory requirements for a custody change and failed to make the required findings. In the Order, the trial court found the Former Wife in contempt and sanctioned her by modifying the Parenting Plan and time-sharing schedule. The trial court provided the Former Husband with make-up time-sharing that gave him exclusive time-sharing from December 21, 2017, until January 12, 2018, and then all time-sharing other than alternate weekends. It did not provide for a return to the previous time-sharing schedule once the make-up time-sharing was completed. It is unclear what the trial court intended, but the Former Wife argues that in effect the trial court permanently modified the Parenting Plan. Because the Order contains no end date for the Former Husband to have all time-sharing other than alternate weekends, it appears to effect a permanent change.
Although many of the cases cited refer to custody, the current statutory scheme uses the concept of time-sharing with a parenting plan. See § 61.13(3), Fla. Stat. (2017).
Section 61.13(4)(c)(1), Florida Statutes (2017), provides for the grant of make-up time-sharing as follows:
(c) When a parent refuses to honor the time-sharing schedule in the parenting plan without proper cause, the court:
1. Shall, after calculating the amount of time-sharing improperly denied, award the parent denied time a sufficient amount of extra time-sharing to compensate for the timesharing missed, and such time-sharing shall be ordered as expeditiously as possible in a manner consistent with the best interests of the child and scheduled in a manner that is convenient for the parent deprived of time-sharing. In ordering any makeup time-sharing, the court shall schedule such time-sharing in a manner that is consistent with the best interests of the child or children and that is convenient for the nonoffending parent and at the expense of the noncompliant parent.
A violation of section 61.13(4) "may be punished by contempt of court or other remedies as the court deems appropriate." § 61.13(4)(d).
While contempt is an available remedy, it is inappropriate to sanction contempt with a transfer of custody. Hunter v. Hunter, 65 So. 3d 1213, 1214 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) ; Burckle v. Burckle, 915 So. 2d 747, 749 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). "In the absence of a finding that a change in custody is in the children's best interest, such a change may ‘penalize the children for the parent's contumacious conduct.’ " Hunter, 65 So. 3d at 1215 (quoting LaLoggia–VonHegel v. VonHegel, 732 So. 2d 1131, 1133 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) ). More recently, this court stated that modification of time-sharing is prohibited "as a sanction for a parent's contempt of a custody order." Duncan v. Brickman, 233 So. 3d 477, 480 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) ; see also Andre v. Abreu, 272 So. 3d 467, 467 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) ; Lewis v. Juliano, 242 So. 3d 1146, 1148 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018).
However, section 61.13(4)(c)(6) also provides that the court "[m]ay, upon the request of the parent who did not violate the time-sharing schedule, modify the parenting plan if modification is in the best interests of the child." The courts have determined as follows:
Modification of timesharing in the context of a contempt proceeding is permissible only if: (1) the moving party has affirmatively alleged and proven a substantial change in circumstances; (2) the minor child's best interests require the modification; and (3) sufficient notice of the proposed modification was afforded to the nonmoving party.
Lewis, 242 So. 3d at 1148 (citing Duncan, 233 So. 3d at 480 n.4 ).
In Cecena v. Chambers, 938 So. 2d 646, 648 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006), this court considered the predecessor to section 61.13(4)(c)(6), section 61.13(4)(c)(5), Florida Statutes (2003), which "provide[d] authority for a court to modify custody if the custodial parent refuses to honor the noncustodial parent's visitation rights without proper cause and the modification is in the best interests of the child." This court determined that the substantial change of circumstances test set forth in Wade v. Hirschman, 903 So. 2d 928, 932 (Fla. 2005), applied to custody modifications made pursuant to section 61.13(4)(c)(5). Cecena, 938 So. 2d at 648. This court concluded as follows:
While section 61.13(4)(c)(5) does provide for the modification of custody as a sanction for a custodial parent's refusal to honor the non-custodial parent's visitation rights, it should be done only upon the filing of a petition for modification with proper notice and only as a last resort. Furthermore, the decision to modify custody under section 61.13(4)(c)(5) must also be in the child's best interests."
Id. at 649.
We further note, as the Former Wife points out in her brief, that the parties' Parenting Plan provides that "[a]ny substantial changes to this Parenting Plan must be sought through the filing of a supplemental petition for modification and/or by agreement of the Parties which is ratified by the Court."
The Former Husband's counsel acknowledged at the hearing that no supplemental petition had been filed. Counsel stated, "We have one pending, but the parties have a mediation requirement that I've just learned that they did satisfy ...." In addition, the Modification Motion does not allege a substantial change of circumstances, it was not addressed at the hearing, and the trial court does not mention a substantial change in circumstances in its written order.
Further, the Modification Motion requests that the child be removed from the Former Wife's residence and placed with the Former Husband and that the Former Husband receive a majority of time-sharing, but there is no affirmative allegation that this is in the child's best interests. And it does not appear that the trial court considered at the hearing the statutory best interest factors provided in section 61.13(3)(a)-(t), Florida Statutes (2017), as the Former Husband presented very little evidence. In addition, when the trial court considers make-up time-sharing "under section 61.13(4)(c), it is not enough that imposing makeup time-sharing is in the best interests of the child; the manner in which the time-sharing is imposed must also be in the child's best interests." Cheek v. Hesik, 73 So. 3d 340, 344 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).
The Former Husband argues that section 61.13(4)(c) does not require the trial court to explicitly make findings on the best interests of the child in its written order. See Nunes v. Nunes, 112 So. 3d 696, 701 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). But the Nunes court recognized that "the statute directs the trial court to consider the best interests of the child in ordering makeup time-sharing." Id. Here, after giving its oral ruling, the trial court asked the Former Wife if she needed any clarification. In the ensuing discussion, the trial judge said, "I am doing this in the best interests of this child." What little evidence the Former Husband provided by his testimony does not support that the modification of the Parenting Plan and the way the make-up visitation was structured was in the child's best interest. See Bainbridge v. Pratt, 68 So. 3d 310, 312 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (reversing a "parenting plan because, regardless of the bare assertion made by the trial court that this type of plan is in the ‘best interest of the minor child,’ there is no evidence supporting this assertion").
In addition, section 61.13(4)(c)(1) requires the court to "calculat[e] the amount of time-sharing improperly denied." The trial court ordered that the Former Husband was "entitled to 670.66 days of make-up time-sharing." The only evidence on this subject was when the Former Husband was asked, "Are you requesting that the Court award you 670 days of make-up timesharing?" The Former Husband replied, "Yes, I do." There was no cross-examination on this subject. Thus, the evidence was that the Former Husband was requesting 670 days, but he never testified that this was the number of days he missed or how he arrived at that number. On appeal, the Former Husband contends that the trial court properly relied upon charts and summaries that he provided to the court to support this figure, but we have found no charts or summaries on the subject in our record, and no evidence was admitted at the hearing.
Therefore, we reverse the Order to the extent that it awarded make-up time-sharing and modified the Parenting Plan, arguably making a permanent change, without the necessary evidence and considerations of a substantial change of circumstances and the best interests of the child.
However, to the extent that the parties stipulated to particular items at the hearing, we affirm those portions of the Order. They agreed that the child should be evaluated by Dr. Shulkin (apparently for autism ) and that he would continue to treat the child. The parties also stipulated that the Former Husband would choose between three therapists, Peggy Gummoe, Melissa Amaya, and Valerie Macleod. They stipulated that the child would be vaccinated and that they would choose a new primary care physician from a list of three. Further, they stipulated that the child would not be given medical marijuana and that the Former Wife would pay for a hair follicle test.
2. Finding of Contempt
The Former Wife contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's three factual findings regarding contempt. The trial court found that the Former Wife: (A) "willfully denied the Former Husband time-sharing with the minor child"; (B) "willfully interfered with the Former Husband's ability to see the minor child because she provided the minor child's school with an emergency contact card with a ‘do not release’ notice on it, stating that there were custody issues"; and (C) "refused to participate in therapy with either of the therapists." The Order states that "[t]he Former Wife had the ability to comply with the terms of the Final Judgment, the Parenting Plan, and the [2016 Order]." The Order further states that "[t]he language of the Final Judgment, the Parenting Plan, and the [2016 Order] is clear and unambiguous" and that "[t]he Former Wife's violations of this Court's orders are willful." We affirm the finding of contempt only on the finding of the Former Wife's refusal to participate in therapy.
A contempt order that is not supported by competent, substantial evidence is an abuse of discretion. See Driggers v. Driggers, 127 So. 3d 762, 764 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013). In order to be held in contempt of a court's order, the order must be "clear and precise" and the person's conduct must be in clear violation of the order. Akre-Deschamps v. Smith, 267 So. 3d 492, 494-95 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) (quoting Reder v. Miller, 102 So. 3d 742, 743 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) ). "Before a trial court can hold a party in civil contempt, it must make a finding that the party has the present ability to comply with the order and willfully refuses to do so." Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Bills, 661 So. 2d 69, 70 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) ; see also Harris v. Hampton, 70 So. 3d 747, 749 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). And, of course, "[u]nsworn statements of counsel do not establish facts." Hitt v. Homes & Land Brokers, Inc., 993 So. 2d 1162, 1166 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).
The parties were both sworn at the beginning of the hearing, but it was primarily the attorneys who were presenting information to the court with the parties testifying occasionally. The trial court stated that it was finding the Former Wife in contempt, but "[n]ot for all things, though," and that the court did not "think it's just all her." When the Former Husband's counsel was addressing the parties' attempts at exchanging the child, the trial court said, "Why don't you elicit that from your client." The parties then presented some testimony.
A. Willful denial of time-sharing
The Former Husband alleged that the Former Wife had not permitted him any meaningful time-sharing with the child since December 2014. The focus at the hearing was on attempted exchanges of the child and disagreements over the meeting place for the exchanges. At the time the Parenting Plan was entered, the Former Wife lived in Land O' Lakes and the Former Husband lived in Clearwater. The plan provided that "[t]he parties shall meet at a mutually agreeable public location at a midpoint between the parties['] residences to exchange the minor child." The parties now live down the street from each other. The 2016 Order also provided for exchange of the child at the therapy sessions with Dr. Kinsler. The Former Husband's counsel referred to a report by Dr. Kinsler that was never introduced into evidence.
The Former Husband testified that he had not had time-sharing since Christmas of 2014 and that he had never had an overnight with his son. The last time he attempted to have time-sharing was Thanksgiving Day of 2017.
The Former Husband testified that he would walk halfway down the street for an exchange on the sidewalk. The Former Wife would inform the Former Husband that she was going to Wendy's or McDonald's for the exchanges. On Thanksgiving Day, the Former Wife said she would meet at McDonald's, and the Former Husband said no because he was following the court order because it had to be "between the houses." She never showed up at the halfway point. He did not go to McDonald's.
The Former Wife testified that she contacted the Former Husband and said she was willing to meet at McDonald's. She was more than willing to meet at a safe place because the child gets upset and "runs into the street," so she did not want to meet on the sidewalk. The child was almost hit by a car twice when he ran off, once in the street, and once when they met at a park. She gave the Former Husband options, but his response was that he would only meet in the street.
The Former Wife testified that the child "has a very hard time with transitioning" and that he would have tantrums, throw himself to the ground, and bang his head. This would happen when his routine was thrown off. For instance, when the Former Wife took a different route to school, the child started banging his head against the seat, requiring her to stop the car and calm him down. He would also have tantrums at other places when the Former Wife was not there, such as at therapy at the hospital.
The Former Husband testified that when the Former Wife drives up with the child, she "makes no attempt to try to get my son out of the car for timesharing." She would ask him if he wanted to go and ask him to try, and when the child said no, she would say, "Okay, we're leaving."
The Former Husband acknowledged that when the visits first stopped in early 2015 the child would say, "I hate you." The Former Husband did not understand why his son "just absolutely hated" him. On another occasion, the Former Wife told the Former Husband that the child refused to leave the house, and she provided the Former Husband a cell phone video showing the child yelling "no" when asked if he wanted to go see his dad.
With respect to an incident at Dr. Kinsler's office in June of 2017, the Former Husband went into Dr. Kinsler's waiting room. The Former Wife later came into the waiting room and told Dr. Kinsler that the child would not get out of the car. Dr. Kinsler went outside, got in the car, and spoke to the child. The child did not get out of the car after Dr. Kinsler talked to him. Dr. Kinsler stated that the Former Husband would have to call the police if he wanted time-sharing that day because she was "not gonna force him out of the car."
In Pearson v. Pearson, 932 So. 2d 601, 603 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006), a visitation was cancelled because the child refused to get out of the car. This court reversed the adjudication of contempt against the mother and explained:
There was no testimony presented at the contempt hearing that supports attributing the child's behavior on July 9 to any action of the Mother. And, the trial court's order contains no factual findings regarding any action or inaction on the part of the Mother that would support the trial court's conclusions that the Mother is responsible for the child's behavior.
Id. at 604.
Here, when the Former Husband testified about the incident, he acknowledged that the child refused to get out of the Former Wife's car and that the therapist could not convince the child to get out of the car. He testified to other instances where the Former Wife appeared with the child for time-sharing, but the child refused to get out of the car. No evidence was provided to establish that the Former Wife was in clear violation of any order based on the child's behavior. Thus, to the extent that the trial court may have relied on the child's refusal to go with his father for time-sharing to find the Former Wife in contempt, the evidence was insufficient on that basis.
With respect to the Former Wife's refusal to meet the Former Husband on the sidewalk at the physical midpoint between their homes, the Former Husband testified that he was following the provisions of the Parenting Plan. But when the parties entered into the Parenting Plan, the Former Husband lived in Clearwater and the Former Wife lived in Land O'Lakes. Thus, the plan called for "a mutually agreeable public location at a midpoint between the parties['] residences" for exchange of the child. But the parties now live down the street from each other.
The fact that the plan calls for a "mutually agreeable" midpoint indicates that there was no one particular spot required for the exchange. The Former Husband's testimony indicates that the Former Wife sought to come up with a mutually agreeable public location at a nearby McDonald's. The Former Wife did not want to meet on the sidewalk because she was concerned with the child's safety as he had run out in the street before. The Former Husband refused and continued to wait on the sidewalk.
We cannot say that the Former Wife's failure to appear at the exact geographical midpoint when she suggested other nearby public locations was a clear, willful violation of the Parenting Plan. Thus, we conclude that the Former Husband failed to present competent, substantial evidence that the Former Wife was in willful contempt on this basis.
B. School contact card
The Parenting Plan provides that "[e]ach Party shall exert every effort to maintain free access and unhampered contact between the minor child and the other parent." The Former Husband's counsel argued at the hearing that the Former Husband was unable to pick the child up from school because of a notation on the school contact card. The attorneys discussed the card, and it was stated that the notation says "[c]all before releasing," but the card was not authenticated or introduced into evidence. The Former Wife testified that she "did not write that" and that she "put him on there."
The Former Wife's counsel contended that the school put the notation on the card because it knew of the parties' situation. When questioned by the court, the Former Wife agreed that there was no reason why the Former Husband could not pick the child up from school. The trial court directed the Former Wife to go to the school that afternoon and update the contact card.
The Former Husband did not testify that he had tried and was unable to pick up the child. In fact, he did not testify at all about the contact card.
Based on the lack of evidence of a clear violation of the Parenting Plan, the trial court erred in finding the Former Wife in contempt for willfully interfering with the Former Husband's ability to see the minor child.
C. Refusal to participate in therapy
The 2016 Order provides that the parties shall use
Dr. Kim Kinsler for the sole purpose of family therapy among the Parties and the minor child. If Dr. Kinsler will not accept the Parties and child for the sole purpose of family therapy or her services are not covered under the Former Husband's health insurance, the Former Husband shall provide the names of two therapists who are covered under his insurance who are willing to provide family therapy for the Parties and minor child.
The 2016 Order further provides that the Former Husband "shall contact" the family therapist selected "to schedule therapy sessions around his schedule."
The trial court found and it was undisputed that Dr. Kinsler terminated her services to the family. At the hearing, counsel referred to a July 2017 report by Dr. Kinsler, but it was not admitted into evidence. No evidence supports the Former Husband's contention on appeal that Dr. Kinsler terminated her services due to the Former Wife's "antics."
The Former Husband testified that in the beginning Dr. Kinsler sometimes did not use the proper diagnosis codes for insurance; thus, they agreed to go to Dr. Cusak. On the first appointment they were to have with Dr. Cusak, the Former Wife called and told the doctor that she would not be there and that she was going on vacation. This was scheduled in December 2016 when the Former Husband was to have his "court ordered winter break vacation." The Former Husband testified that he never got that "court ordered winter break vacation." Neither the Former Wife nor the child attended the appointment. The Former Wife later refused to schedule with Dr. Cusak because he allegedly told her in a private meeting that if her son acted up he would Baker Act him.
The Former Husband then contacted Wayne Davidson to act as their therapist. The Former Wife wanted a private session with Davidson first, but he refused her request to bill the Former Husband's insurance. She objected to Davidson's $100 fee because she had no insurance. The Former Husband testified that Davidson lowered it to $50, and she said she could not afford that. Davidson told the Former Husband that she refused to come in. The Former Husband went to his appointment with Davidson. When asked how much the Former Husband would have to pay after he had the initial conversation with Davidson, the Former Husband said, "After [the Former Wife's] initial conversation, I was allowed to get five free sessions for myself, five free sessions for my son through my insurance company, and after that it would be $25 a session." The Former Wife did not attend or follow up with any appointments with Davidson. Since the September 2016 Order, the Former Husband had gone to Dr. Cusak, Mr. Davidson, and Dr. Kinsler. The Former Husband believed that the Former Wife "absolutely" obstructed the therapy appointments. The Former Wife did not provide any conflicting testimony on this issue.
We conclude that the Former Husband presented competent, substantial evidence that the Former Wife willingly refused to participate in therapy and affirm the finding of contempt on this basis.
3. Attorney's Fees
The Former Husband requested attorney's fees in connection with the Contempt Motion. The trial court found that the Former Husband was entitled to an award of attorney's fees but reserved jurisdiction on amount. An order that determines entitlement to attorney's fees without a determination of the amount is a nonappealable, nonfinal order. See Lockett v. Lockett, 235 So. 3d 1003, 1006 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (citing McIlveen v. McIlveen, 644 So. 2d 612, 612 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) ). Thus, we do not have jurisdiction over the portion of the order that determines entitlement to attorney's fees, and we dismiss the appeal as to that issue. See Brunt v. Brunt, 272 So. 3d 829, 829-830 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019).
CONCLUSION
We affirm the Order regarding the finding of contempt for the Former Wife's refusal to participate in the ordered family therapy and reverse the other two findings of contempt based on a lack of competent, substantial evidence. We also reverse the Order to the extent that it improperly awarded make-up time-sharing and improperly modified the parties' Parenting Plan. As to those portions of the Order modifying the Parenting Plan based on the stipulations made at the hearing described in issue one, we affirm. We dismiss the appeal to the extent that the Order awards entitlement to attorney's fees but no amount to the Former Husband on the Contempt Motion as that issue is not ripe for review.
We recognize that it is unclear what the circumstances will be on remand. The Former Husband's counsel asserted at the hearing that a supplemental petition for modification was pending but had not yet been filed. In her motion for rehearing, the Former Wife asserted that the child has since been evaluated at Johns Hopkins All Children's Hospital, that he has been diagnosed with autism, and that there is a report with detailed recommendations. We remand for further proceedings upon proper pleadings and notice as to any modification of the Parenting Plan. Of course, the trial court will have to consider the circumstances before it at that time.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, dismissed in part, and remanded.
BADALAMENTI and SMITH, JJ., Concur.