Wolf v. Servco Oil, Inc.

Full title: PAUL D. WOLF V. SERVCO OIL, INC

Court: Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of Danbury

Date published: Sep 8, 1998

1998 Ct. Sup. 10373 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998)

23 CLR 139

Opinion

No. 32 76 51

September 8, 1998

MEMORANDVM OF DECISION

MORAGHAN, J. 10374

The first count of the amended complaint alleges that the plaintiff, Paul D. Wolf, was employed by the defendant from October 3, 1993 to November 1, 1996. During the course of his employment, he observed a number of employment practices that violated state or federal laws. He complained to his supervisor, Peter Lebrun, about said violations and threatened to inform the appropriate authorities. As a direct result of these communications, the plaintiff's employment was terminated.

The defendant now moves to strike the first count of the amended complaint on the ground that the plaintiff's discharge did not contravene an important public policy. In Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods. Inc., 179 Conn. 471 (1980), our Supreme Court "sanctioned a common law cause of action for wrongful discharge in situations in which the reason for the discharge involved impropriety . . . derived from some important violation of public policy." internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corporation., 240 Conn. 576, 580-81 (1997).

In the present case, Wolf has alleged, inter alia, that he was terminated for refusing to install oil tanks in violation of state licensure laws. This allegation alone establishes that his discharge violated an important public policy. See Lagrow v. Protective Alarms. Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. 336703 9 CONN. L. RPTR. 209 (June 3, 1993, Hadden, J.). A primary purpose of state licensure requirements is to protect the public health and safety. See Hartford Hospital v. Dept. of Consumer Protection, 243 Conn. 709, 719-20, (1998). An employee should not have to choose between risking state sanction or jeopardizing his continued employment. See Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., supra, 480; Lagrow v. Protective Alarms, Inc., supra. The court is satisfied that Wolf has sufficiently alleged that his termination contravened an important public policy.

The defendant also argues that count one should be stricken because the plaintiff has adequate statutory remedies. See Atkins v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co., 5 Conn. App. 643, 648 (1985).¹ According to the defendant, the following statutes provide the plaintiff with adequate statutory remedies: §§ 31-51m and 31-51q of the General Statutes state and federal anti-discrimination statutes, OSHA, Connecticut's workers' compensation anti-retaliation statute, and federal and state wage and hour laws. The only statutes enumerated by the defendant that are even remotely applicable to the allegations concerning violations of state licensure laws are §§ 31-51m and 31-51q.² § 31-51m, however, does not provide an adequate remedy because the plaintiff did not allege that he reported the violations to a public body. See Kirchner v. Bicron Electronics Company, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. 067312 (May 4, 1995, Fineberg, J.) (14 CONN. L. RPTR. 236). In Addition, § 31-51q does not apply here because the allegations of count one indicate that the plaintiff's complaints interfered with the working relationship between himself and the defendant.³ See Cotto v. United Technologies Corp. , 48 Conn. App. 618, 625-26 n. 10, cert. granted, 244 Conn. 915, (1998). Accordingly, the court concludes that the plaintiff does not have an adequate statutory remedy.

1 In Atkins the court stated that "[a] finding that certain conduct contravenes public policy is not enough by itself to warrant the creation of a contract remedy for wrongful dismissal by an employer. The cases which have established a tort or contract remedy for employees discharged for reasons violative of public policy have relied upon the fact that in the context of their case the employee was otherwise without remedy and that permitting the discharge to go unredressed would leave a valuable social policy to go unvindicated." Atkins v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co., supra, 648.

2 Section 31-51m(b) provides in pertinent part: "No employer shall discharge, discipline or otherwise penalize any employee because the employee, or a person acting on behalf of the employee, reports, verbally or in writing, a violation or a suspected violation of any state . . . law . . . to a public body.
Section 31-51q provides in pertinent part: "Any employer . . . who subjects any employee to discipline or discharge on account of the exercise by such employee of rights guaranteed by the first amendment to the United States Constitution or section 3, 4 or 14 of article first of the Constitution of the state, provided such activity does not substantially or materially interfere with the employee's bona fide job performance or the working relationship between the employee and the employer, shall be liable to such employee for damages caused by such discipline or discharge, including punitive damages, and for reasonable attorney's fees as part of the costs of any such action for damages."

3 Count one alleges that, when the plaintiff informed Lebrun about the alleged violations, Lebrun became angry and prepared written documents which indicated that the plaintiff was a problem employee.

In light of the foregoing, the defendant's motion to strike count one of the plaintiff's amended complaint is denied.

Moraghan, J.