Opinion
11-30-2016
Debra WOLF, et al., appellants, v. Robert CRUICKSHANK, respondent.
Goldblatt & Associates, P.C., Mohegan Lake, NY (Kenneth B. Goldblatt of counsel), for appellants. Burke, Conway, Loccisano & Dillon, White Plains, NY (Jayne L. Brayer and Michelle Piantadosi of counsel), for respondent.
Goldblatt & Associates, P.C., Mohegan Lake, NY (Kenneth B. Goldblatt of counsel), for appellants.
Burke, Conway, Loccisano & Dillon, White Plains, NY (Jayne L. Brayer and Michelle Piantadosi of counsel), for respondent.
JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, J.P., ROBERT J. MILLER, HECTOR D. LaSALLE, and VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Giacomo, J.), dated September 16, 2015, which granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
A vehicle operated by the plaintiff Debra Wolf (hereinafter the injured plaintiff) collided with a vehicle operated by the defendant at the intersection of Hill Boulevard and a service road leading from the Jefferson Valley Mall, in the Town of Yorktown. It is undisputed that at the time of the accident the defendant was traveling straight on Hill Boulevard, which was not governed by any traffic control device at its intersection with the service road. The injured plaintiff was turning left from the service road onto Hill Boulevard when the accident occurred. The service road was governed by a stop sign at its intersection with Hill Boulevard.
The injured plaintiff, and her husband suing derivatively, commenced this action against the defendant. The defendant subsequently moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The Supreme Court granted the motion, and the plaintiffs appeal.
Pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1142(a), a driver entering an intersection controlled by a stop sign must yield the right-of-way to any other vehicle that is already in the intersection or that is approaching so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard (see McPherson v. Chanzeb, 123 A.D.3d 1098, 1099, 999 N.Y.S.2d 521 ; Yelder v. Walters, 64 A.D.3d 762, 763–764, 883 N.Y.S.2d 290 ). Moreover, a driver who has the right-of-way is entitled to anticipate that other drivers will obey traffic laws that require them to yield (see Kann v. Maggies Paratransit Corp., 63 A.D.3d 792, 793, 882 N.Y.S.2d 129 ; Moreno v. Gomez, 58 A.D.3d 611, 612, 872 N.Y.S.2d 143 ).
Here, the defendant demonstrated, prima facie, his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by establishing that the injured plaintiff negligently drove her vehicle into the intersection without yielding the right-of-way and that this was the sole proximate cause of the accident (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1142[a] ; Lara v. Faulisi, 142 A.D.3d 1052, 39 N.Y.S.3d 172 ; Hatton v. Lara, 142 A.D.3d 1047, 37 N.Y.S.3d 604 ; Foley v. Santucci, 135 A.D.3d 813, 813–814, 23 N.Y.S.3d 338 ; McPherson v. Chanzeb, 123 A.D.3d at 1099, 999 N.Y.S.2d 521 ). In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Contrary to the plaintiffs' contention, the affidavit of their expert was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact, as it was conclusory, speculative, and unsupported by the record (see Harris v. Linares, 106 A.D.3d 873, 874, 964 N.Y.S.2d 657 ; Exime v. Williams, 45 A.D.3d 633, 634, 845 N.Y.S.2d 450 ; see generally Abrams v. Bute, 138 A.D.3d 179, 195–196, 27 N.Y.S.3d 58 ). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.