Opinion
CV196082155S
10-25-2019
Shayna D. Wolf v. Board of Zoning Appeals, Town of Stratford
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh):Radcliffe, Dale W., J.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
RADCLIFFE, JTR
FACTS
The Plaintiff, Shayna D. Wolf, is the owner of property known as 350 Wippoorwill Lane, Stratford. The property is located in a Residential (RS-1) Zone, and consists of approximately 2.2521 acres, as shown on Tax Assessor Map 3388 (ROR 19).
Shayna Wolf acquired title to 350 Wippoorwill Lane via a warranty deed, dated February 26, 2016 (ROR 16; Ex. 1), which is recorded at Volume 3951, Pages 3-4, of the Stratford Land Records. The consideration for the conveyance, as recited in the deed, (ROR 16) is twenty thousand ($20,000) dollars.
350 Wippoorwill Lane is an irregularly shaped parcel, which has no frontage on a public street. Access to the parcel is provided by a twenty (20) foot right of way, which is also utilized to access other properties which are otherwise landlocked (ROR 14).
In August of 2018, the plaintiff applied to the Stratford Board of Zoning Appeals (ROR 7), requesting seven (7) variances, in order to construct a single-family residence at 350 Wippoorwill Lane. In the application, she claimed, as a legal hardship, "pre-existing nonconforming irregular shaped property formerly part of an old farm sporadically developed over the years to one family homes, preexisted rear lot Regulation." (ROR 7).
The property owner sought six (6) variances of Section 3.3.1 of the Stratford Zoning Regulations, the provision applicable to rear lots.
Section 3.3.1(3) of the Regulations requires that a building lot in an RS-1 Zone, must have 60, 000 square feet. 350 Wippoorwill Lane contains 48, 970 square feet.
Section 3.3.1(4), the section requiring a "lot square," requires:
A rectangle meeting the minimum width and lot depth of the applicable zoning district must fit within the rear lot.
The "lot square" requirement cannot be satisfied, thus requiring a variance.
Section 3.3.1(5) mandates:
The minimum front, side and rear yard setback requirements shall be one and one half times the requirement of the applicable zoning district.
Section 4.2 of the Stratford Zoning Regulations, requires a minimum forty (40) foot front yard setback, and a minimum of thirty-five (35) feet for a side or rear yard setback in an RS-1 Zone. Because 350 Wippoorwill Lane is proposed as a rear lot, a seventy (70) foot front yard setback, and seventy (70) feet side and rear lot setbacks are required.
The access to 350 Wippoorwill Lane was the subject of three (3) of the requested variances.
Section 3.3.1(6) reads:
Each rear lot shall have access to a street by means of an unobstructed access way held in the same fee ownership as the rear lot. The area of the access way shall be included in the minimum required lot area.
The access way to 350 Wippoorwill Lane is shared by other property owners.
Section 3.3.1(7) of the Regulations requires that an access way which is over three thousand (3, 000) feet in length must be thirty (30) feet wide, and Section 3.3.1(8) requires that there be no more than two (2) adjoining access ways.
A seventh variance is necessary, in that Section 3.3 of the Regulations requires a minimum of fifty (50) feet of road frontage. 350 Wippoorwill Lane has no frontage on a public street.
Prior to the filing of the variance application with the Board of Zoning Appeals, 350 Wippoorwill Lane was the subject of a cease and desist order, and proceedings before the Stratford Inland Wetlands and Watercourses Commission. The cease and desist order involved the clearing of trees within the upland review or buffer area applicable to Pumpkin Ground Brook.
The upland review area is two hundred fifty (250) feet, and encompasses the bulk of 350 Wippoorwill Lane (ROR 26, p. 28-29; p. 1-2).
Although the ordered restoration of the area has not been completed, as ordered by the Stratford Inland Wetlands and Watercourses Commission, the wetland itself was not impacted by the clear cutting, and the only activity took place in the extensive upland review area. A wetlands permit has been approved, permitting the construction of a single-family dwelling as a regulated activity within the upland review area (ROR 26, p. 2-3).
During the September 4, 2018 public hearing (ROR 26), the applicant demonstrated that her property was once part of a ten (10) acre parcel, owned by one Anna Wilson (ROR 26, p. 3-5; ROR 13). The ten (10) to twelve (12) acre tract was the subject of conveyances by Anna Wilson, in 1968 and 1969 (ROR 21.6). The Board of Zoning Appeals heard a history of the property, which was once a working farm, from Michael Wilson, the grandson of Anna Wilson (ROR 26, p. 3-6).
Michael Wilson explained (ROR 26, p. 3-6) that his grandmother divided the property into three parcels. One was sold to his father, Ralph Wilson, and a second was conveyed to his uncle, Bernard Wilson, and his wife Gertrude (ROR 26, p. 3; ROR 21.6).
Following a series of conveyances, and the purchase, renovation and sale of the dwelling owned by Bernard and Gertrude Wilson (ROR 21.6), Michael Wilson and his wife Barbara acquired title to 350 Wippoorwill Lane in December of 2002.
Three years later, in October of 2005, Michael Wilson and Barbara Ede conveyed a portion of their property to Steven and Dorothy Pastir (ROR 16). The deed, recorded at Volume 2475, Pages 114-15, of the Stratford Land Records, created 410 Wippoorwill Lane.
While Michael Wilson and Barbara Ede owned 350 Wippoorwill Lane, they recorded several maps, but did not seek approval of the property as a building lot. Record Map 3406 contains a notation "O.K. to file, G. L. 10-11-05." The initials "G.L." refer to Gary Lorentson, who served as Stratford’s Planning and Zoning Administrator. Similar notations are indicated on other Record Maps (ROR 18; ROR 19).
Michael Wilson quitclaimed his interest in the property to Barbara Ede in March of 2010 at Volume 3365, Pages 215-16 of the Stratford Land Records. The Tax Assessor’s card (ROR 19) lists the appraised value of the unimproved parcel at one hundred forty-eight thousand six hundred ($148,600) dollars. The card acknowledges that the property was "split from 320 Wippoorwill Lane."
Barbara Ede conveyed 350 Wippoorwill Lane to the Plaintiff, Shayna D. Wolf, in 2016 (ROR 16). The record does not reflect any attempt to develop the property between 2010 and 2016.
The Stratford Board of Zoning Appeals considered the Plaintiff’s request for seven (7) variances at a September 3, 2018 public hearing (ROR 26).
The Plaintiff’s representative argued that 350 Wippoorwill Lane was subject to a hardship, based upon its irregular shape, a configuration which renders compliance with Stratford’s rear lot regulations impossible (ROR 26, p. 9; p. 11-13). She also insisted that the failure to grant the requested variances, and to permit the construction of a single-family residence on the property, would result in practical "confiscation" of the property (ROR 26, p. 11-12).
Opponents argued that the Plaintiff knew that the property was not an approved building lot when it was purchased (ROR 26, p. 31). Any hardship, it was claimed, was created by the Plaintiff’s predecessor in title, and did not arise from the application of zoning regulations to the property.
The public hearing resumed on December 4, 2018, when it was again argued that the property is impacted by wetlands, and that its irregular shape and lack of any frontage on a public street constitutes a hardship (ROR 27, p. 2-3).
Following the close of the public hearing, the Board of Zoning Appeals voted, unanimously, to deny the request for multiple variances. The motion approved by the Board was made by Commissioner Young: "I find this to be a self-created hardship and for that reason I move to deny the application." (ROR 28, p. 1.)
The letter announcing the Board’s decision (ROR 1) read:
1. The applicant failed to demonstrate an adequate hardship that would allow the Board to grant the requested variances.
Notice of the decision was published in the December 12, 2018 edition of The Connecticut Post (ROR 25), and this timely appeal by the owner of 350 Wippoorwill Lane followed.
AGGRIEVEMENT
The Plaintiff, Shayna D. Wolf, is the record owner of 350 Wippoorwill Lane, Stratford. She purchased the property in February of 2016, by way of a warranty deed from Barbara Ede (Ex. 1; ROR 16). The instrument recites twenty thousand ($20,000) as the consideration for the acquisition of the 2.2521-acre parcel.
Shayna Wolf has owned the property since March 1, 2016, the date on which the warranty deed was recorded. She has owned the property during the entire time this appeal has been pending.
Pleading and proof of aggrievement are prerequisites to a trial court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter of an appeal. Stauton v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 271 Conn. 152, 157 (2004). In order to have standing to prosecute an administrative appeal, a person must be aggrieved. Bongiorno Supermarket, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 266 Conn. 531, 538 (2003). The question of aggrievement is one of fact, to be determined by the trial court. Primerica v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 211 Conn. 85, 93 (1989); Hughes v. Town Planning & Zoning Commission, 156 Conn. 505, 508 (1968).
One claiming aggrievement must sustain his interest in the property throughout the course of an appeal. Craig v. Maher, 174 Conn. 8, 9 (1977). The burden of proving aggrievement rests with the party challenging the decision of the agency. London v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 149 Conn. 282, 284 (1962).
Aggrievement falls into two (2) basic categories- statutory aggrievement, and classical aggrievement.
Statutory aggrievement exists by virtue of legislative fiat, rather than through the facts and circumstances of a particular case. Weill v. Lieberman, 195 Conn. 123, 124-25 (1986). To be statutorily aggrieved, one must show that a particular statute grants standing to appeal, without the necessity of proving actual injury based upon the facts at hand. Pond View, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 288 Conn. 143, 156 (2008).
Classical aggrievement, on the other hand, requires a party to satisfy a well-established two-fold test: 1) the party claiming to be aggrieved must demonstrate a personal and legal interest in the decision appealed from, as distinct from a general interest such as a concern of all members of the community as a whole, and 2) the party must show that the personal and legal interest has been specifically and injuriously affected by the action of the agency. Lewis v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 275 Conn. 383, 391 (2005); Cannavo Enterprises v. Burns, 194 Conn. 43, 47 (1984).
An owner of property which is the subject of a municipal land use body’s decision satisfies the test for aggrievement, based upon an adverse decision of the agency. Moutinho v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 278 Conn. 660, 661 (2006); Huck v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Agency, 203 Conn. 525, 530 (1987).
It is found that Shayna D. Wolf, as the owner of 350 Wippoorwill Lane, Stratford, is aggrieved by the denial of her requests for variances, by the Stratford Board of Zoning Appeals.
It is therefore found, that the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW- ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS
The powers of a municipal zoning board of appeals, unless exercised pursuant to a Special Act of the General Assembly, are derived from Section 8-6(3) of the General Statutes. The statute provides authority to:
(3) determine and vary the application of the zoning bylaws, ordinances or regulations in harmony with their general purpose and intent and with due consideration for conserving the public health, safety, convenience, welfare and property values solely with respect to a parcel of land where, owing to conditions especially affecting such parcel but not affecting generally the district in which it is situated, a literal enforcement of such bylaws, ordinances or regulations would result in exceptional difficulty or unusual hardship so that substantial justice will be done and the public safety and welfare secured.
The standard for judicial review of an appeal from a decision to grant or deny a variance is well established. A zoning board of appeals is endowed with liberal discretion, and its decisions are subject to review by a court only to determine whether the board acted arbitrarily, illegally or unreasonably. Moon v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 291 Conn. 16, 23-24 (2009); Pleasant Farms Development, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 217 Conn. 265, 269 (1991). The burden of demonstrating that the board has acted improperly is upon the party seeking to overturn the board’s decision. Adolphson v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 205 Conn. 703, 707 (1988); Whittaker v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 179 Conn. 650, 654 (1980).
A reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the zoning board of appeals, thereby usurping the prerogatives of the board, so long as the board’s decision reflects an honest judgment, arrived at after full hearing. Bloom v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 233 Conn. 198, 206 (1995). The question is not whether another decision maker, such as the trial court, would have made a different decision, but whether the record supports the decision reached. Calandro v. Zoning Commission, 176 Conn. 439, 440 (1979).
A decision must be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Smith Bros. Woodland Management v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 108 Conn.App. 621, 628 (2008). Substantial evidence is enough evidence to justify, if the trial were to a jury, the refusal to direct a verdict, if the conclusion to be drawn is one of fact. Sampieri v. Inland Wetlands Agency, 226 Conn. 579, 588 (1993). The possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions, does not prevent a decision from being supported by substantial evidence. Property Group, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 226 Conn. 684, 697 (1993).
Section 8-7 of the General Statutes requires a municipal zoning board of appeals to state the reason for its decision to grant or deny a variance, and to identify the hardship on which its decision is based. The statute reads:
Whenever a zoning board of appeals grants or denies any ... variance in the zoning regulations applicable to any property ... it shall state upon the record its reason for the decision and ... when a variance is granted, describe specifically the exceptional difficulty or unusual hardship on which its decision is based ...
In this case, the Stratford Board of Zoning Appeals found that the Plaintiff had failed to prove the existence of a legal hardship, and, therefore, did not describe any hardship applicable to 350 Wippoorwill Lane, Stratford. Although the motion approved by the Board found that any hardship was "self-created," the Board did not provide specific reasons for the decision, in support of its conclusion.
Where a municipal land use agency has stated collective reasons for its decision, a court should not go beyond the collective reasons of the agency, but should only determine whether any reason given is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Gibbons v. Historic District Commission, 285 Conn. 755, 770-71 (2008). However, where, as here, the Board has failed to state collective reasons in support of its decision, that fact is not fatal. In that event, a reviewing court is obligated to search the record, and to determine whether some basis for the action exists. Grillo v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 206 Conn. 362, 369 (1988).
BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS DECISION THAT PLAINTIFF FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE HARDSHIP SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
In order to grant a variance, a zoning board of appeals must find that two (2) conditions have been satisfied: 1) the variance must be shown not to affect substantially the municipal comprehensive plan, and 2) adherence to the strict letter of the zoning ordinance must be shown to cause unusual hardship unnecessary to the carrying out of the general purpose of the zoning ordinance. Moon v. Zoning Board of Appels, supra, 24; Francini v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 227 Conn. 785, 790 (1994). The comprehensive plan consists of the zoning regulations, and the zoning map. Konigsberg v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 283 Conn. 553, 584-85 (2007); Dutko v. Planning & Zoning Board, 110 Conn.App. 228, 242 (2008). Compliance with the comprehensive plan is usually met when the use allowed is consistent with other uses in the area. Amendola v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 161 Conn.App. 725, 726 (2015).
Because the granting of a variance permits a property owner to use his property, even though a violation of the zoning regulations will result, it is reserved for unusual or exceptional circumstances. Burlington v. Jencik, 168 Conn. 506, 508 (1978). Proof of exceptional difficulty or unusual hardship is absolutely necessary, as a condition precedent to the granting of a variance. Tine v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 308 Conn. 310 (2013); Bloom v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 206-08.
A variance runs with the land; Reid v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 235 Conn. 850, 858 (1996); Section 8-6(b), Connecticut General Statutes; and must be based upon property conditions. Garibaldi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 163 Conn. 235, 239 (1972). The identity of the applicant is irrelevant. Dinan v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 220 Conn. 61, 66-67 (1991).
In order to support the granting of a variance, a hardship must arise from conditions different in kind from those generally affecting properties in the same zoning district, and must be imposed by conditions outside the control of the person or entity seeking the variance. Smith v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 174 Conn. 323, 327-28 (1978). A general hardship to the neighborhood, or to the community as a whole, cannot support the approval of a zoning variance. Malstrom v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 152 Conn. 385, 390 (1965); Finch v. Montanari, 143 Conn. 542, 546 (1956). Even the fact that one or more variances have been granted to landowners near the site of a proposed variance, does not constitute proof of undue hardship. Haines v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 26 Conn.App. 187, 191 (1991).
Hardships which are personal to the applicant, however compelling from a human standpoint, does not provide sufficient basis for the granting of a variance. Gangemi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 54 Conn.App. 559, 564 (1999). Hardships which arise out of the voluntary act of an applicant are considered to be self-inflicted, and cannot provide justification for the granting of a variance. Pollard v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 186 Conn. 32, 39 (1982); Archambault v. Wadlow, 25 Conn.App. 375, 381 (1991). Disappointment in the use of property does not constitute exceptional difficulty or unusual hardship. Green Falls Associates, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 138 Conn.App. 481, 494 (2012). However, if a hardship is created by the enactment of a zoning ordinance, and a predecessor in title could have sought a variance, a subsequent owner may also seek a variance. Michler v. Planning & Zoning Board of Appeals, 123 Conn.App. 182, 185 (2010). This situation is to be distinguished from one in which a predecessor in title creates a nonconformity, from which the current owner seeks relief. Johnny Cake, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 180 Conn. 296, 300 (1980).
The Plaintiff, Shayna D. Wolf, seeks to construct a single-family dwelling at 350 Wippoorwill Lane. Single-family residences are permitted uses in the RS-1 Zone.
The first part of the test which must be satisfied in order for variances to be granted, requires that the use requested is in accordance with the municipal comprehensive plan. This requirement is usually met, when the use allowed is consistent with other uses in the area. Amendola v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 161 Conn.App. 726, 752 (2015).
Since the contemplated use of 350 Wippoorwill Lane is a permitted use in the zone, the variances requested are consistent with the comprehensive plan.
A showing of hardship, however, is another matter entirely. The Plaintiff claims that a hardship concerning 350 Wippoorwill Lane is present, and arises out of the application of the Stratford Zoning Regulations to the property. She maintains that her predecessor in title could have sought a variance, and that she is therefore able to pursue the seven (7) variances to permit the construction of a single-family home.
The Board of Zoning Appeals, in rejecting the variance application, found that the Plaintiff failed to demonstrate a hardship (ROR 1), and that any hardship is governed by the "purchase with knowledge" rule.
The court agrees with the Board.
350 Wippoorwill Lane, in its present configuration, was created by the Plaintiff’s predecessor in title, Barbara Ede and Michael Wilson. At no time did either Barbara Ede or Michael Wilson seek to subdivide the property, or seek approval for a building lot from agencies of the Town of Stratford.
The record amply supports the Board’s conclusion that the property was not rendered non-conforming through the adoption of a zoning ordinance by the Town of Stratford. The Plaintiff correctly notes where a hardship is created through the enactment of a zoning ordinance, a subsequent purchaser has the same right to seek a variance, since any hardship runs with the land. Petruzzi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 176 Conn. 479, 483 (1979). However, where, as here, any hardship was created by the applicant’s predecessor in title, the board lacks authority to grant a variance, because the hardship is self-inflicted. Johnny Cake, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 300; Highland Park, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 155 Conn. 40, 43 (1967). Where the claimed hardship arises from the applicant’s act, a zoning board of appeals lacks the power to grant a variance. Abel v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 172 Conn. 286, 289 (1977).
Here, because the record supports a finding that any claimed hardship arose from the creation of the parcel itself, rather than from the enactment of any subsequent regulation or ordinance, the hardship is self-created.
Nor does the fact that another parcel in the immediate area received one or more variances, assist the Plaintiff. Each application must be determined on its own merits. The fact that one or more variances were granted to properties in the immediate area, or on the same street, does not establish a legal hardship. Haines v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 191; Norwood v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 62 Conn.App. 528, 535-37 (2001).
Substantial evidence in the record supports the decision of the Board of Zoning Appeals, that any hardship was self-created, and that the Plaintiff’s variance requests should be denied.
MUNICIPAL ESTOPPEL NOT APPLICABLE
The Plaintiff next claims that the requested variances should have been granted, based upon principles of municipal estoppel.
She alleges that the action of Stratford Planning and Zoning Administrator Gary Lorentson in 2005, when he approved the filing of a record map submitted by Michael Wilson and Barbara Ede, estops the Town of Stratford from asserting that the parcel is not a building lot, and entitled to the requested variances.
She further claims that 350 Whippoorwill Lane was assessed as a building lot, by the Town of Stratford, and, therefore, the proposal to construct a single-family dwelling cannot be thwarted. Neither of these claims are well taken.
In order to establish an estoppel, two (2) essential elements must be present: 1) the party against whom estoppel is claimed must do or say something calculated to induce another to believe in the existence of certain facts, and to act on that belief, and 2) the other party must be justifiably induced to change its position, or do some act to its injury, which it would otherwise not have done. Levine v. Town of Sterling, 300 Conn. 521, 534-35 (2011); West Hartford v. Rechel, 190 Conn. 114, 121 (1983).
The party seeking to invoke municipal estopped shoulders the burden of proof. Cortese v. Planning & Zoning Board of Appeals, 274 Conn. 411, 418-19 (2005). Because of the substantial burden placed on the party claiming municipal estopped, the doctrine should be invoked with great caution. Dornfried v. October Twenty-Four, Inc., 230 Conn. 622, 635-36 (1994); Gelinas v. West Hartford, 225 Conn. 575, 590 (1993).
In order for a court to apply municipal estoppel in support of a party, the aggrieved party must establish: 1) an authorized agent of the municipality did or said something calculated or intended to induce the party to believe in the existence of certain facts, and to act on that belief, 2) the party exercised due diligence to ascertain the truth and not only lacked knowledge of the state of things, but had no convenient means of acquiring the knowledge, 3) the party changed its position in reliance upon those facts, and 4) the party would be subject to substantial loss if the municipality, were permitted to negate the acts of its agent, Levine v. Town of Sterling, supra, 535; Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 234 Conn. 221, 246-47 (1995).
A review of the record demonstrates that the Plaintiff has failed utterly to establish any claim of municipal estoppel.
In her Reply Brief, the Plaintiff acknowledges that she purchased the property for twenty thousand ($20,000) dollars, and that she knew that variances would be necessary in order to construct a single-family home. There is no evidence that she relied upon, or even knew of the "sign off" by Stratford’s Planning and Zoning Administrator, an act which occurred many years prior to her purchase of 350 Wippoorwill Lane.
Shayna D. Wolf had the ability to determine the need for variances as a prerequisite to development of her property, and she in fact made that determination. There is no evidence that the Plaintiff relied upon, or changed her position, based upon any action taken by Gary Lorentson or any other Town of Stratford employee or agent.
Nor can it credibly be argued that she relied upon an assessed valuation of 350 Wippoorwill Lane, which was many times the purchase price recited in her deed (Ex. 1).
TAKING CLAIM NOT ESTABLISHED
The Plaintiff seems to allege that the refusal of the Stratford Board of Zoning Appeals to approve the seven (7) requested variances has resulted in a taking of her property without "just compensation," in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and Article first, Section 11 of the Constitution of the State of Connecticut.
" ... nor shall property be taken for public use without just compensation."
"The property of no person shall be taken for public use, without just compensation."
The Plaintiff seems to claim that the failure of the Board to approve the variances has resulted in what is commonly known as an inverse condemnation of her property.
This claim fails to resonate.
An inverse condemnation takes place when: 1) the application of a regulation to the property amounts to practical confiscation, because the property cannot be used for any reasonable purpose, and 2) utilizing a balancing test, the regulation’s application impermissibly has infringed upon the property owner’s reasonable investment backed expectations of the use and enjoyment of the property, so as to constitute a taking. Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., supra; 257-58; Santos v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 174 Conn.App. 531, 534 (2017).
An inverse condemnation claim and an administrative appeal are distinct actions, and seek distinct remedies. Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Town of Groton, 247 Conn. 196, 216 (1998).
The record compiled before the Board of Zoning Appeals is insufficient to establish the elements of an inverse condemnation claim. The fact that the Plaintiff’s property may have greater value as an approved building lot, does not render it valueless. The possibility of a sale to an abutting owner has been found sufficient to withstand a taking claim. Grillo v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 369-70. Nor does the purchase of 350 Wippoorwill Lane for the consideration of twenty thousand ($20,000) dollars provide the necessary investment backed expectation in order to justify a taking claim. Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., supra, 257.
Because the granting of a variance is reserved for unusual or exceptional circumstances, the Plaintiff had no basis for assuming that multiple variances would be approved pro forma, in order to permit development of 350 Wippoorwill Lane.
A taking claim has not been demonstrated, based upon a review of the record which was compiled before the Stratford Board of Zoning Appeals.
CONCLUSION
The appeal of the Plaintiff, Shayna D. Wolf, is DISMISSED.