From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

Wojtunik v. Kealy

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
Sep 30, 2003
CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-8410 (E.D. Pa. Sep. 30, 2003)

Opinion

CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-8410

September 30, 2003


MEMORANDUM


I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Presently before the Court is Henry J. Wojtunik's ("Wojtunik") Motion for Reconsideration. Wojtunik asks the Court to reconsider its August 26, 2003 Opinion ("Initial Opinion") transferring the entire suit to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. For the following reasons, the Court will deny Wojtunik's Motion for Reconsideration.

At this stage of the litigation, the parties are well-versed in the facts underlying the dispute. However, the Court will briefly recite them. Wojtunik filed his Complaint against former directors and/or officers of a now bankrupt Arizona company, International FiberCom, Inc. ("IFC"). Wojtunik was the only holder of outstanding shares of a New Jersey corporation. IFC and Wojtunik agreed to a stock merger whereby the New Jersey company would merge with IFC, and Wojtunik would receive eight million dollars worth of IFC stock. Approximately a year after this merger, IFC filed for bankruptcy, and the IFC stock Wojtunik received became worthless.

On November 12, 2002, Wojtunik filed various federal securities claims and Arizona state law claims against the Defendants alleging the SEC filings of IFC and representations Wojtunik relied on in agreeing to the merger were fraudulent. On August 26, 2003, after balancing the public and private factors pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the Court transferred the entire case to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. On September 5, 2003, Wojtunik filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. No. 36), asking the Court to reconsider its August 26, 2003 decision to transfer. For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Wojtunik's Motion for Reconsideration

II. STANDARD

A motion for reconsideration is appropriate only where: (1) there has been an intervening change in controlling law; (2) new evidence is available; or (3) there is need to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice. N. River Ins. Co. v. Cigna Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995). Additionally, a motion for reconsideration can be granted to correct manifest errors of fact.See Corrigan v. Methodist Hosp., 885 F. Supp. 127, 127 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (citing Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985)). Wojtunik argues in his Motion for Reconsideration that the Court misapplied the law and the facts, therefore, the Court will not address whether there has been an intervening change in controlling law or whether there is new evidence available.

III. DISCUSSION

In the Initial Opinion, the Court examined the public and private factors under Section 1404(a) and found that the factors weighed in favor of transferring the case to the District of Arizona. In a Section 1404(a) transfer, the Court must balance and weigh all relevant public and private factors. See Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879 (3d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). The Court properly analyzed all the relevant Section 1404(a) factors, yet Wojtunik asserts the Court should have given more weight to his arguments regarding a few specific factors. Wojtunik argues that his choice of forum and the convenience of witnesses were not given enough weight in the Court's Initial Opinion.

Wojtunik does not contest the numerous other factors discussed in the Court's Initial Opinion, which weighed in favor of transfer. These factors included the Defendants' choice of forum, where the claim arose, the enforceability of judgment, Arizona's stronger local interest in this action, and the District of Arizona's greater familiarity with the Arizona state law claims. The Court found that these factors all weighed in favor of transfer, and Wojtunik does not claim that the Court was incorrect as to its balancing on any of these numerous factors. While Wojtunik only contests a few of the factors the Court considered in its Initial Opinion, for clarification, the Court will discuss the factors Wojtunik asserts were mishandled. First, Wojtunik argues that "the Court essentially disregarded Plaintiff's choice of forum or any inconvenience to him" in having to litigate this case in the District of Arizona. (Pl.'s Mot. Recons. at 7). Wojtunik asserts the Court applied the wrong standard in weighing his choice of forum. The Court noted in its Initial Opinion that a plaintiff's choice of forum is given significant deference under Section 1404(a). (Mem. Op. at 17). However, the Court also noted that a plaintiff's choice of forum is given less weight where he chooses to litigate in a forum other than his home forum. (Id.). Wojtunik does not attempt to distinguish this point in his Motion for Reconsideration. The Court did not disregard Wojtunik's choice of forum, but rather simply stated that his choice of forum in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania would be given less weight since Wojtunik's home state is New Jersey. The discussion in the Initial Opinion properly tracked cases which have stated where a plaintiff chooses a forum outside of his home forum, such a choice is given less weight under Section 1404(a). See Am. Littoral Soc'y v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 943 F. Supp. 548, 551 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (citing Kielczynski v. Consol. Rail Corp., 837 F. Supp. 687, 689 (E.D. Pa. 1993)).

As one court has noted, "[t]o insist that plaintiff's choice of forum is controlling would be to render § 1404(a) meaningless. Equally important is the balancing of the other relevant choice-of-forum considerations." Rowles v. Hammermill Paper Co., Inc., 689 F. Supp. 494, 496 (E.D. Pa. 1988). All the relevant Section 1404(a) factors were weighed and balanced in the Initial Opinion.

Wojtunik additionally argues that the Court incorrectly applied the relative inconvenience towards him in having to litigate in Arizona. In the Initial Opinion, the Court found that the relevant forum selection clause between IFC and Wojtunik was relevant as to this factor. While the Court stated that such a forum selection clause was not controlling, the Court found that because Wojtunik signed a clause that would have made Arizona a convenient forum in an action between IFC and Wojtunik, Wojtunik's arguments that Arizona was inconvenient would be given less weight. (Mem. Op. at 19). The Court finds that such analysis was proper, however, even if the Court misapplied the importance of the forum selection clause in determining the relative convenience towards Wojtunik, this would not change the overall holding to transfer. Rather, in light of the numerous other factors favoring transfer, the Court would still hold that transfer is proper.

Secondly, Wojtunik argues the Court misapplied the convenience of witnesses factor in its Section 1404(a) balancing. Wojtunik misconstrues the Court's Initial Opinion regarding this factor. In this case, the burden was on the Defendants to show that in the interests of justice and convenience, a transfer was warranted. See Connors v. R S Parts Servs., Inc., 248 F. Supp.2d 394, 396 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (stating burden is on moving party to establish balance of interests favor transfer). As such, the Court initially focused on the witnesses listed by the Defendants. The witnesses set out by the Defendants included those who prepared and had knowledge regarding the SEC filings Wojtunik asserts were fraudulent. Most, if not all of these non-party witnesses listed by the Defendants are located in Arizona, or the neighboring state of California.

Wojtunik asserts that because the Court did not mention his witnesses by name, the Court ignored his list of witnesses. While the Court did consider Wojtunik's witnesses in weighing this factor, for clarity, the Court will briefly discuss this point. Defendants' witnesses are located predominantly, if not entirely, in either Arizona or neighboring California. The witnesses Wojtunik asserts the Court ignored reside in Florida, Georgia, Virginia and Pennsylvania. Obviously, the few witnesses residing in Pennsylvania would find it convenient to testify in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Presumably, the witnesses residing in Florida and Georgia will have to travel considerable distances no matter if the case proceeds in Pennsylvania or Arizona. Contrarily, Defendants' witnesses will only travel a short distance if the case proceeds in Arizona. Wojtunik asserts his witnesses would find it inconvenient to testify in Arizona as compared to Pennsylvania, however, such an assertion is missing in the two declarations filed by Wojtunik's witnesses. These witnesses would probably find it inconvenient to testify in either Pennsylvania or Arizona since traveling to both locations would require considerable time and expense. See Tischio v. Bontex, Inc., 16 F. Supp.2d 511, 522 (D.N.J. 1998) (stating adjudication of case in Virginia as opposed to New Jersey is not more inconvenient for Belgium residents since "they will be required to travel a significant distance regardless of whether the action is transferred.").

The Court must consider all witnesses, not just those listed by Wojtunik. Wojtunik asserts his witnesses "can testify as to the facts that will prove why defendants' accounting practices were improper and why IFC's financial statements were misstated." (Pl.'s Mot. Recons. at 6). Defendants assert their witnesses will provide an explanation of these documents. (Defs' Joseph P. Kealy and Terry W. Beiriger's Mem. in Opp'n of Pl.'s Mot. Recons. at 4). The Court has set forth that Defendants' witnesses are located in or near Arizona. Most of Wojtunik's witnesses, however, are scattered across the Eastern seaboard, and will have to travel significant distances no matter where the case is heard. Therefore, the Court was correct in its analysis regarding the convenience of the witnesses. The Court properly stated that "this factor balances more towards Arizona being the more convenient forum for the witnesses, or at best for Wojtunik, this factor remains neutral towards both parties." (Mem. Op. at 22).

IV. CONCLUSION

Wojtunik's Motion for Reconsideration focuses only on a select number of the numerous factors the Court properly balanced in its Initial Opinion. Wojtunik's choice of forum, while given some weight, is given less weight since he chose to litigate outside of his home forum. Additionally, many of Wojtunik's witnesses are scattered all over the East Coast and will have to travel considerable distances no matter where the case is heard. Defendants' witnesses, on the other hand, reside in or around Arizona. The Court properly considered the public and private factors in its Initial Opinion and, therefore, Wojtunik's Motion for Reconsideration is Denied.

An appropriate Order follows.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 30th day of September, 2003, upon consideration of Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of Defendants' Motions to Dismiss or in the Alternative to Transfer (Doc. No. 36), together with the response thereto, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.


Summaries of

Wojtunik v. Kealy

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
Sep 30, 2003
CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-8410 (E.D. Pa. Sep. 30, 2003)
Case details for

Wojtunik v. Kealy

Case Details

Full title:HENRY J. WOJTUNIK, Plaintiff, v. JOSEPH P. KEALY, JOHN F. KEALY, JERRY A…

Court:United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

Date published: Sep 30, 2003

Citations

CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-8410 (E.D. Pa. Sep. 30, 2003)