Opinion
6:22-cv-00382-MK
12-19-2022
ADALINE WINNINGHAM, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, et al, Plaintiffs, v. RAFEAL'S GOURMET DINER, LLC dba THE NILE, an Oregon Limited Liability Company; ABDRABARRASOOL M. BUESSA, an individual; and DOES, 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
MUSTAFA T. KASUBHAI, United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiffs Adaline Winningham and Hannah Thornton bring this putative class action against Defendants, Rafeal's Gourmet Diner, LLC dba The Nile, Abdrabarrasool Buessa, and Does 1 through 10, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq. Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs seek equitable tolling of the FLSA's statute of limitations for potential members to join the collective action. Pls.' Mot. for Conditional Certification and Notice, ECF No. 20 (“Pls.' Mot.”). For the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs' request for equitable tolling should be GRANTED, but only for the period of time between October 13, 2022, and the date that notice is issued to potential collective action members.
Originally, Winningham was the sole Plaintiff. Compl., ECF No. 1. Thornton later opted into the action. Notice of Consent, ECF No 18. Counsel withdrew from representing Winningham. Motion to Withdraw, ECF No. 19. Thornton is not the lead Plaintiff.
In Plaintiffs' motion, they also seek conditional certification of the collective action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and approval of the issuance of a notice to potential collective action members inviting them to opt in. Because a motion to conditionally certify a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) is non-dispositive motion, it will be addressed in a separate decision.
I. Legal Framework
Unlike class action claims brought under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23, the statute of limitations for collective action suits under the FLSA is not automatically tolled for potential members upon the filing of the complaint. 29 U.S.C. § 256(b). Instead, the statute of limitations continues to run for any putative plaintiff until the plaintiff consents to opting into the collective action in writing. Id. Under the FLSA, the statute of limitations for filing a claim is two years, or three years if the violation was “willful.” 29 U.S.C. § 255(a).
Nevertheless, the principle of equitable tolling, which extends the length of an applicable limitations period, is available for FLSA collective action suits. Lukovsky v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008); see, e.g., Partlow v. Jewish Orphans' Home of S. California, Inc., 645 F.2d 757, 760 (9th Cir. 1981) (abrogated on other grounds by Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 493 U.S. 165 (1989)). In general, “[e]quitable tolling applies when the plaintiff is prevented from asserting a claim by wrongful conduct on the part of the defendant or when extraordinary circumstances beyond a plaintiff's control made it impossible to file a claim on time.” Veliz v. Cintas Corp., No. C03-1180 SBA, 2007 WL 841776, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2007) (citing Stoll v. Runyon, 165 F.3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 1999)).
II. Analysis
Plaintiffs move the Court to equitably toll the statute of limitations for all putative class members “from the time this matter is conditionally certified to the end of the Notice periods.” Pls.' Mot. 15, ECF No. 20. Plaintiffs argue that the Court's own docket-management determinations is a basis for a court to equitably toll. See Lew v. Countrywide Finan. Corp., 2009 WL 1384975 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2009) (“The Court will not penalize the Plaintiff or other members of the putative classes for its own docket-management determinations.”).
Even where no party has engaged in wrongful conduct, the course of litigation and discovery in FLSA collective actions “generally function to bar putative opt-in collective plaintiffs from damages they otherwise may have been eligible to receive through no fault of their own.” Chastain, 2014 WL 3734368, at *12. Thus, “[c]ourts have equitably tolled the statute of limitations in a FLSA action when doing so is in the interest of justice.” Castle v. Wells Fargo Fin., Inc., No. C 06-4347 SI, 2007 WL 1105118, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2007); see also Beauperthuy v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc., No. 06-0715 SC, 2007 WL 707475, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2007) (equitably tolling the FLSA's statute of limitations because of litigation factors beyond the plaintiff's control, including arbitration and settlement of a related action); Coppernoll v. Hamcor, Inc., No. C 16-05936 WHA, 2017 WL 1508853, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2017) (equitably tolling the statute of limitations because of a stay in a related case, which prevented plaintiffs from “receiving approval to notice this action to putative class members”); Koval v. Pacific Bell Telephone Co., No. C 12-1627 CW, 2012 WL 3283428, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2012) (finding that courts have “applied equitable tolling prospectively where the court's discretionary case management decisions have led to procedural delay beyond the control of the putative class action members”).
The Court agrees that it is in the interest of justice to equitably toll the statute of limitations because the Court's docket management is out of Plaintiffs' control. “The time required for a court to rule on a motion . . . for certification of a collective action in [a] FLSA case[ ] may be deemed an extraordinary circumstance justifying application of the equitable tolling doctrine.” Small v. Univ. Med. Ctr. of S. Nevada, 2013 WL 3043454, at *3 (D. Nev. June 14, 2013) (quoting Yahraes v. Restaurant Assocs. Events Corp., 2011 WL 844963, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)). Additionally, Defendants in this case would not be prejudiced by this tolling because Defendants knew the scope of potential liability at the time that Plaintiffs filed the Complaint. Id. at *4. Thus, it is in the interests of justice to equitably toll the statute of limitations to eliminate any prejudice suffered by potential collective action members as a result of the delay in resolving the conditional certification motion.
Plaintiffs ask the Court to equitably toll the FLSA's statute of limitations until the end of the notice period. However, doing so would be contrary to Congress's intent in creating a distinct statute of limitations that, in the case of the putative class, is uniquely tolled “on the subsequent date on which such written consent [to opt into the collective] is filed in the court in which the action was commenced.” 29 U.S.C. § 256(b). Other courts have equitably tolled the statute of limitations until the date when the notice is issued to potential collective action members. See, e.g., Yahraes, 2011 WL 844963, at *3 (finding that tolling was warranted for the periods of time in which the court was evaluating plaintiff's motions and notice); Castle, 2007 WL 1105118, at *1-*2, *1 n.2 (applying equitable tolling from the date conditional certification was taken under advisement until the date a stay over the case was resolved by a separate court).
Here, the parties completed briefing on October 13, 2022. It is just and appropriate to equitably toll the statute of limitations for the period of time between October 13, 2022, and the date on which notice is issued to potential collective action members.
RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons above, Plaintiffs' motion for equitable tolling (ECF No. 20) should be GRANTED. The request for oral arguments is denied as unnecessary.
This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1) should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment or appealable order. The Findings and Recommendation will be referred to a district judge. Objections to this Findings and Recommendation, if any, are due fourteen (14) days from today's date. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).