Opinion
No. 14-07-00193-CR
Memorandum Opinion filed May 22, 2008. DO NOT PUBLISH — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
On Appeal from the 344th District Court Chambers County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 13943.
Panel consists of Chief Justice HEDGES, and Justices BROWN and BOYCE.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Luther Windham appeals a conviction for driving while intoxicated on grounds that (1) the stop of appellant's vehicle could not be justified under the "community caretaking" doctrine; and (2) there was no reasonable suspicion to justify stopping appellant's vehicle on the basis that appellant violated section 42.03 of the Texas Penal Code. We affirm. Background On February 25, 2006, appellant was operating a Ford pickup truck in the west-bound lane of the feeder road on the south side of Interstate 10 in Chambers County. At approximately 3 a.m., Officer James E. Thomas observed appellant stopped in a traveled lane of traffic on the feeder road. The truck's lights were on and the truck appeared to be running, but it did not move for at least eight seconds. Officer Thomas was unable to see inside the cab due to the darkness. After Officer Thomas saw the truck begin to move, he initiated a traffic stop by turning on his lights and pulling behind appellant. Appellant came to a stop under an overpass, and Officer Thomas approached his truck. Officer Thomas immediately smelled alcohol and began to investigate appellant for the offense of driving while intoxicated. Upon concluding his investigation, Officer Thomas arrested appellant for driving while intoxicated and issued a warning for parking in a roadway. Appellant had four prior offenses for driving while intoxicated in the state of Louisiana. He also had an outstanding warrant from Georgia. On June 9, 2006, appellant was indicted for a felony offense of driving while intoxicated. On September 14, 2006, appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence, alleging he was detained and arrested in violation of the Texas and United States Constitutions without reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that appellant had committed any offense. A hearing was held on appellant's motion on November 2, 2006. Appellant limited his grounds for the suppression hearing to the issues raised in this appeal. Officer Thomas testified at the suppression hearing that he had two reasons for stopping appellant: (1) he thought appellant was violating section 545.302 of the Texas Transportation Code (parking illegally); and (2) to ascertain if appellant was in need of assistance (community caretaking doctrine). The trial court denied the motion to suppress in a letter to the parties and signed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law incorporating the letter to support its decision. The trial court held that appellant was not in violation of section 545.302 of the Texas Transportation Code, but concluded that Officer Thomas' initial detention of appellant was justified under the "community caretaking" doctrine. The trial court said Officer Thomas would have "been derelict in his duty" if he had not stopped appellant to ascertain if appellant needed assistance. The trial court also found the detention justifiable under Section 42.03 of the Texas Penal Code (obstructing highway or other passageway). The trial court noted this was not the statutory basis given by Officer Thomas, but determined that an officer need not articulate the precise statutory grounds so long as objective grounds existed in fact at the time an individual is pulled over. Appellant pleaded guilty in a plea agreement that allowed for punishment of five years' incarceration, while preserving the right to appeal the results of the suppression hearing. Standard of Review We review a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress for abuse of discretion. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); Goudeau v. State, 209 S.W.3d 713, 715 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.). When the trial court denies a motion to suppress, we review the factual findings for clear error and the application of those facts to the law de novo. Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 327. "The United States Supreme Court held that a police officer can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity `may be afoot,' even if the officer lacks probable cause." Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33, 35 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968). A routine traffic stop resembles an investigative detention, and must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the initial investigative stop. State v. Cardenas, 36 S.W.3d 243, 246 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. ref'd). A temporary detention of an automobile during a traffic stop constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996). A police officer may stop an automobile when that officer has a reasonable suspicion to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. Woods, 956 S.W.2d at 35; Goudeau, 209 S.W.3d at 716. The burden is on the State to justify the investigatory detention as reasonable. Bishop v. State, 85 S.W.3d 819, 822 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002); Goudeau, 209 S.W.3d at 716. The test for a "reasonable suspicion" is whether a reasonable person would have believed that a traffic violation had occurred. Bishop, 85 S.W.3d at 822. "A trooper's incorrect belief that a motorist is in violation of state traffic laws is insufficient to justify a vehicle stop." United States v. Granado, 302 F.3d 421, 423 (5th Cir. 2002); Goudeau, 209 S.W.3d at 716; see also United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 1998) (the legal justification for pulling a driver over must be objectively grounded). The good-faith intent of the officer does not provide a justification when no objective traffic violation has occurred. See Goudeau, 209 S.W.3d at 716; see also Miller, 146 F.3d at 279 ("given that having a turn signal on is not a violation of Texas law, no objective basis for probable cause justified the stop of [defendant]"). "During an investigation of a traffic violation, if an officer develops a reasonable suspicion that another violation has occurred, the scope of the initial investigation expands to include the new offense." Goudeau, 209 S.W.3d at 719. Additionally, a police officer may pull over a driver under the community caretaking doctrine if a reasonable person would have believed the individual was in need of assistance. See Wright v. State, 7 S.W.3d 148, 151-52 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999) (adopting the community caretaking doctrine set forth in Cady v. Dombrowki, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), including the relevant factors in determining if an officer acted reasonably). Analysis Appellant argues that Officer Thomas lacked an objectively reasonable and articulable reason for pulling appellant over on the night of February 25, 2006. Appellant argues that neither the community caretaking doctrine nor the referenced statutory provisions provided an objectively reasonable reason for the initial stop. Appellant argues there was no reasonable suspicion that he was obstructing a roadway (section 42.03) or illegally parking or stopping in a prohibited place (section 545.302). See Tex. Penal Code § 42.03 (Vernon 2003); Tex. Transp. Code § 545.302 (Vernon Supp. 2007). We need not address the community caretaking doctrine or section 545.302 because the trial court correctly concluded that Officer Thomas was justified in pulling appellant over pursuant to section 42.03 of the Texas Penal Code. See Cedano v. State, 24 S.W.3d 406, 410 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.) ("appellate courts can uphold the trial court's ruling on the defendant's motion to suppress on a ground not articulated by the arresting officer in his testimony") ( citing Williams v. State, 726 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986)); see also Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 530 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001) (only one objectively reasonable reason is required to justify a stop). Section 42.03 states in pertinent part:
(a) A person commits an offense if, without legal privilege or authority, he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly:
(1) obstructs a highway, street, sidewalk, railway, waterway, elevator, aisle, hallway, entrance, or exit to which the public or a substantial group of the public has access, or any other place used for the passage of persons, vehicles, or conveyances, regardless of the means of creating the obstruction and whether the obstruction arises from his acts alone or from his acts and the acts of others;
(b) For purposes of this section, "obstruct" means to render impassable or to render passage unreasonably inconvenient or hazardous .Tex. Penal Code § 42.03(a), (b) (emphasis added). Pursuant to this statute, a violation can occur when passage is rendered "unreasonably . . . hazardous." See Cashin v. State, Nos. 14-03-01140-CR, 14-03-1141-CR, 2005 WL 975663, at *2 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.], April 28, 2005, no pet.) (officer's testimony that a car, stopped for fifteen seconds in moderate traffic and impeding the free progress of other cars, was sufficient to warrant a traffic stop); Lauderback v. State, 789 S.W.2d 343, 346-47 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1990, pet. ref'd) (blocking one lane on a busy day is sufficient to constitute rendering passage unreasonably inconvenient or hazardous). The record here establishes that appellant rendered passage on the access road "unreasonably . . . hazardous." Appellant was stopped at night on a feeder road along a busy interstate highway. The trial court admitted a video recording of the stop, in which Officer Thomas told appellant that one of the reasons for stopping appellant was his concern for appellant's safety. It is apparent from the recording that many vehicles utilize this interstate highway even late at night. Officer Thomas reasonably interpreted appellant's stopping of his truck for at least eight seconds on the traveled portion of the feeder road as a significant hazard given that drivers using the feeder road would not expect to encounter a stopped car in the middle of the feeder road at night. Officer Thomas told appellant, "I saw you were stopped there in the road. You had me concerned. I didn't want to see you ran over." The trial court concluded that stopping in the middle of the traveled portion of a feeder road was "unreasonably . . . hazardous," noting: "Officer Thomas would be derelict in his duty to protect citizen drivers and the motoring public if he didn't stop and at least investigate the reasons for a vehicle stopped in the traveled portion of the feeder road along a heavily traveled Interstate Highway." The trial court noted this was reasonable, observing: "Officer Thomas did what any other officer would have done. . . ." Because there was ample evidence before the trial judge establishing that appellant was creating an "unreasonably . . . hazardous" condition by stopping in an active traffic lane of the feeder road of a busy interstate highway at 3 a.m., the trial court acted within its discretion in denying appellant's motion to suppress based upon the initial stop. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.