Summary
holding that the plaintiff's argument "that the residual limitations period does not apply" to actions under §§ 50(B), (E) was "foreclosed by [the Court's] holding in Priester."
Summary of this case from Bormio Invs., Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.Opinion
No. 13-10078
2013-09-20
ANNA JOYCE WILTSE Plaintiff - Appellant v. CARRINGTON MORTGAGE SERVICES, L.L.C. Defendant - Appellee
Summary Calendar
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:12-CV-0680
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DENNIS, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Anna Joyce Wiltse brought an action against Carrington Mortgage Services in Texas state court, seeking a declaratory judgment that Carrington's lien on her home is invalid. Wiltse alleges that the lien, which secures a $68,000 loan, is invalid due to noncompliance with Article XVI, Section 50(a)(6) of the Texas Constitution. Specifically, Wiltse alleges that the amount of the loan was greater than eighty percent of the fair market value of her home, and that she was charged more than three percent of the loan's value for closing fees. Carrington removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss Wiltse's claim as time-barred. Carrington argued that the four-year residual limitations period of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 16.051, which applies to "[e]very action for which there is no express limitations period, except an action for the recovery of real property," is applicable to Wiltse's claim. The district court granted Carrington's motion and dismissed Wiltse's claim.
On appeal, Wiltse argues that the residual limitations period does not apply to an action under Article XVI, Section 50(a)(6) of the Texas Constitution. However, as Wiltse recognizes, this argument is foreclosed by our holding in Priester v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 708 F.3d 667, 673-74 (5th Cir. 2013). Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.