Summary
In Wilson v. Riverside Hosp. (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 8, 18 OBR 6, 479 N.E.2d 275, the Supreme Court set forth the standard for claims under R.C. 4123.90: A complaint filed by an employee states a claim for relief for retaliatory discharge when it alleges that the employee was injured on the job, that he filed the claim for workers' compensation, and that he was discharged by the employer in contravention of R.C. 4123.90.
Summary of this case from Kilbarger v. Anchor Hocking Glass Co.Opinion
No. 84-1160
Decided June 19, 1985.
Workers' compensation — Claim for retaliatory discharge stated, when — R.C. 4123.90.
O.Jur 2d Workmen's Compensation § 258.
A complaint filed by an employee against an employer states a claim for relief for retaliatory discharge when it alleges that the employee was injured on the job, filed a claim for workers' compensation, and was discharged by that employer in contravention of R.C. 4123.90.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lucas County.
This appeal is taken by plaintiff-appellant, Sonya Wilson, following the grant of a motion to dismiss made by defendant-appellee, Riverside Hospital.
On August 5, 1982, plaintiff was injured in a fall at her place of employment, Riverside Hospital. She subsequently applied for workers' compensation. The injury was certified by Riverside Hospital and allowed by the Industrial Commission of Ohio. The plaintiff was awarded temporary total disability and was unable to work for over eleven months.
On July 14, 1983, the plaintiff's doctor released her for work effective July 25, 1983. The plaintiff notified Riverside Hospital of her intention to return to work. The hospital informed her that she no longer had a job. Plaintiff's attorney informed the hospital in a letter dated July 15, 1983 that the discharge of his client violated R.C. 4123.90. In a letter dated July 19, 1983, the hospital informed the plaintiff's attorney that plaintiff's employment relationship with the hospital had been terminated because the hospital had a leave of absence policy that only guaranteed a position for ten weeks. Since the appellant was on leave for over eleven months, her position had been filled.
R.C. 4123.90 provides:
"The industrial commission, or any other body constituted by the statutes of this state, or any court of this state, in awarding compensation to the dependents of employees, or others killed in Ohio, shall not make any discrimination against the widows, children, or other dependents who reside in a foreign country. The commission, or any other board or court in determining the amount of compensation to be paid to the dependents of killed employees, shall pay to the alien dependents residing in foreign countries the same benefits as to those dependents residing in this state.
"No employer shall discharge, demote, reassign, or take any punitive action against any employee because such employee filed a claim or instituted, pursued or testified in any proceedings under the workers' compensation act for an injury or occupational disease which occurred in the course of and arising out of his employment with that employer. Any such employee may file an action in the common pleas court of the county of such employment in which the relief which may be granted shall be limited to reinstatement with back pay, if the action is based upon discharge, or an award for wages lost if based upon demotion, reassignment, or punitive action taken, offset by earnings subsequent to discharge, demotion, reassignment, or punitive action taken, and payments received pursuant to section 4123.56 and Chapter 4141. of the Revised Code plus reasonable attorney fees. Such action shall be forever barred unless filed within one hundred eighty days immediately following such discharge, demotion, reassignment, or punitive action taken, and no action may be instituted or maintained unless the employer has received written notice of a claimed violation of this paragraph within the ninety days immediately following such discharge, demotion, reassignment, or punitive action taken." (Emphasis added.)
On July 27, 1983, the plaintiff filed a complaint against Riverside Hospital in the Court of Common Pleas of Lucas County. The complaint sought damages for an alleged violation of R.C. 4123.90. Attached to that complaint was the July 19, 1983 letter in which Riverside Hospital stated that Wilson was not allowed to return to her job because of a leave of absence policy which had been adopted by the hospital and, in doing so, the hospital further stated, it did not violate any law. Riverside Hospital filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ. R. 12(B)(6). That motion asserted the complaint failed to state a claim for an R.C. 4123.90 violation because it did not specifically allege that the discharge was in retaliation for plaintiff's workers' compensation claim. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment.
This cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Wagoner, Steinberg, Chinnis Dorf, Joan H. Rife and Michael D. Dorf, for appellant.
Eastman Smith, John T. Landwehr and Thomas A. Dixon, for appellee.
The issue in this cause is whether the appellant's complaint stated a claim for retaliatory discharge pursuant to R.C. 4123.90.
This court set forth the following standard for determining whether a motion to dismiss should be granted in O'Brien v. University Community Tenants Union (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 242 [71 O.O.2d 223]:
"`In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of course, the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.' Conley v. Gibson (1957), 355 U.S. 41, 45." Id. at 245.
In determining whether a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should be granted, the material allegations of the complaint are taken as admitted. State, ex rel. Alford, v. Willoughby (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 221, 223 [12 O.O.3d 229]. The court must determine whether the allegations constitute a statement of claim under Civ. R. 8(A) which provides:
"A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, * * * shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. * * *"
The purpose of this rule is to notify the defendant of the legal claim against him. See Border City S. L. Assn. v. Moan (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 65. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted. 5 Wright Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure (1969) 593, 598, Section 1357.
Appellee argues that the July 19, 1983 letter from the hospital which was attached to the complaint demonstrates that appellant was terminated pursuant to the appellee's leave of absence policy. The hospital contends that letter demonstrates there was no retaliatory motive in failing to rehire Wilson. Thus, the appellee reasons the motion to dismiss was properly granted. We do not agree. Appellee's reliance on its letter is misplaced.
Appellant's material allegation with respect to that letter was that her employment relationship with Riverside Hospital was terminated. The complaint does not allege that she was discharged because of the hospital's leave of absence policy. Therefore, the existence of a leave of absence policy was not a material allegation of appellant's complaint. The leave of absence policy may not be considered in determining whether the motion to dismiss should be granted.
The material allegations in the case sub judice are that the appellant was employed by appellee, she was injured on the job, she received workers' compensation, she attempted to return to her job after recovering from the work-related injury, and she was discharged in contravention of R.C. 4123.90. By referring to R.C. 4123.90 in the complaint, appellant sufficiently complied with the notice pleading requirements of Civ. R. 8(A). The material allegations in the complaint manifest an adequate claim of a discharge in violation of R.C. 4123.90.
It is the decision of this court that appellant stated a cause of action based upon an alleged violation of R.C. 4123.90 by her employer. At this juncture of this cause we do not determine or consider the validity of appellee's leave of absence policy for its employees as it relates to R.C. 4123.90.
We therefore hold that a complaint filed by an employee against an employer states a claim for relief for retaliatory discharge when it alleges that the employee was injured on the job, filed a claim for workers' compensation and was discharged by that employer in contravention of R.C. 4123.90.
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
CELEBREZZE, C.J., SWEENEY, LOCHER and C. BROWN, JJ., concur.
WRIGHT, J., concurs separately.
HOLMES, J., dissents.
PARRINO, J., of the Eighth Appellate District, sitting for DOUGLAS, J.
I concur in the majority opinion only because the majority carefully refuses to consider as admitted the hospital's leave of absence policy as articulated in the letter that was attached to appellant's complaint. Had the leave of absence policy been deemed as undisputed it would have been sufficient to support a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim because such policy is based solely upon the duration of the employee's absence from the firm. This policy does not discriminate on any basis. Thus, I concur in this narrowly drafted opinion.
In the present case, the record shows that Riverside Hospital maintained a leave of absence policy which permitted employees, who are temporarily disabled for less than ten weeks, to return to their work after recovery. This policy was explained in a letter to appellant's attorney, dated July 19, 1983, which was attached to the complaint as "Exhibit B." As noted in the complaint, appellant suffered a back injury in a slip-and-fall accident at Riverside Hospital on August, 5, 1982. She thereafter filed a claim for workers' compensation, which the Industrial Commission allowed, assigning her a designated claim number. Appellant was not able to return to work until July 25, 1983, or approximately eleven months after her injury, as indicated by a letter to Riverside from her physician dated July 14, 1983. As Riverside's assistant director of personnel explained in the letter marked "Exhibit B," when an employee's absence exceeds ten weeks, the employee is considered for the next available position for which he or she is qualified, assuming that one becomes available within three months of the date the employee requests a return to active employment.
Paragraph four of appellant's complaint contains the only important allegation pertinent to the present analysis. There, appellant alleges only that Riverside informed her that she could not return to her original job and that her employment had been terminated. She does not allege that Riverside's action was motivated by her pursuit of a workers' compensation claim. By reference to Riverside's letter (Exhibit B), appellant acknowledges and admits the existence of the hospital's policy regarding leaves of absence which exceed ten weeks. See Civ. R. 10(C). Implicit in this letter is the fact that Riverside's policy predates appellant's employment.
Appellant does not allege any retaliatory motivation relating to Riverside's adherence to its policy. Indeed, this would be difficult to maintain, since if appellant had not filed a claim for compensation, her eleven-month disability would still have necessitated her termination under Riverside's leave of absence policy. As Exhibit B indicates, Riverside's policy applies to all employees, and no employee is guaranteed to return to his or her job if that employee's leave exceeds ten weeks. Whether an employee who files a claim is ever compensated is irrelevant to Riverside's adherence to its ten-week-leave-of-absence policy. Thus, appellant's eleven-month disability "caused" her termination, and the fact that she filed a workers' compensation claim following her injury is actually irrelevant.
Consequently, appellant's complaint sets forth no facts giving rise to a cognizable claim for relief, and the trial court correctly granted Riverside's motion to dismiss.
Accordingly, I dissent from the majority opinion.