Opinion
A120321
4-23-2009
THEODORE W. WILSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SEGUNDINO O. OBEDOZA, M.D., Defendant and Respondent.
Not to be Published in Official Reports
Theodore W. Wilson, a former state prison inmate, appeals from a summary judgment in favor of a physician who treated Wilson after he injured his eye while working at a Prison Industry Authority (PIA) laundry. The trial court found that Wilsons malpractice complaint was barred by the provisions of Californias Workers Compensation Act (Labor Code, § 3200 et seq.). We affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Labor Code unless otherwise specified.
I. INTRODUCTION
The following facts are uncontested by the parties:
Wilson is an ex-inmate of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) who was an inmate housed at the California State Prison, Solano on October 3, 2001. While working at the PIA laundry on that date, Wilson suspected that either splashing or fumes from potassium hydrochloride (known as "break"), a chemical used in the laundry, came in contact with his right eye. At the time of this incident, Wilson was working as a maintenance mechanic within in the course and scope of his employment at the PIA laundry room.
Wilson was taken to the medical clinic located in a room adjoining the prison laundry. He was immediately seen by Nurse Ramos, who took some brief information, and he was then immediately seen by Dr. Segundino Obedoza. Obedoza misdiagnosed Wilson as having an infection, and prescribed gentamicin for the eye infection. Wilsons suit arose from Obedozas failure to appropriately treat his chemical burn. On March 8, 2002, Wilsons workers compensation claim was accepted by the CDCR.
The Present Action
Wilson sued Obedoza for medical malpractice. Obedoza moved for summary judgment or summary adjudication of issues on the ground that Wilsons complaint was barred by the provisions of Californias Workers Compensation Act. Obedoza relied in particular on sections 3370, 3601, and 3602.
Section 3370 specifies that inmates are entitled to workers compensation benefits for injury arising out of and in the course of assigned employment: "Each inmate of a state penal or correctional institution shall be entitled to the workers compensation benefits provided by this division for injury arising out of and in the course of assigned employment . . . subject to all of the following conditions: [¶] . . . [¶] (3) No benefits shall be paid to an inmate while he or she is incarcerated. The period of benefit payment shall instead commence upon release from incarceration. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] (9) This division shall be the exclusive remedy against the state for injuries occurring while engaged in assigned work or work under contract. Nothing in this division shall affect any right or remedy of an injured inmate for injuries not compensated by this division." (§ 3370, subd. (a).)
Section 3601 provides that coemployees acting within the scope of their employment are generally immunized from liability for injuries covered by the workers compensation law: "Where the conditions of compensation set forth in Section 3600 concur, the right to recover such compensation, pursuant to the provisions of this division is, [subject to specific exceptions not relevant here], the exclusive remedy for injury or death of an employee against any other employee of the employer acting within the scope of his or her employment . . . ." (§ 3601, subd. (a).)
Section 3602 provides that workers compensation benefits are the sole and exclusive remedy against the employer for injuries that are compensable under the workers compensation law: "Where the conditions of compensation set forth in Section 3600 concur, the right to recover such compensation is, [with exceptions not relevant here], the sole and exclusive remedy of the employee or his or her dependents against the employer and the fact that either the employee or the employer also occupied another or dual capacity prior to, or at the time of, the employees industrial injury shall not permit the employee or his or her dependents to bring an action at law for damages against the employer." (§ 3602, subd. (a).)
The trial court granted Obedozas motion for summary judgment, finding that (1) Wilson and Obedoza were coemployees of the State of California, and (2) Wilsons suit was barred by section 3601. Wilson timely appealed from the ensuing judgment.
II. DISCUSSION
Wilson contends that a multiplicity of constitutional, statutory, and factual reasons compel reversal of the trial courts ruling: (1) the ruling denied him his constitutional right of access to the courts; (2) the court erred in dismissing as immaterial whether he freely, knowingly, and voluntarily consented to the workers compensation claim he signed before seeing Dr. Obedoza; (3) limiting him to his remedy under the workers compensation law is contrary to the policy behind the law, and deprives him of any redress for the wrong done to him; (4) his supervisors "implicit threat" to extend his parole and release dates if he did not sign the workers compensation claim form constituted false imprisonment that is actionable outside the workers compensation system; (5) the court erred in holding that Wilson and Obedoza were coemployees, but even if Wilson and Obedoza were coemployees, Wilsons injury was not subject to the workers compensation law because it did not arise out of his employment, Obedoza was not acting within the scope of his employment when it occurred, and the dual capacity doctrine applies.
We do not find any of these reasons persuasive.
A. Access to Courts
Wilson argues that he was denied his constitutional right of access to the courts, a right explicitly recognized by the California Supreme Court in Payne v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 908 (Payne). The petitioner in Payne was a state prison inmate who was convicted of receiving stolen property and suffered a monetary default judgment in a civil action brought against him by the company from which the property had been stolen. (Id. at pp. 911-912.) The petitioners request that he be allowed to attend the civil trial was denied by the Department of Corrections. (Id. at p. 912.) A default judgment was thereafter entered against him for $24,722. (Ibid.) Petitioner sought a writ of error coram nobis in the trial court on the grounds that he had been denied permission to attend the trial and had been denied his right to counsel. (Ibid.) Treating it as a motion to vacate a default judgment (Code Civ. Proc., § 473), the trial court rejected the request. (Payne, at p. 912.) The inmates ensuing petition to the Court of Appeal was also denied. (Ibid.) The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that "such unqualified deprivation [of the right of access to the courts] constituted a violation of petitioners rights under the due process and equal protection clauses of both the state and federal Constitutions." (Id. at pp. 922-923.)
Payne is not applicable here. Payne recognizes that inmates have a right of access to the courts. It does not guarantee inmates success in litigation and it does not exempt them from the same pretrial procedures for weeding out non-meritorious cases that apply to all other civil litigants. In this case, a statute bars suits between coemployees for injuries suffered on the job. Any suit brought in violation of the statute is subject to an affirmative defense based on it, regardless of whether the plaintiff is an inmate exercising his rights under Payne or a non-inmate exercising the ordinary rights of a citizen. Here, Wilson appeared in this action, was represented by competent counsel, and fully litigated the summary judgment motion Obedoza brought against him. He fails to demonstrate how the trial court, simply by finding that his claim was barred by sections 3370 and 3601, could have violated any inmate due process or equal protection right recognized in Payne or any other case.
B. Consent to Workers Compensation Claim
In his response to Obedozas summary judgment motion, Wilson asserted that the following additional facts set forth in his opposition declaration were material: On October 3, 2001, when he first felt a burning sensation in his eye, Wilson followed the instructions delineated in "Material Safety Data Sheets" posted in the laundry. He rinsed out his eye in the nearest sink for approximately 15 minutes, and then informed his supervisor, Dave Hendrix, that he needed to get to the infirmary. Hendrix instructed Wilson to first sign a workers compensation claim form. Wilson complied because Hendrix and the laundry clerk told him the form must be signed before going to the clinic. Wilson did not read the paperwork and did not ask any questions about it.
The form Wilson signed appears to be a standard form issued by the workers compensation division of the California Department of Industrial Relations, captioned "Employees Claim for Workers Compensation Benefits." Nothing on the form suggests that it was intended for inmate use only. The form includes blanks to fill in the address, date, and time where the injury occurred, a description of the injury, and the identity of the employer and the employers insurer. The blanks were filled in with typed information in this case. Assuming Wilson signed the form immediately after reporting his eye problem, as he alleges, the information must have been typed in after he signed it. State law requires employers to provide employees with workers compensation claim forms promptly after obtaining notice or knowledge of an injury at work. (§ 5401, subd. (a).)
Wilson argues at length that his signature on the workers compensation claim form was not valid. He maintains that the form itself did not comply with statutory requirements, and that his signature was vitiated by procedural and substantive unconscionability, undue influence, coercion, and duress. But Wilson fails to explain why the validity of his signature is material here. Obedozas motion for summary judgment was neither brought nor granted on the theory that the suit was barred because Wilson had voluntarily applied for workers compensation benefits. The theory of the motion was that workers compensation was Wilsons sole and exclusive remedy for his injury. Whether or not Wilson freely and voluntarily chose to pursue that remedy was immaterial.
The statutes upon which Obedozas motion was based—primarily, sections 3370 and 3601—do not give injured workers a right to elect between taking workers compensation benefits or initiating a private tort suit against a coemployee tortfeasor. Those statutes provide that workers compensation is the injured workers sole and exclusive remedy whenever the conditions of compensation concur. The only choice the employee has is between the workers compensation remedy and no remedy at all.
Wilson cites sections 5400, 5401, subdivision (c), and 5705, but these sections merely describe the claim-filing requirements that must be met by the claimant in order for the claimants employer to be liable for paying workers compensation benefits. A claimants failure to comply with these provisions may relieve the employer of liability under the workers compensation system, but it does not give the employee any remedy outside of that system.
It is Wilsons burden to establish error. He has failed to provide authority or any convincing argument supporting his claim that the voluntariness of his signature on the workers compensation claim is a material factual issue requiring a trial.
C. Violation of Public Policy and Denial of Redress
Wilson argues rather broadly that "[b]arring [his] medical malpractice suit against Dr. Obedoza leaves [him] without any redress," and is "substantially unjust . . . because of his unique situation as an inmate." According to Wilson, his "unique situation" consisted of the fact that he purportedly believed he might face discipline, including an increase in his prison time and a denial of medical care for his eye, by not signing the claim form.
For the reasons stated above, whether Wilson knowingly and voluntarily signed the claim form is not material to the case before us. Under section 3370, workers compensation was his exclusive remedy "for injuries occurring while engaged in assigned work," whether or not he chose to claim its benefits. As demonstrated by its enactment of section 3370, the Legislature has not deemed inmate employees to be so unique or the workers compensation benefits for which they are eligible so inadequate that they must be left free to pursue remedies foreclosed to other workers.
While it is true that Wilson was not eligible for cash benefits while incarcerated, an inmate is not in the same position as an injured worker who suffers a loss of income due to full or partial disability and who may need to incur added out-of-pocket medical expenses as a result of his injury. While incarcerated, Wilson was not dependent on work for his livelihood and he had access to free medical care for his injury. He has not come forward with any evidence that he suffered any compensable cash loss for workers compensation purposes during his confinement. Once he was out of prison, Wilson was eligible for cash benefits if he timely applied for them and met the same disability requirements that would apply to any other claimant. (§ 3370, subd. (a)(3), (5).)
Wilson fails to explain why this system left him "without any redress" or in what way applying the system to him was contrary to the policy behind the workers compensation law. That policy, as explained in our state Constitution, is to provide an expeditious, inexpensive means to compensate workers for injury or disability sustained in the course of their employment, without having to litigate the fault of any party. (Cal. Const., art. XIV, § 4.) "[T]he legal theory supporting [the workers compensation] exclusive remedy provisions is a presumed `compensation bargain, pursuant to which the employer assumes liability for industrial personal injury or death without regard to fault in exchange for limitations on the amount of that liability. The employee is afforded relatively swift and certain payment of benefits to cure or relieve the effects of industrial injury without having to prove fault but, in exchange, gives up the wider range of damages potentially available in tort. [Citations.] The function of the exclusive remedy provisions is to give efficacy to the theoretical `compensation bargain." (Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 16.)
Here, it is Wilson, not Obedoza, who seeks to abrogate the workers compensation bargain by claiming damages—emotional distress, pain and suffering, and punitive damages—that are not compensable under the workers compensation system, and by resorting to litigation to fix fault on a third party. Wilson has not set forth any facts or legal theory to establish that enforcement of the workers compensation bargain against him would be fundamentally unfair or unlawful.
D. False Imprisonment
In Fermino v. Fedco, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 701 (Fermino), the California Supreme Court held that an employees suit for false imprisonment against her former employer was not barred by the exclusivity provisions of the workers compensation law. (Id. at p. 706.) The salient allegations of the employees suit in Fermino were that the plaintiff, a store sales clerk, was taken to a windowless interrogation room at work where managers and security agents prevented her from leaving for more than an hour, accused her of stealing, threatened to have her arrested and charged with the crime unless she confessed, and claimed there were witnesses against her, before finally releasing her and telling her that there were no witnesses and her interrogators believed she was innocent. (Id. at pp. 706-707.) The court held that "[w]hen an employer forcibly and criminally deprives an employee of her liberty, even as a means to otherwise legitimate ends, it steps outside its `proper role, [as an employer]" and its action falls outside the workers compensation bargain, subjecting it to liability in tort to its employee. (Id. at pp. 721-723.)
In our view, Fermino has absolutely no relevance here. First, the sole defendant in this case is Dr. Obedoza. Neither Wilsons former employer nor his work supervisor, who are the parties he holds responsible for his alleged false imprisonment, are part of this lawsuit. As to Obedoza, Wilson alleges medical negligence only, not false imprisonment. Second, there is no plausible similarity or analogy between the factual assertions Wilson makes about his former supervisors conduct and the allegations at issue in Fermino. Reduced to its essentials, Wilson is merely alleging that he believed he faced the threat of disciplinary action if he did not sign the claim form, not that any such threat was ever made. This is far from the criminal deprivation of liberty that the Supreme Court was concerned with in Fermino. Wilsons alleged fear was entirely unreasonable in any event. His supervisor had no motivation to punish him for failing to sign the claim form because, as discussed earlier, the only effect of Wilsons failure to sign would have been the loss of his right to claim workers compensation benefits. Wilsons supervisor and his employer had no stake in forcing him to sign the form other than as proof that he had been informed of his workers compensation rights if he later denied it.
Wilsons asserted facts regarding false imprisonment, even if true, fail to create a triable issue of material fact.
E. Coemployee Immunity
Wilson claims that he and Obedoza are not coemployees for purposes of section 3601 because, according to the PIAs Web site, the PIA is a "semiautonomous state agency" that operates prison industries "in a manner similar to private industry." (<;http://www.pia.ca.gov/aboutpia.html> [as of Apr. 23, 2009].) He points out that the PIA is governed by a Prison Industry Board (PIB) that, according to its Web site, functions "much like a corporate board of directors." PIA expenses and revenues go into a prison industries revolving fund rather than into the states general fund, which funds the CDCR. (Pen. Code, § 2804; Gov. Code, § 16300 et seq.)
We are not convinced. While the PIA may have its own board and revolving fund, the statutory framework under which it exists places it firmly within the CDCR. Thus, Penal Code section 2800 provides as follows: "Commencing July 1, 2005, there is hereby continued in existence within the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation the Prison Industry Authority." (Italics added.) Government Code section 12838, subdivision (a) provides: "The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation shall consist of Adult Operations, Adult Programs, Juvenile Justice, the Corrections Standards Authority, the Board of Parole Hearings, the State Commission on Juvenile Justice, the Prison Industry Authority, and the Prison Industry Board." (See also Pen. Code, § 2802.) By law the PIB is chaired by the secretary of the CDCR, and all of its members are appointed by the Governor, other officials of the executive branch, and the Legislature. (Pen. Code, §§ 2802, 2803.)
Until amended in 2005, former Penal Code section 5001 had provided that the PIA was part of the Department of Corrections. As part of a governmental reorganization in that year, the Department of Corrections was renamed the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, and the above language continuing the status of the PIA and PIB as components of the CDCR was placed into Penal Code section 2800 and Government Code section 12838. (Stats. 2005, ch. 10, §§ 6, 16, 33.)
In our view, inmates who work in PIA programs and doctors who work in CDCR medical clinics are in fact both working for the CDCR and for the State of California, for workers compensation purposes. (See Colombo v. State of California (1991) 3 Cal.App.4th 594 [highway patrol officer injured on the job could not sue the California Department of Transportation (DOT) for negligence because the California Highway Patrol and DOT are not separate entities]; Walker v. San Francisco (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 901 [family of firefighter killed in collision with streetcar could not sue City and County of San Francisco (CCSF) because firefighter and streetcar operator were both employees of CCSF]; Riddell v. State of California (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1607, 1611 [DOT and California Department of Health Services "are simply two parts of the same entity: the State of California"].) Wilson fails to demonstrate that there is a triable issue of material fact as to whether he and Obedoza were coemployees for purposes of section 3601.
This case is factually indistinguishable from Hendy v. Losse (1991) 54 Cal.3d 723 (Hendy). The California Supreme Court held in Hendy that a professional football player injured while playing in a regular season game could not maintain an action for medical malpractice against the team physician, based on the physicians alleged failure to properly diagnose and treat the players knee injury. The Hendy court explained the basis for its ruling as follows: "The conditions necessary to invoke the immunity granted by section 3601 are present here since both the original injury and the alleged aggravation arose out of and in the course of plaintiffs employment and `at the time of the injury, [plaintiff was] performing service growing out of and incidental to his . . . employment and [was] acting within the course of his . . . employment. In addition `the injury [was] proximately caused by the employment . . . . (§ 3600, subd. (a)(2) & (3).) Since the conditions of section 3600 were met, and defendant was acting within the scope of his employment when he diagnosed and/or treated plaintiff, section 3601, by its express terms, makes workers compensation plaintiffs exclusive remedy." (Id. at pp. 740-741.)
In our view, the disposition of this case is controlled by Hendy. Contrary to Wilsons suggestion, the fact that Obedoza treated him for an eye infection rather than for his true, work-related chemical exposure does not mean that his aggravated injury did not arise out of his employment, or was not proximately caused by it. Wilson was brought in to see Obedoza because he complained of a work-related injury. Obedozas misdiagnosis does not break that causal relationship. Proximate cause existed because Obedoza allegedly injured Wilson by aggravating his work-related injury, just as in Hendy. Furthermore, Dr. Obedoza was clearly acting within the course and scope of his employment when he diagnosed and treated Wilson. He saw Wilson during normal business hours in the medical clinic in which he worked and was acting for the employer, providing treatment the employer was obligated to provide, when he did so. (Hendy, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 740.) Thus, all of the conditions for section 3601 to apply and to immunize Obedoza from suit applied in this case. (Id. at pp. 740-741.)
Finally, the dual capacity doctrine has no relevance here. The nature and evolution of that doctrine were explained in Hendy, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pages 729-739. The dual capacity doctrine "`holds that if the employer occupies toward his employee a second relationship that imposes obligations different from those he has undertaken in his capacity as employer, he may be liable in tort in the event the employee is injured as a result of the violation of those distinct obligations. The rule has [for example] been applied to cases in which the . . . employer steps out of his role as employer by providing [negligent] medical care to the employee [citations]." (Id. at p. 732, quoting Jones v. Kaiser Industries Corp. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 552, 560.) The doctrine was sharply curtailed in 1982 by legislative amendments made to section 3602. (Hendy, at pp. 735-736.) Most importantly for our purposes, although some early cases had extended the dual capacity doctrine to find employee physicians liable along with their employers, Hendy makes it clear that once section 3601 was amended in 1959 to provide a separate immunity for employees acting within the scope of their employment, the dual capacity doctrine per se no longer had any bearing on the potential liability of a coemployee, including that of a coemployee physician. (Hendy, at pp. 735, 737-738, 741.) Instead, the critical issue in determining the coemployee physicians liability under section 3601 is whether the physician acted outside the scope of his or her employment. (Hendy, at pp. 741-742.) As Hendy explains: "`"[T]he purpose of section 3601 is to make workmens compensation the exclusive remedy of an injured workman against his employer. That purpose would be defeated if a right of action existed against a fellow employee acting in the scope of his employment in such a way that the fellow employees negligence could be imputed to the employer. For that reason workmens compensation was also made the exclusive remedy against a fellow workman `acting within the scope of his employment."" (Id. at p. 740, quoting Saala v. McFarland (1965) 63 Cal.2d 124, 130.) For the reasons stated above, Wilson fails to create a triable issue of material fact as to whether Obedoza was acting within the scope of his employment when he treated him.
Because the dual capacity doctrine does not apply, Wilsons argument that the malpractice occurred after and independently of his work injury also fails. Sturtevant v. County of Monterey (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 758 is inapposite in that regard, because the only issue before the court in that case was the employers liability, not the coemployee physicians. (Id. at p. 761 & fn. 2.)
There are no triable issues of material fact and summary judgment was properly granted.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur:
Marchiano, P.J.
Graham, J.