Opinion
3:23-cv-00263-DNH-TWD
05-04-2023
QUINTIN L. WILSON, Plaintiff, v. SGT. DANIEL FLANDERS et al., Defendants.
APPEARANCES: QUINTIN L. WILSON Plaintiff, pro se
APPEARANCES:
QUINTIN L. WILSON
Plaintiff, pro se
ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
THERESE WILEY DANCKS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
The Clerk has sent the Court a civil rights complaint filed by Quintin L. Wilson (“Plaintiff”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 1-5.) Plaintiff has also filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (Dkt. No. 6.) For the following reasons, the Court grants Plaintiff's IFP application for purposes of initial review and recommends dismissal of the complaint in its entirety.
The Court reads Dkt. Nos. 1 and 1-5 together as Plaintiff's complaint in recognition of Plaintiff's pro se status.
I. IFP APPLICATION
Plaintiff has not paid the filing fee for this action and seeks leave to proceed IFP. (Dkt. No. 6.) After reviewing Plaintiff's application, this Court finds he is financially eligible for IFP status. Therefore, Plaintiff's IFP application is granted for purposes of initial review.
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff initiated this action against Sgt. Daniel Flanders, Judge Joseph F. Cawley, Jr., Alexander Czebiniak, Christopher D. Grace, and Judge Kevin Dooley on February 28, 2023. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 1-5.) The Court takes judicial notice Judge Kevin Dooley was a Broome County Criminal Court Judge from 2014 to February 2022; Judge Joseph F. Cawley, Jr., has been a Broome County Judge since 2008; and Alexander Czebiniak is an Assistant District Attorney for Broome County.
Jim Ehmke, Broome County Court Judge Kevin Dooley retires, Binghamton Home Page (Feb, 25, 2022, 5:28PM), https://www.binghamtonhomepage.com/news/broome-county-court-judgekevin- dooley-retires/.
6th JD - BROOME COUNTY, NYCOURTS.GOV, https://ww2.nycourts.gov/courts/6jd/broome/county.shtml (last visited May 1, 2023); The Honorable Joseph F. Cawley, Trellis, https://trellis.law/judge/joseph.f.cawley (last visited May 1, 2023.)
Alexander John Czebiniak, OPENGOVNY, https://opengovny.com/attorney/5931654 (last visited May 1, 2023.)
Plaintiff has filed a threadbare, conclusory complaint making it difficult for the Court to discern his claims. See id. From this complaint, however, the Court gleans the following. Plaintiff is suing Sgt. Flanders for “assaulting [him] at [his] home on the porch which put [him] in fear for [his] life” and which caused him to go into “Flight or Fight” on June 1, 2021. (Dkt. No. 1 at 1.) He is suing Judge Dooley, Judge Cawley, Alexander Czebiniak, and Christopher D. Grace for violations of his due process, speedy trial, Sixth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Dkt. No. 1 at 1-2, Dkt. No. 1-5 at 2.) Plaintiff lists his first cause of action as “monetary relief” and “$1,000,00.00”; his second cause of action as “$750,000.00”; and his third cause of action as “$500,000.00.” (Dkt. No. 1-5 at 4.) Plaintiff requests “monetary relief” from the Court. (Dkt. No. 1-5 at 5.)
III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE COMPLAINT
A. Legal Standard
Under Section 1915(e), the Court must dismiss a complaint filed IFP if it determines that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998).The Court must also dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest claims that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006).
Unless otherwise indicated, in quoting cases, all alterations, internal quotation marks, emphases, footnotes, and citations are omitted. See, e.g., Sczepanski v. Saul, 946 F.3d 152, 157 n.4 (2d Cir. 2020).
A claim is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (holding that “a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible”); Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437 (“[A]n action is ‘frivolous' when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless . . . or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.”).
To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement of the claim must be “plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The statement of the claim must do more than present “an unadorned, the-defendant-harmed-me accusation.” Id. It must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
In determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, “the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994). “[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. No. 1.) “To state a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege that the challenged conduct (1) was attributable to a person acting under color of state law, and (2) deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Whalen v. Cty. of Fulton, 126 F.3d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1997). “Section 1983 itself creates no substantive rights; it provides only a procedure for redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere.” Sykes v. James, 13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1993).
Moreover, a court should not dismiss a pro se complaint “without giving leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, an opportunity to amend is not required where “the problem with [the plaintiff's] causes of action is substantive” such that “better pleading will not cure it.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000).
B. Claims Against Alexander Czebiniak
Prosecutors are immune from civil suit for damages in their individual capacities for acts committed within the scope of their official duties where the challenged activities are not investigative in nature but, rather, are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Simon v. City of New York, 727 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 (“[I]n initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages under § 1983.”); see also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993) (absolute immunity is analyzed under a “functional approach” that “looks to the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In addition, prosecutors are immune from suit for acts that may be administrative obligations but are “directly connected with the conduct of a trial.” Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 344 (2009).
In short, absolute prosecutorial immunity covers “acts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an advocate for the State.” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273. This includes “the decision to bring charges against a defendant, presenting evidence to a grand jury, and the evaluation of evidence prior to trial.” Moye v. City of New York, No. 11 Civ. 316, 2012 WL 2569085, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2012) (quoting Johnson v. City of New York, No. 00 CIV 3626, 2000 WL 1335865, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2000)). Immunity even extends to “the falsification of evidence and the coercion of witnesses,” Taylor v. Kavanagh, 640 F.2d 450, 452 (2d Cir. 1981) (citing Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 321-22 (2d Cir. 1980)), “the knowing use of perjured testimony,” “the deliberate withholding of exculpatory information,” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.34, the “making [of] false or defamatory statements in judicial proceedings,” Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 490 (1991), and “conspiring to present false evidence at a criminal trial,” Dory v. Ryan, 25 F.3d 81, 83 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Verbeek v. Teller, 158 F.Supp.2d 267, 282 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (granting motion to dismiss claims against prosecutorial official because conspiracy allegation does not “negate her entitlement to absolute immunity”) (citing Dory, 25 F.3d at 83).
Moreover, “‘[w]hen prosecuting a criminal matter, a district attorney in New York State, acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, represents the State not the county.'” Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 536 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Baez v. Hennessy, 853 F.2d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1014 (1989)); see also Rich v. New York, No. 21-CV-3835, 2022 WL 992885, at *5 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 20221) (“[A]ny claims Plaintiff may raise against the [District Attorney] Defendants in their ‘official capacity' would be precluded by immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.”); Gentry v. New York, No. 21-CV-0319, 2021 WL 3037709 (GTS/ML), at *6 (N.D.N.Y. June 14, 2021) (recommending dismissal of the plaintiff's claims against the defendant assistant district attorneys in their official capacities-which were effectively claims against the State of New York-as barred by the Eleventh Amendment), adopted by, 2021 WL 3032691 (N.D.N.Y. July 19, 2021).
Although the allegations in the complaint do not clarify the context of Plaintiff's claims, Plaintiff appears to complain Alexander Czebiniak violated Plaintiff's due process, speedy trial, Sixth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment rights while performing his official duties as a prosecutor. (See generally Dkt. No. 1 at 2.) Simon, 727 F.3d at 171. Here, Plaintiff's allegations against Alexander Czebiniak clearly relate to non-investigative actions taken by Alexander Czebiniak in his official capacity as a prosecutor, and, therefore, he is entitled to prosecutorial immunity. Simon, 727 F.3d at 171; see, e.g., Matthews v. Cnty. of Cayuga, No. 5:17-CV-1004 (MAD/TWD), 2018 WL 2926272, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. June 8, 2018) (dismissing claims against prosecutor on initial review because of prosecutorial immunity). Thus, Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against Alexander Czebiniak fail as a matter of law.
Therefore, the Court recommends that Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against Defendant Alexander Czebiniak, an Assistant District Attorney for Broome County, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e), 1915A.
C. Claims Against Judge Dooley and Judge Cawley
It is well-settled judges are absolutely immune from suit for damages for judicial acts performed in their judicial capacities. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Generally, “acts arising out of, or related to, individual cases before the judge are considered judicial in nature.” Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009). Absolute immunity protects judges for their judicial acts, even when such acts “are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978). This is because “[w]ithout insulation from liability, judges would be subject to harassment and intimidation[.]” Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1994). This is true however erroneous an act may have been and however injurious its consequences were to the plaintiff. Id.
Although the allegations in the complaint do not clarify the context of Plaintiff's claims, Plaintiff appears to complain Judge Dooley and Judge Cawley violated his due process, speedy trial, Sixth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment rights while performing their official duties as judges. (See generally Dkt. No. 1 at 1-2.) Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11. Here, Plaintiff's allegations against Judge Dooley and Judge Cawley clearly relate to actions that are judicial in nature and, therefore, they are entitled to judicial immunity. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11; see, e.g., Hardy-Graham v. Southampton Just. Ct., No. 20-CV-0981(JS) (SIL), 2021 WL 260102, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2021) (dismissing claims against a New York State court judge on initial review because of judicial immunity); United States v. Bommer, No. 1:19-CV-00823 EAW, 2020 WL 1963159, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2020) (same). Thus, Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against Judge Dooley and Judge Cawley fail as a matter of law.
Consequently, the Court recommends that all claims against Judge Dooley and Judge Cawley be dismissed with prejudice as Plaintiff seeks relief from defendants immune from suit under Section 1983. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e), 1915A.
D. Claims Against Christopher D. Grace
“To prevail on a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) that some person has deprived him of a federal right, and (2) that the person who has deprived him of that right acted under color of state law.” Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 84 (2d Cir. 2005). “[P]rivate individuals . . . cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 absent a plausible allegation that they acted under color of state law.” Basile v. Connolly, 538 Fed.Appx. 5, 7 (2d Cir. 2013). Private conduct is simply beyond the reach of Section 1983 “no matter how discriminatory or wrongful that conduct may be.” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999). A conclusory allegation that a private individual acted in concert with a state actor does not constitute a plausible allegation that the private individual acted under color of state law. See Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 324 (2d Cir. 2002); see, e.g., Asensio v. DiFiore, No. 18-CV-10933 (RA), 2019 WL 4392743, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2019) (concluding the plaintiff's “conclusory allegations” of conspiracy were “plainly insufficient to support a finding that [the defendant] has acted under color of state law.”); Bornschein v. Herman, 304 F.Supp.3d 296, 301 (N.D.N.Y. 2018) (same). Here, Plaintiff has not made any plausible allegation that Christopher D. Grace acted under the color of state law.
Further, insofar as Plaintiff seeks to impose liability on Christopher D. Grace, presumably as Plaintiff's criminal defense attorney, based on the allegations in the current complaint, such claims are not plausible because attorneys, whether court appointed or privately retained, are generally not state actors for purposes of Section 1983. See, e.g., Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); see also Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 65-66 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[I]t is well-established that court-appointed attorneys performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to [a] defendant [in a criminal proceeding] do not act ‘under color of state law' and therefore are not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”).
As such, Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against Christopher D. Grace are inadequately pled because he has failed to allege Christopher D. Grace acted under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Velez, 401 F.3d at 84. The undersigned accordingly recommends dismissing all of Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against Christopher D. Grace on the grounds that they are inadequately pled and frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437; Walker v. Rivera, No. 1:22-CV-560 (DNH/TWD), 2022 WL 2341544, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. June 29, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:22-CV-560, 2022 WL 2805477 (N.D.N.Y. July 18, 2022).
E. Claim Against Sergeant Flanders
Construed liberally, Plaintiff asserts a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against Sgt. Flanders. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 1-5.) “The Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable seizures prohibits the use of excessive force by police officers in arresting suspects. To establish a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim, Plaintiff must show that the force used by the officer was ‘objectively unreasonable.'” Correa v. McLeod, No. 3:17CV1059 (VLB), 2017 WL 2962884, at *3 (D. Conn. July 11, 2017). Determining whether the force is “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of “the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests” against the governmental interests at stake. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). A court shall consider “the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the [arrestee] poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id.
Simply put, “‘[n]ot every push or shove' amounts to a Fourth Amendment violation. Indeed, a ‘de minimis use of force will rarely suffice to state a Constitutional claim.'” Acosta v. City of New York, No. 11 Civ. 856(KBF), 2012 WL 1506954, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2012) (citing Romano v. Howarth, 998 F.2d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 2005)). Moreover, a plaintiff must allege that he sustained an injury. Wims v. N.Y.C. Police Dep't, No. 10 Civ. 6128, 2011 WL 2946369, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2011). “However, an individual does not need to sustain a severe injury to maintain a claim.” Id. (citing Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 924 (2d Cir. 1987) (“If the force used was unreasonable and excessive, the plaintiff may recover even if the injuries inflicted were not permanent or severe.”)).
Here, Plaintiff has not provided “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that he is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Instead, he advances the general claim that Sgt. Flanders violated his constitutional rights by “assaulting” him on his porch, putting him in “fear for [his] life” which put him in “Flight or Fight” mode on June 1, 2021, in Binghamton, New York. (Dkt. No. 1 at 1.) Plaintiff's allegation against Sgt. Flanders is conclusory and simply devoid of facts to support an excessive force claim. He has also not pled that he sustained any injuries. Thus, the Court recommends dismissal of the claim without prejudice for failure to state a claim.
F. Whether to Permit Amendment
A pro se complaint should not be dismissed “without giving leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Gomez, 171 F.3d at 795 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). An opportunity to amend is not required where “the problem with [the plaintiff's] causes of action is substantive” such that “better pleading will not cure it.” Cuoco, 222 F.3d at 112.
In this case, it is not clear whether better pleading would permit Plaintiff to cure the deficiencies identified above. Nevertheless, out of deference to Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court recommends that he be granted leave to amend to cure the deficiencies identified above, except with regard to any claims against Judge Dooley and Judge Cawley, who are entitled to judicial immunity, and Alexander Czebiniak, who is entitled to prosecutorial immunity.
WHEREFORE, for these reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiff's IFP application (Dkt. No. 6) is GRANTED solely for purposes of initial review; and it is further
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's claims against Judge Dooley, Judge Cawley, and Alexander Czebiniak (Dkt. No. 1) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AND WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e), 1915A; and it is further
RECOMMENDED that the remaining claims against Sgt. Flanders and Christopher D. Grace be DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A; and it is further
Should Plaintiff be granted leave to amend, any amended complaint must comply with Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 10.1. Any amended complaint must be a complete pleading which will supersede and replace the original complaint in its entirety. Any amended complaint submitted by Plaintiff must set forth all of the claims he intends to assert against the defendants and must demonstrate that a case or controversy exists between Plaintiff and the defendants which Plaintiff has a legal right to pursue and over which this Court has jurisdiction. “[C]omplaints relying on the civil rights statutes are insufficient unless they contain some specific allegations of fact indicating a deprivation of rights, instead of a litany of general conclusions that shock but have no meaning.” Hunt v. Budd, 895 F.Supp. 35, 38 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (McAvoy, J.) (quoting Barr v. Abrams, 810 F.2d 358, 363 (2d Cir. 1987)).
ORDERED that the Clerk serve a copy of this Order and Report-Recommendation on Plaintiff, along with a copy of the unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with the Second Circuit's decision in Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW . Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, 6(a).
If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order and Report-Recommendation by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the Order and Report-Recommendation was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a)(1)(C).
IT IS SO ORDERED.