Opinion
3:24-cv-05069-DGE
06-10-2024
BRENT ARTHUR WILSON, Plaintiff, v. LAUREN ERICKSON et al., Defendant.
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (DKT. NO. 9)
David G. Estudillo United States District Judge
This matter comes before the Court on the Report and Recommendation of the Honorable David W. Christel, United States Magistrate Judge. (Dkt. No. 9.) Judge Christel reviewed Plaintiff Brent Arthur Wilson's pending application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and proposed complaint, finding the complaint to be deficient. (Dkt. No. 5.) Judge Christel notified Wilson of the deficiencies and granted him until May 15, 2024 to cure those deficiencies. (Dkt. Nos. 6, 7.) Wilson filed a response to the order. (Dkt. No. 8.) Judge Christel determined that response did not cure the deficiencies in the complaint and issued a Report and Recommendation recommending this Court dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim and deny the IFP application as moot. (Dkt. No. 9.) Wilson timely filed objections to the Report and Recommendation. (Dkt. No. 10.)
A district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's disposition to which a party has properly objected. The district judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3). Nevertheless, objections to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation are not an appropriate vehicle to rehash or re-litigate the points considered and resolved by the magistrate judge. See, e.g., El Papel LLC v. Inslee, 2021 WL 71678, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 8, 2021) (“Because the Court finds that nearly all objections are merely a rehash of arguments already raised and decided upon by the Magistrate Judge, the Court will not address each objection here.”); Aslanyan v. Herzog, 2014 WL 7272437, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 17, 2014) (rejecting a challenge to a magistrate judge's report and recommendations when “all of [plaintiff's] objections simply rehash arguments contained in his amended opening memorandum or in his reply memorandum”).
Wilson objects to Judge Christel's finding regarding Wilson's IFP deficiency, directing this Court to consider his response dated April 22, 2024. (Dkt. No. 10 at 1.) In that response, Wilson appears to instruct the court to strike the IFP application as moot and furnish to Plaintiff a “‘dividend statement' supported under the Banking Act of 1933 and said IRSC compliance.” (Dkt. No. 8 at 3.) Plaintiff argues the complaint should proceed not in forma pauperis, but “In Internal Revenues Serv. Compliance[,]” appearing to suggest the Court collect the filing fee from one of Plaintiff's investments or some other government body or financial institution. (Id. at 5.) It is the responsibility of Plaintiff, not the Court, to procure the filing fee if his IFP application is denied or otherwise withdrawn. See LCR 3(b), (c). Wilson's objection is OVERRULED.
Wilson's objections contain no other challenges to Judge Christel's findings regarding the remaining defects in his complaint. (Dkt. No. 10.) Wilson requests the Court set the deadline for the filing of an amended complaint to June 15, 2024. (Dkt. No. 8 at 5.) But with no filing fee paid, and no approved application for IFP, Wilson's case cannot continue. Moreover, Plaintiff's objections fail to identify the factual or legal basis Plaintiff offers to cure the deficiencies in the original proposed complaint as identified by Judge Christel.
Accordingly, and having considered the Report and Recommendation, Plaintiff's objections, and the remainder of the record de novo, the Court finds and ORDERS that the Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED. Plaintiff's objections are OVERRULED and his complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice.