Opinion
No. CIV 04-1184 MCA/RLP.
November 14, 2006
ORDER
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendant Virginia Cruise's Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, to Set Aside Entry of Default and Default Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support [Doc. 24], filed October 2, 2006 and Plaintiffs' Motion to Delay Response and for Leave to Conduct Limited Discovery [Doc. 25], filed October 20, 2006. Having considered the parties' submissions, the relevant law, and otherwise being fully advised in the premises, the Court holds in abeyance Defendant Virginia Cruise's Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, to Set Aside Entry of Default and Default Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support and grants Plaintiffs' Motion to Delay Response and for Leave to Conduct Limited Discovery.
The relevant facts underlying this personal-injury action are set forth in the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order of April 10, 2006 and need not be repeated in full here. [See Doc. 20]. For purposes of the instant motions, it is sufficient to note that the Court entered a default judgment in the amount of $886,653.00 against Defendant Virginia Carlene Cruise on April 10, 2006 following the Clerk of Court's January 4, 2006 entry of default against Cruise and a hearing on damages, held March 22, 2006. [See Docs. 14, 20, 21]. Cruise now moves to dismiss or to set aside the entry of default and the default judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that complete diversity of citizenship is lacking because at the time the action was filed, she, like Plaintiffs Dennis and Madeline Wilson, was a domiciliary of the State of New Mexico, having relocated to Albuquerque from Texas. [See Doc. 24 at 5]. The Wilsons have moved to delay their response to Cruise's motion and for leave to conduct limited discovery related to the motion. [Doc. 25]. Cruise opposes the Wilsons' request. [Doc. 27].
At the hearing, the Court expressly found, among other things, that Cruise had been properly served but had failed to answer the Complaint or otherwise appear in this action at any time and was in default. [See Doc. 20 at 1-2].
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and "have only the power that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto." Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). Where, as here, an action comes before the Court by virtue of the diversity-of-citizenship statute, the proponent of federal subject matter jurisdiction establishes such jurisdiction by demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that complete diversity of citizenship exists between the parties and that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Radil v. Sanborn Western Camps, Inc., 384 F.3d 1220, 1225 (10th Cir. 2004); see also McCann v. Newman Irrevocable Trust, 458 F.3d 281, 286 (3rd Cir. 2006) (discussing preponderance-of-the-evidence standard). When the Court evaluates a claim of diversity jurisdiction, it must look to the well-pleaded allegations on the face of the Complaint and, if those allegations are insufficient to find diversity jurisdiction, the Court may also look to other facts developed in the record. See Penteco Corp. Ltd. P'ship-1985A v. Union Gas Sys., Inc., 929 F.2d 1519, 1521 (10th Cir. 1991).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
For purposes of diversity jurisdiction under § 1332(a)(1), state citizenship is the equivalent of domicile. To effect a change in domicile, two things are indispensable: (1) residence in a new domicile, and (2) the intention to remain there indefinitely. Crowley v. Glaze, 710 F.2d 676, 678 (10th Cir. 1983). As explained above, in this case Cruise questions the Court's subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that complete diversity of citizenship is lacking. See United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians v. State of Okl. ex rel. Moss, 927 F.2d 1170, 1173 n. 8 (10th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he issue of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time."). According to Cruise, the additional limited discovery requested by the Wilsons is unnecessary because at the time they filed their Complaint, Cruise, formerly of Texas, was residing in New Mexico. In support of her argument against allowing additional discovery, Cruise cites the Court to several cases stating that citizenship is measured as of the time a party files suit. See Hassan v. Allen, 1998 WL 339996, at *6 (10th Cir. June 24, 1998) ([I]t is more than well-settled that a party's citizenship, i.e., his domicile, must be determined as of the moment the plaintiff's complaint is filed, and events either before or after the filing of the complaint will not defeat citizenship); see also Chaara v. Intel Corp., 410 F.Supp.2d 1080 (D.N.M. 2005).
That citizenship or domicile is determined as of the time the Complaint is filed, however, does not prevent the Court from considering information relevant to a party's status prior to the initiation of litigation. Indeed, as another district court has explained,
Plaintiff's argument that he has no obligation to provide any information concerning his citizenship, other than that selected information that may be relevant only on the date of his filing an action . . . rings a sour note for the reason that such a restriction would effectively cutoff any inquiry into plaintiff's intentions to indefinitely remain at a particular residence. We know that the key to determining "intention to remain" requires a close inspection of a person's course of conduct. In this regard, we have found no court which limited its inquiry into issues of diversity jurisdiction to the date of the filing of the action. Quite the contrary, the courts have regularly held that since "intent is crucial" to the determination of one's domicile, an approach which looks to the totality of the evidence is required.Perry v. Pogemiller, 146 F.R.D. 164, 167 (N.D.Ill. 1993) (emphasis added); see also Chaara, 410 F.Supp.2d at 1096-97 (considering such factors as (1) plaintiff's decision to move his entire family from New Mexico to Colorado; (2) the place where plaintiff paid property taxes; (3) admissions plaintiff made on a uniform residential loan application; (4) the location of plaintiff's primary care physician; and (5) statements plaintiff had made during proceedings before the New Mexico Human Rights Commission in determining whether plaintiff intended to remain in Colorado or return to New Mexico at time he filed suit).
In the instant action, Cruise has submitted various forms of documentation she contends proves she was a domiciliary of New Mexico at the time the Wilsons filed their Complaint. [See Doc. 24; Exhs. A-G]. The Court, however, concludes that a more satisfactory showing of the facts would better assist it in determining whether complete diversity — and, therefore, subject matter jurisdiction — exists here. For that reason, the Court will grant the Wilsons' motion to delay their response to Cruise's motion to dismiss or set aside the entry of default and default judgment and allow the Wilsons additional limited jurisdictional discovery. See Health Grades, Inc. v. Decatur Mem'l Hosp., 2006 WL 1704454, at * 3 (10th Cir. June 22, 2006) ("While the district court has broad discretion in determining whether to permit jurisdictional discovery, a refusal to grant discovery constitutes an abuse of discretion if either the pertinent jurisdictional facts are controverted or a more satisfactory showing of the facts is necessary."); Sizova v. Nat. Inst. of Standards Tech., 282 F.3d 1320, 1326 (10th Cir. 2002) ("When a defendant moves to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, either party should be allowed discovery on the factual issues raised by that motion.") (internal quotation omitted).
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Defendant Virginia Cruise's Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, to Set Aside Entry of Default and Default Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support [Doc. 24] is HELD IN ABEYANCE;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion to Delay Response and for Leave to Conduct Limited Discovery [Doc. 25] is GRANTED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs shall have three months from the date of entry of this Order in which to conduct and complete additional limited jurisdictional discovery and file a response to Defendant Virginia Cruise's Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, to Set Aside Entry of Default and Default Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support. SO ORDERED in Albuquerque, New Mexico.