Opinion
CV-23-00008-TUC-JGZ (JR)
11-02-2023
Travis Wilson, Plaintiff, v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
HONORABLE JACQUELINE M. RATEAU UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Travis Wilson (“Wilson”) brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), seeking judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”). (Doc. 1.) This matter, on referral to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for Report and Recommendation, is ripe for decision. (Doc. 13, 18, 22.) As more fully set forth below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the district court reverse the ALJ's decision and remand the matter to the agency for further proceedings.
Wilson did not file a reply brief and the time for filing a reply brief has elapsed.
BACKGROUND
Procedural History
On October 2, 2020, Wilson protectively filed a Title II application for disability and disability insurance benefits and a Title XVI application for supplemental security income alleging a disability onset date of January 1, 2019. (Administrative Record “AR” 24.) Wilson's claims were denied initially on January 4, 2021, and denied on reconsideration on March 26, 2021. (AR 73-77 (initial denial); AR 85-91 (reconsideration denial).) A hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on August 30, 2021. (AR 39-70.) In a decision dated December 14, 2021, the ALJ determined Wilson was not disabled. (AR 24-33.) On November 4, 2022, the Appeals Council denied review thus making the ALJ's decision final for judicial review. (AR 1-6.) See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).
Relevant Factual Background
Wilson was 46 years old on the alleged onset date. (AR 73.) He completed two years of community college and has past work as a call center operator, cashier, fast food employee, factory worker and retail stocker. (AR 309.)
Brief Statement of Medical Evidence
On March 19, 2019, Wilson presented to Cassandra Diaz de Leon PMHNPBHMP (“BHMP Diaz de Leon”), for a behavioral health visit. (AR 530.) A diagnosis of bipolar I disorder was noted to be unchanged. (AR 532.)
(Psychiatric Mental Health Nurse Practitioner)
(Behavioral Health Medical Practitioner)
On June 19, 2019, Wilson presented to BHMP Diaz de Leon again for a behavioral health visit. (AR 436.) Wilsons's bipolar I disorder diagnosis was noted to be unchanged. (AR 438.) Mental status examination revealed rapid speech and expansive affect. (AR 440.)
At an August 5, 2019 comprehensive assessment with Carmen Jimenez BHT, Wilson is recorded as reporting suffering from anxiety and depression for the last twenty years and having ups and downs. (AR 537, 540.) He is recorded as carrying a primary diagnosis of bipolar I disorder and noted as currently stable due to taking medications as prescribed. (AR 540.)
(Behavioral Health Technician)
At a November 18, 2019 behavioral health visit with BHMP Diaz de Leon, Wilson reported a recent manic/paranoid episode one week earlier. (AR 499-500.) Wilson is recorded as reporting that while he was at the “Dollar Store and thought everyone at the store was following and staring at him.” (AR 500.) He thought the security guard was staring at him and “went to the guy and started yelling at him.” Id. Wilson is recorded as endorsing poor sleep. Id. Following examination he was assessed with bipolar I disorder with deteriorated status. (AR 501.) His Depakote dosage was increased to 500 mg and he was advised to continue taking all other psychotropic medication as prescribed. Id. A mental status exam documented Wilson's mood as anxious, irritable and sad, and that he suffered from delusions and paranoia the past few days. (AR 503.)
On August 26, 2020, Plaintiff underwent a comprehensive assessment performed by Hector Ramirez BHT. (AR 515.) Wilson was assessed with a primary diagnosis of bipolar I disorder, a secondary diagnosis of “stress, not elsewhere classified,” and a tertiary diagnosis of “depression, major.” (AR 519.) He was determined to meet the criteria for “special assistance.” Id.
On September 1, 2020, Wilson presented to BHMP Diaz de Leon via telehealth for psychiatric services. (AR 428.) He endorsed anger, crying spells, irritability, guilt, and experiencing manic/anger episodes that he cannot remember but others report them to him. (AR 429.) He was noted to be compliant with medication and his Depakote dosage was increased. Id. Following examination, he was assessed with bipolar I disorder and anxiety. (AR 429-30.) His bipolar I disorder was noted to be deteriorated. (AR 430.) He was advised to continue taking Citalopram, Trazadone, Propanolol, Bupropion, and Buspirone. Id.
On October 13, 2020, Wilson returned to BHMP Diaz de Leon for a behavioral health visit. (AR 470.) He is recorded as reporting that his parents recently told him that he was talking very fast and he had some anger problems when in public. (AR 472.) Following examination, his bipolar I disorder and anxiety diagnoses were noted as deteriorated. (AR 472-73.)
On February 19, 2021, Wilson presented to BHMP Diaz de Leon for a behavioral health psychiatric visit. (AR 548-49.) His bipolar I disorder was noted to be improved and his anxiety disorder was noted to be unchanged. (AR 550.)
Medical Opinion Evidence
Susan Kaz, Psy. D., and Jaine Foster-Valdez, Ph. D., opined on Wilson's functional limitations at the initial and reconsideration levels respectively. (AR 75-79 (Dr. Kaz); AR 88-89 (Dr. Foster-Valdez).) Upon review of Wilson's medical records, Drs. Kaz and Foster-Valdez opined that he had no mental health limitations. (AR 77, 82, 90, 97.) Both physicians reasoned that Wilson's subjective symptom complaints were inconsistent with his “completely independent function,” “minimal” treatment, and “normal” mental status exams. (AR 76, 81, 90, 97.)
Hearing Testimony
Wilson testified that he suffers from bipolar disorder and clinical depression. (AR 51.) He is unable to work due to attacks of paranoia which have previously left him unable to leave his apartment. (AR 49.) He has mood swings and manic episodes. (AR 52.) During his manic episodes, it is very hard for him to get along with other people, and he exhibits poor decision-making, and poor memory. (AR 52, 56.) He has been involved in physical altercations with his manager at his previous employment. (AR 53-54.) His manic episodes last seven to ten days. (AR 55.) He experiences three to four “depression days” per month. (AR 55-56.) He has difficulty maintaining a regular schedule due to his psychiatric symptoms. (AR 58-89.)
A vocational expert testified that an employer typically tolerates no more than one absence per month. (AR 67.) If an individual were to arrive late to work three to four times per month then such an individual would be unable to maintain employment. Id.
The ALJ's Decision
At step one, the ALJ determined that Wilson had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 1, 2019, the alleged onset date. (AR 27.) At step two, the ALJ determined that Wilson suffered from the severe impairments of bipolar disorder, anxiety and depression. Id. At step three, the ALJ determined Wilson did not suffer from an impairment or combination of impairments that met or equaled a listed impairment. (AR 27-28.) After step three but before step four, the ALJ determined Wilson's residual functional capacity (“RFC”) as follows:
[T]he claimant has the [RFC] to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following limitations: Claimant can understand[,] remember and apply both simple and detailed but uninvolved instructions; can maintain sufficient concentration, persistence and pace to consistently apply such instructions throughout a regular 8 hour work day with regular breaks in between; can interact with the public, coworkers and supervisors as long as the interactions are occasional and superficial; and can adapt to changes in a routine work setting.(AR 27-28.) At step four, the ALJ determined that Wilson had no past relevant work. (AR 32.) At step five, the ALJ found Wilson able to perform other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy such as laboratory clinic cleaner, commercial cleaner and window cleaner. (AR 32-33.)
ISSUE ON REVIEW
Wilson raises one issue for review. (Doc. 15 at 1.) He claims that the ALJ's mental RFC determination is not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ did not rely on any medical opinion evidence in formulating Wilson's mental RFC. Id. Wilson seeks remand for further development of the record and a new hearing. Id. at 12. The Commissioner defends the ALJ's decision. (Doc. 22.) As more fully explained below, the Court agrees with Wilson.
ANALYSIS
RFC Formulation in the Absence of a Medical Opinion
As mentioned above, Wilson urges that the ALJ's mental RFC determination is not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ formulated it without a medical opinion. “An RFC is the most a plaintiff can do despite their limitations and is based upon all relevant evidence in the record, including medical records, medical source statements, and symptom testimony.” Bradford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV-21-00232-TUC-SHR (JR), 2022 WL 4538569, at *5 (D. Ariz. Aug. 18, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV-21-00232-TUC-SHR (JR), 2022 WL 4535239 (D. Ariz. Sept. 28, 2022) (quoting Howell v. Kijakazi, No. 20-CV-2517-BLM, 2022 WL 2759090, at *7 (S.D. Cal. July 14, 2022) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1)-(3)). “The responsibility for making th[e RFC] assessment is within the purview of the [ALJ].” Bradford, 2022 WL 4538569 at *5 (quoting Howell, 2022 WL 2759090, at *7) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c)); see also Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001) (“It is clear that it is the responsibility of the ALJ, not the claimant's physician, to determine the residual functional capacity.”)). While an ALJ's RFC determination need not precisely reflect any particular provider's opinion, “[b]arring a few exceptions, an ALJ must have a doctor's opinion of a claimant's functional capacity in order for there to be substantial evidence supporting the decisions.” Bradford, 2022 WL 453529 at *5 (quoting Howell, 2022 WL 2759090, at *7). (citations omitted.)
Here, the ALJ found the only medical opinions of record-those of Drs. Kaz and Foster-Valdez-unpersuasive, reasoning:
As for medical opinion(s) and prior administrative findings(s), I cannot defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any prior administrative medical finding(s) or medical opinion(s), including those from medical sources. I have fully considered the medical opinions and prior administrative medical findings as follows: The prior administrative medical findings by the state agency at the initial and reconsideration levels reflected the claimant did not have any severe mental impairment. [(]EX 3A, 4A, 7A, 8A). I find their opinions unpersuasive. As detailed previously, although the claimant routinely has normal mental status examinations and reported his mood was stable on medication, he nevertheless does appear to experience some increased symptoms that
would warrant a finding that his conditions are severe and would result in limitations. (e.g. EX 4F, 5F).(AR 31.) As a result of finding the only medical opinions of record unpersuasive, the ALJ was left with no opinion evidence upon which to rely on in formulating Wilson's RFC. As more fully explained below, this Court agrees with Wilson that the ALJ's failure to obtain a physician's opinion of Wilson's functional limitations renders the RFC formulation unsupported by substantial evidence.
In Bradford, this Court recognized that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that an ALJ is precluded from interpreting raw medical data in formulating a claimant's RFC. Bradford, 2022 WL 4538569, at *5. The Ninth Circuit has noted that “[s]uch records generally reflect only the findings, impressions, and medical diagnoses, which are difficult for a lay person to interpret.” Id. (quoting Howell, 2022 WL 275909, at *7). Accordingly, this Court found, and the district court agreed, that:
Because a medical opinion is not included within the additional medical records, the ALJ independently evaluated Bradford's functional capacities and improperly substituted her judgment for that of a medical expert. The ALJ's decision to substitute her own judgment for competent a medical opinion was error. See Howell, 2022 WL 2759090, at *8 (finding “ALJ erred by using his own interpretation and judgment of raw medical data to formulate Plaintiff's RFC.”)Bradford, 2022 WL 4538569, at *6.
In Katie E.B. v. Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-2354-MDD, 2022 WL 459062, at *9 (S.D. Cal. 2022), the district court found that the ALJ's own interpretations of diagnoses of Ehlers-Danlos syndrome, MRIs, a CT scan, an ultrasound, along with physical, neurological, and rheumatological examinations is evidence that is not susceptible to a lay understanding and does not obviously translate into functional limitations. Accordingly, the court held that the ALJ's independent interpretation of this raw medical data rendered the RFC determination unsupported by substantial evidence. Id. See also, Mack v. Saul, No. 1:18-CV-01287-DAD-BAM, 2020 WL 2731032, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 26, 2020) (finding the ALJ improperly determined RFC after considering MRIs and radiological studies absent a doctor's opinion regarding the effect on plaintiff's ability to work on a function-by-function basis); Escudero v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:18-CV-01136-EPG, 2019 WL 4917634, *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2019) (finding RFC not based on substantial evidence where the ALJ considered x-rays and records indicating Plaintiff's diabetes diagnoses post-dated the accepted physician's opinion on which the ALJ based the RFC); Padilla v. Astrue, 541 F.Supp.2d 1102, 1106 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (ALJ not qualified to extrapolate functional limitations from raw medical data); Atkinson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 1:18-cv-00331-REB, 2019 WL 4046537, at *4-5 (D. Idaho 2019) (finding RFC not supported by substantial evidence where ALJ rejected opinions of state consulting physicians and independently relied upon his own review of the raw medical data to formulate RFC); Kevin B. v. Kijakazi, No. CV 21-02033-AS, 2022 WL 19076652, at *5 (C.D. Cal. 2022) (finding error where ALJ rejected the only medical opinion to address the plaintiff's functional capacities and instead relied his own interpretation of the raw medical data to formulate RFC).
Here, after finding the opinions of the state agency physicians unpersuasive, the ALJ went on to determine that Wilson “nevertheless does appear to experience some increased symptoms that would warrant a finding that his conditions are severe and would result in limitations. (e.g., EX 4F, 5F).” (AR 31.) Exhibit 4F is 27 pages of Wilson's behavioral health visits to and lab reports from Marana Health Center. (AR 562588.) Exhibit 5F is 145 pages of Wilson's behavioral health visits to and lab reports from Marana Health Center. (AR 589-733.)
This Court finds that the records contained in exhibits 4F and 5F-consisting of behavior health visit notes, lab reports, mental status examinations and psychiatric assessments-are raw medical data in that these records reflect findings, impressions, and medical diagnoses that are difficult for a lay person to interpret. As a result, the ALJ erred in interpreting these records without a medical opinion. See, e.g., Howell, 2022 WL 2759090, at *7 (finding ALJ erred in failing to obtain medical opinion where records “generally reflect only the findings, impressions and medical diagnoses, which are difficult for a lay person to interpret); Goodman v. Berryhill, No. 2:17-cv-01228 CKD, 2019 WL 79016, at *7 (E.D. Cal. 2019) (finding the ALJ erred where ALJ herself found the effects of plaintiff's impairments negligible; ALJ should have developed the record and obtained a consultative examination by “a physician who had access to plaintiff's medical records through the November 2014 spinal fracture and its aftermath”).
This Court is not persuaded by Chapo v. Astrue, 682 F.3d 1285 (10th Cir. 2012), relied upon by the Commissioner. (Doc. 22 at 5.) Chapo, a Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals case, rejected the claimant's argument that the components of an RFC assessment lack substantial evidentiary support unless they “line up with an expert medical opinion.” Here, however, at issue is whether the ALJ, after rejecting in their entirety the only two medical opinions of record, erred in formulating Wilson's RFC based upon her own lay interpretation of raw medical evidence of record. Chapo does not address this argument and this Court thus finds Chapo unpersuasive.
The Commissioner also relies upon Farlow v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 584, 488 (9th Cir. 2022), urging that ALJs are “capable of independently reviewing and forming conclusions about medical evidence to discharge their statutory duty to determine whether a claimant is disabled and cannot work.” (Doc. 22 at 5.) This Court is not persuaded by Farlow. Farlow recognized that, under pre-2017 regulations, an ALJ “may reject the opinion of a non-examining physician by reference to specific medical evidence in the record.” 53 F.4th at 488 (quoting Sousa v. Callahan, 143 F.3d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir. 1988)). It was in this context that Farlow used the language relied upon by the Commissioner. Farlow stated in full, “[i]nherent in this standard is a presumption that ALJs are, at some level, capable of independently reviewing and forming conclusions about medical evidence to discharge their statutory duty to determine whether a claimant is disabled and cannot work.” Farlow, 53 F.4th at 488. Farlow does not stand for the proposition that the ALJ is herself permitted to interpret raw medical data and, in the absence of a medical opinion, formulate a claimant's RFC.
For the reasons set forth above, this Court finds the ALJ erred in interpreting raw medical data in formulating Wilson's RFC. Accordingly, this Court finds the RFC is not supported by substantial evidence.
Record Development
Wilson argues that having rejected the only two medical opinions of record, the ALJ had a duty to develop the record and should have discharged this duty by obtaining an additional medical opinion related to Wilson's functional limitations prior to formulating the RFC. (Doc. 18 at 11.) The Commissioner argues that the ALJ did not err in failing to develop the record urging that Wilson's attorney represented that there were no outstanding records thus waiving this argument and that the opinions from Drs. Kaz and Foster-Valdez (which were rejected by the ALJ) did not “in any way indicate that the record was insufficient for adequate review.” (Doc. 22 at 7.) As explained below, this Court agrees with Wilson.
“In Social Security cases the ALJ has a special duty to fully and fairly develop the record and to assure that the claimant's interests are considered.” Brown v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Thompson v. Schweiker, 665 F.2d 936, 941 (9th Cir.1982)). The ALJ's duty exists even where a claimant is represented by counsel. Brown, 713 F.2d at 443 (citing Driggins v. Harris, 657 F.2d 187, 188 (8th Cir. 1981)). The ALJ's duty to develop the record is triggered by ambiguous evidence or a record that is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence. Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ may discharge her duty “in several ways, including subpoenaing the claimant's physicians, submitting questions to the claimant's physicians, continuing the hearing, or keeping the record open after the hearing to allow supplementation of the record.” Id.
Here, the ALJ rejected the only two medical opinions of record and relied upon her interpretation of approximately 150 pages of raw medical data in formulating Wilson's RFC. (AR 31.) In the absence of a medical opinion on Wilson's functional capacities, the record was inadequate to allow for a proper evaluation of Wilson's functional limitations resulting from his mental impairments. This Court therefore finds that the ALJ was obligated to obtain additional medical opinion evidence on Wilson's functional limitations. See Aktinson, 2019 WL 4046537, at *5-6 (finding ALJ erred by failing to fully develop the record by obtaining an appropriate medical opinion regarding what work-related limitation arise from the petitioner's physical and mental impairments and remanding with instructions to obtain a consultative examination by a physician regarding the petitioner's physical and mental impairments); Kevin B., 2022 WL 19076652 at *5 (finding ALJ should have developed record where ALJ rejected the only medical opinion to address the plaintiff's functional capabilities); Rondan v. Halter, 8 Fed.Appx. 724, 725 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding ALJ's duty to further develop the record was triggered by the lack of a medical opinion that included consideration of MRIs that Plaintiff had undergone); Howell, 2022 WL 2759090, at *10 (holding ALJ's duty to further develop the record triggered where the ALJ rejected plaintiff's treating physician's opinion and the record did not contain an opinion or interpretation of plaintiff's functional limitations following the deterioration of plaintiff's medical condition); Goodman, 2019 WL 79016, at *7 (finding ALJ should have developed the record and obtained a consultative examination by “a physician who had access to plaintiff's medical records through the November 2014 spinal fracture and its aftermath”).
This Court is not persuaded by the case law relied upon by the Commissioner. The Commissioner relies on Flynn v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV-20-08303-PCT-MTL, 2022 WL 3552433, at *3 (D. Ariz. Aug. 18, 2022), urging that “an attorney's statement that the record is complete forecloses an argument that the ALJ failed to develop the record.” (Doc. 22 at 7.) In Flynn, the only issue in the case was whether the ALJ erred in failing to obtain additional medical opinion evidence before making a disability determination. Flynn, 2022 WL 3552433, at *3. In addition to pointing out that the attorney in Flynn had agreed that the record was complete, the court in Flynn also found that “[the p]laintiff has not shown that the record before the ALJ was either ambiguous or inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of her claim.” Id.
Here, however, Wilson argues that the ALJ had a duty to develop the record after she determined that the only two medical opinions of record were unpersuasive. Contrary to not being at issue in Flynn, Wilson's argument here is that the ALJ had a duty to develop the record precisely because the record was inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of his claim because the ALJ had rejected as unpersuasive the only two medical opinions of record. Accordingly, this Court is not persuaded by Flynn.
Relying on Mettert v. Comm's of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV-22-08065-PCT-MTL, 2023 WL 4558066, at *3 (D. Ariz. July 17, 2023), the Commissioner insists that “[a] medical advisor is not required when, despite some inadequacies, a relatively complete medical chronology of the claimant's condition during the relevant time period is available.” The Commissioner urges that “in these situations, the ALJ's duty to develop the record is discharged.” (Doc. 22 at 7.) However, the language used by the district court in Mettert that is relied upon by the Commissioner was used in the context of addressing the claimant's argument regarding the ALJ's determination of a claimant's disability onset date and the inability of a claimant to require an ALJ “to call on the services of an [medical expert] to assist in inferring the date that the claimant first met the statutory definition of disability.” Mettert, 2023 WL 4558066, at *3. The entire language used by the district court in addressing the claimant's argument in Mettert is:
Even if SSR 83-20 was the applicable ruling, it “does not apply when the record has no meaningful gaps. A medical advisor is not required when, despite some inadequacies, a relatively complete medical chronology of the claimant's condition during the relevant time period is available ... In these situations, the ALJ's duty to develop the record is discharged.”Id. (quoting Wellington v. Berryhill, 878 F.3d 867, 874 (9th Cir. 2017)). Here, Wilson has not argued that there is an incomplete medical chronology during the relevant time period. Likewise, there is no dispute in this case on the alleged disability onset date. Thus, this Court is not persuaded by Mettert.
The Error is Not Harmless
An ALJ's decision will not be reversed for an error that is harmless. Stout v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006). (citation omitted.) An error is harmless if the reviewing court can confidently conclude that no reasonable ALJ could have reached a different disability determination. Stout, 454 F.3d at 1056. Stated another way, an error is harmless if it is inconsequential to the non-disability determination. Id. at 1055. Here, the ALJ's non-disability determination relied on her own interpretation of raw medical data in formulating the RFC. This Court cannot conclude that the ALJ's error is inconsequential to the non-disability determination and is thus harmless.
Remand is Recommended
Upon finding the ALJ committed reversible error, the district court has the discretion to remand or reverse and award benefits. Mack, 2020 WL 2731032, at * 3 (citing McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that, “[g]enerally, we direct the award of benefits in cases where no useful purpose would be served by further administrative proceedings, or where the record has been thoroughly developed.” Mack, 2020 WL 2731032, at *3 (quoting Ghokassian v. Shalala, 41 F.3d 1300, 1304 (9th Cir. 1994)). “Where . . . an ALJ makes a legal error, but the record is uncertain and ambiguous, the proper approach is to remand the case to the agency.” Treichler v. Comm 'r of Social Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1105 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1021 (9th Cir. 2014).
As explained above, this Court finds that the ALJ erred in interpreting raw medical data in formulating Wilson's RFC instead of obtaining a consultative medical opinion on Wilson's functional capacity. In other words, this Court finds that the record is not fully developed. Accordingly, remand for further development of the record is recommended.
RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that the district court REVERSE the decision of the Administrative Law Judge and remand the matter to the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file written objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to the other party's objections within fourteen days. No reply brief shall be filed on objections unless leave is granted by the district court. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number: 4:23-cv-8-JGZ.