Opinion
6:22-cv-01374-MK
08-18-2023
KENNETH D. WILLSEY; Plaintiff, v. SSA MARINE; and HOMEPORT INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
MUSTAFA T. KASUBHAI (HE / HIM) UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Kenneth D. Willsey brought this action against Defendants SSA Marine and Homeport Insurance Company (collectively, “Defendants”) seeking enforcement of Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Christopher Larson's August 29, 2019 and September 25, 2019 administrative orders. Compl. ¶ 1-7, ECF No. 1. Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint, arguing that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion to dismiss should be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
This case pertains to a workers' compensation claim arising out of hearing loss Plaintiff suffered from noise exposure during his employment with Defendant SSA Marine as a longshoreman. Compl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 1. On August 29, 2019 and September 25, 2019,ALJ Larson awarded Plaintiff 132.5 weeks of compensation starting on June 12, 2015 for his hearing loss under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. Id. The ALJ also ordered payments suspended as of November 13, 2017 due to temporary total disability as a result of a separate knee injury until such time as Plaintiff was declared medically stationary. Id. at ¶ 2. A letter from the U.S. Department of Labor Office of Worker's Compensation (OWCP) made clear that once Plaintiff became medically stationary, he would be entitled to the remaining 6.04 weeks of compensation related to the hearing loss. Compl. Ex. D, ECF No. 1-1.
The latter order was a correction of the number of weeks for which Plaintiff was entitled to compensation. Compl. ¶ 2.
After Plaintiff received a medical report which he claimed established that he was medically stationary as of November 14, 2019, he demanded payment from Defendants for the remaining 6.04 weeks of compensation pursuant to the ALJ's order. Compl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 2. When Defendants did not pay the remaining compensation plus interest, Plaintiff filed this enforcement action on September 12, 2022. Id. at ¶ 6. The Complaint specifically sought enforcement of “the [ALJ's] Decision and Order of August 29, 2019.” Id. at p. 1.
On February 10, 2023, Defendants filed the instant motion seeking dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because they contend that the order Plaintiff sought to enforce was not enforceable by the district court without a supplemental order. ECF No. 23. Shortly thereafter, on February 24, 2023, the ALJ did issue a supplemental order declaring Plaintiff medically stationary and therefore entitled to the remaining 6.04 weeks of compensation. Pl.'s 1st Resp. Ex. A, ECF No. 35-2. Defendants did not appeal that order and it became final on March 30, 2023. Id. Plaintiff's initial response to Defendants' motion, which was filed after this supplemental order, argued that jurisdiction was conferred by the February 24, 2023 supplemental order and that Plaintiff sought enforcement of the interest due on the compensation under that order. Pl.'s 1st Resp. 7, ECF No. 35.
Following the above series of events, the OWCP issued its calculation of the interest due on the compensation on April 18, 2023, and Defendants paid that interest on April 20, 2023. ECF No. 39.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) (quotation marks omitted). As such, a court is to presume “that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted); see also Robinson v. United States, 586 F.3d 683, 685 (9th Cir. 2009); Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004).
An objection that a particular court lacks subject matter jurisdiction may be raised by any party, or by the court on its own initiative, at any time. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). A court must dismiss any case over which it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3); see also Pistor v. Garcia, 791 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that when a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction-meaning it lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate a case-the court must dismiss the complaint, even sua sponte if necessary).
DISCUSSION
In light of the moving target presented by the facts of this case while this motion has been pending, the Court ordered additional briefing on June 13, 2023 to clarify the present positions of the parties. Plaintiff agrees that the order he initially sought to enforce through his September 12, 2022 Complaint was insufficient to confer this Court with subject matter jurisdiction. See Pl.'s 2nd Resp. 2, ECF No. 44 (“Based on Grimm, the defendant is legally correct that there was no administrative order to enforce until the plaintiff obtained an administrative order on February 24, 2023”); see also Grimm v. Vortex Marine Constr., 921 F.3d 845, 847 (9th Cir. 2019) (to be enforceable, an order must “at a minimum specify the amount of compensation due or provide a means of calculating the correct amount without resort to extra-record facts which are potentially subject to genuine dispute between the parties”) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Instead, Plaintiff argues that Defendants' motion should be denied because this Court had subject matter jurisdiction as of March 30, 2023 when the February 2023 supplemental order became final. Defendants argue (1) that an order which was not in existence at the time of the complaint cannot form a basis for jurisdiction; and (2) that-even if it could-it is itself unenforceable because it was the subject of a factual dispute. Because the Court agrees with Defendants as to the first point, it does not reach the second.
Jurisdiction in this case depends on 33 U.S.C. § 921, which allows a party to apply to the district court for enforcement of a final compensation order which a party has failed to comply with. The statute defines the procedure for applying for such enforcement in the event of default, which includes obtaining a supplemental order following investigation, notice and hearing, and a determination of the amount in default. 33 U.S.C. § 918(a). Here, the parties agree that as of the date of the Plaintiff's Complaint, there had been no such supplemental order. See Pl. 2nd Resp. 2, ECF No. 44.
As discussed above, Plaintiff concedes that the order upon which this enforcement action is based did not confer jurisdiction but argues that because the Court had subject matter jurisdiction “on March 30, 2023, based on the February 24, 2023 administrative order.. .it was not necessary to dismiss the pending action and file a new case.” Pl.'s 2nd Resp. 3, ECF No. 44. Plaintiff cites no authority for this proposition, which runs counter to the above-cited general rule that jurisdiction is determined by the original complaint and the status of events at the time the action is brought.
Neither party presented any legal authority addressing the threshold question of the time at which a Court is to evaluate subject matter jurisdiction. Nevertheless, pursuant to this Court's independent obligation to ensure it has jurisdiction over the matters before it, the Court provides the following authority and analysis relevant to this issue. SeeUnited Invs. Life Ins. Co. v.Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 966 (9th Cir. 2004) (“a district court's duty to establish subject matter jurisdiction is not contingent upon the parties' arguments”).
As a general rule, federal court jurisdiction is determined by the original complaint, and “depends on the state of things at the time the action is brought.” Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. California State Bd. of Equalization, 858 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). For example, a district court does not have jurisdiction to review agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act when the statutory prerequisites for jurisdiction do not exist at the time of filing. Mamigonian v. Biggs, 710 F.3d 936, 941 (9th Cir. 2013), abrogated on other grounds by Patel v. Garland, 142 S.Ct. 1614 (2022).
The Ninth Circuit has recognized exceptions to this general rule. For example, in Northstar Fin. Advisors Inc. v. Schwab Invs., 779 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2015), as amended on denial of reh'g and reh'g en banc (Apr. 28, 2015), the Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted a plaintiff to file a supplemental pleading after a post-complaint assignment of claims that established standing where such standing did not exist at the time of the original complaint. Id. at 1048. In so ruling, the Court was concerned that a rigid application of the rule in Morongo would have a case turn on the technical distinction between a new complaint and a supplemental pleading. Id. at 1047. In other words, in that case, there would be no substantive distinction between a supplemental pleading and a new complaint. The allegations in the Complaint would remain the same.
This case differs from Northstar for several reasons. First, this case does not involve a supplemental pleading at all. See id. at 1047 (distinguishing cases applying a time-of-filing rule because “the present case involves the filing of a supplemental pleading that became the operative pleading in the case on which subject-matter jurisdiction must be based”). Instead, Plaintiff here seeks to enforce a different order than the one that was the basis of the operative complaint in this case. Plaintiff argues that should not matter because “this court would have allowed an amended complaint” to “substitute” the unenforceable order for the enforceable one. Pl.'s 2nd Resp. 6, ECF No. 44. But this Court is charged with evaluating its jurisdiction over the case as it stands (i.e. based on the operative complaint), not based on a speculative posture.
Second, the Court has serious doubts as to whether it could have allowed amendment at all, even if Plaintiff had sought to amend his complaint. See Morongo, 858 F.3d at 1381 (“a district court is powerless to grant leave to amend when it lacks jurisdiction over the original complaint”). While the Ninth Circuit in Northstar did allow a supplemental pleading, it was only because the post-complaint assignment of claims conferred standing where it lacked at the time of the Complaint. The nature of the allegations in the complaint remained the same. By contrast, here, Plaintiff's hypothetical amended complaint would change the nature of the suit entirely, as it involves enforcement of a different order with different facts underlying its resolution (i.e. the effect of Plaintiff's medical report on the suspension of his benefits versus the application and calculation of interest in light of payment that had not been made at the time of the Complaint).This Court therefore sees no reason to depart from the rule in Morongo and finds that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction.
Indeed, the moving target presented by the evolving facts in this case underscores the importance of the need for a final administrative order before this court can exercise jurisdiction (even if this Court were not bound by law to require it). It is inefficient for this Court to involve itself in administrative matters that are still ongoing and capable of resolution through the prescribed administrative process.
Because the Court finds that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction over this case because it does not pertain to an enforceable supplemental administrative order, it does not address the parties' remaining arguments. The Court should dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons above, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 23) should be GRANTED.
This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1) should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment or appealable order. The Findings and Recommendation will be referred to a district judge. Objections to this Findings and Recommendation, if any, are due fourteen (14) days from today's date. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).