Opinion
24A-PL-1110
09-09-2024
Jimmie Willoughby, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Clarissa Brown, The Estate of Annie L. Feagin, Appellees-Defendants
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Katherine M. Forbes Polli A. Pollem Nicholas Thompson Indiana Legal Services, Inc. Indianapolis, Indiana Elizabeth Adams Indiana Legal Services, Inc. Bloomington, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Sarah J. Glasser, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 49D08-2310-PL-39905
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Katherine M. Forbes Polli A. Pollem Nicholas Thompson Indiana Legal Services, Inc. Indianapolis, Indiana Elizabeth Adams Indiana Legal Services, Inc. Bloomington, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Mathias, Judge.
[¶1] Jimmie Willoughby appeals the Marion Superior Court's order dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Willoughby presents three issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court erred when it dismissed his complaint.
[¶2] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶3] From 2014 until April 2023, Willoughby lived with his girlfriend, Annie Feagin. In 2021, Feagin bought a residence in Indianapolis ("the residence"), where she and Willoughby continued to live together. While they were living together, Feagin "was unemployed for the majority" of the time but was receiving Social Security benefits. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 205. Willoughby "was the primary financial contributor" to their household through "his jobs as a truck driver and through his VA benefits." Id. "On average, . . . Willoughby paid approximately $1,742.36 more per month than . . . Feagin for the care and maintenance of the shared household for the approximately nine years they lived together." Id. at 205-06. In addition, Willoughby paid "approximately $40,000" towards the purchase of the residence. Id. at 205. But only Feagin's name was on the title to the residence.
[¶4] On April 26, 2023, Feagin died intestate. Feagin's half-sister Clarissa Brown filed a petition to be appointed personal representative of Feagin's estate, and that petition was granted. Brown, on the Estate's behalf, took immediate steps to evict Willoughby from the residence.
[¶5] In October, Willoughby filed a complaint against the Estate alleging that he was entitled to damages under two theories: implied contract and unjust enrichment. The Estate filed a motion to dismiss that complaint. Before the trial court ruled on that motion, Willoughby filed an amended complaint alleging implied contract, unjust enrichment, and promissory estoppel. Among his claims, Willoughby alleged that Feagin had promised to add his name to the title of the residence in exchange for his $40,000 contribution toward the purchase price. The Estate moved to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Estate argued that Willoughby's claim for implied contract was barred by the statute of frauds and that all three claims were "barred because no interpretation of the facts alleged in the Complaint would support the cause of action." Id. at 213. Following a hearing, the trial court dismissed Willoughby's amended complaint. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[¶6] Willoughby contends that the trial court erred when it dismissed his amended complaint. Our standard of review is well settled.
In reviewing a 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss, we look at the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, with every inference drawn in its favor, to determine if there is any set of allegations under which the plaintiff could be granted relief. King v. S.B., 837 N.E.2d 965, 966 (Ind. 2005). A 12(B)(6) dismissal is
improper unless it appears to a certainty on the face of the complaint that the complaining party is not entitled to any relief. Id. Dismissals under T.R. 12(B)(6) are "rarely appropriate." Id. (citing State Civil Rights Comm'n v. County Line Park, Inc., 738 N.E.2d 1044, 1049 (Ind. 2000)).[] Though Indiana's notice pleading rules do not require the complaint to state all elements of a cause of action, Miller v. Mem'l Hosp. of S. Bend, Inc., 679 N.E.2d 1329, 1332 (Ind. 1997) (citing State v. Rankin, 260 Ind. 228, 294 N.E.2d 604, 606 (1973)), the plaintiff must still plead the operative facts necessary to set forth an actionable claim. Trail v. Boys and Girls Clubs of Nw. Ind., 845 N.E.2d 130, 135 (Ind. 2006) (citing Mem'l Hosp. of S. Bend, Inc., 679 N.E.2d at 1332).State v. Am. Fam. Voices, Inc., 898 N.E.2d 293, 295-96 (Ind. 2008).
[¶7] The Estate has not filed an appellee's brief. In such a case, we "need not develop an argument for [the Estate] but instead will reverse the trial court's judgment if [Appellant's] brief presents a case of prima facie error." In re Adoption of E.B., 163 N.E.3d 931, 935 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Prima facie error means "at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it." Jenkins v. Jenkins, 17 N.E.3d 350, 352 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014). "Still, we are obligated to correctly apply the law to the facts in the record in order to determine whether reversal is required." Id.
[¶8] In its motion to dismiss, the Estate argued that Willoughby's implied contract claim was barred because "it is premised upon an alleged oral or implied contract that is unenforceable under the statute of frauds." Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 215. And the Estate argued that Willoughby's claims for unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel should be dismissed because he did not allege facts that, if taken as true, do not support those claims. We address each issue in turn.
Implied Contract
[¶9] In support of his claim of implied contract, Willoughby alleged that he and Feagin had an agreement whereby she would add his name to the title to the residence in exchange for $40,000. Willoughby paid the $40,000, but Feagin did not add his name to the title. We agree with the Estate that that claim is barred by the statute of frauds because the agreement was not in writing. As our Supreme Court has explained:
The Statute of Frauds provides in pertinent part that "[n]o action shall be brought . . . [u]pon any contract for the sale of lands . . . [u]nless the promise, contract or agreement upon which such action shall be brought . . . shall be in writing...." Ind. Code § 32-2-1-1....
The Statute of Frauds does not define the term "sale." However, the law is settled that "a right to the possession of real estate is an interest therein, and any contract which seeks to convey an interest in land is required to be in writing." Guckenberger v. Shank, 110 Ind.App. 442, 37 N.E.2d 708, 713 (1941) (emphasis added). Although not often articulating it as such, our courts have long applied the principle that an agreement to convey land is subject to the Statute of Frauds' writing requirement.Brown v. Branch, 758 N.E.2d 48, 50-51 (Ind. 2001).
[¶10] We reject Willoughby's attempt to circumvent the statute of frauds by framing his claim under an implied contract theory. While unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel are recognized exceptions to the statute of frauds, see Akin v. Simons, 180 N.E.3d 366, 379 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021), our review of relevant authority does not reveal an exception for an implied contract. The trial court did not err when it dismissed this claim.
Unjust Enrichment
[¶11] In support of his unjust enrichment claim, Willoughby's complaint alleges in part that:
38. Not only did Mr. Willoughby provide a significant amount of money to Ms. Feagin in cash for the purpose of a property ownership right, he also provided the main income for the households they shared since 2014.
39. Ms. Feagin enjoyed the financial provisions from Mr. Willoughby while only adding in her social security check to the joint PNC account once she started receiving social security.
40. Ms. Feagin never completed her end of the bargain to add Mr. Willoughby to the title of the Property, nor did she return the financial benefit he bestowed on her and the household she shared with him since 2014.
Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 209.
[¶12] As our Supreme Court has explained,
[a] claim for unjust enrichment "is a legal fiction invented by the common law courts in order to permit a recovery . . . where the circumstances are such that under the law of natural and immutable justice there should be a recovery[.]" Bayh v. Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d 398, 408 (Ind. 1991) (citation omitted).
"A person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the other." RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937). To prevail on a claim of unjust enrichment, a claimant must establish that a measurable benefit has been conferred on the defendant under such circumstances that the defendant's retention of the benefit without payment would be unjust. Bayh, 573 N.E.2d at 408.Zoeller v. East Chicago Second Century, Inc., 904 N.E.2d 213, 220 (Ind. 2009).
[¶13] Willoughby has alleged facts that, taken as true, set out a claim for unjust enrichment. The trial court erred when it dismissed that claim under Trial Rule 12(B)(6). See, e.g., Fox Dev., Inc. v. England, 837 N.E.2d 161, 166 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005) (merely alleging that exceptions to statute of frauds apply is enough to survive a 12(C) motion).
Promissory Estoppel
[¶14] Finally, in support of his promissory estoppel claim in his amended complaint, Willoughby alleged that, in reliance on Feagin's promise to add his name to the title to the residence, he gave Feagin $40,000. "Even when oral agreements fall within the statute of frauds, they may still be enforced under the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel." Akin, 180 N.E.3d at 380. Promissory estoppel "encompasses the following elements: (1) a promise by the promissor; (2) made with the expectation that the promisee will rely thereon; (3) which induces reasonable reliance by the promisee; (4) of a definite and substantial nature; and (5) injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." Brown v. Branch, 758 N.E.2d 48, 52 (Ind. 2001). "[T]he party asserting the doctrine carries a heavy burden establishing its applicability." Id. And the plaintiff must prove that he suffered an "'unjust and unconscionable injury and loss'" as a result of his reliance on an oral promise. Id. at 53 (quoting Whiteco Indus., Inc. v. Kopani, 514 N.E.2d 840, 845 (Ind.Ct.App. 1987), trans. denied).
[¶15] Willoughby has alleged facts that, taken as true, set out a claim for promissory estoppel. The trial court erred when it dismissed that claim under Trial Rule 12(B)(6).
Conclusion
[¶16] The trial court did not err when it dismissed Willoughby's claim for implied contract under Trial Rule 12(B)(6) based on the statute of frauds. But the trial court erred when it dismissed Willoughby's claims of unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel. We reverse that part of the trial court's judgment and remand for further proceedings on those two claims.
[¶17] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
Altice, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.