Opinion
Case No. 3:20-cv-00493-AC
04-16-2020
STEVEN DAWAYNE WILLIS, Plaintiff, v. WASHINGTON COUNTY SHERIFFS OFFICE and STATE OF OREGON, Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION :
Introduction
Plaintiff Steven Dawayne Willis ("Willis"), filed this pro se lawsuit against defendants Washington County Sheriff's Office ("County") and State of Oregon ("State") (collectively "Defendants"). Willis applied to proceed in forma pauperis. An examination of the application revealed Willis is unable to afford the fees of this action. Accordingly, his application was granted on April 13, 2020, and no filing fee will be assessed against him. However, for the reasons set forth below, Willis's complaint should be dismissed without prejudice based on his failure to state a viable claim against the County, and with prejudice in light of the State's sovereign immunity.
Background
In the "Statement of Claim" set forth in Willis's complaint, Willis alleges:
During my stay in the Washington County jail from Oct. 6. 2019 to Feb. 5. 2020 I was unable to receive any hygiene or envelopes from the jail because my account was frozen. The jail didn't give me my mail. I was unable to send mail. I received 2 toothbrushes from 2 other inmates while I was there. I often had to trade my food for necessities other indigent inmates such as myself could order from canteen. After several attempts to notify staff of the issue they refused to help me.(Compl. ECF No. 2, at 4.) Willis contends the alleged conduct violated his rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments and "would appreciate it if the court remedies the injury(s)" by awarding "$122,000,000 in compensation." (Compl. at 3-4.)
Legal Standard
When a party seeks to proceed in forma pauperis, "the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (2019); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989) (sua sponte dismissals under section 1915 "spare prospective defendants the inconvenience and expense of answering" complaints which are "frivolous, malicious, or repetitive"); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) (section 1915(e) applies to all informa pauperis complaints, not just those filed by inmates).
The Ninth Circuit has instructed courts to "construe pro se filings liberally." Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). A pro se complaint "must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). If the court dismisses a complaint for failure to state a claim, the court should grant leave to amend "unless the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly sure the deficiency." DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Discussion
Willis alleges Defendants violated his constitutional rights by failing to: 1) allow him to receive hygiene items while his account was frozen; 2) allow him to receive envelopes while his account was frozen; 3) allow him to send mail; and 4) deliver his mail to him. Willis also alleges Defendants forced him to trade food for necessities available to other indigent inmates. The United States Constitution does not create a private right of action for violations thereof. However, a plaintiff may pursue alleged constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"). Although Willis fails to expressly allege a claim under Section 1983, the court will assess the substance of his claims as though they were so alleged.
I. Section 1983
To prevail on a claim under Section 1983, the plaintiff must show "(1) [a] deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United states, and (2) that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Willis fails to adequately allege the depravation of a constitutional right. \\\\\ \\\\\
A. Conditions of Confinement
Willis alleges he was housed at the Washington County Jail ("Jail") during the relevant period, but he fails to indicate if he was a pretrial detainee or a prisoner serving an imposed sentence. If Willis is a pretrial detainee, his condition of confinement claims must be construed as arising under Section 1983 for violation of his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Claims by pretrial detainees are analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, rather than under the Eighth Amendment."). In contrast, the conditions under which a sentenced prisoner is confined are scrutinized under the Eighth Amendment. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1983). This distinction is largely semantic, however, because "detainees' rights under the Fourteenth Amendment are comparable to prisoners' rights under the Eighth Amendment," and courts apply the "same standards." Frost, 152 F.3d at 1128.
Willis alleges he was unable to receive hygiene products because his account was frozen, he obtained two toothbrushes from other inmates, and he had to trade food for necessities. "Indigent inmates have the right to personal hygiene supplies such as toothbrushes and soap." Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 1996). While not specifically alleged, the court will assume the freezing of Willis's account left Willis indigent. Willis alleges he was "unable to receive," presumably by purchasing, hygiene products during the four-month period between October 6, 2019, and February 5, 2020 (the "Period"). Willis does not identify when he was first housed at the Jail. He may well have been allowed to purchase, or was given, hygiene products when he first arrived or prior to the start of the Period. Willis also fails to allege he was entirely denied hygiene products during the Period: i.e., he was without and he requested, and was denied, such products. See Pleasant v. County of Merced, 669 Fed. Appx. 388, 389 (9th Cir. 2016) ("Dismissal of Pleasant's conditions-of-confinement claim was premature because Pleasant alleged he was entirely denied access to indigent welfare kits for six and one-half weeks, while non-indigent inmates could purchase personal hygiene items.") To the contrary, Willis admits he obtained two toothbrushes from other inmates during the Period. Additionally, Willis alleges he was able to trade food for necessities. Indigent inmates should not have to choose between hygiene items and other items to which they are constitutionally entitled. Id. (allegations that indigent inmate had to choose between hygiene items and legal supplies stated a viable claim); Gluth v. Kangas, 951 F2d 1504, 1508 (9th Cir. 1991) ("We agree with the district court's conclusion that this policy, which according to the uncontroverted facts forces inmates to choose between purchasing hygienic supplies and essential legal supplies, is unacceptable."). While the term "necessities" could include hygiene products, or other items protected by the Constitution, it is too indefinite to support a claim standing alone.
Willis failed to allege he was entirely deprived of hygiene products or that he was forced to choose between hygiene products and other constitutionally protected items, such as food, during the Period. As a result, Willis fails to allege a viable conditions-of-confinement claim.
B. Free Speech
Willis also alleges Defendants violated his constitutional rights by not allowing him to receive envelopes while indigent, not delivering his mail to him, and not allowing him to send mail. It appears Willis is attempting to allege Defendants violated his rights under the First Amendment.
"Prison inmates enjoy a First Amendment right to send and receive mail." Young v. Tampkins, Case No. CV 16-07455-JFW (RAO), 2017 WL 2389974, *5 (C.D. Cal. May 12, 2017). This is particularly true for legal mail, because legal mail implicates an inmate's access to the courts. It is well established that prisoners have a constitutional right of meaningful access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). This right includes the reasonable provision of pens, paper, envelopes, and postage to allow inmates to prepare and send documents to the courts. Gluth, 951 F.2d at 1509-10; Young, 2017 WL 2389974 at *5. "However, there is no constitutional right to free postage for non-legal mail." Young, 2017 WL 2389974 at *5. Furthermore, "[a] temporary delay or isolated incident of mail interference is usually insufficient to establish a constitutional violation." Id.
Willis does not allege he was prevented from sending or receiving legal mail. Consequently, his lack of envelopes and temporary inability to send and receive mail, as currently alleged, do not amount to a violation of his First Amendment rights.
II. Sovereign Immunity
Willis is unable to prosecute a claim against the State. The Eleventh Amendment preserves the sovereign immunity of the states by providing the judicial power of the United States "shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted" against a state. "The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against the State or its agencies for all types of relief, absent unequivocal consent by the state. The Eleventh Amendment jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the nature of relief sought and extends to instrumentalities and agencies." Krainski v. Nevada ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Nevada Sys. of Higher Educ., 616 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also McCall v. Oregon, Case No. 3:12-cv-00465-PK, 2013 WL 6196966, at *8 (D. Or. Nov. 13, 2013 ("[t]he State of Oregon has not waived it immunity" in § 1983 cases). Because the State is immune from Section 1983 suits, Willis is unable to state a claim against the State.
III. Leave to Amend
The court is mindful that "[u]nless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect, . . . a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint's deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the action." Lucas v. Dep't of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995); Obeng-Amponsah v. Don Miguel Apartments, 744 F. App'x 476, 477 (9th Cir. 2018). The State enjoys sovereign immunity for Section 1983 claims and should be dismissed with prejudice. Willis fails to allege the requisite constitutional violation in support of his Section 1983 claims against the County. It is possible, however, Willis could allege facts establishing he was completely deprived of, and unable to obtain, hygiene products or other constitutionally protected items, was deprived of meaningful access to the courts, or was prevented from sending or receiving mail for an extended period of time, and should be given the opportunity to amend his complaint to allege such claims. If Willis chooses to file an amended complaint, he is cautioned he must remedy the deficiencies identified in this Findings and Recommendation and allege specific facts in support of his claim. Willis is advised that failure to cure the deficiencies will result in dismissal of this action.
Conclusion
Willis's complaint (ECF No. 2) should be dismissed sua sponte for failure to state a claim with leave to file an amended complaint against the County curing the identified deficiencies within thirty days of the district judge's order of dismissal. The State should be dismissed with prejudice. The court recommends the district judge advise Willis that failure to file an amended complaint which cures the deficiencies shall result in a dismissal of this proceeding, with prejudice.
Scheduling Order
The Findings and Recommendation will be referred to a district judge for review. Objections, if any, are due 17 days. If no objections are filed, then the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement on that date.
If objections are filed, then a response is due within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of the objections. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement.
DATED this 16th day of April, 2020.
/s/_________
JOHN V. ACOSTA
United States Magistrate Judge