Opinion
No. 05-03-00816-CR
Opinion Filed January 9, 2004. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the 194th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F02-54398-Jm. Affirm.
Before MOSELEY, FITZGERALD, and LANG.
OPINION
Jonathan Lamar Willis appeals his conviction for aggravated robbery. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 29.03 (Vernon 2003). Appellant waived a jury trial and entered a non-negotiated guilty plea. The trial court sentenced appellant to twenty-five years' confinement and made an affirmative finding that appellant used or exhibited a deadly weapon, a firearm, during the commission of the offense. In a single point of error, appellant contends the trial court failed to comply with article 26.13 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure by ensuring appellant was mentally competent to enter his guilty plea. We affirm the trial court's judgment. A trial court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere unless it appears the defendant is mentally competent and the plea is free and voluntary. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(b) (Vernon Supp. 2004). A person is incompetent if he lacks either (1) sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, or (2) a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. A person is presumed competent unless proved incompetent by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. art. 46.02, § 1A(a), (b); see also McGowin v. State, 912 S.W.2d 837, 840 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1995, no pet.). Unless the issue of appellant's mental competency is raised at the time of the plea, the trial court need not inquire into appellant's mental competency, and it is not error for the trial court to accept the plea. See Kuyava v. State, 538 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex.Crim.App. 1976); see also Hall v. State, 935 S.W.2d 852, 855 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, no pet.). Appellant argues the trial court failed to conduct an independent inquiry into his mental competency before accepting his guilty plea and ensuring the plea was free and voluntary. Appellant argues the pre-printed boilerplate recitals in the plea agreement that he signed should be disregarded. Appellant points to his testimony that at the time of the offense, he had consumed two beers and smoked marijuana soaked with embalming fluid. Thus, appellant argues, there can be no presumption of mental competency, nor can there be substantial compliance with the requirements of article 26.13 where there is no inquiry as to the appellant's mental competency. The State responds the trial court correctly found appellant competent to enter his guilty plea because the documentary evidence and the trial court's dialogue with appellant support the finding that appellant was mentally competent when he entered his plea. Here, the record shows the trial judge properly admonished appellant orally and in writing. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(a), (d) (Vernon 1989 Supp. 2004); Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd). At the plea hearing, appellant testified he understood the charges in the indictment, understood the punishment range for the offense, and he was freely and voluntarily pleading guilty to the charges in each indictment. When the trial judge asked appellant if he had any questions about anything, appellant replied, "No." Appellant's signed judicial confession was offered into evidence without objection. The case was passed for a presentence investigation report. During the punishment hearing, appellant testified at length. The trial court had the opportunity to observe and to converse with appellant, and the judgment states appellant appeared competent. Appellant's point of error mixes the issue of his mental state at the time of the offense with his mental competency to stand trial for an offense. The fact that appellant consumed alcohol and drugs at the time of the offense does not raise the issue of his present ability to understand the charges against him or to consult with counsel. See Ward v. State, 906 S.W.2d 182, 185 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995, pet. ref'd). We conclude appellant has not rebutted the presumption he was mentally competent at the time he entered his guilty plea, and that the trial court complied with the requirements of article 26.13(b). See McGowin, 912 S.W.2d at 840; Kirk, 949 S.W.2d at 771. Accordingly, we overrule appellant's sole point of error. We affirm the trial court's judgment.