Opinion
Civil Action No. 00-1977 Section "L" (2).
December 27, 2000.
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is plaintiffs' motion to remand. For the following reasons, plaintiffs' motion is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Amanda M. Willie ("Willie"), worked as a driver for defendant, Greenleaf Wholesale Florists ("Greenleaf"). Willie claims that a fellow employee, defendant Steven Knecht ("Knecht"), sexually harassed her daily from early June of 1999 until her resignation on October 27, 1999. Willie avers that the harassment included unwanted advances, attempts to touch her breasts and legs, and a simulated ejaculation during which Knecht squirted lotion onto her leg. When she complained of Knecht's conduct to her general supervisor, Harold Tani ("Tani"), and her immediate supervisor, Waldo Smith ("Smith"), Willie and Knecht were separated.
The separation, however, failed to end the alleged harassment. Although Willie lodged subsequent complaints with Tani, she explains that her concerns were dismissed as "a grain of salt." She claims that her workplace environment became so hostile by October 27, 1999 that she had no alternative other than to resign. After her resignation, Willie sought psychiatric treatment and was prescribed the drugs Prozac and Cyclobenzapr.
Willie filed suit against Greenleaf, Tani, Smith, Knecht, and their respective insurance companies in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, Louisiana. The defendants then removed the matter to this Court pursuant to title 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 1441(b) and filed a motion to dismiss Tani, Smith, and Knecht for fraudulent joinder pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Defendants argue that Louisiana's employment discrimination law imposes liability only on the employer for claims of sexual harassment and therefore moots Willie's complaint against her supervisors. Additionally, the individual defendants argue that Willie cannot prove the elements of an intentional infliction of emotional distress action against them. Even if she could satisfy the requirements of such a claim, the defendants insist that this Court should retain jurisdiction over Willie's claims because she has raised a federal question by praying for punitive damages.
Willie now moves to remand her case back to state court because she explains that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over her state law claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress against Louisiana defendants.
II. ANALYSIS
Remand is appropriate when there is no diversity of citizenship or a claim does not in fact arise under federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447. In the present case, Willie contends that complete diversity of citizenship does not exist between the parties because she asserts a valid claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against three non-diverse defendants: Knecht, Tani, and Smith. Defendants claim that Willie's claims against the Louisiana defendants should be dismissed because the defendants were fraudulently joined.
Remand is appropriate if Willie has raised colorable claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Louisiana defendants. See B., Inc. v. miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 1981). In making this determination, the Court need not address the merits of Willie's claim; rather, it must determine whether she could establish an intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action against the in-state defendants in a Louisiana state court. See id.
To establish a colorable claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Louisiana law, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous; (2) that the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress; and (3) that the defendant either intended to inflict severe emotional distress or knew that severe emotional distress would be certain or substantially certain to result. See White, 585 So.2d 1205, 1209 (La. 1991). "Extreme and outrageous" conduct is conduct as so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. See id. (quoting Restatement of Torts § 46 cmt. d (1965)). Mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities do not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous behavior because persons must necessarily be expected to be hardened to a certain amount of rough language and occasional acts of inconsiderateness or unkindness. See id.
The extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may arise from an abuse by someone of a position, or a relation with the other, which gives him actual or apparent authority over the other, or power to affect her interests. See id. at 1209-10. "[A] plaintiffs status as an employee may entitle him to a greater degree of protection from insult and outrage by a supervisor with authority over him than if he were a stranger." Id. at 1210. Causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress in a workplace, however, have usually been limited to situations involving "a pattern of deliberate, repeated harassment over a period of time." Id.; (citing Maggio v. St. Francis Medical Center, Inc., 391 So.2d 948 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1981)); Bustamanto v. Tucker, 607 So.2d 532, 538 (La. 1992); Deus v. Allstate Ins. Co., 15 F.3d 506, 515-16 (5th Cir. 1994). "This has been characterized as a sliding scale approach under which even `mild' harassment may become tortious if continued over a substantial time period." Glenn, 977 F. Supp. at 789; Bustamanto, 607 So.2d at 538.
The facts alleged by Willie support valid claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress against the non-diverse defendants. First, the defendants' conduct could be found to be extreme and outrageous. Willie has asserted a claim of work-place sexual harassment that took place on a daily basis from early June 1999 until her resignation on October 27, 1999. In her claim she alleges that Knecht made unwanted advances, attempted to touch her breasts and legs, and even simulated an ejaculation during which he squirted lotion onto Willie's leg. Willie complained to her general and immediate supervisors who she alleges did not put an end to the harassments. Instead, as a result of her complaints, Willie claims that her workplace became so hostile that she had no other choice but to resign.
Second, Willie has claimed that she has suffered severe emotional distress. After her resignation, Willie sought psychiatric treatment because of the harassment and is currently taking Prozac and Cyclobenzapr. Finally, the facts alleged by Willie support a claim that the defendants either intended to inflict severe emotional distress or knew that severe emotional distress would be certain or substantially certain to result from their conduct. Willie claims that she complained of the harassment on multiple occasions to her supervisors who refused to act despite being aware of the harassment and how it may have affected her.
The facts alleged by Willie are analogous to cases for which Louisiana courts have found a valid claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Martin v. Bigner, 665 So.2d 709 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1995). In Martin for example, the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeals permitted a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against defendants who committed unwanted touching, unwanted advances, and suggestive statements over a period of five months. Although the plaintiff reported these acts to management, they failed to intercede and eventually fired her. In the present case, Willie has similarly alleged harassment that included unwanted touching and unwanted advances on a daily basis over a period of four months. Willie also complained to her supervisors who allegedly did not stop the harassment. Therefore, Willie has alleged sufficient facts under Louisiana jurisprudence to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against the non-diverse defendants.
Defendants alternatively argue that this Court should retain federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because Willie requested punitive damages in her prayer for relief. In support of their argument, the defendants cite Caravanas v. Hall, Civ. A. No. 991405, 1999 WL 605491 *2 (E.D. La. Aug; 10, 1999). In Caravanas, the Court scrutinized a claim of sexual harassment to determine its statutory basis because the plaintiff failed to cite Louisiana law. The Court in Caravanas examined the circumstances surrounding the action to determine whether the claim arose under federal or state law. The present case, however, is distinguishable from Caravanas in that Willie has clearly cited Louisiana Employment Discrimination Statutes, LA R.S. 23:1006, et seq. and LA R.S. 51:2242, 51:2256 and 51:2264, as statutory grounds for her claim. Therefore, Willie's claim expressly arises under state law.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs' motion to remand is GRANTED and IT IS ORDERED that the case be REMANDED to the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant's motion to dismiss is DENTED as MOOT.