Opinion
C. A. 9:23-04663-DCC-MHC
06-25-2024
John Anthony Michael Williams, Plaintiff, v. Chuck Wright, Sgt. Clayton, Lt. Bishop, D. Walker, Deputy Longe, Sgt. Josh Gillespie, S. Scalf, Kristin Washington, K. Apples, Margrett, Nurse Sonya S. Paz, Nurse Ivery, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (PARTIAL SUMMARY DISMISSAL)
Molly H. Cherry United States Magistrate Judge
This is a civil action filed by Plaintiff, John Anthony Michael Williams, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), pretrial proceedings in this action have been referred to the assigned United States Magistrate Judge.
In the Court's Proper Form Orders dated November 7, 2023, and January 29, 2024, Plaintiff was given the opportunity to bring his case into proper form by providing specific items as specified in the Proper Form Orders. Plaintiff was also notified of pleading deficiencies and given the opportunity to amend his Complaint. See ECF Nos. 5 and 9. Plaintiff has partially complied with the Proper Form Orders, and his case is now in substantially proper form. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on February 21, 2024. ECF No. 11.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee at the Spartanburg County Detention Center (SpCDC). Records from Spartanburg County indicate that Plaintiff has pending charges, with an arrest date of July 15, 2021, for domestic violence of a high and aggravated nature (case number 2021A4210203636), possession of a weapon during a violent crime (2021A4210203637), and pointing and presenting a firearm at a person (2021A4210203638). He was also arrested on June 2, 2022, for contraband (2022A4210203316), and on April 18, 2023, for assault and battery-first degree (2023A4210202060). Additionally, Plaintiff has charges from October 2023 for assault/attempted murder (2023A4210205593), and an arrest on December 24, 2023, for prisoners/contraband (2023A4210206989). See Spartanburg County Seventh Judicial Circuit Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Spartanburg/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx [search case numbers listed above] (last visited June 21, 2024).
A federal court may take judicial notice of the contents of its own records, as well as those records of other courts. See Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (noting that courts may take judicial notice of other courts' records and proceedings).
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that he brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, Twelfth, and Thirteenth Amendment rights. He also appears to be attempting to bring state law claims for alleged violations of prison rules and policies. ECF No. 11 at 8.
Many of Plaintiff's allegations concern a “mind listener” or “listen up” device. He contends that Defendant Sheriff Chuck Wright (Wright) of the Spartanburg Sheriff's Department allowed people into the SpCDC in order to perform investigations, sleep studies, and sleep interrogations; listen to his thoughts and look for future acts of domestic violence; change his religion; and force him to become an informant. He also nonsensically claims he “allowed them to blow pressure from [his] vent system to keep [him] disoriented. ECF No. 11 at 9. Plaintiff claims he wrote a grievance to Defendant Sgt. Gillespie (Gillespie) about “them” using the mind listener on Plaintiff. Id. at 10. He asserts he wrote Defendant Lt. Bishop (Bishop) to inform Bishop that deputies and nurses were using the mind listener to interrogate and apply pain, cruel and usual punishment, and excessive force on Plaintiff, but that Bishop refused to take the device off Plaintiff. Id.
Plaintiff appears to be attempting to assert First Amendment claims against Defendant Chaplin K. Apples (Apples) and Defendant Sgt. Clayton (Clayton), an arresting officer in one of Plaintiff's criminal cases. He claims that Apples denied him a Quran and told Plaintiff to read the Bible. Plaintiff alleges that Apples denied his request to talk to the Imam about his treatment at the jail and denied his request to attend Jummah services. ECF No. 11 at 10. He claims that Clayton stole Plaintiff's Quran and other Islamic books and left him only a Bible. Id. at 9.
Plaintiff also contends that Apples stole his legal work to allegedly help the prosecutor. He alleges that Clayton stole Plaintiff's clothing and left him only with “only one white sock with a note that said it is only one way the white way.” ECF No. 11 at 9 (errors in original).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Deputy Longe (Longe) took his mattress for a total of 40 days as a disciplinary action, altered his meals to give him cold trays for 45 days, allowed to come outside his cell only three days a week, and denied him legal materials including pens. He also claims that Longe told him that he would die in lockup and would “have to plea and become Christian.” ECF No. 11 at 9.
Plaintiff claims that Defendant D. Walker (Walker), a deputy, “verbally sexually assaulted” him while he was in the shower by allegedly telling Plaintiff that he was looking to see if something was in Plaintiff's “growing area” and made homosexual gestures at Plaintiff “while looking down at [Plaintiff's] growing area while in the shower[.]” ECF No. 11 at 10.
There does not appear to have been any physical assault and thus this appears to be a sexual harassment, not an assault, claim.
Defendant Nurse Sonya S. Paz (Paz) allegedly denied Plaintiff medical attention for 29 months. Plaintiff asserts that mental health care workers Kristin Washington (Washington) and Margrett changed his medication without his informed consent. He claims that Defendant Nurse Ivery (Ivery) gave him medications that belonged to others on several occasions which resulted in his having “[illegible] episodes” ECF No. 11 at 10.
Plaintiff's alleged injuries are swelling in his head, memory loss, altered facial features, swelling in his throat, speech problems, hearing loss, vision loss, loss of brain cells, back problems, tissue damage, muscle damage, weight loss, seizures, tooth decay, breathing problems, sleep deprivation, and body mutilations. He requests that everyone responsible be prosecuted and that he receive “20 million for police brutality[.]” ECF No. 11 at 12.
A private citizen such as Plaintiff has no constitutional right to, or in fact any judicially cognizable interest in, the criminal prosecution or non-prosecution of another person. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (A private citizen does not have a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another person); Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64-65 (1986) (applying Linda R.S. v. Richard D. and collecting cases); Collins v. Palczewski, 841 F.Supp. 333, 340 (D. Nev. 1993) (“Long ago the courts of these United States established that ‘criminal statutes cannot be enforced by civil actions.'”).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Amended Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992), Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989), Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), and Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983). Pro se petitions are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, and a court is charged with liberally construing a petition filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that this Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
III. DISCUSSION
For the reasons discussed below, it is recommended that Defendants Wright, Bishop, Gillespie, and Scalf be dismissed as Defendants to this action. Plaintiff fails to state a claim against these Defendants and has not alleged any facts to establish supervisory liability as to these Defendants. It is also recommended that Plaintiff's Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, Twelfth, and Thirteenth Amendment right claims be dismissed.
A. Claims under the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, Twelfth, and Thirteenth Amendments
Although Plaintiff generally claims violations of his Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, Twelfth, and Thirteenth Amendment rights, he has not alleged any facts to indicate that these rights have been violated. He has alleged no claims under the Third Amendment that generally prohibits the quartering of a soldier in a house during peacetime without the owner's consent, the Fourth Amendment that prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, the Sixth Amendment that provides rights to the accused in criminal proceedings, the Seventh Amendment that provides for trial by jury in certain civil cases, the Eleventh Amendment that restricts judicial power as to suits against States, the Twelfth Amendment that concerns the election of the President and Vice-President, and the Thirteenth Amendment, that prohibits slavery. See U.S. Const. amends. III, IV, VI, VII, XI, XII, XIII.
Plaintiff also has not alleged any claims under the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court has only allowed Fifth Amendment claims under section 1983 pursuant to the enforcement of the takings clause, Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U.S. 180 (2019), and a criminal defendant's right to be free from self-incrimination, Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003). As it pertains to the right to due process, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause applies to the federal government. U.S. Const. amend V (“No person ... shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ...”).
Plaintiff has not stated any claim under the Ninth Amendment which “has not been interpreted as independently securing any constitutional rights for purposes of making out a constitutional violation.” Schowengerdt v. United States, 944 F.2d 483, 490 (9th Cir.1991) (rejecting Navy civilian engineer's Ninth Amendment claim arising out of allegedly improper investigation and discharge), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 951 (1992); see also Dyson v. Le'Chris Health Sys., Inc., No. 4:13-CV-224-BO, 2015 WL 134360, at *3 (E.D. N.C. Jan. 9, 2015) (the Ninth Amendment provides “no independent constitutional protection ... which may support a § 1983 cause of action.” (citations omitted)); Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744, 748-49 (9th Cir. 1986) (rejecting § 1983 claim based on the penumbra of the Ninth Amendment in the absence of some specific constitutional guarantee). Nor can he state a claim under the Tenth Amendment which “creates no constitutional rights cognizable in a civil rights cause of action.” Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744, 74r (9th Cir. 1986); see also Stone v. City of Prescott, 173 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Plaintiffs cannot found a [§] 1983 claim on the Tenth Amendment because it is neither a source of federal authority nor a fount of individual constitutional rights.”).
Plaintiff appears to be attempting to allege cruel and unusual punishment claims under the Eighth Amendment. However, claims of pretrial detainees against detention center officials are evaluated under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than under the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979); Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir.1988). Thus, Plaintiff's allegations concerning his conditions of confinement, sexual harassment, and his medical care should be evaluated under the Fourteenth Amendment and not the Eighth Amendment.
B. Claims Against Defendants Wright, Bishop, Gillespie/Mind Listener Claims
Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Wright, Bishop, and Gillespie concern the alleged use of a mind listener. He claims he has suffered medical problems from the alleged use of the device and that the device is being used to pressure him to change his religion and take a plea. However, his claims concerning the mind listener are frivolous and should be summarily dismissed. Numerous other courts have considered claims about alleged mind reading devices and have found such claims to be fanciful, fantastic, irrational, insane, delusional, and/or implausible. See, e.g., Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1025 (7th Cir. 2000) (affirming district court's dismissal of frivolous complaint, where the plaintiff “filed two insane complaints charging the United States and China with a conspiracy to ‘bio-chemically and bio-technologically infect and invade' various people including [the plaintiff] with a mind reading and mental torture device[.]”); Taylor v. Oliver, No. 523CV00337TESCHW, 2023 WL 8283612 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 30, 2023) (recommending summary dismissal of claims that the Georgia Department of Corrections and other inmates were using a military grade scanner to spy on the plaintiff and read his thoughts because these claims failed “to satisfy the minimal standards of rationality required at the preliminary screening stage” as they were “fanciful, fantastic, irrational, and/or delusional”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 523CV00337TESCHW, 2023 WL 8830586 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 21, 2023); Watson v. Broward Cnty. Sheriff Off., No. 21-CV-60361-RAR, 2021 WL 736412 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 25, 2021) (dismissing complaint for failure to state a claim and frivolousness, finding that the plaintiff's allegations of “mind reading machines” that were allegedly designed to “circumvent the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches and seizure” defied reality and were implausible and defied reality); Payne v. Contra Costa Sheriff's Dep't, No. C 02-2382CRB(PR), 2002 WL 1310748, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 10, 2002) (dismissing claim that a sheriff's department was using telepathy/mind control to harass and torture the plaintiff); Manco v. Does, No. 08-3205-SAC, 2009 WL 2356175, at *5 (D. Kan. July 29, 2009) (finding on frivolity review that prisoner's claims that government and prison officials implanted and manipulated plaintiff with mind-reading and thought and behavior-controlling devices were “wholly incredible and delusional and hence factually frivolous.”).
Plaintiff's allegation that Defendant Wright allowed unidentified person(s) to “blow pressure from [his] vent system” is also frivolous.
Additionally, to the extent Plaintiff may be attempting to bring claims against Defendants Wright, Bishop, and/or Gillespie based on a theory of supervisory liability, such claims are subject to summary dismissal. To state a § 1983 claim for supervisory liability, a plaintiff must allege:
(1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that [his or her] subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed “a pervasive and unreasonable risk” of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) that the supervisor's response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show “deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices”; and (3) that there was an “affirmative causal link” between the supervisor's inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.Wilkins v. Montgomery, 751 F.3d 214, 226 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994)). Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to establish supervisory liability as to Defendants Wright, Bishop, and/or Gillespie.
C. Access to the Courts/Defendant Scalf
Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendant Scalf denied him access to the court because two pages of a motion he sent to the court were taken out of the motion “before it left the jail.” ECF No. 11 at 10. He claims that Deputy Longe denied him a pen to fill out this lawsuit, and Defendant Clayton allegedly stole his legal work to help the prosecutor. Id. at 9.
The Supreme Court stated in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977), that prisoners must have meaningful access to the courts. The “meaningful access” referred to in Bounds does not, however, entitle a plaintiff to total or unlimited access. See Moore v. Gray, No. 5:04-CT-918-FL, 2005 WL 3448047, at *1 (E.D. N.C. Jan. 26, 2005), aff'd, 133 Fed. App'x 913 (4th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (citation omitted). The right of access to the courts only requires that prisoners have the capability of bringing challenges to sentences or conditions of confinement. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 356-57 (1996). Moreover, as a jurisdictional requirement flowing from the standing doctrine, the prisoner must allege an actual injury. See id. at 349. “Actual injury” is prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or present a non-frivolous claim challenging their conviction or conditions of confinement. See id. A plaintiff's “[f]ailure to show that a ‘nonfrivolous legal claim has been frustrated' is fatal to his Bounds claim.” Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1155 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. at 353).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim based on denial of access to the courts. Although he complains about missing pages to a motion, a lack of a pen, and that some of his legal work was allegedly stolen, he has not alleged any actual injury as a result of these alleged actions.
He has not alleged any injury to support any access to the court claim concerning his pending criminal proceedings. Moreover, records from Spartanburg County indicate that he is represented by counsel. See Blalock v. Eaker, 845 F.Supp.2d 678, 680 (W.D. N.C. 2012) (“[A] pretrial detainee who is represented by counsel, or who refuses an offer of counsel, lacks a constitutionally protected right to access and use legal materials.” (citing United States v. Chatman, 584 F.2d 1358, 1360 (4th Cir. 1978)).
D. Property Claims
Plaintiff's claims that Defendant Clayton took his clothing should be summarily dismissed. A claim of intentional deprivation of property by a prison official also does not state a constitutional due process claim, provided that the prisoner has access to an adequate postdeprivation remedy. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (concluding that “intentional deprivations do not violate [the Due Process] Clause provided, of course, that adequate state postdeprivation remedies are available”). Plaintiff has remedies under South Carolina law to obtain relief for the alleged taking of his personal property by bringing a tort action in state court or proceeding pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, SC Code Ann. §15-78-10 et seq. See Mora v. City of Gaithersburg, 519 F.3d 216, 231 (4th Cir. 2008) (state courts are available for property claims and the State process is constitutionally adequate); see also Plumer v. State of Maryland, 915 F.2d 927, 930-31 (4th Cir. 1990) (where a state actor commits an “unauthorized act” of taking property then an adequate state post-deprivation procedure satisfies due process).
IV. RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Court dismiss Defendants Wright, Bishop, Gillespie, and Scalf. It is also recommended that Plaintiff's claims under the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, Twelfth, and Thirteenth Amendments and his claims concerning a mind listener, personal property, and access to the courts be dismissed. The Amended Complaint should be served on Defendants Clayton, Walker, Longe, Washington, Apples, Margrett, Paz, and Ivery as to the remaining claims.
Thus, if this report and recommendation is adopted, Plaintiff's remaining claims will be his First Amendment claims against Defendants Clayton and Apples concerning his religious allegations and his Fourteenth Amendment claims against Defendant Longe concerning conditions of confinement, against Defendant Walker concerning sexual harassment, and against Defendants Margrett, Paz, and Ivery concerning his medical treatment.
Plaintiff's attention is also directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).