Opinion
No. CV06-4001270S
December 3, 2010
HABEAS DECISION
THE COURT: All right. The following is going to constitute the decision of this court.
We're going to start out with the Zeke issue, and I'm going to note that Mr. Williams did, in fact, give his correct address, his correct social security number and his correct last name, but it's also clear that his real name is Corey, his real first name is Corey, and he gave the name Zeke.
Now, it is unclear from the record perhaps, as noted by the appellate court, as to whether Zeke was or was not a nickname. But here's where the appellate court decision does provide binding . . . does become binding upon this court.
Even if Zeke was a nickname, it is not his given legal first name, and based on the decision of the appellate court, it's clear then that that is not . . . I mean it's clear that it's a false name. It may well be the nickname by which he is known, but the appellate court decision would not have changed even if it was determined that Zeke was a nickname.
Now, the appellate court in an understatement has indicated that the evidence for conviction was not overwhelming, and I'm talking about the interference charge. Nevertheless, the court concluded that based upon the evidence that was presented, it was sufficient for the jury to have reached that finding of guilty.
So to the extent that the issues raised here in the habeas, I've not heard any facts introduced in the habeas case that would allow me to conclude that there is any ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the use of the nickname Zeke.
Had Zeke been his legal name or middle name, there would be a stronger argument, but it is clear that even had Mr. Crossland introduced evidence that his nickname was Zeke, the holding of the appellate court would not have been any different.
The petition as to 4(a), of course, has to be denied on that basis.
Now, the issue of the motion to suppress, well, first it's clear that there was no motion to suppress litigated in Mr. Williams' underlying case, and while there probably was no downside to pursuing a motion to suppress, that's not enough to allow relief in the habeas matter.
In order to set aside the conviction and find relief, this court has to conclude that there has been deficient performance on the part of Attorney Crossland as well as prejudice that inures to the detriment of the petitioner.
Now, the only factual basis this court has for concluding what took place on that night in October of 2004 when Mr. Williams was arrested is the testimony of Officers Arrington and Fallow. I haven't heard any evidence introduced in this court that would establish any other facts other than those facts that were established by Officers Fallow and Arrington.
Mr. Rozwaski's testimony in front of this court, simply put, is that he would have liked to have been able to file an appeal on denial of the motion to suppress, but there was no motion to suppress, or no holding on the motion to suppress; consequently, he couldn't raise that appeal. Mr. Crossland clearly established that he didn't go forward with the motion to suppress.
So even if this court assumes that the failure to pursue the motion to suppress was deficient performance on the part of Mr. Crossland, the petitioner also has to establish that there was prejudice for his failing to do so, which essentially means the petitioner has to establish that had he gone forward, the issue would have been resolved favorably to the petitioner and that the evidence would have therefore been suppressed.
Based upon this court's reading of the testimony of Officers Fallow and Arrington, there would not have been a basis by which a court would have been able to grant that motion to suppress, so the failure by Attorney Crossland to proceed with the motion to suppress, even if deficient performance, fails under the CT Page 2236 Strickland standard because the petitioner has failed to demonstrate prejudice.
The respondent's counsel has succinctly stated the circumstances that existed on that day, two o'clock in the morning. The testimony of Officer Fallow is that there had been complaints of trespassing in the area, finding of materials in parking lots that led to complaints. It was testified that this was a not so nice area.
The officer sees a car parked in the parking lot of a closed business. As the police cruiser approaches, the car exits the parking lot, turns onto the street, putting on its headlights and attempts to drive off.
At that point, Officer Fallow, Sergeant Fallow, pulls the car over to inquire further. He clearly had a reasonable and articuable suspicion that something was amiss.
After approaching the vehicle, he finds out the driver doesn't have a driver's license. He then finds that the reason why the driver says he was there was to pick up Mr. Williams, his uncle, and Mr. Williams, to his credit, says "I'm not his uncle," thereby, of course, putting the driver in the position of having lied.
The officer reports that the three occupants of the car appeared nervous, more nervous than they should have been, given a routine traffic stop. At that point Sergeant Fallow calls for backup.
Thereafter, the case, the matter proceeds. The gentlemen are asked to step out of the car and narcotics are seen, seized, arrests are made.
Based on Officer Fallow's . . . I'm sorry, Sergeant Fallow and Sergeant Arrington's testimony, I can't see a basis upon which the trial court would have suppressed the fruits of that search. Therefore, I can't find any prejudice and the petition must be denied.