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stating that the burden of proving publication is on the plaintiff
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Civil Action No. 02-CV-7085.
October 27, 2004
NEIL J. HAMBURG, JUHWON LEE, Attorney Nos. 32175 and 83109, HAMBURG GOLDEN, P.C., Philadelphia, PA Counsel for Defendant University of the Science in Philadelphia.
ORDER
AND NOW, this day of 2004, upon consideration of defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and plaintiffs' response, it is hereby ORDERED and DECREED that the Motion is GRANTED and plaintiffs' state law claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress, false light invasion of privacy and loss of consortium are DISMISSED.
DEFENDANT UNIVERSITY OF THE SCIENCES IN PHILADELPHIA'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
For the reasons set forth in the attached memorandum of law, Defendant University of the Sciences in Philadelphia (the "University") moves for partial summary judgment in its favor and against plaintiffs Hercules Williams and Shanell Williams on plaintiffs' negligent infliction of emotional distress, false light invasion of privacy and loss of consortium claims.DEFENDANT UNIVERSITY OF THE SCIENCES OF PHILADELPHIA'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
I. BACKGROUND
Because the factual background of this case has been briefed in detail in the previous motion for partial summary judgment filed by the University of the Sciences in Philadelphia's (the "University"), the University incorporates that background by reference. In entering summary judgment on Counts IV and V of plaintiffs' complaint for intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation, this Court did not dismiss plaintiffs' negligent infliction of emotional distress, false light invasion of privacy, and loss of consortium claims, which are contained in the titles of the same counts as the causes of action that this Court dismissed because the University did not explicitly move for summary judgment on those causes of action. A copy of this Court's order is attached as Exhibit 1.
For the reasons that follow and for the reasons set forth in the University's initial motion for partial summary judgment, which is incorporated herein by reference, the University respectfully moves for summary judgment on plaintiffs' remaining state law tort claims: the negligent infliction of emotional distress, the false light invasion of privacy, and the loss of consortium claims.
II. ARGUMENT
A. MR. WILLIAMS' CLAIM FOR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE PENNSYLVANIA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT PREEMPTS IT.
Even though Mr. Williams' failed to properly plead a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, such a claim would fail as a matter of law because the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, 77 Pa.C.S.A § 1, et seq., preempts the claim for negligent intentional emotional distress. The Pennsylvania Workmen's Act provides that "[t]he liability of an employer under this act shall be exclusive and in place of any other liability to such employees . . . in any action at law or otherwise on account of any injury or death defined in [77 Pa.C.S.A. § 411] or occupational disease in [77 Pa.C.S.A. § 27.1]." 77 Pa.C.S.A. § 481(a).
The Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act provides one very narrow exception, the personal animus exception, for "employee injuries caused by the intentional conduct of third parties for reasons personal to the tortfeasor and not directed against him as an employee or because of his employment." Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 160 (3d Cir. 1999).
This Court has time and time again ruled that the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act preempts negligent intentional infliction of emotional distress claims and has held that the personal animus exception does not apply to such claims. InBrooks v. Mendoza, et al., 2002 WL 467157 (E.D.Pa.), this Court ruled as follows:
Defendants also argue that the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act preempts plaintiff's negligent infliction of emotional distress claims (First Cause of Action, Count II). The Court agrees because, unlike plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, the personal animus exception does not except negligent infliction of emotional distress claims from the bar of the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act. See Pryor v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr., No. CIV. A. 99-0988, 1999 WL 956376, at *2 (E.D.Pa. Oct. 15, 1999) (Hutton, J.) ("While the personal animus exception to the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act . . . supports the possibility of a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a negligent infliction claim by its very terms excluded."). "Any claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress which arises out of an employment relationship is thus barred by the [Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act]." Hoover v. Nabisco, Inc., No. CIV. A. 99-1452, 1999 WL 1073622, at *2 (E.D.Pa. Nov. 10, 1999) (O'Neill, J.) (citing Vaugh v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 1999 WL 299576, at *2 (E.D.Pa. May 10, 1999); Williams v. Claims Overload Sys. Inc., 1998 WL 104476, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Feb. 25, 1998); see also Hettler v. Zany Brainy, Inc., No. Civ. A. 99-3879, 2000 WL 1468550, at *6 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 27, 2000) (Pollack, J.) ("Claims against employers for negligent infliction of emotional distress do not fall within the personal animus exception."); Fieni v. Pocopson Home, Civ. A. No. 96-5343, at *6, 1997 WL 220280 (E.D.Pa. Apr. 29, 1997) (Hutton, J.) (dismissing a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim as preempted by the WCA). Accordingly, the Court grants the defendants' Motions for Reconsideration as to these claims and now grants the Motions for Summary Judgment as to the claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress against defendants Mendoza and Denny's.Id. at *4.
Because the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act preempts Mr. Williams' negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, it must be dismissed.
B. AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE UNIVERSITY'S CONDUCT CANNOT PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR MR. WILLIAMS' FALSE LIGHT INVASION OF PRIVACY CLAIM
Even though Mr. Williams failed to properly plead his false light invasion of privacy claim, the factual allegations are based on the same facts as his defamation claim.
Under Pennsylvania law, the tort of false light invasion of privacy is defined as:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if (a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.
(emphasis added).
Curran v. Children's Serv. Ctr. of Wyoming County, Inc., 578 A.2d 8, 12 (Pa.Super. 1990) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E); see also Lin v. Rohm Hass Co., 293 F.Supp.2d 505, 521-22 (E.D.Pa. 2003) (detailing the elements of a false light invasion of privacy).
Like his claim for defamation, Mr. Williams' claim for false light invasion of privacy must fail as a matter of law because he has provided no evidence to support any of its requisite elements.
This Court dismissed Mr. Williams' defamation claim and stated as follows:
Further, the Plaintiff cannot show that the defamatory statements were published to a third party by the University. Plaintiff makes no allegation that anything that was said in the e-mail to Fernberger or in the exit interview was disseminated by University employees to any other persons. "Publication of an allegedly false statements is a necessary element of the tort of defamation . . . The burden of proving publication is on the plaintiff." Lekich v. IBM Corp., 469 F.Supp. 485, 487 (E.D.Pa. 1979). Plaintiff has failed to sustain his burden of showing publication to unauthorized parties. See Cumberledge v. Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 1985 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 21136, *5 (E.D.Pa. Apr. 2, 1985). Therefore, this Court finds that any factual disputes relevant to the defamation claim, even if genuine, are not material, and there are no genuine issues of material fact on the second or seventh elements of the Plaintiff's prima facie case. Summary judgment on Count V for defamation is granted.
Memorandum and Order of the Honorable Petrese B. Tucker dated September 29, 2004, at p. 10-11.
Like his defamation claim, Mr. Williams' claim for false light invasion of privacy claim must be dismissed because he cannot meet the publication requirement.
C. SHANELL WILLIAMS' LOSS OF CONSORTIUM CLAIM FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW.
The University incorporates by reference the arguments regarding Shanell Williams' loss of consortium claim as stated in its motion for partial summary judgment filed on October 22, 2003.
Ms. Williams' loss of consortium claim fails as a matter of law because (1) she has no Pennsylvania tort derivative claim because Mr. Williams' underlying state law claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress and false light invasion of privacy claims lack merit, and (2) a spouse has no right to recover for loss of consortium under any employment discrimination statute. See Hettler v. Zany Brainy, Inc., 2000 WL 1468550, *7 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 27, 2000); Danas v. Chapman Ford Sales, Inc., 120 F.Supp.2d 478, 489 (E.D.Pa. 2000) (dismissing loss of consortium claim alleged to derive from spouse's ADEA and PHRA claims); see also Ouitmeyer v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 740 F.Supp. 363, 370 (E.D.Pa. 1990) (no spousal recovery for loss of consortium based on violations of other spouse's civil rights).
Accordingly, the University is entitled to summary judgment on Shanell Williams' loss of consortium claim under Count VI of the complaint.
III. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, defendant University of the Sciences in Philadelphia respectfully requests that this Court grant its motion for partial summary judgment and dismiss plaintiffs' negligent infliction of emotional distress, false light invasion of privacy and loss of consortium claims.