Opinion
2:20-cv-00794-SPB-RAL
04-05-2022
CHARLES WILLIAMS, Plaintiff v. THE PA. DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, JOHN WETZEL, J. S. JOHNSON, MARK CAPOZZA, DEPUTY SUPT. NICKELSON, DEPUTY SUPT. ARMEL, DEBRA HAWKINBERRY, RHONDA HOUSE, SHELLEY MANKEY, JOSEPH TREMPUS, CAPT. TIFT, LT. FISHER, LT. WOODS, MR. BYERS, MR. RIDDLE, MS. NAGY, MR. KNEPPER, MR. ERICKSON, CARRIE HAWK-LUSTER, C.O. 1 MINNIE, C.O. 1 BAGAN, NEDRA RICE, DR. JIN, MR. CASPER, MS. KACZMARK, MS. GIBSON, MS. BROWN, MS. SCHWARTZ, CO 1 FETSKO, SGT. KOWALL, Defendants
ECF NOS. 41, 47
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER UNITED STATE DISTRICT JUDGE.
RICHARD A. LANZILLO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
Two motions to dismiss Plaintiffs amended complaint are pending before the Court- one on behalf of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) and twenty-seven DOC employees (the DOC Defendants), and the other on behalf of Defendant Dr. Jin. See ECF Nos. 41, 47. Both motions have been referred to the undersigned for Report and Recommendation pursuant to the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the motions be granted. .
This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.
II. Report .
A. Background
Plaintiff Charles Williams (Williams), an inmate in the custody of the DOC, filed this civil rights action against individuals employed or who provide services at the State Correctional Institution at Fayette (SCI-Fayette). His amended complaint asserts claims for violation of his constitutional rights under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. ECF No. 33, p. 1. He also alleges a variety of state law claims. Id. His pleading is not divided into counts.
Dr. Jin filed a motion to dismiss Williams' complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and for failure to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, along with a brief in support. ECF Nos. 41, 42. The DOC Defendants also moved to dismiss, without a supporting brief. ECF No. 47. Williams filed what have been construed as briefs in opposition to the motions. ECF No. 52, 56, 57, 74. Dr. Jin has replied. ECF No. 59. Williams filed a sur-reply to Dr. Jin's reply brief. ECF No. 63. The motions are fully briefed and ready for decision. '
B. Allegations of Amended Complaint
In general, the amended complaint's allegations can be grouped into five categories: (1) Williams suffered physical harm due to exposure to coal ash in the prison's air and water after he was transferred from SCI-Forest to SCI-Fayette in August 2017, id., ¶¶ 35-58; (2) SCI-Fayette personnel conspired to have another inmate file a false Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) complaint against him as a pretext to have Williams placed in the restricted housing unit (RHU) and to confiscate his legal papers for one of his pending lawsuits, id, ¶¶ 59-61, 67-70; (3) prison personnel denied him certain “privileges” available to other inmates in administrative custody, id., ¶ 62-66; (4) in retaliation for his filing of a separate civil action and grievances, personnel subjected him to adverse actions, including labelling him gay, calling him a snitch, conspiring to have inmates file false PREA complaints against him, and interfering with or confiscating his legal papers and possessions after he was released from administrative custody, id, ¶¶ 71-105; and (5) in April 2020, prison personnel failed to give him information about the coronavirus pandemic, symptoms of the viral infection, and the related prison lockdown while taking insufficient safety measures. Id., ¶¶ 106-116. All actions alleged in the amended complaint occurred before May 2020. Williams seeks various forms of relief, including compensatory damages and an injunction compelling DOC officials to transfer him to another prison. Id., pp. 31-32.
C. Standard of Review
All complaints must comply with the pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that pleadings contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Rule 8 “does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations omitted). While the complaint need not be exactingly specific, it must “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the.. .claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Thus, Rule 8(a)(2) “requires a ‘showing' rather than a blanket assertion of an entitlement to relief.” Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008). “(W]ithout some factual allegation in the complaint, a claimant cannot satisfy the requirement that he or she provide not only ‘fair notice,' but also the ‘grounds' on which the claim rests.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3).
Accordingly, when suing more than one defendant, the complaint must explain who is responsible for what conduct. Thus, “lumping all the defendants together in each claim and providing no factual basis to distinguish their conduct” fails to satisfy Rule 8's minimum “fair notice” standard. Atuahene v. City of Hartford, 10 Fed.Appx. 33, 34 (2d Cir. 2001). For example, plaintiffs generally “may not rely on vague references to a group of defendants.” Engel v. Buchan, 710 F.3d 698, 710 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
The Defendants have also moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits; the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-36 (3d ed. 2004)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). A complaint should only be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) if it fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (rejecting the traditional Rule 12(b)(6) standard established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). In making this determination, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002).
While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts in the complaint. See California Pub. Emp. Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. See also McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”).
Expounding on the Twombly/Iqbal line of cases, the Third Circuit has articulated the following three-step approach:
First, the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.' Second, the court should identify' allegations that, ‘because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.' Finally, ‘where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.'Burtch v. MilbergFactors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). This determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
While the foregoing principles apply to all complaints in federal court, pro se complaints, “however inartfully pleaded, ” are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). If the court can reasonably read a pro se complaint to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or the litigant's unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (petition prepared by a prisoner may be inartfully drawn and should be read “with a measure of tolerance”).
D. Analysis
1. Williams' Complaint Violates Rule 8
Both Dr. Jin and the DOC Defendants argue that the amended complaint should be dismissed for failure to comply with the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. ECF No. 42, pp. 910; ECF No. 47, ¶ 5. The DOC Defendants add that Williams “engages in collective pleading, which renders the Amended Complaint insufficient and speculative.” ECF No. 47, ¶ 8. The Court agrees that Williams' pleading flouts the requirements of Rule 8 by failing to state the acts or omissions of each Defendant upon which Williams bases his claims against him or her. The Court also agrees that in the few instances where the amended complaint sufficiently identifies a particular Defendant, it fails to state a claim and is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).
The Court has construed Williams' federal claims as asserted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under § 1983, constitutional tort liability arises only upon a showing that the defendant was personally involved in the alleged wrongful conduct. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988); Colon v. Anglikowski, 2021 WL 2875477, at *7-8 (W.D. Pa. July 8, 2021) (citation omitted). In other words, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant played an “affirmative part” in the complained-of misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (“Absent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”); Oliver v. Beard, 358 Fed.Appx. 297, 300 (3d Cir. 2009). Claims against a defendant are properly dismissed where the complaint fails to allege facts to support an inference that he or she played a role in depriving the plaintiff of a constitutional right. See, e.g., Mearin v. Swartz, 951 F.Supp.2d 776, 781-82 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (dismissing claims under Rule 12(b)(6) because plaintiffs failed to set forth sufficient facts to establish that certain defendants had played an affirmative part in the alleged Eighth Amendment violation).
Despite its length-32 pages and 128 paragraphs-Williams' amended complaint does not provide any Defendant with fair notice of the factual basis of his claims against him or her. His pleading generally fails to specify which Defendant or Defendants committed the specific acts or omissions upon which he bases his claims. Instead of identifying the conduct of the Defendants, Williams lumps them and other individuals together using vague words and phrases such as “plaintiff informed the staff” “a number of the other staff” “the medical personnel, ” “a number of the staff, ” “plaintiff informed a number of his defendants, ” '"some of the defendants, ” "some of the defendants conspired, ” “the defendants, ” "the defendants refused, ” “a number of the defendants, ” “[plaintiff] sent a number of them requests slips, ” “the members of SCI-Fayette 's [Program Review Committee], ” “John Wetzel and his staff, ” and “they.” ECF No. 33, ¶¶ 48-49, 51-52, 58-59, 61-65, 114, 115 (emphasis supplied).
Where Williams does refer to Defendants by name, he characterizes their involvement in broad conclusory terms, unsupported by specific factual allegations. He asserts, for example, that several defendants and other unnamed staff sought to “cover up” adverse effects allegedly suffered by Williams as a result of exposure to coal ash:
The plaintiff filed a grievance about that matter and Rhonda House, Nedra Rice, Dr. Jin, Keri Mooore, Mr. Byers, Ms. Nagy, Mr. Riddle, C.O. 1 Fields, C.O.l Bums, Sgt. Lilly, C.O.l Bagan and a number of the staff tried to cover up the fact that the plaintiff was affected by the particles (coal ash) that he was exposed to.ECF No. 33, ¶ 53.
Dismissal under Rule 8 “is appropriate in cases where the ‘complaint is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.'” Clark v. Linares, 594 Fed.Appx. 81, 82 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (quoting Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995)). Although Williams alleges that he experienced longterm exposure to coal ash and resulting physical symptoms, he fails to allege facts to tie his exposure and symptoms to any DOC Defendant. His conclusory allegations against groups of defendants are insufficient to support the personal involvement of any Defendant in actionable conduct. See Saisi v. Murray, 822 Fed.Appx. 47, 48 (3d Cir. 2020); Van Tassel v. Piccione, 608 Fed.Appx. 66, 69-70 (3d Cir. 2015) (allegations that broadly implicate multiple defendants without delineating individual conduct are legally insufficient.); Ying Li v. City of New York, 2017 WL 1208422, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2017) (“Pleadings that do not differentiate which . defendant was involved in the unlawful conduct are insufficient to state a claim.”); Wright v. Orleans Cty., 2015 WL 5316410, at *13 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2015) (in a § 1983 case, “[g]roup pleading is insufficient for purposes of Rule 8(a)(2) which requires a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief') (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The same principles apply to Williams' claims against Dr. Jin. Williams' general allegations that “the defendants” or “a number of defendants” violated his rights similarly fail to put Dr. Jin on notice of what conduct is alleged against him. See Saisi, 822 Fed.Appx. at 48. The amended complaint's only allegations against Dr. Jin are that “he was informed about a number of the allegations that are alleged in this complaint” but “failed to remedy those matters, ” that Dr. Jin and approximately a dozen other named Defendants “and a number of the staff' together “tried to cover up the fact that [Williams] was affected by the particles (coal ash) that he was exposed to, ” and that Dr. Jin never responded to a request slip Williams sent on April 28, 2020. ECF No. 33, ¶¶ 28, 52, 53, 112. As Dr. Jin rightly argues, see ECF No. 42, p. 7, these allegations do not establish his personal involvement in actionable conduct and thus fail to state a claim.
2. Williams' Complaint Also Fails to State a Claim for Retaliation.
The few allegations of the amended complaint that identify a particular Defendant or Defendants nevertheless fail to state a retaliation claim. To state a retaliation claim, the plaintiff must allege facts to support that (1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) officials took an adverse action against the plaintiff; and (3) “a causal link” exists “between the exercise of his constitutional rights and the adverse action taken against him.” See Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000) (alteration in original)); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003).
An “adverse action” is one that would “deter a person of ordinary firmness” from exercising his First Amendment rights. Allah, 229 F.3d at 225 (quoting Suppan v. Dadonna, 203 F.3d 228, 235 (3d Cir. 2000)). This is an objective inquiry. See Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 376 (3d Cir. 2012). This requirement is not too demanding. “[U]nless the claimed retaliatory action is truly ‘inconsequential,' the plaintiffs claim should go to the jury.” Id. (citing Bell v. Johnson, 308 F.3d 594, 603 (6th Cir. 2002)). To show that retaliatory motive caused the adverse action, the plaintiff may rely on direct evidence or an inference of retaliatory motive arising from either (1) an unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the protected activity and the alleged retaliatory action; or (2) a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing that suggests a causal link. Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007). “‘These are not the exclusive ways to show causation, as the proffered evidence, looked at as a whole, may suffice to raise the inference.'” Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 280 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Kachmar v. SunGard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 1997)). Here, however, Williams' amended complaint has not alleged facts to support an inference that any adverse action taken against him was the product of any Defendants retaliatory motive.
Williams alleged that when Captain Tift learned that he had filed a lawsuit (Charles Williams v. The Pa. Dept. Of Corrections, et al., l:18-cv-170-SPB-RAL) and Grievance No. 784700, “Capt. Tift conspired with one of his coworkers to have them steal a number of items from out of the Plaintiffs property while the Plaintiff was being held in SCI-Fayette's RHU for the false PREA complaint that was filed against him.” ECF No. 33, ¶¶ 67-68. It is true that filing a lawsuit and a prison grievance are protected activity. See Mitchell, 318 F.3d at 530. And stealing property from an inmate could also be an adverse action depending on the circumstances (although Williams has not said what was stolen or when). See Jackson v. Carter, 813 Fed.Appx. 820, 825 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006)) (“discarding an inmate's personal and legal property could be considered an ‘adverse action.'”). But here, the adverse action Williams alleges Captain Tift took against him is not the actual taking of his property, but Tiffs alleged conspiring with unnamed others to do so. “To demonstrate a conspiracy under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that two or more conspirators reached an agreement to deprive him or her of a constitutional right ‘under color of law.'” Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 5 F.3d 685, 700 (3d Cir. 1983), abrogated on other grounds by United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392 (3d Cir. 2003). A plaintiff must plead an actual agreement among the parties to the alleged conspiracy. See Watson v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 436 Fed.Appx. 131, 137 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). “Mere conclusory allegations that a conspiracy existed will not survive a motion to dismiss.” Rogers v. Mount Union Borough ex rel. Zook, 816 F.Supp. 308, 314 (M.D. Pa. 1993). “As ‘the linchpin for conspiracy is agreement,' concerted action, without more, cannot suffice to state a conspiracy claim.” Watson, 436 Fed.Appx. at 137. “[O]nly allegations which are particularized, such as those addressing the period of the conspiracy, the object of the conspiracy, and actions taken in furtherance of the conspiracy, will be deemed sufficient.” Grigsby v. Kane, 250 F.Supp.2d 453, 458 (M.D. Pa. 2003); see also Brown v. Camp Hill, 2015 WL 5675575, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2015) (“A conspiracy claim requires more than mere speculation as to an agreement. Plaintiff must provide specific allegations of combination, agreement, or understanding among all or between any of the defendants to plot, plan or conspire to carry out the challenged conduct.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Tang v. State of R.1., Dep't of Elderly Affairs, 904 F.Supp. 55, 62 (D.R.I. 1995) (“[A]llegations of conspiracy [must] be supported by material facts, not merely conclusory statements.”). Here, Williams has failed to allege any particularized facts from which the Court might reasonably infer “a mutual understanding among the [alleged] conspirators to take action directed toward an unconstitutional end.” Grigsby, 250 F.Supp.2d at 458.
Williams' allegations also fail to support a plausible inference that Tift or any other Defendant acted with retaliatory motive. Williams has not alleged any direct evidence of retaliatory motive. And his failure to allege when Tift learned of his prior lawsuit or grievance and when he allegedly conspired to have Williams' property stolen allows no basis to infer that the alleged conspiracy or theft of his papers was motivated by retaliation. See Lauren W., 480 F.3d at 267. Thus, the amended complaint fails to support the causation element of Williams' retaliation claim against Tift.
Williams also alleges that “[w]hen C.O. 1 Fetsko, C.O. 1 Minnie, C.O. 1 Dell, Sgt. Kowall, and Carrie Hawk-Luster saw that a number of inmates started interacting with Plaintiff and going to him for legal advice, they tried to discourage a number of them from talking to the Plaintiff by telling them that the Plaintiff was gay and a snitch.” ECF No. 33, ¶ 75. He adds that Fetsko, Dell, Minnie, Kowall, and Hawk-Luster “tried to persuade a number of inmates to file false PREA complaints against the Plaintiff.” ECF No. 33, ¶ 76. These allegations similarly fail to support a retaliation claim because Williams has pleaded no direct evidence of retaliatory motive or an unusually suggestive timeline from which to infer motive or causation. See Lauren W, 480 F.3dat267.
To the extent Williams bases his retaliation claim on his activities as a “jailhouse lawyer, ” that claim also fails. Courts in the Third Circuit have repeatedly and consistently held that “[i]nmates do not possess an independent First Amendment right to provide legal assistance to fellow inmates.” Horan v. Collins, 2016 WL 5030468, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2016) (citing Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223 (2001)). See also Cooper v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 2016 WL 1271327, at *4-5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2016) (collecting cases for the same proposition). In the absence of a protected First Amendment right, Williams cannot establish that he engaged in protected conduct for purposes of his retaliation claim. Miller v. Lawler, 2012 WL 629280, at *15-16 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2012) (holding that, because inmates have no constitutional right to offer legal assistance to other inmates, such activity does not amount to “constitutionally protected conduct”) (citing Walker v. Campbell, 2011 WL 6153104, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2011)). See also Hodges v. Mankey, 2014 WL 7338760, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2014) (assisting other inmate in filing grievances “is not protected activity giving rise to a First Amendment claim, and therefore could not form the basis of a Section 1983 claim.”).
Although Williams uses the phrase “failure to protect” in his pleading, he does not allege that he experienced any violence, harassments, or threats as a result of the Defendants' alleged name calling.
In another instance, Williams alleges that Fetsko made comments critical of his ongoing lawsuit, asked why he was “wasting his time.. .when he knew that he was going to lose, ” and told him that he would “never” win any of his grievances or lawsuits. ECF No. 33, ¶¶ 73, 95. While it is questionable that such comments could be considered verbal harassment, even so, verbal harassment without more does not state a constitutional violation. See Green v. Wetzel, 2019 WL 1426955, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2019) (“Because verbal threats and comments are not adverse actions, Santos' sarcastic comments during Plaintiff's meeting are not actionable”) (citing Chruby v. Kowaleski, 534 Fed.Appx. 156, 161 (3d Cir. 2013)).
3. Williams' Conspiracy to Retaliate Claims Also Fail.
The amended complaint includes convoluted allegations about events on and shortly after July 30, 2019. ECF No. 33, ¶¶ 77-105. These allegations raise a possible claim of conspiracy to retaliate that merits brief discussion. That day, Fetsko and Ko wall are alleged to have learned from Williams that he had received a favorable ruling from a judge (in an unspecified lawsuit) and that he was also preparing an amended complaint with a deadline of August 24, 2019. After learning this, Fetsko is alleged to have “persuaded C.O. 1 Dell, C.O. 1 Minnie, Sgt. Kowall and Carrie Hawk-Luster to conspire with him to try to get a number of inmates to file false PREA complaints” to have Williams placed in the RHU so that Fetsko could then steal the amended complaint that Williams was preparing. Id., ¶ 99. Fetsko and Hawk-Luster's efforts failed to convince one inmate to cooperate, but they successfully prompted inmate Thomas Hazelet to file a PREA complaint. Id., ¶¶ 100-01. The amended complaint does not allege what Fetsko and Hawk-Luster did to accomplish this. Officials moved Williams to another housing unit because of Hazelet's PREA complaint. Id., ¶ 102. But about two weeks later, Hazelet apologized to Williams for filing a false complaint and an investigation concluded that the allegation was unfounded. Id., ¶¶ 103-05. The amended complaint does not say whether Williams' legal papers were then stolen or lost.
These allegations fail to state a conspiracy claim. To state that claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that two or more persons acting under color of state law conspired to deprive him of a constitutional right. Laurensau v. Romarowics, 528 Fed.Appx. 136, 140 (3d Cir. 2013). “[M]ere conclusory allegations of deprivations of constitutional rights are insufficient to state a conspiracy claim.” Tindell v. Beard, 351 Fed.Appx. 591, 594 (3d Cir. 2009). Rather, the plaintiff “must provide some factual basis to support the existence of the elements of a conspiracy: agreement and concerted action.” Capogrosso v. The Supreme Court of the State of New Jersey, 588 F.3d 180, 184-85 (3d Cir. 2009). He has provided no more than “bare allegations of wrongdoing by [the] Defendant[s], without any substantiating proof of an unlawful agreement, ” which is “insufficient to state a conspiracy claim.” See Carey v. Johnson, 2008 WL 724101, at *10 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2008). Williams has not identified “specific facts, particular to the moving defendants, demonstrating the actions of defendants committed in creating and furthering the conspiracy, including the times and places of meetings and the general role of each conspirator.” Brown v. Wetzel, 2019 WL 1331619, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 2019) (quoting Robinson v. Corizon Health, Inc., 2016 WL 1274045, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2016)). This claim should be dismissed.
4. Williams' Allegations Concerning Access to COVID-19 Information Fail to State a Claim.
Williams alleges that the Defendants have failed to provide him with information) concerning the COVID-19 pandemic and safety measures within the prison. Williams specifically alleges that the Defendants either failed to volunteer or refused to provide him with information about the virus's symptoms, its mortality rate, and whether DOC policy or practice permitted staff who tested positive for the virus to return to work. Id., ¶¶ 111-13. Williams also alleges that various prison officials refused to tell him why SCI-Fayette had gone into a lockdown in mid-April 2020. ECF No. 33, ¶ 106. It is unclear what claim or theory of liability, if any, Williams is attempting to assert based on these allegations. He has not alleged that he has experienced illness or other injury because of inadequate information being shared by the Defendants or that he faces a threat of such harm. He has pointed to no constitutional, statutory, or other authority entitling him to this information, and the Court is aware of none.
In cases involving the risk of contracting disease, courts recognize that the speculative risk of future harm-without more-does not meet the “imminence” requirement of an injury in fact. See Purdy v. Community Corr., 2021 WL 2778565, at *3 (D. Neb. July 2, 2021) (holding that prison inmate failed to plead injury with respect to the allege risk of CO VID-19 infection); Robinson v. Vaugh, 1992 WL 368461, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 1992) (“constant fear of contracting an asbestos-related disease, ” “absent some manifestation of an asbestos-related disease, ” rendered his purported injury “too speculative.”); Cage v. Nwozo, 2017 WL 6815023, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 26, 2017) (inmate lacked standing to assert claims based on prison officials' release of shingles-virus-positive inmate into the prison population when plaintiff did not claim personal shingles' infection or higher vulnerability to the virus). Here, Williams' allegations support neither a viable theory of liability nor a cognizable injury.
Therefore, any claims based on Defendants' alleged failure to provide Williams with COVID-19 information and further safety measures should be dismissed.
5. Sovereign Immunity
a. Williams' claims against the Pennsylvania DOC are barred.
The DOC Defendants correctly argue that suit against the Pennsylvania DOC as an entity is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. ECF No. 47, ¶ 7. The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state governments in federal courts. This immunity extends to any entity that is an arm of the state. See Regents of the Univ, of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429-30 (1997). “The DOC is quintessentially an arm of the state and is funded by, controlled by, and accountable to the state.” Fox v. Bayside State Prison, 726 Fed.Appx. 865, 867-68 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Koslow v. Pennsylvania, 302 F.3d 161, 169 (3d Cir. 2002)) (other citation omitted). Thus, Williams' claims against the Pennsylvania DOC should be dismissed with prejudice.
b. Williams' Official Capacity Claims Against the Individual DOC Defendants for Money Damages Should be Dismissed with Prejudice.
Williams has sued each individual DOC Defendant in both his or her official and individual capacities. See ECF No. 33. The DOC Defendants argue that Williams' official capacity claims against them must be dismissed because the DOC and its employees are protected by sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, an immunity which Pennsylvania has not waived. ECF No. 47, ¶ 7. The DOC Defendants are correct in that they have immunity for official capacity claims seeking monetary damages. The Eleventh Amendment proscribes actions for money damages in the federal courts against states, their agencies, and state officials acting in their official capacities. See Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23 (3d Cir. 1981) (Pennsylvania); Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (state agencies); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (state employees acting in their official capacity). The DOC, as an agency of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and its agents and employees are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity for money damages. See Brown v. Smith, 2019 WL 2411749 (W.D. Pa. June 7, 2019). Because all DOC Defendants are alleged to have acted within the scope of their employment, Williams' claims for monetary relief against them in their official capacities should be dismissed with prejudice. And while the Eleventh Amendment does not provide immunity for claims for injunctive or declaratory relief, see Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 n.18 (1985), Williams has alleged no facts to support any viable claim for such relief. 6. Leave to Amend Should Be Granted
When a civil rights complaint is subject to dismissal, the district court “must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 246 (3d. Cir. 2008). Because the principal deficiencies of Williams' claims arise from his failure to allege facts sufficient to support each claim, it cannot be said that a curative amendment would be futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002)). As a result, except where this Report specifies dismissal with prejudice, each of his claims should be dismissed without prejudice. Williams should be granted a reasonable time to file an amended complaint. If Williams fails to file an amended complaint, his federal claims should be dismissed with prejudice and the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims.
The Court should decline the invitation to convert the motions to dismiss into ones for summary judgment following the argument of Dr. Jin and the DOC Defendants that Williams failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). ECF Nos. 42, pp. 5, 15-16; 47, ¶ 10. This argument is premature because the Defendants bear the burden to prove the affirmative defense of a prisonerplaintiffs failure to exhaust, and Defendants have not submitted Williams' grievance record or other appropriate evidence in support this defense. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007); Rinaldi v. United States, 904 F.3d 257, 268 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 295 (3d Cir. 2002)).
Supplemental jurisdiction over Williams' state law claims is dependent on whether he files a further amended complaint. If Williams chooses not to amend, then the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Williams' state law claims because no independent basis for federal court jurisdiction will remain. Declining supplemental jurisdiction is appropriate when “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(c); see e.g., Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000) (“where the claim over which the district court has original jurisdiction is dismissed before trial, the district court must decline to decide the pendent state claims unless considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative justification for doing so.”) (citation omitted). At this early stage of the case, no such considerations would support this Court continuing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if all federal claims were to be dismissed with prejudice.
An amended complaint “must be complete in all respects. It is a new pleading which stands by itself as an adequate complaint without reference to the complaint already filed.” Williams v. Ferdarko, 2018 WL 3653272, at *1 n.l (W.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2018) (quoting Young v. Keohane, 809 F.Supp. 1185, 1189 (M.D. Pa. 1992)). This means that Williams should not simply submit the new facts or claims that he wishes to add to this litigation and request that they be added to his prior complaint. Rather, he must draft a full and complete amended complaint with all his facts necessary to state a claim.
Given the nature of the deficiencies in his pro se Complaint, Williams is reminded that any amended complaint must describe the personal involvement of each defendant in violating his rights. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). In his amended complaint, Williams should (1) differentiate his claims among the defendant or defendants he is suing, (2) provide a short and plain statement of the facts in accordance with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, (3) identify what each defendant did or did not do, when, for how long, and if the violations of rights are ongoing, (4) explain his actual injuries (beyond an insufficient statement that the Defendants violated his civil rights), and (5) what relief he is seeking. Because Williams generally lumped his multiple claims against all Defendants together, the Court invokes Rule 10 for Williams to follow at the urging of the DOC Defendants, see ECF No. 47, ¶ 6, which requires that “[a] party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Fed. R Civ. P. 10(b). “[E]ach claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence.. .must be stated in a separate count or defense.” Id.
7. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, it is respectfully recommended that the Court grant the motions to dismiss filed by Dr. Jin and the DOC Defendants at ECF Nos. 41 and 47. All claims of Williams' amended complaint against the DOC as a Defendant and all official capacity claims for money damages against each Defendant should be dismissed with prejudice. All other claims should be dismissed without prejudice and with leave to file an amended complaint.
III. Notice
In accordance with the applicable provisions of the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) & (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of the service of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections thereto. Plaintiffs failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of his appellate rights.