Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-9603.
April 2, 2008.
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Peter A. Michalski, Judge., Trial Court No. 3AN-96-7525 Civ.
Dan S. Bair, Assistant Public Advocate, Appeals Statewide Defense Section, and Joshua Fink, Public Advocate, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Michael Sean McLaughlin, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and Talis J. Colberg, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer and Stewart, Judges.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
David Williams was convicted of first-degree murder for killing his girlfriend, Deborah Goodlataw. This Court affirmed Williams's conviction on direct appeal. See Williams v. State, 823 P.2d 1 (Alaska App. 1991).
Williams then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, raising various claims. These claims have now been reduced to one: Williams asserts that his trial attorney was incompetent for failing to seek suppression of Williams's confession to the police on the theory that it was involuntary.
Following an evidentiary hearing, Superior Court Judge Peter A. Michalski concluded that Williams had failed to prove that his trial attorney's decision ( i.e., the attorney's failure to file the proposed suppression motion) was incompetent. In fact, Judge Michalski concluded that such a motion would have had no merit. The judge dismissed Williams's petition, and Williams now appeals the judge's decision.
We conclude that Judge Michalski could properly find that Williams failed to prove the incompetence of his trial attorney. We therefore affirm the decision of the superior court.
Basic explanation of the issue in this case
On December 31, 1988, an officer of the Anchorage Police Department entered the apartment that Williams shared with his girlfriend, Goodlataw. This officer discovered Goodlataw alone in the apartment; she was dead. A later medical examination showed that Goodlataw had been dead for approximately 24 hours, and that she had suffered brain injuries from a severe beating (comprising at least 21 separate blows to her head and body).
During the 24 hours between Goodlataw's death and the discovery of her body, Williams told his foster mother that he thought Goodlataw was dead; when she asked Williams if he had hit Goodlataw, Williams replied, "I must have." In addition, Williams told a friend that he and Goodlataw had gotten into a fight, and that when he woke up "[there was] blood all over".
Williams's foster mother called the police after speaking with Williams. This telephone call prompted the police to begin searching for Goodlataw — which led to the officer's entry into the apartment and the discovery of Goodlataw's body.
Williams was arrested later that afternoon. He was taken to the police station, where he waived his rights and consented to be interviewed.
Williams was initially interviewed by Investigators Joe Austin and Michael Grimes. During this portion of the interview, Williams repeatedly told the officers that he and Goodlataw had been drinking, and that he had wakened from an alcohol-induced blackout to find Goodlataw lying unresponsive on their bed. Williams stated that he tried to rouse Goodlataw, but he was unable to.
At one point during this portion of the interview, Williams mentioned that he had attempted to telephone Officer Pat O'Brien, whom Williams claimed to know from their mutual attendance at Alcoholics Anonymous meetings. When Austin and Grimes heard this, they sent for O'Brien.
The second portion of the interview began when O'Brien arrived at the police station. O'Brien took over the questioning from Austin and Grimes, and he spoke with Williams for approximately one hour.
During this second portion of the interview, Williams initially continued to assert that he remembered nothing about what happened until he awoke to find Goodlataw unresponsive beside him. But toward the end of the hour, O'Brien announced that he was frustrated by Williams's assertions of ignorance, that he saw no point in continuing the interview, and that he was going to leave. At this point, Williams began to confess that he had beaten Goodlataw.
Williams's trial attorney did not seek suppression of this confession. In Williams's petition for post-conviction relief, he contended that his trial attorney's failure to seek suppression of the confession was incompetent.
In particular, Williams contended that his statement was rendered involuntary because O'Brien repeatedly played on his Alcoholics Anonymous connection with Williams in an effort to induce Williams to confess. Williams further contended that any competent defense attorney would have recognized that O'Brien's tactics rendered the confession involuntary.
Details of the interview between O'Brien and Williams
When O'Brien arrived at the police station, Investigators Austin and Grimes left the interview room and O'Brien took over the questioning.
Williams almost immediately began to explain to O'Brien why he had tried to call O'Brien after he realized that Goodlataw would not wake up. However, Williams continued to insist that he had no recollection of events until he discovered Goodlataw lying there unresponsive:
O'Brien: What did you have to tell me [when you tried to call me], Dave?
Williams: I was gonna ask if you would come over there.
. . .
O'Brien: What did you want me to help you with?
. . .
Williams: I was gonna tell you that . . . we were drinking, . . . and I woke up . . . and she was dead, [or] she wouldn't wake up. . . . Wish you [had been] home.
. . .
O'Brien: What was it you thought I could do for you Dave? What was happening?
Williams: I thought I could trust you.
O'Brien: Feeling pretty bad about what happened? . . .
Williams: [I] wish I could remember what happened.
O'Brien: You trying to tell me [that] you don't remember what happened? Come on, Dave.
Williams: I don't remember. We were both sitting on the couch. We were playing with the dog, and that's . . .
At this point, O'Brien referred to his Alcoholics Anonymous connection with Williams in an effort to get Williams to be more forthcoming. However, Williams continued to stick to his story:
O'Brien: Come on, Dave. You and I both know each other from the streets and stuff. . . . And between you and me, that can be kind of a cop out — you know, that "I don't remember what happened; I blacked out." . . . You know, that's a pretty lousy line to use, I think.
Williams: I'm honestly telling you that we drank, and that's all I remember.
As the interview proceeded, O'Brien again referred to the fact that he and Williams "[knew] each other from the streets" and from AA meetings, and O'Brien again asserted that "this thing about `I don't remember what I was doing when I was drinking'" was "a lie" and "a sham".
O'Brien then told Williams that he would have been willing to help him if he had received Williams's telephone call:
O'Brien: Have you got [an AA] sponsor, Dave? Did you try calling anybody in the program?
Williams: Just you.
O'Brien: You know that I would've come and helped you out, don't you? You know that's kinda how this whole thing works, is trying to help somebody else. [Because] I know what you know — [what] drinking can do to you.
Williams: Sure wish you [had been] there.
O'Brien then returned to his theme that Williams's claimed lack of memory was a false excuse, and that if Williams wanted to adhere to the principles of Alcoholics Anonymous, he needed to admit the truth:
O'Brien: You know [that] you can't use a lot of excuses; you know that. It's not a part of what . . . being involved in this program [ i.e., Alcoholics Anonymous] is about. How much clean time did you have?
Williams: Probably . . . a little over a month.
O'Brien: Were you going to meetings?
Williams: Yeah.
. . .
O'Brien: Are you using this . . . "I'm an alcoholic" as just a screen for what happened? You know, claiming [that] you had a blackout. Are you using it as a cop out, Dave? You know that's not what this honesty stuff is all about. . . . You know [that] it's a program of rigorous honesty, and it's not just when you're inside those meeting rooms for an hour. It's rigorous honesty in everything. Now, you know that. . . . It has got to carry over to all parts of your life.
But despite these exhortations to be honest, Williams continued to repeat his story that he had been drinking, that he had fallen unconscious, and that he had awakened to discover Goodlataw unresponsive beside him.
Finally, O'Brien told Williams that he believed that Williams was not being truthful, that Williams was treating him "like an idiot", and that there was no point in continuing the interview. O'Brien repeated his point that Williams needed to "get it out", and he warned Williams that "this is going to be the last chance you're going to have to talk to me." O'Brien then told Williams: "I wish you'd bring it out. I really want you to come out and tell me. Bring it out now, and let it out quick. Tell me what the hell happened. . . . I know you want to talk to me."
At this point, Williams began to make incriminating statements. He admitted that he and Goodlataw had fought because another man had been paying attention to Goodlataw. Williams further admitted that he had struck Goodlataw on her right cheek.
As O'Brien pressed for more details, Williams admitted that he had hit Goodlataw on the head at least three times, and that he then hit and kicked her "all over" her body while she lay prostrate. After this assault, Williams asserted, he blacked out. When he awoke, he discovered that Goodlataw was lying on the bed and that she would not wake up. Williams admitted that he used a wash rag to clean Goodlataw's blood from the night stand.
At Williams's trial, the State introduced this confession as part of its proof that Williams assaulted Goodlataw and caused her injuries.
Williams's contention that his trial attorney was incompetent for failing to attack the voluntariness of this statement
In his petition for post-conviction relief, and now on appeal, Williams argues that his confession was involuntary because of the interrogation technique employed by Officer O'Brien — and that any competent defense attorney would have realized this.
Williams contends that, in many respects, the members of Alcoholics Anonymous function toward each other like members of a close-knit community. Members are urged to engage in honest and fearless self-examination, and to openly take responsibility for their failings. Moreover, members of Alcoholics Anonymous are taught to support each other, and to look to each other for support, in the way that family members might. Williams argues that, because he knew O'Brien from Alcoholics Anonymous, O'Brien was able to use these precepts to play upon Williams's emotions and get him to confess.
But the test for involuntariness is not whether the police interrogator was successful in finding a psychological tactic that induced the suspect to confess. Rather, the test is whether the police used methods that were so coercive as to "overbear the suspect's will to resist" and elicit a confession that was "not fairly self-determined". Edwards v. State, 842 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Alaska App. 1992). This test focuses "in large measure on the subjective effect of the police conduct on the suspect's will." State v. Garrison, 128 P.3d 741, 750 (Alaska App. 2006); Edwards, 842 P.2d at 1285.
In the present case, the record shows that O'Brien repeatedly referred to the precepts of Alcoholics Anonymous — most importantly, the need to be honest about one's failings, and to take responsibility for them. In this vein, O'Brien repeatedly stated that it was not honest for Williams to hide behind assertions of an alcoholic black-out.
But the record also shows that, despite this interrogation technique, Williams continued to declare — for almost an hour — that he had no memory of what happened to Goodlataw. In addition, the videotape of the interrogation shows that Williams did not exhibit any overt physical reaction to O'Brien's pleas about "the program". It was not until O'Brien announced that he saw no purpose in continuing the interview, and that he was going to leave, that Williams finally began to confess his assault on Goodlataw.
Although we were not able to find other reported cases where police officers relied on the precepts of Alcoholics Anonymous to try to induce a suspect to confess, we did find cases where police officers relied on a suspect's religious beliefs and tenets during an interrogation.
In United States v. Miller, 984 F.2d 1028 (9th Cir. 1993), the police interrogator reminded the defendant of the religious beliefs he had once held — beliefs that "included the need to repent when one transgressed a law or offended someone". The officer told the defendant that, "in [his] opinion, honesty in this particular matter was the first step in that direction [ i.e., repentance]." Id. at 1032. The Ninth Circuit concluded that this tactic was not coercive, because the record showed no causal connection between the officer's exhortations and the defendant's confession two days later.
In State v. Newell, 132 P.3d 833 (Ariz. 2006), the Arizona Supreme Court reached a similar result: the record showed that the interrogating officer's appeals to religion had not overborne the suspect's will. Id. at 844.
In Noble v. State, 892 S.W.2d 477 (Ark. 1995), the defendant argued that his confession was involuntary because, after he announced that he was a Baptist and that he believed in God, the police interrogator used that religious belief to elicit the defendant's confession. Id. at 483. The record showed that the officer told the defendant that, "in [his] belief as a Christian", the important thing "[was] not who judges you on this earth". Rather, the officer admonished, "it is . . . the good Lord [who] will judge [you] at the end of your life" — "that's the only person you have to be right with." Id. The Arkansas Court concluded that the defendant's religious beliefs did not make him "so singularly vulnerable to the broadly based religious appeals made by the police officers that his free will was completely overborne." Id.
Overruled on other grounds in Grillot v. State, 107 S.W.3d 136, 145 (Ark. 2003).
Similarly, in State v. Cobb, 43 P.3d 855 (Kan.App. 2002), the court held that a defendant's confession was voluntary despite the fact that the defendant discussed shared religious beliefs or background with the interrogating officers. The court noted that the defendant "joined into the religious discussion enthusiastically and urged the agents to continue talking to him". Id. at 864. The court concluded:
In the end, we view the situation as comparable to one in which a police officer is aware that a suspect feels most comfortable when talking to a person who shares his or her opinions on politics. The officer would be permitted to feign agreement with and enthusiasm for the defendant's position and to try to make cooperation in the investigation consistent with the defendant's world view. This tactic would not make resulting incriminating statements involuntary if the suspect was mature and of normal intelligence.
Cobb, 43 P.3d at 864.
In citing these cases, we do not necessarily endorse the result reached in each one. Rather, our purpose is to show that a reasonably competent defense attorney could conclude, based on the facts of Williams's case and on these judicial decisions, that the statements Williams made to O'Brien were voluntary for constitutional purposes. Any motion to suppress these statements as involuntary would, at best, be debatable.
We therefore agree with Judge Michalski that, on this record, Williams failed to prove that his trial attorney acted incompetently by failing to pursue the proposed suppression motion. That is, Williams failed to prove that his trial attorney's decision fell below the minimum standard of competence required of criminal law practitioners.
Conclusion
The judgement of the superior court is AFFIRMED.