Opinion
No. 05-02-01185-CR.
Opinion Filed April 28, 2003. DO NOT PUBLISH, Tex.R.App.P. 47.
Appeal from the 282nd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F02-48948-TS. Affirm.
Before Justices MORRIS, WRIGHT, and MOSELEY.
OPINION
A jury convicted Kerry Williams of theft of property valued at less than $1500, and having two prior theft convictions, and assessed punishment at two years in a state jail facility. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 31.03 (Vernon 2003). In two points of error, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the trial court's judgment. The indictment alleged appellant intentionally and knowingly appropriated three packages of deodorant having a value of less than $1500 without the effective consent of Andrew Harris, the owner, with intent to deprive Harris of the property. Harris, a Cockrell Hill police officer, was employed part-time by Carnival Food Store as an undercover store officer. At approximately 5:30 p.m. on March 12, 2002, Harris saw appellant enter the store. Harris testified he noticed appellant because appellant was "talking loudly to himself and appeared to have been homeless for awhile." Harris saw appellant put packages of deodorant in his coat pockets. Then appellant selected a candy bar, paid for it at the register, and walked out of the store without paying for the deodorant. When Harris identified himself to appellant as a police officer, appellant immediately ran into the street and zigzagged through rush-hour traffic. Harris chased appellant for seven blocks before apprehending him. Harris testified he never gave appellant consent to take the deodorant. In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.307, 318-19 (1979). In a factual sufficiency review, we determine whether a neutral review of all the evidence demonstrates the proof of guilt is so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the jury's determination, or the proof of guilt, although adequate if taken alone, is greatly outweighed by contrary proof. See Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). The jury is the exclusive judge of the facts provided and of the weight to be given to the testimony. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04 (Vernon 1979). While the reviewing court has some authority to disregard evidence that supports the verdict, it may not substitute its own determination for that of the jury. See Ortiz v. State, 93 S.W.3d 79, 87-88 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). Appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient because the State failed to prove ownership of the property or that Harris had a greater right to possession of the property than appellant. The State responds that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to show appellant stole property from the store and that Harris had a greater right to possession of the property than appellant. We agree with the State's arguments. The "owner" of property means a person who has title to or possession of the property, whether lawful or not, or has a greater right to possession of the property than the actor. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(35) (Vernon 2003). The evidence presented at trial showed Harris was employed by the Carnival Food Store as a part-time undercover security officer. There was no evidence that Harris was not an employee of the store. As a store employee who had responsibility to protect the property, Harris qualifies as an owner with a greater right to possession of the deodorant than appellant. See Johnson v. State, 606 S.W.2d 894, 896 (Tex.Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980); see also Freeman v. State, 707 S.W.2d 597, 606 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986). Having reviewed all of the evidence, we conclude it is legally and factually sufficient to support the conviction. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19; Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 11. Accordingly, we overrule appellant's two points of error. We affirm the trial court's judgment.