Opinion
24A-CR-1082
09-27-2024
Devonte N. Williams, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
Attorney for Appellant Eugene A. Kress Anderson, Indiana Attorneys for Appellee Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Megan M. Smith Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Hamilton Superior Court, The Honorable William J. Hughes, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 29D03-2306-CM-004554
Attorney for Appellant Eugene A. Kress Anderson, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Megan M. Smith Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Felix, Judge
Statement of the Case
[¶1] Devonte Williams kicked in the door of Taylor Stapleton's apartment after Stapleton had obtained a no-trespass order against Williams. The State charged Williams with criminal trespass and criminal mischief. At the start of Williams's bench trial, Williams asked for a continuance. The trial court denied his request, proceeded with the trial, and found him guilty as charged. Williams appeals, presenting two issues for our review:
1. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to convict Williams of criminal trespass and criminal mischief; and
2. Whether the trial court erred in denying Williams's motion for a continuance.
[¶2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶3] In early 2023, Williams and Stapleton were living together as boyfriend and girlfriend in an apartment. Stapleton and her son were the only people listed on the lease. In February 2023, the couple broke up, and Stapleton took back the key to the apartment she had given to Williams. Even though Williams no longer had a key, Stapleton allowed him to live in the apartment with her until April 18, 2023. On that date, Stapleton obtained a no-trespass order which prohibited Williams from going to the apartment complex. That same day, Stapleton had Williams remove his belongings while the Noblesville Police Department arrived to notify Williams that he could not come back to the apartment because of the no-trespass order. Despite the no-trespass order being in effect, Williams "popp[ed] up over at [the] apartment complex" more than once over the next two months. Tr. Vol. II at 13. Near the end of May, Stapleton starting "talking to somebody new." Id.
[¶4] On June 13, 2023, Williams called Stapleton and threatened to kill Stapleton's "new guy." Tr. Vol. II at 13. The next day, Stapleton was in her apartment when she heard banging and kicking at her front door. Amidst the sound of the kicking and banging, Stapleton recognized Williams's voice yelling and calling her a "[b*]tch." Id. at 17. Shortly after the noise stopped, Stapleton left her apartment and went to the parking lot. In the parking lot, Stapleton saw a Jeep Compass-a vehicle she recognized as one that Williams had driven before- pulling out of the apartment complex. When she returned to her apartment, Stapleton realized the door had been kicked off the frame. She was later charged $500 to replace the door.
[¶5] On June 22, 2023, the State charged Williams with criminal trespass as a Class A misdemeanor and criminal mischief as a Class B misdemeanor. At an initial hearing, the trial court determined that Williams was indigent, appointed a public defender, and scheduled a bench trial for September 21, 2023. Throughout the course of the proceedings, the trial court granted multiple continuances for both parties with the final continuance being granted on March 7, 2024, at Williams's request. On March 13, 2024, Williams was appointed a different public defender to represent him.
Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2(b)(1) (2023).
Id. § 35-43-1-2(a) (2023).
[¶6] On April 25, 2024, Williams's bench trial began. At the start of the proceedings, Williams asked the trial court for another continuance so he could hire private counsel. From the record before us, it appears that the day of the bench trial was the first time Williams expressed a desire to hire private counsel to the trial court. The need to continue the trial was explained to the trial court as Williams's desire to have an attorney who has "more preparation to try this case", but Williams's counsel told the trial court: "I cannot represent to the court that I am not prepared to take this to trial[.]" Tr. Vol. II at 10. In other words, Williams's counsel was ready for trial. The trial court denied Williams's request, and Williams was found guilty as charged. Williams now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
1. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Convict Williams
[¶7] Williams claims that the State provided insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction. For these claims, we show significant deference to the factfinder's decision:
Sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims trigger a deferential standard of review in which we "neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, instead reserving those matters to the province of the jury." Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018). A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if "there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each
element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015). In conducting that review, we consider only the evidence that supports the jury's determination, not evidence that might undermine it. Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024).Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024). Williams argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove he committed criminal trespass and criminal mischief.
a. Criminal Trespass
[¶8] In order to convict Williams of criminal trespass as a Class A misdemeanor under Indiana Code section 35-43-2-2(b)(1), the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, without having a contractual interest in the property, Williams "knowingly or intentionally enter[ed] the real property of another person after having been denied entry by the other person or that person's agent." Williams argues that the State failed to show that he had previously been denied entry to the apartment and that he entered the apartment.
[¶9] A person has been denied entry under subsection (b)(1) when the person has been denied entry by "personal communication, oral or written." I.C. § 35-43-2-2(c)(1)(2023). Williams claims he was not denied entry by any communication. However, on April 18, 2023, Stapleton obtained a no-trespass order from the apartment complex "that was for the ... apartment property." Tr. Vol. II at 12. On that date, law enforcement officers came to the apartment as Williams was gathering his things, notified Williams of the no-trespass order, and told him that he was not allowed to come back to the apartment complex.
[¶10] Williams contends this notice was insufficient because there is no evidence that the law enforcement officers were acting as agents of Stapleton or the apartment complex. An agency relationship is shown by establishing: "(1) manifestation of consent by the principal, (2) acceptance of authority by the agent, and (3) control exerted by the principal over the agent." Glispie v. State, 955 N.E.2d 819, 822 (Ind.Ct.App. 2011) (quoting Demming v. Underwood, 943 N.E.2d 878, 883 (Ind.Ct.App. 2011)). "[A]gency cannot be proven by the declaration of the agent alone," id. (citing United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Ind. Dep't of State Revenue, 459 N.E.2d 754, 758 (Ind.Ct.App. 1984)), but agency can be proven by circumstantial evidence, id. Stapleton obtained a no-trespass order from the apartment complex. Immediately after obtaining the no-trespass order, and while Williams was taking his belongings out of the apartment, law enforcement notified Williams of the no-trespass order obtained by Stapleton prohibiting him from trespassing at the apartment property-which would have included Stapleton's apartment. We conclude that this evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that the law enforcement officers were acting on behalf of Stapleton or the apartment complex and Williams had been denied entry to the apartment property. See id.
[¶11] Although the evidence reflects that Williams was prohibited from entering the apartment property, Williams argues that if there was a valid no-trespass order, that it only prevented Williams from entering Stapleton's apartment. Williams argues that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate he entered Stapleton's apartment because he claims that Stapleton did not have a possessory interest in the common areas of the apartment complex. We have held that, in a criminal trespass action, a tenant's possessory interest extends "to an interest in the passageways for ingress and egress to and from the rental unit, to the area in the threshold of the unit, and to the door of the unit." Walls v. State, 993 N.E.2d 262, 267 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013); see also J.M.J. v. State, 38 N.E.3d 686, 691 (Ind.Ct.App. 2015) (holding that a tenant of a rental unit has a possessory interest in the common area immediately adjacent to the apartment door). Williams came to the common area outside the front door of Stapleton's apartment, yelled at Stapleton through the door, and kicked the door multiple times causing it to break from the frame. Even if the no-trespass order was limited to only preventing Williams from entering Stapleton's apartment, since Stapleton had a possessory interest in the threshold of her doorway and the adjacent common area, see Walls, 993 N.E.2d at 267, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to show that Williams entered an area from which he was previously denied entry.
b. Criminal Mischief
[¶12] A person commits criminal mischief as a Class B misdemeanor when he "recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally damages or defaces property of another person without the other person's consent." I.C. § 35-43-1-2(a)(2023). Williams contends that the State provided insufficient evidence to demonstrate the state of repair of the door before June 14 or to identify him as the individual who damaged the door.
[¶13] Regarding the condition of the door, Williams claims that there was no evidence to show the condition of Stapleton's door prior to June 14, 2023. Stapleton testified that her door was closed when Williams kicked it off the frame and it would not close afterwards due to the damage. Thus, even if there was some damage prior to June 14, 2023, the factfinder could have reasonably inferred that the door was also damaged by Williams kicking it off the frame. See Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. 2007).
[¶14] Regarding whether the State proved Williams's identity, identity can be established by circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom. Hancz-Barron, 235 N.E.3d at 1244-45; Holloway v. State, 983 N.E.2d 1175, 1178 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013). The evidence most favorable to the verdict shows that Stapleton heard Williams yelling at her while he kicked the door. Once Williams left the building, Stapleton went to the parking lot and observed a Jeep Compass pulling away. Stapleton recognized this vehicle as a car that Williams had driven before. This evidence is sufficient to prove Williams was the perpetrator of the damage to Stapleton's door. See Hancz-Barron, 235 N.E.3d at 1244-45.
2. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying Williams's Motion for a Continuance
[¶15] Williams contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for a continuance. We review the denial of a motion for continuance for abuse of discretion. In re K.W., 12 N.E.3d 241, 243-44 (Ind. 2014) (citing Rowlett v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Off. of Family & Children, 841 N.E.2d 615, 619 (Ind.Ct.App. 2006), trans. denied). To demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion, Williams must show that there was good cause to grant the motion and that he was prejudiced by the denial. Id. at 244 (quoting Rowlett, 841 N.E.3d at 619). Additionally, Williams claims that the denial violated his Sixth Amendment rights. We review constitutional claims de novo. Harris v. State, 211 N.E.3d 929, 934 (Ind. 2023) (citing Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 189 (Ind. 2021)).
[¶16] To determine whether a trial court abused its discretion by denying a defendant's motion for a continuance, we conduct a two-step inquiry. Ramirez v. State, 186 N.E.3d 89, 96 (Ind. 2022) (citing Vaughn v. State, 590 N.E.2d 134, 135-36 (Ind. 1992)). "We first determine whether the trial court 'properly evaluated and compared' the parties' 'diverse interests' that would be impacted 'by altering the schedule.'" Id. (quoting Vaughn, 590 N.E.2d at 135-36). If we find the trial court did not properly evaluate the parties' interests, then "we assess whether the court's denial resulted in prejudice." Id. (citing Vaughn, 590 N.E.2d at 136). "A defendant can establish prejudice by making specific showings as to why additional time was necessary and how it would have benefitted the defense." Id. (citing Carter v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1254, 1261 (Ind. 1997)).
[¶17] Williams relies on the first prong of the analysis to argue the trial court abused its discretion. Here, Williams argues the trial court did not properly weigh the parties' interests because it denied his request without explanation. Because the trial court did not announce its reasoning for denying the continuance, we do not specifically know why it denied Williams's request. However, we do know that this misdemeanor case had been pending for nearly ten months, the parties and witnesses were present for trial, and at the beginning of trial, the defendant, for the first time expressed a desire to hire private counsel to the trial court and asked for a continuance. Continuances made shortly before trial "are disfavored because they cause a substantial loss of time for jurors, lawyers and the court." Beadin v. State, 533 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 1989) (citing Roberts v. State, 500 N.E.2d 197 (Ind. 1986)).
Hamilton County courts also have a local rule on the filing of continuances which require requests to be, among other things, in writing and filed five days prior to a trial. See LR29-TR53-206.
[¶18] Even assuming that there was an abuse of discretion on this first prong, Williams has not argued that he was prejudiced by the trial court's denial of his motion. Because he has failed to show he was prejudiced by the denial, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion. See In re K.W., 12 N.E.3d at 244.
[¶19] Williams also argues that the denial violated his constitutional rights. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees "criminal defendants the right to have an attorney assist them with their defense." State ex rel. Allen v. Carroll Cir. Ct., 226 N.E. 3d 206, 213 (Ind. 2024) (citing U.S. const. amend. VI). "For defendants who can afford to hire an attorney or retain an attorney to represent them for free, that constitutional guarantee includes the right to choose which attorney will represent them." Id. (citing United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 144, (2006)). The right to choose one's counsel is not absolute, Lewis v. State, 730 N.E.2d 686, 689 (Ind. 2000) (citing United States v. Richardson, 894 F.2d 492, 496 (1st Cir.1990)); rather, "the right to counsel of choice must be exercised 'at the appropriate stage of the proceeding,'" id. (quoting Parr v. State, 504 N.E.2d 1014, 1016 (Ind. 1987)). When reviewing an allegation that a court violated one's right to choose counsel, we determine if a court acted "unreasonably and arbitrarily." Id. at 690 (citing Barham v. State, 641 N.E.2d 79, 82 (Ind. 1994)).
[¶20] Here, Williams asked for a continuance on the day of trial to hire private counsel. Williams had ten months after he was charged to hire private counsel, and his appointed counsel told the trial court he was prepared to represent Williams. Our Supreme Court has held that the day of trial is not the appropriate stage of the proceedings to ask for a continuance to hire private counsel. Lewis, 730 N.E.2d at 689; Vacendak v. State, 431 N.E.2d 100, 104-05 (Ind. 1982). Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not violate Williams's Sixth Amendment rights by denying his request for a continuance to hire private counsel. See Lewis, 730 N.E.2d at 688-89.
Conclusion
[¶21] The State provided sufficient evidence to prove Williams committed criminal trespass and criminal mischief. The trial court did not abuse its discretion or violate Williams's Sixth Amendment rights by denying his request for a continuance. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's decision.
[¶22] Affirmed.
Kenworthy, J., and Riley, Sr. J., concur.