Opinion
07-23-00302-CR
06-14-2024
CURTIS WILLIAMS, APPELLANT v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
Do not publish
On Appeal from the 137th District Court Lubbock County, Texas Trial Court No. 2020-419,347, Honorable John J. “Trey” McClendon III, Presiding
Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and DOSS, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Judy C. Parker Justice
Appellant, Curtis Williams, appeals from the judgment sentencing him to confinement for 25 years for the first-degree felony offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Background
The charge against Appellant related to an offense committed against his step-granddaughter, H.W., in January of 2020, when she was ten years old. H.W. and her younger sister were spending the night with their grandmother and her husband, Appellant. Appellant set up a tent that H.W. had received for Christmas in a bedroom so they could have an indoor campout. When H.W.'s sister left the tent to go to bed, and Appellant's wife went outside with the family's dogs, Appellant put his hand on H.W.'s stomach. He then reached inside H.W.'s underwear, touching and penetrating her sexual organ. H.W. saw that Appellant was "looking down into [her] shorts." Appellant asked H.W. if it felt good and told her that she looked beautiful. H.W. got up and said she was going to bed. Soon after H.W. went into the bedroom where her sister was, Appellant followed her. He apologized for his behavior and asked her, several times, not to tell anyone about it. H.W. went outside and told her grandmother what had happened. H.W.'s grandmother confronted Appellant and then called the police. Appellant was arrested that night.
We use initials to protect the privacy of the victim. See Tex. Const. art. 1, § 30(a)(1).
Appellant entered an open plea of guilty. During the three-day trial on punishment, the trial court heard testimony from H.W., her grandmother, her aunt, the sexual assault nurse examiner who examined H.W., Appellant, and Appellant's brother. The trial court sentenced Appellant to confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for a term of 25 years, from which he appeals.
Analysis
Appellant's issues on appeal relate to the propriety of his sentence, the trial court's failure to hold a hearing on his motion for new trial, and the trial court's limitation on his cross-examination of a witness.
Grossly Disproportionate Sentence; Denial of Hearing on Motion for New Trial
Following his trial, Appellant filed a motion for new trial, supported with two affidavits, contending that his sentence was grossly disproportionate and violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. Appellant requested that his motion be set for an evidentiary hearing to allow the presentation of evidence regarding sentences in Lubbock County for sexual offenses involving children. The motion was overruled by operation of law.
On appeal, Appellant challenges the trial court's failure to set his motion for new trial for hearing. First, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion and violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment in refusing to set his motion for an evidentiary hearing. Second, Appellant asserts that his 25-year sentence is grossly disproportionate and violates his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. We review a trial court's denial of a hearing on a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion, reversing only when the decision lies outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Hobbs v. State, 298 S.W.3d 193, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
The purpose of a hearing on a motion for new trial is to decide whether the case should be retried and to prepare a record for presenting issues on appeal in the event the motion is denied. See Smith v. State, 286 S.W.3d 333, 338 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). A defendant's right to a hearing on a motion for new trial is not absolute. Rozell v. State, 176 S.W.3d 228, 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). A hearing on a motion for new trial is not required when the matters raised in the motion are determinable from the record. Hobbs, 298 S.W.3d at 199 . Further, a defendant who raises matters not determinable from the record must also establish the existence of reasonable grounds showing that he could potentially be entitled to relief. Id. Appellant argues that a hearing on his motion for new trial was necessary to develop the claim he raised within the motion, namely that his sentence was grossly disproportionate to sentences ordinarily given for similar offenses in Lubbock County. We review the trial court's determination of whether Appellant raised grounds that are both undeterminable from the record and reasonable, meaning they could entitle Appellant to relief. Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 340.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments that are "grossly disproportionate" to the offense for which the defendant has been convicted. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001, 115 L.Ed.2d 836, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (1991); Simpson v. State, 488 S.W.3d 318, 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). In evaluating a claim that a sentence is grossly disproportionate to a particular defendant's crime, we first conduct a threshold comparison of the gravity of the offense underlying the current conviction as well as offenses underlying prior convictions against the severity of the sentence. McGruder v. Puckett, 954 F.2d 313, 316 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 849, 113 S.Ct. 146, 121 L.Ed.2d 98 (1992). In the rare case in which this threshold comparison leads to an inference of gross disproportionality, we then consider the remaining factors set forth in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983) (setting forth factors for analyzing proportionality claim). Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 60, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010).
Solem explains that courts should be guided by (1) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the sentence, (2) the sentences imposed on other defendants in the same jurisdiction, and (3) the sentences imposed for commission of the same offense in other jurisdictions. Id.
A sentence within the statutory range of punishment is generally not considered cruel, unusual, or excessive. Winchester v. State, 246 S.W.3d 386, 388 (Tex. App.- Amarillo 2008, pet. ref'd). The statutory range of punishment for aggravated sexual assault of a child is confinement in prison for a term of five years to 99 years or life. Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.32(a); 22.021(e). Appellant's 25-year sentence is within the range the Legislature has provided. But Appellant argues that, under the circumstances of this case, a sentence of 25 years' confinement is grossly disproportionate to the crime committed. See Winchester, 246 S.W.3d at 388 (prohibition against grossly disproportionate sentences survives under federal constitution apart from consideration of whether punishment assessed is within range set by statute); see also Bradfield v. State, 42 S.W.3d 350, 353-54 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2001, pet. ref'd) (sentence may violate Eighth Amendment if grossly disproportionate to either offense itself or sentences in other circumstances). He urges us to consider his age of 65, his lack of any prior criminal history, his lack of a history of sexual misconduct, and evidence indicating that he would be a good candidate for probation, with a low risk of reoffending and a history of being a law-abiding, hard worker. Additionally, Appellant highlights the circumstances of the offense itself, stating that his actions happened quickly, that he immediately stopped upon realizing his wrongdoing, that he apologized quickly, and that he then freely confessed to his wife and to the police.
Although Appellant has no prior criminal history, the trial court heard evidence that Appellant had touched his stepdaughter inappropriately when she was 21 years old.
Even considering these factors, Appellant has not shown that this is one of those rare cases that meets the threshold inference of gross disproportionality. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980) ("Outside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare."). Appellant was charged with, and admitted that he was guilty of, "intentionally or knowingly caus[ing] the penetration of the sexual organ of [H.W.], a child who was then and there younger than 14 years of age, by [Appellant's] finger." The aggravated sexual assault of a child is a crime in which an adult preys upon the vulnerability of a child. As a first-degree felony, it is a crime of exceptional gravity. See Ex parte Ramirez-Hernandez, 642 S.W.3d 907, 918 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2022, no pet.) (noting that aggravated sexual assault of a child under fourteen years of age is a first-degree felony regardless of whether any other violence is present); Baletka v. State, Nos. 09-04-00180-CR, 09-04-00181-CR, 2005 Tex.App. LEXIS 1355, at *7 & n.4 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1996, pet. ref'd) (mem. op.) (same; further noting that Legislature has provided that a life sentence is mandatory for any offender who is convicted of sexual assault of a child a second time). Appellant's victim, ten-year-old H.W., was Appellant's step-granddaughter, who had loved and trusted Appellant. Appellant was in a position of trust and authority over H.W., adding to the reprehensible nature of his conduct. Further, while a 25-year sentence is considerable, it is less than one-third of the possible sentence for a first-degree felony. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.32 (establishing range of punishment from not less than five years up to 99 years or life in prison). Considering the gravity of the offense, which is significant, and the severity of the sentence, which is clearly on the lower end of the authorized range, we do not conclude that Appellant has raised an inference that the sentence was grossly disproportionate to the crime. See Tobar-Gonzalez v. State, No. 05-21-00974-CR, 2023 Tex.App. LEXIS 714, at *9-10 (Tex. App.-Dallas Feb. 3, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (rejecting claim that sentence was "rare" case leading to inference of gross disproportionality even though defendant took responsibility for his actions, cooperated with law enforcement, and lacked prior convictions or arrests).
Appellant requested a hearing on his motion for new trial "in order to present evidence that defendants sentenced in Lubbock County for similar crimes received much more favorable treatment then [sic] he did and that his sentence was grossly disproportionate." However, because Appellant has not passed the threshold test raising an inference of disproportionality, there was no need to compare his sentence to sentences imposed on other offenders. Simpson, 488 S.W.3d at 323. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion or violate Appellant's constitutional rights in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing to allow Appellant to present such evidence. Further, we conclude that Appellant's 25-year sentence is not grossly disproportionate, nor does it violate his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. We overrule Appellant's first three issues.
Limitation on Cross-Examination
In his remaining issues, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying him the ability to cross-examine State's witnesses concerning false allegations and that the trial court's limitation on cross-examination violated his right to confrontation under the Confrontation Clause and right to due process.
At trial, the State elicited testimony from H.W.'s maternal aunt, Monica Yett, about an incident in which Appellant touched her inappropriately. Yett testified that when she was 21 years old and living with her mother and Appellant, she was experiencing back pain and Appellant offered to give her a massage. When Appellant began massaging Yett's legs, Yett told him that she did not need him to work on her legs. However, he continued, working from her calves to her thighs. Appellant then reached into Yett's shorts and rubbed her vagina. Yett jumped up and asked Appellant what he was doing. Appellant then asked her if it felt good. Yett later told her mother about the incident, which led to a rift between her mother and Appellant. Yett's mother lived in a separate bedroom for six months, but the couple eventually reconciled.
Appellant testified that he did not engage in any sexual misconduct against Yett. He further challenged Yett's credibility by presenting evidence that Yett had a history of drug use and mental health issues and a reputation for vindictiveness, and that she had resumed a normal relationship with Appellant after the allegation of misconduct. Appellant also sought to question Yett and her mother about whether Yett had falsely accused other men of sexual misconduct. In both instances, the State objected that it was improper impeachment, and the trial court sustained the objection. Appellant completed a bill of review, eliciting testimony that Yett had accused a police officer of touching her inappropriately and accused her brother-in-law of rubbing up against her inappropriately. The trial court stated it would not consider the evidence. Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by limiting his cross-examination of both witnesses.
A trial judge has wide discretion in the admission of evidence at trial. Ryder v. State, 514 S.W.3d 391, 398 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2017, pet. ref'd). We apply an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence. Id. Under this standard, we will not disturb the trial court's decision if it was within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id.
"Whether rooted in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the opportunity to present a complete defense." Castillo v. State, No. 09-20-00026-CR, 2021 Tex.App. LEXIS 9884, at *8 (Tex. App.-Beaumont Dec. 15, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986)). The Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses encompasses the right to cross-examine them to attack their general credibility and to show their possible bias, self-interest, or motive in testifying. Hammer v. State, 296 S.W.3d 555, 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974)). The right is not unqualified, however, and the trial court has wide discretion in limiting the scope and extent of cross-examination. Id. While a witness generally may be cross-examined on any relevant matter, including credibility, Rule 608(b) prohibits cross-examination about specific instances of conduct, other than criminal convictions as provided in Rule 609(a), for the purpose of attacking the witness's character for truthfulness. Tex. R. Evid. 611(b), 608(b). Thus, courts distinguish challenges to a witness's general credibility from questioning that reveals the witness's possible bias, prejudice, or ulterior motive that relates to the people or issues of a particular case. See Hammer, 296 S.W.3d at 562-63.
Appellant intended to present an evidentiary chain showing (1) Yett made prior false accusations, and (2) such conduct shows dishonest character, so (3) Yett is dishonest and should not be believed. Stated differently, the testimony Appellant sought to introduce was evidence of specific instances of Yett's bad conduct, i.e., lying, for the purpose of showing that Yett was again lying when she claimed that Appellant had touched her inappropriately. Such evidence of prior false accusations, when offered to attack a complainant's general credibility, is prohibited by Rule 608(b) and its exclusion does not infringe on Appellant's rights under the Confrontation Clause. See id. at 564- 65 & n.26. Moreover, while Appellant claims that the proffered evidence would show Yett's bias, prejudice, or motive, he fails to explain his claim. Nothing about Yett's complaints about the behavior of the police officer or the conduct of her brother-in-law suggests that Yett had a bias or prejudice against Appellant or had an ulterior motive to falsely accuse him of misconduct.
The testimony elicited by Appellant in the bill of review did not show that Yett's prior accusations were false. Without a showing that Yett's allegations were false, testimony about the allegations lacks probative value in impeaching Yett's credibility. See Igo v. State, No. 07-02-00484-CR, 2004 Tex.App. LEXIS 10715, at *20-21 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Nov. 30, 2004), aff'd, 210 S.W.3d 645 (Tex. 2006).
Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and did not violate Appellant's constitutional rights in ruling that the proffered testimony was inadmissible. See Chitwood v. State, 350 S.W.3d 746, 748 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2011, no pet.) (trial court properly excluded evidence of previous instance of sexual assault involving complainants when evidence did not tend to show bias or motive of complainants in defendant's case). We overrule Appellant's final three issues.
Conclusion
Having resolved each of Appellant's issues against him, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.