Opinion
23A-CR-2575
06-11-2024
Antawin Williams, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Christopher Kunz Marion County Public Defender Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General Alexandria Sons Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Angela Dow Davis, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49D27-2101-MR-1829
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Christopher Kunz Marion County Public Defender Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General Alexandria Sons Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
VAIDIK, JUDGE.
Case Summary
[¶1] The State charged Antawin Williams with murder for shooting his roommate. At the bench trial, Williams argued that he acted in sudden heat and asked the judge to find him guilty of voluntary manslaughter. The judge found Williams guilty of murder, and he now appeals. Concluding that the State negated the existence of sudden heat, we affirm Williams's conviction for murder.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] The facts most favorable to the judgment are as follows. In January 2021, George Stanley Oakley ("Stan") was seventy years old. He suffered from congestive heart failure, kidney failure, and a bone infection; was "wheelchairbound" because "he wasn't able to walk"; and could only get out of bed with assistance. Tr. Vol. II pp. 60, 115, 128-29. Stan lived with his daughter's mother, Mary Lee Futrell; Mary's sister, Rosie; and Williams, who is Mary's nephew. Rosie and Mary lived on the second floor of the house, Stan lived on the main floor, and Williams lived in the basement. Rosie was Stan's "caregiver." Id. at 93. She dressed and washed him, made his bed, got him ready for his dialysis appointments three times a week (to which he was transported by ambulance), and took care of him when he wasn't at dialysis.
[¶3] On January 15, Stan, Mary, Rosie, and Williams were all home. Rosie had been "in and out" of Stan's bedroom "the whole day." Id. at 114-15. Around 3:00 p.m., Rosie, who was in the kitchen, saw Stan "in bed." Id. at 115. Shortly after, Rosie saw Williams come upstairs and sit in a chair in the living room. Williams then got out of the chair and stood in the doorway of Stan's bedroom. Id. Stan told Williams to "get out of [his] room" and "just leave [him] alone." Id. at 97. Williams returned to the living room, sat back down "for a minute," and said, "What did you say, Stan?" Id. at 97-98. Stan, however, did not respond. Williams then stood back up, went to Stan's doorway, and shot him multiple times, killing him. Williams left the house and was later apprehended by police.
[¶4] The State charged Williams with murder. Williams waived his right to a jury trial, and a bench trial was held. Williams testified that a few days before the shooting, Stan had accused him of stealing his money, which he denied. He explained that as he came upstairs from the basement on the afternoon of January 15, Stan "stood up" and "verbally" "confront[ed] him about the money," which made him "angry." Id. at 208-09, 213. Williams then pulled out his gun and shot Stan "[m]aybe five times" "[i]n the hand and below the waist." Id. at 211. Williams said that contrary to Rosie's account, she was on the second floor of the house when the shooting occurred, and he did not sit down before shooting Stan. Defense counsel argued that Williams acted in "sudden heat" and asked the judge to find him guilty of voluntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of murder. The judge found that sudden heat did not exist and that Williams was guilty of murder:
Williams was also charged with and convicted of Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement and Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license. Williams does not appeal these convictions.
[H]ere, we have a man who is basically incapacitated and . . . laying in a hospital bed with . . . walkers.... And couldn't even get up. He's on dialysis. He was pretty sick. And, you know, the argument that because he's accused of taking money from him, of somebody who can't even get out of bed, is difficult for this court to kind of agree with the Defense[']s position on.... And I just don't find sudden heat.... I don't think that there's the requisite of sudden heat to justify a voluntary manslaughter conviction.... I don't believe that Stan was aggressive in his kind of physical [state] ....Id. at 224-25. The court sentenced Williams to fifty years in prison.
[¶5] Williams now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[¶6] Williams contends the evidence is insufficient to support his murder conviction. Specifically, he argues that the State failed to negate the existence of sudden heat and therefore he should have been found guilty of voluntary manslaughter instead.
[¶7] When reviewing sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015). We consider only the evidence supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence. Id. We will affirm a conviction if there is substantial evidence of probative value to support each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
[¶8] To determine whether the evidence is sufficient, we must consider the elements of murder and voluntary manslaughter. A person commits murder when they knowingly or intentionally kill another human being. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. A person commits voluntary manslaughter when they knowingly or intentionally kill another human being while acting under sudden heat. I.C. § 35-42-1-3(a). The existence of sudden heat is a mitigating factor that reduces what otherwise would be murder to voluntary manslaughter. Id. at (b). "Sudden heat exists when a defendant is provoked by anger, rage, resentment, or terror, to a degree sufficient to obscure the reason of an ordinary person, prevent deliberation and premeditation, and render the defendant incapable of cool reflection." Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 572 (Ind. 2018) (quotation omitted), reh'g denied. It involves an "impetus to kill" that arises "suddenly." Suprenant v. State, 925 N.E.2d 1280, 1283 (Ind.Ct.App. 2010), trans. denied. "Use of insulting or taunting words does not alone provide sufficient provocation for reducing murder to manslaughter." Hall v. State, 166 N.E.3d 406, 415 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021). Once a defendant presents evidence of sudden heat, the State bears the burden of disproving its existence beyond a reasonable doubt. Whitt v. State, 91 N.E.3d 1082, 1093 (Ind.Ct.App. 2018), trans. denied. The existence of sudden heat is a classic question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact. Id.
[¶9] Williams acknowledges that words alone are not enough to prove that he acted in sudden heat. He argues, however, that there were more than "mere words" here as Stan "also took the affirmative action of standing up, presumably to approach [him]." Appellant's Br. p. 12. But this is contrary to the testimony of Rosie, who said that the last time she saw Stan "he was in bed" and he couldn't get out of bed without assistance. Even assuming Stan stood up as he accused Williams of stealing his money, this action could not provoke Williams "to the point that his reason was obscured." Id. As the trial court pointed out, Stan, who was bedridden, was "basically incapacitated" and "pretty sick." Therefore, even if Stan stood up, that does not "even raise an eyebrow for adequate provocation under Indiana law." See Carmack v. State, 200 N.E.3d 452, 462 (Ind. 2023). The State met its burden of negating the existence of sudden heat.
[¶10] Williams relies on two cases, Landske v. State, 147 N.E.3d 387 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020), and Earl v. State, 715 N.E.2d 1265 (Ind. 1999). In Landske, we found that the State negated the existence of sudden heat because the defendant scheduled a business meeting with the victim and then shot the victim at the meeting, which showed that "there was nothing sudden or unanticipated." Landske, 147 N.E.3d at 392. In Earl, the defendant lived on and off with the victim. On the night before the defendant stabbed the victim, he told her he was going to kill her. Our Supreme Court found that the State negated the existence of sudden heat because the defendant's "statement of intent foreshadowed events to come and served to illustrate premeditation and calculation." Earl, 715 N.E.2d at 1267. Williams says his case is not like Landske and Earl. He is right. But just because there was no premeditation or deliberation here does not mean that there was sudden heat. The evidence is sufficient to support Williams's murder conviction.
[¶11] Affirmed.
May, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.