Opinion
23A-CR-1040
01-23-2024
Robert L. Williams, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Carlos I. Carrillo Carrillo Law LLC Greenwood, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General George P. Sherman Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Tippecanoe Superior Court The Honorable Randy J. Williams, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 79D01-2103-F1-000005
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Carlos I. Carrillo Carrillo Law LLC Greenwood, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General George P. Sherman Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Felix, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[¶1] After a one-day bench trial, Robert Williams was found guilty of attempted murder, a Level 1 felony; aggravated battery, a Level 3 felony; and pointing a firearm, a Level 6 felony. At sentencing, the trial court vacated the latter two convictions and sentenced Williams to 35 years on the attempted murder conviction, with 30 years executed at the Indiana Department of Correction (the "DOC") and the remaining five years suspended to supervised probation. Williams presents three issues for our review, which we restate as follows:
I.C. § 35-42-2-1.5.
I.C. § 35-47-4-3(b).
1. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support a finding that Williams had specific intent for attempted murder; 2. Whether the trial court erred in not sua sponte ordering a competency evaluation of Williams; and 3. Whether Williams's sentence is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B).
[¶2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶3] Between approximately 11:00 pm and 11:30 pm on March 6, 2021, Daryl Johnson walked to a Marathon Gas Station near his residence in Lafayette,
Indiana, in search of a ride to a nearby location. Johnson approached Williams-who was a stranger to Johnson at that time-and Williams agreed to drive Johnson to and from Johnson's desired location in exchange for five dollars. Johnson paid Williams the five dollars from a set of folded bills amounting to almost $200. Williams had a dog in his car when he transported Johnson. After Williams dropped off Johnson at the Marathon Gas Station, Johnson returned to his residence.
[¶4] Approximately one to two hours later, in the early hours of March 7, 2021, Johnson went to the same Marathon Gas Station to purchase a soft drink. Williams, who was also at the gas station again, approached Johnson and demanded Johnson pay him for allegedly dropping something that the dog in Williams's car allegedly ingested. Johnson refused to give Williams money without seeing a receipt for the dog's veterinary care. Williams then attempted to direct Johnson into a nearby alley. Concerned that Williams was going to rob him, Johnson began backing away from Williams while Williams told Johnson that he wanted money.
[¶5] As Johnson was backing away from Williams, Johnson saw Williams pull a gun out of his waistband area and chamber a round. When Johnson turned to run from Williams, Williams shot Johnson in the leg near his hip. Williams left Johnson lying in the street. Johnson was transported to the hospital where he received stitches but did not require surgery.
[¶6] Shortly after the shooting, law enforcement officers located Williams at a neighborhood bar where they arrested him and seized his vehicle. When law enforcement officers searched Williams's vehicle, they found a .40-caliber pistol with five rounds of ammunition in the magazine and one in the chamber. Law enforcement officers found a spent shell casing near where Johnson was shot that was the same caliber, color, and brand of casing on the ammunition in the pistol.
[¶7] On March 11, 2021, the State charged Williams with four counts: (1) attempted murder, a Level 1 felony; (2) aggravated battery, a Level 3 felony; (3) pointing a firearm, a Level 6 felony; and (4) possession of methamphetamine, a Level 6 felony. The State dismissed the possession charge before trial. Lori James was initially appointed to represent Williams, but she withdrew from the case on December 9, 2021. Robert Williams represented Williams after James, but he withdrew from the case on October 28, 2022. Starting on November 16, 2022, Timothy Broden began representing Williams and continued to do so through trial and sentencing. On January 1, 2023, Williams waived his right to a jury trial, and on March 2, 2023, the trial court conducted a bench trial. On March 10, 2023, the trial court found Williams guilty of and entered judgment of conviction on attempted murder, a Level 1 felony; aggravated battery, a Level 3 felony; and pointing a firearm, a Level 6 felony. At sentencing, the trial court vacated the latter two convictions and sentenced Williams on only the attempted murder conviction.
[¶8] On April 6, 2023, four days prior to the sentencing hearing, Williams filed with the trial court a psychological evaluation report dated May 28, 2021, which concluded that Williams was not competent to stand trial (the "2021 Competency Report"). The 2021 Competency Report was completed at the request of James, Williams's public defender for most of 2021. Several months after the Competency Report was completed, James withdrew from the case. Broden, Williams's public defender at trial, did not know about the 2021 Competency Report until after the trial and verdict. Notably, Broden did not make or file a motion requesting a competency evaluation of Williams; instead, Broden argued at the sentencing hearing that the trial court should consider as a mitigating factor Williams's mental health and intellectual abilities as described in the 2021 Competency Report.
[¶9] The trial court determined there were two mitigating factors: (1) Williams has family support, and (2) Williams has mental health issues. The trial court also determined there were four aggravating factors:
1. Williams's self-reported possession of a handgun as a juvenile;
2. Williams's adult criminal history, including
a. felony convictions for shooting at a public transit employee; aggravated unlawful use of a weapon; and making terroristic threats,
b. misdemeanor convictions for domestic assault; giving a false name, date of birth, or identification to a peace officer; consuming alcohol under 21 years of age; and driving without a license,
c. three petitions to revoke probation, two of which were found to be true,
d. an outstanding warrant in a pending case from another state, and
e. a history of failing to appear;
3. Williams's history of substance use; and
4. Williams's previous failed attempts at rehabilitation.
Appellant's App. Vol. II at 180-81. The trial court sentenced Williams to a total of 35 years for the attempted murder of Johnson, with 30 years executed at the DOC and 5 years suspended to supervised probation. Williams now appeals his conviction and sentence.
We note that in his brief, Willilams violates Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A) in numerous ways. For example, Williams violates Appellate Rules 46(A)(6)(a) and (8)(a) by repeatedly citing the transcript in this case but failing to specify which of the four volumes he is citing. Appellant's Br. at 5-8, 11, 12, 17, 24. Williams violates Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) by including many statements of fact in his Argument that he fails to support with citations to the record. Appellant's Br. at 11-13, 17, 19, 20. Williams also violates Appellate Rule 46(A)(6) by failing to provide the facts relevant to his claim regarding the 2021 Competency Report in his Statement of Facts. Appellant's Br. at 5-8. Nonetheless, because Williams's noncompliance with Appellate Rule 46(A) does not substantially impede our review of his claims, we choose to address the merits thereof. See Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015).
Discussion and Decision
1. The Evidence Was Sufficient to Support Williams's Attempted Murder Conviction
[¶10] Williams argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for attempted murder. "Sufficiency-of-the-evidence arguments trigger a deferential standard of appellate review, in which we 'neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, instead reserving those matters to the province of the [factfinder].'" Owen v. State, 210 N.E.3d 256, 264 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018)), reh'g denied (Aug. 17, 2023). In our review, "we consider only 'the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict.'" Id. (quoting Matheney v. State, 583 N.E.2d 1202, 1208 (Ind. 1992)). We will reverse a guilty verdict only when no reasonable trier of fact "could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Lock v. State, 971 N.E.2d 71, 74 (Ind. 2012) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007)).
[¶11] In order to convict Williams of attempted murder, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams, acting with the specific intent to kill, engaged in conduct that constituted a substantial step toward the commission of murder. See I.C. §§ 35-42-1-1(1), 35-41-5-1(a); Rosales v. State, 23 N.E.3d 8, 12 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Hopkins v. State, 759 N.E.2d 633, 637 (Ind. 2001)). Notably, the Indiana Supreme Court has "singled out attempted murder for special treatment" by requiring the State to show specific intent because of "the stringent penalties for attempted murder and the ambiguity often involved in its proof." Rosales, 23 N.E.3d at 12 (quoting Hopkins, 759 N.E.2d at 637).
[¶12] Williams argues only that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he had specific intent to kill Johnson. "Intent to kill may be inferred from the nature of the attack and the circumstances surrounding the crime." Kiefer v. State, 761 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ind. 2002) (citing Nunn v. State, 601 N.E.2d 334 (Ind. 1992)). Additionally, "intent to kill may be inferred from the deliberate use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or serious injury," Henley v. State, 881 N.E.2d 639, 652 (Ind. 2008) (citing Wilson v. State, 697 N.E.2d 466, 476 (Ind. 1998)), including when a defendant "fir[es] a gun in the direction of an individual," id. (citing Jones v. State, 536 N.E.2d 267, 270 (Ind. 1989)).
[¶13] The probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict reveal that Williams provided a ride to Johnson in exchange for five dollars, Williams later demanded money from Johnson, Williams tried to get Johnson alone in an alley when Johnson refused Williams's demand, Williams pulled out a gun when Johnson continued to refuse Williams's demand, Williams shot Johnson as Johnson ran away from Williams, and Williams left Johnson lying in the street. Based on the foregoing, the trier of fact could have reasonably inferred that Williams had the specific intent to kill. Therefore, the State presented sufficient evidence to support Williams's conviction for attempted murder.
[¶14] Nevertheless, Williams argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove he had the specific intent to kill because Johnson's testimony regarding Williams's identity as the shooter was "unclear," Appellant's Br. at 11-12; "Williams could have fired more rounds at Johnson if he wanted to kill him but did not do so," id. at 12; "there is no evidence that Williams was agitated or violent immediately after the incident," id.; "[a]lthough Williams shot at close range, he could have pointed the gun at Johnson's upper body if he wanted to kill him," id.; and "Johnson's injury only required stitches and did not result in any fractures or surgery," id. These arguments are merely an attempt to have us reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility; we cannot do so, Owen, 210 N.E.3d at 264 (quoting Brantley, 91 N.E.3d at 570).
2. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by Not Sua Sponte Ordering a Competency Evaluation of Williams
[¶15] Williams also argues-for the first time on appeal-that the trial court should have initiated a competency proceeding sua sponte in 2023 based on the conclusions in the 2021 Competency Report. Although we would ordinarily consider this argument waived because it was not properly preserved, "suggestions of trial incompetency coming even after sentencing, 'may be so significant and compelling as to create "reasonable grounds" to question a defendant's competency at the time of his trial and therefore require a hearing on the question.'" Tinsley, 312 N.E.2d at 73 (quoting Tinsley, 298 N.E.2d at 433).
[¶16] Indiana Code section 35-36-3-1(a) provides in relevant part:
If at any time before the final submission of any criminal case to the court or the jury trying the case, the court has reasonable grounds for believing that the defendant lacks the ability to understand the proceedings and assist in the preparation of a defense, the court shall immediately fix a time for a hearing to determine whether the defendant has that ability.
The right to a competency hearing pursuant to Section 35-36-3-1 is not absolute, Barber v. State, 141 N.E.3d 35, 43 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020) (citing Campbell v. State, 732 N.E.2d 197, 202 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000)); rather, "[t]o receive a competency hearing, there must be 'evidence before the trial court that creates a reasonable or bona fide doubt as to the defendant's competency.'" Isom v. State, 170 N.E.3d 623, 653 (Ind. 2021) (quoting Goodman v. State, 453 N.E.2d 984, 986 (Ind. 1983)).
[¶17] Whether a reasonable doubt exists is a fact-specific inquiry. Barber, 141 N.E.3d at 43 (citing Mast v. State, 914 N.E.2d 851, 856 (Ind.Ct.App. 2009)). The trial court's "observations of a defendant in court can be an adequate basis for finding that a competency hearing is not necessary." Isom, 170 N.E.3d at 653 (quoting Cotton v. State, 753 N.E.2d 589, 591 (Ind. 2001)). We review a trial court's decision on whether a reasonable doubt exists for an abuse of discretion. Minnick v. State, 965 N.E.2d 124, 131-32 (Ind.Ct.App. 2012) (quoting Gibbs v. State, 952 N.E.2d 214, 219 (Ind.Ct.App. 2011)). A trial court abuses its discretion "when its decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances" before it or when the trial court misinterpreted the law. Id. (quoting Gibbs, 952 N.E.2d at 219).
[¶18] By the time the trial court received the 2021 Competency Report on April 6, 2023, the trial court had observed Williams in court for more than two years, and the 2021 Competency Report was nearly two years old. There is no indication in the record that Williams or his public defenders ever raised any concerns to the trial court about Williams's competency. The record is further devoid of any indication that the trial court ever expressed any concern about Williams's competency to stand trial or otherwise assist in the preparation of his defense, including when the trial court confirmed Williams's desire to proceed without a jury, Tr. Vol. II at 2-6, and to not testify in his own defense, id. at 66-68.
[¶19] Williams also wrote several letters to the trial court. For example, on August 13, 2021, Williams wrote a letter to the trial court about his desire to attend all proceedings in person. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 55. On February 6, 2022, Williams wrote a letter to the trial court expressing his willingness to plead to a Level 6 felony but not a Level 1 felony. Id. at 77. On October 17, 2022, Williams wrote another letter to the trial court regarding his attempt to fire his public defender "due to lack of communication in our attorney-client relationship." Id. at 88. On March 3, 2023, Williams wrote a letter to the trial court asking the trial court to "take into consideration" that he is "a father before anything" and that he was "trying to be [a] better man everyday [sic]." Id. at 125.
[¶20] In light of all these facts and circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it did not sua sponte order a competency evaluation in 2023 for Williams based on the 2021 Competency Report.
3. Williams's Sentence is Not Inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B)
[¶21] The Indiana Constitution authorizes us to independently review and revise a trial court's sentencing decision. Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 159 (Ind. 2019) (citing Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6; McCain v. State, 88 N.E.3d 1066, 1067 (Ind. 2018)). That authority is implemented through Appellate Rule 7(B), which permits us to revise a sentence if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, we find that the sentence is "inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender." Faith, 131 N.E.3d at 159 (quoting App. R. 7(B)).
[¶22] Our role under Appellate Rule 7(B) is to "leaven the outliers," Faith, 131 N.E.3d at 159-60 (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008)), and we reserve that authority for exceptional cases, id. at 160 (citing Taylorv. State, 86 N.E.3d 157, 165 (Ind. 2017), reh'gdenied). When gauging inappropriateness under Appellate Rule 7(B), we do not construe the term "sentence" to include only the aggregate length of the sentence. Davidson v. State, 926 N.E.2d 1023, 1025 (Ind. 2010). Rather, courts have a variety of sentencing tools, such as probation and home detention, and we consider these tools in our Appellate Rule 7(B) analysis. Id. That is, when determining whether a sentence in inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B), we focus on both the length and the manner of the allegedly inappropriate sentence. Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224. Generally, a trial court's sentencing decision prevails unless it is "overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense . . . and the defendant's character." Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 111-12 (Ind. 2015).
[¶23] In considering the nature of the offense, we start with the advisory sentence to determine the appropriateness of the sentence. T.A.D.W. v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1205, 1211 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016) (quoting Johnson v. State, 986 N.E.2d 852, 856 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013)), as amended (May 26, 2023). Williams was convicted of and sentenced on one count of attempted murder, a Level 1 felony. "A person who commits a Level 1 felony . . . shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between twenty (20) and forty (40) years, with the advisory sentence being thirty (30) years." I.C. § 35-50-2-4(b) (emphasis added). The trial court sentenced Williams to 35 years on his attempted murder conviction, with 30 years executed at the DOC and the remaining 5 years suspended to supervised probation.
[¶24] Where, as here, the trial court deviated from the advisory sentence, one factor we consider is "whether there is anything more or less egregious about the offense committed by the defendant that makes it different from the 'typical' offense accounted for by the legislature when it set the advisory sentence." T.A.D.W., 51 N.E.3d at 1211 (quoting Holloway v. State, 950 N.E.2d 803, 80607 (Ind.Ct.App. 2011)). We also consider whether the offense was "accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality." Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.
[¶25] Williams's decision to shoot Johnson was not provoked by any aggression or violence from Johnson; instead, Williams chose to shoot Johnson after Johnson refused Williams's demand for money. Williams shot Johnson in the leg at close range while Johnson attempted to run away from Williams. After the shooting, Williams left Johnson lying in the street and went to a neighborhood bar.
[¶26] In considering the character of the offender, "we engage in a broad consideration of a defendant's qualities," T.A.D.W., 51 N.E.3d at 1211 (citing Aslinger v. State, 2 N.E.3d 84, 95 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014), clarified on other grounds on reh'g), including whether the defendant has "substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character," Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.
[¶27] Williams has strong family support, and, according to the 2021 Competency Report, Williams may have below average mental health and intellectual abilities. However, Williams has a history of substance abuse, including daily use of marijuana and weekly use of MDMA (commonly known as "ecstasy") since he was 16 years old as well as daily consumption of "a fifth of hard alcohol" since he was 18 years old. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 149. Williams's substance abuse continued until his arrest in this case. Williams was arrested for possessing a handgun at 14 years old. He also has a history of adult criminal convictions, including violent offenses such as domestic assault, shooting at a public transit employee, aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, and making terroristic threats. Williams violated his probation twice in a prior case, and he has a history of failing to appear. Previous attempts at rehabilitation were unsuccessful. At the time of trial and sentencing in this case, Williams had a pending criminal case in another state.
[¶28] Based on the serious nature of Williams's offense and his history of criminal or otherwise deviant behavior, we cannot say that Williams has produced compelling evidence demonstrating that the nature of his offense or his character renders his sentence inappropriate. See Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483, 487 n.1 (Ind. 2023), reh'g denied (Aug. 18, 2023).
Conclusion
[¶29] In sum, the State presented sufficient evidence to support Williams's attempted murder conviction. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it did not sua sponte order a competency proceeding for Williams after Williams filed the 2021 Competency Report shortly before sentencing in 2023. Finally, Williams has not met his burden of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense and his character. We therefore affirm the trial court on all issues raised.
[¶30] Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and May, J., concur.