Summary
In Williams, the defendant was serving a fifteen-year sentence because he, like Petitioner, was classified as a PRR after serving time in a county jail.
Summary of this case from Sims v. FloridaOpinion
No. 1D19-783
11-04-2020
Zuberlon Lenard WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Glen P. Gifford, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Petitioner. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Glen P. Gifford, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Petitioner.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
Per Curiam.
In 2015, a jury found Petitioner guilty of burglary of a dwelling. The trial court thereafter sentenced him to 15 years in prison as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR). On appeal, Petitioner objected to his PRR sentence, arguing that he committed the burglary within 3 years after release from county jail on a plea to a felony which had a sentence of 511 days with credit for 511 days served. He never went to state prison on the prior felony. He asserted that, although the sentence was consistent with this Court's controlling decision in State v. Wright , 180 So. 3d 1043 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), Wright was wrongly decided. This Court per curiam affirmed without written opinion. Counsel moved for a written opinion and certification of conflict with Lewars v. State , 277 So. 3d 143 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017), but this Court denied the request.
Subsequently, in State v. Lewars , 259 So. 3d 793 (Fla. 2018), the Florida Supreme Court disapproved this Court's decision in Wright and approved the Second District's holding in Lewars . The supreme court specifically held that "commission of a PRR-qualifying offense within three years of release from jail, rather than prison, does not satisfy the requirements of section 775.082(9)(a)1." Id. at 802.
Because Petitioner asked for certification of conflict with Lewars , it would be manifestly unjust under the circumstances to deny Petitioner the same relief as was afforded the defendant in Lewars . See Elsperman v. State , 201 So. 3d 1247 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). We grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus, vacate the sentence imposed for the burglary of a dwelling offense, and remand for resentencing in accordance with Lewars .
Rowe, Winokur, and Nordby, JJ., concur.