Opinion
20-CV-2167 (PMH) (AEK)
06-27-2023
DARREN WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. BRIAN D. SMITH, Respondent.
HONORABLE PHILLIP M. HALPERN, U.S.D.J
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
ANDREW E. KRAUSE, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
On February 26, 2020, Petitioner Darren Williams (“Petitioner”), proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2554, challenging the decision of the New York State Parole Board (“Parole Board”) to revoke his release to post-release supervision (“PRS”). See ECF No. 1 (“Petition”).On June 14, 2022, Respondent sent a letter to the Court seeking dismissal of this habeas proceeding for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on the ground that full expiration of Petitioner's sentence renders his habeas claims moot. ECF No. 29 (“Resp. Mot.”). For the reasons that follow, I respectfully recommend that Respondent's motion to dismiss be GRANTED, and that the Petition be dismissed with prejudice.
Under the prison mailbox rule, the Court deems the Petition filed on the date on which it was delivered to prison authorities for mailing. See Noble v. Kelly, 246 F.3d 93, 97 (2d Cir. 2001). Here, although the Petition states that it was “placed in the prison mailing system on March __, 2020,” Petition at 16, and the Petition was docketed on March 9, 2020, the Court deems the Petition to have been filed as of February 26, 2020, the date on which it was signed by Petitioner, see id. At no point during the pendency of this matter has Respondent argued that the Petition was untimely filed.
BACKGROUND
In 2004, Petitioner pled guilty to assault, and on October 28, 2004, a judgment of conviction was entered, sentencing Petitioner, as a predicate violent felon, to a term of five years of imprisonment and five years of post-release supervision. Resp. Mot. at 1; see ECF No. 16 (“Long Decl.”) ¶ 2; ECF Nos. 16-1 to 16-3 (“State Court Record” or “SCR”) at 76. Petitioner's sentence for the assault was to run consecutively to two pre-existing undischarged sentences. Resp. Mot. at 1. In 2016, the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”) released Petitioner to PRS. Resp. Mot. at 1; ECF No. 17 (“Resp. Mem. in Opp'n”) at 2-3; SCR at 81-84. Among the conditions of Petitioner's release to PSR was that he “not behave in such a manner as to violate the provisions of any law to which [he is] subject which provide for a penalty of imprisonment, nor will [his] behavior threaten the safety or well-being of [himself] or others,” and that he “abide by a curfew of 8 PM to 8 AM seven (7) days per week.” Resp. Mem. in Opp'n at 3; SCR 81, 83. On May 28, 2017, Petitioner was arrested on various charges including resisting arrest and disorderly conduct for events that took place at approximately 11:15 p.m. that evening. Resp. Mem. in Opp'n at 3-4; SCR 86-87, 843. On July 5, 2017, Petitioner was separately arrested pursuant to a parole warrant for violation of the conditions of PRS based on the May 28, 2017 incident and arrests; among other things, Petitioner was charged with “flail[ing] and struggl[ing] to elude capture during a foot pursuit to effect a lawful arrest” and violating his 8:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m. curfew. SCR 86-87. Ultimately, in June 2018, after a final parole revocation hearing, an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) sentenced Petitioner to 36 months of imprisonment for his violations of PRS conditions. Resp. Mem. in Opp'n at 10-12; see ECF No. 36 (“Pet. Aff.”) at 4; SCR 772-85 (transcription at 77985). Petitioner filed an administrative appeal of the ALJ's decision to the Parole Board, and in August 2018 the Parole Board affirmed the decision. Resp. Mem. in Opp'n at 12; SCR 462-65. After his re-incarceration, Petitioner filed two state court habeas corpus petitions challenging the parole revocation decision, both of which were denied; the final denial of Petitioner's second state habeas petition was issued on November 21, 2019. Resp. Mem. in Opp'n at 12-14; SCR 483-87, 503-05, 516-17 (denials of first state habeas petition); SCR 731, 767 (denials of second state habeas petition).
On February 26, 2020, while he was still incarcerated, Petitioner commenced this federal habeas proceeding, again challenging the decision to revoke his release to PRS. See Petition. The Petition asserts four claims: (1) Petitioner was denied the right to confrontation when he was denied the right to cross-examine his parole officer during his parole revocation hearing; (2) Petitioner's counsel at the parole revocation hearing was ineffective; (3) the decision of the parole revocation hearing officerwas arbitrary and capricious, and the 36-month sentence imposed for the parole violation was arbitrary, capricious, and excessive; and (4) the Appellate Division wrongly denied Petitioner's state habeas corpus petition. Petition ¶ 12; see Resp. Mem. in Opp'n at 14. In his request for relief, Petitioner asks this Court to vacate the decision to revoke his release to PRS or, in the alternative, to reduce the length of his re-incarceration from 36 months to “time served.” Petition at 16. On October 15, 2020, Respondent filed opposition papers, maintaining that none of Petitioner's habeas claims have merit. See ECF Nos. 16-17.
The Court understands this to be a reference to the ALJ who presided over Petitioner's parole revocation hearing.
Meanwhile, in July 2020, after the Petition had been filed but before Respondent submitted his opposition, DOCCS re-released Petitioner to PRS. Resp. Mot. at 2; see https://nysdoccslookup.doccs.ny.gov/ (Darren Williams, DIN 04A5841) (last visited 6/26/2023); Perez v. Lilly, No. 17-cv-4222 (VB), 2018 WL 3768528, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2018) (taking judicial notice of information found on DOCCS Inmate Lookup website).On August 22, 2021, Petitioner's sentence fully expired, and Petitioner was discharged from PRS. ECF No. 35 (Certificate of Final Discharge); https://nysdoccslookup.doccs.ny.gov/ (Darren Williams, DIN 04A5841).
In accordance with Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) and Local Civil Rule 7.2 of the Local Rules of the United States District Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, copies of this case and other cases that are unpublished or only available by electronic database are being simultaneously mailed to the pro se Petitioner along with this Report and Recommendation.
Respondent filed the motion to dismiss the Petition as moot on June 14, 2022. See Resp. Mot. In response to Respondent's motion to dismiss, Petitioner attempts to offer various bases to allow the matter to proceed in its current form, and also suggests, in the alternative, that the Court determine whether he was denied due process of law when he was not released on May 21, 2009 from the sentence that was imposed in November 2004. Pet. Aff. at 7-9.
According to the DOCCS inmate lookup database, Petitioner's incarceration began on November 8, 2004. See https://nysdoccslookup.doccs.ny.gov/ (Darren Williams, DIN 04A5841).
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standard for Mootness
The Court has no jurisdiction over any matter that does not present an actual, ongoing case or controversy pursuant to Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution. The constitutional requirement for a “case or controversy” means that “throughout the litigation, the plaintiff ‘must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.'” Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (quoting Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990)). “[I]t is not enough that a dispute was very much alive when suit was filed ....The parties must continue to have a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit.” Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477-78 (cleaned up).
In the habeas context, if a petitioner's sentence ends before final adjudication of the habeas petition, any challenges to the validity of the sentence are mooted. See Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S 624, 631-33 (1982); North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 248 (1971) (per curiam) (“Nullification of a conviction may have important benefits for a defendant, . . . but urging in a habeas corpus proceeding the correction of a sentence already served is another matter.”); see also Garcia v. Schultz, No. 05-cv-2428 (BSJ) (MHD), 2010 WL 1328349, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2010) (“[C]ourts have held that challenges to the validity of a sentence are mooted by the expiration or completion of that sentence.”), adopted by 2010 WL 1328333 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2010).
Even a challenge to the validity of a conviction takes on a different shape once the petitioner's sentence has expired. In such cases, “some concrete and continuing injury other than the now-ended incarceration or parole-some ‘collateral consequence' of the conviction-must exist if the suit is to be maintained.” Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7. But “a petitioner seeking relief from a parole revocation, unlike a petitioner seeking relief from an original conviction, is not entitled to a presumption of collateral consequences satisfying the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.” Washington v. Spears, No. 07-cv-7773 (DLC), 2009 WL 3459222, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2009) (citing Spencer, 523 U.S. at 14). “A habeas petitioner no longer in custody who is challenging the result of a parole revocation hearing must therefore demonstrate a concrete, ongoing injury-in-fact attributable to his [or her] parole revocation” in order to avoid a finding of mootness. Id.; see United States v. Probber, 170 F.3d 345, 348 (2d Cir. 1999).
II. Analysis
On August 22, 2021, Petitioner's overall sentence-including his period of PRS- expired, as reflected in the Certificate of Final Discharge and on the DOCCS website. See ECF No. 35; https://nysdoccslookup.doccs.ny.gov/ (Darren Williams, DIN 04A5841). Because Petitioner challenges the Parole Board's revocation of his release to PRS, and his sentence has fully expired, Petitioner is not entitled to any presumption that the revocation of PRS has created collateral consequences that would satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7, 14. Therefore, Petitioner must demonstrate that he has suffered, or has been threatened with, a concrete, ongoing injury-in-fact attributable to the 2018 revocation of his release to PRS in order to avoid dismissal of his habeas claims as moot. Id. at 6, 14. Petitioner contends that his claims are not moot, citing several alleged concrete, ongoing injuries-in-fact.
First, Petitioner maintains that he has an ongoing injury because he cannot recover monetary damages for his alleged wrongful imprisonment as a result of the revocation of his PRS without a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. See Pet. Aff. at 7-8. For this argument, Petitioner relies on the Supreme Court's decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), which held that
in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.Id. at 486-87. But the Supreme Court rejected this exact argument in Spencer, both by dismissing the underlying notion “that a § 1983 action for damages must always and everywhere be available,” and by observing that it was “not certain” that a § 1983 damages claim based on a parole revocation would be foreclosed if “for example, petitioner were to seek damages for using the wrong procedures, not for reaching the wrong result and if that procedural defect did not necessarily imply the invalidity of the revocation.” 523 U.S. at 17 (cleaned up). Accordingly, any potential limitation on an action for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 posed by Heck does not constitute a collateral consequence that amounts to an injury-in-fact that would allow Petitioner to continue to pursue habeas relief here. See Washington, 2009 WL 3459222, at *3 (rejecting nearly identical argument that inability to obtain damages for alleged unlawful imprisonment stemming from parole revocation constituted collateral consequence that should prevent dismissal of habeas petition as moot).
Petitioner cites to the Supreme Court case of Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301 (1964), to argue that his claims are not rendered moot by the expiration of his sentence because he has “a personal interest in the court's judgment” insofar as a finding of constitutional violations based on the parole revocation purportedly would require Respondent to pay Petitioner monetary damages. See Pet. Aff. at 7. That case, however, stands for the proposition that where injunctive relief has been mooted, liability on an indemnity bond procured in connection with the issuance of the injunction remains a live controversy. Liner, 375 U.S. at 305-06. The Supreme Court's holding in Liner has no applicability whatsoever here.
Second, Petitioner contends that he has suffered ongoing injuries as a result of his reincarceration following the 2018 revocation of his release to PRS, including the denial of affordable housing and the denial of job opportunities. Pet. Aff. at 5-6. As an initial matter, the Supreme Court has expressly rejected any potential impact of a parole revocation on “employment prospects” as a collateral consequence sufficient to keep the controversy alive in a habeas proceeding because these consequences are the result of discretionary decisions that may take into consideration a range of factors other than the ”mere presence or absence of a recorded violation of parole.” See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 13. The alleged denial of affordable housing should be treated similarly in this context. Petitioner's argument regarding housing and employment impacts is also unavailing because it is entirely speculative whether these alleged ongoing injuries either stem from the revocation of Petitioner's release to PRS or could be redressed by vacatur of the revocation. Even if Petitioner's release to PRS had not been revoked, he almost certainly would have faced similar challenges in pursuing affordable housing or job opportunities based on his multiple convictions for violent felonies, none of which would be modified in the event Petitioner were able to obtain habeas relief in connection with the 2018 parole revocation. Moreover, Petitioner's attempt to attribute these difficulties to the parole revocation alone is inconsistent with the record before the Court. See Pet. Aff. Ex. A (Petitioner was denied a license to become a security guard because of prior felony convictions).
Any claim that Petitioner experienced “mental injuries from the wrongful imprisonment,” Pet. Aff. at 9, also cannot serve as a collateral consequence that would preclude a dismissal for mootness. Again, the contention that Petitioner's mental injuries resulted specifically from the 2018 revocation of PRS, as opposed to his many years of incarceration prior to his 2016 release to PRS, is entirely speculative.In any event, Petitioner's alleged medical conditions could not even be remedied by an award of habeas relief, which can only provide release from illegal custody, not medical intervention or monetary damages. See Aponte v. Harper, No. 20-cv-0719 (GLS) (TWD), 2022 WL 1308116, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2022), adopted by 2022 WL 1304163 (N.D.N.Y. May 2, 2022); Yearwood v. Barr, 391 F.Supp.3d 255, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
Indeed, it is not even clear from Petitioner's submission whether he is alleging mental injuries as a result of purported “wrongful imprisonment” in connection with the 2018 revocation of PRS, or “wrongful imprisonment” resulting from an alleged denial of due process that impeded his release from prison in 2009. See infra.
Third, Petitioner asks that the Court “fashion some form of meaningful relief that is sufficient to prevent this case from being moot” by effectively requesting leave to amend the Petition to add claims raised in an earlier federal habeas petition, including that he was denied due process of law when he was not released on May 21, 2009 from a sentence that was imposed in November 2004. See Pet. Aff. at 8-9; Williams v. Thomas, No. 15-cv-1541 (TJM), 2016 WL 3766351, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. July 11, 2016) (noting that one of the grounds for relief in the 2015 habeas petition was that Petitioner was “in custody in violation of his due process and equal protection rights because he was not released in May 2009 when his ‘5 yr. period of incarceration expired'”). But the Honorable Thomas J. McAvoy dismissed Petitioner's 2015 petition as time-barred, and found that Petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling of this limitations period. See Williams, 2016 WL 3766351 at *5-7. Petitioner makes no argument here for why, years after Judge McAvoy's decision, he should now be entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations, or why any of those claims, even if they were not time-barred, would not now be moot.
In sum, upon the full expiration of Petitioner's sentence on August 22, 2021, any concrete injury attributable to the Parole Board's revocation of his release to PRS ceased, and his claims became moot. See Artis v. Smith, No. 12-cv-5863 (NSR) (PED), 2015 WL 4271098 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2015) (“[P]etitioner has failed to show any valid reason why his petition is not moot as a result of his release and subsequent discharge from supervision.”); Garcia, 2010 WL 1328349, at *1 (“Petitioner has completed both his prison term and his post-release sojourn on parole, and hence his claim is now moot.”); cf. Washington, 2009 WL 3459222, at *3 (petitioner's parole revocation challenge was rendered moot because petitioner was conditionally re-released to parole supervision). Because Petitioner has been fully released from DOCCS custody and supervision, and because he has not demonstrated a concrete, ongoing injury attributable to the 2018 revocation of his PRS, the Petition does not present an active case or controversy. Accordingly, the Petition is moot, and should be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully recommend that Respondent's motion to dismiss the Petition as moot be GRANTED, and that the Petition be dismissed with prejudice.
As the Petition presents no questions of substance for appellate review, I respectfully recommend that a certificate of probable cause should not issue. See Rodriquez v. Scully, 905 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam); Alexander v. Harris, 595 F.2d 87, 90-91 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam). I further respectfully recommend that the Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) that an appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962).
NOTICE
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from service of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d) (adding three additional days when service is made by mail). A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Such objections, and any responses to such objections, shall be filed with the Clerk of Court, with courtesy copies delivered to the chambers of the Honorable Phillip M. Halpern, United District Court, Southern District of New York, 300 Quarropas Street, White Plains, New York, 10601, and to the chambers of the Honorable Andrew E. Krause at the same address.
Any request for an extension of time for filing objections or responses to objections must be directed to Judge Halpern, and not to the undersigned.
Failure to file timely objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of objections and will preclude appellate review. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Smith v. Campbell, 782 F.3d 93, 102 (2d Cir. 2015).
A copy of this Report and Recommendation has been mailed to Petitioner by Chambers.