Summary
finding genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment where plaintiff “had never been previously disciplined in his thirteen-year career with [defendant], and was engaging in much of the same activity as before his June 2013 e-mail [complaining of discrimination], [but] was subjected to increased scrutiny and discipline only after his June 2013 e-mail”
Summary of this case from Anderson v. Lowcountry Urology Clinics, PAOpinion
Case No. 1:15-cv-01255
08-02-2016
Robert WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. RICOH AMERICAS, CORP., Defendant.
Nicholas Wyckoff Woodfield, The Employment Law Group PC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff. Helenanne Connolly, Reed Smith LLP, Falls Church, VA, for Defendant.
Nicholas Wyckoff Woodfield, The Employment Law Group PC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.
Helenanne Connolly, Reed Smith LLP, Falls Church, VA, for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Gerald Bruce Lee, United States District Judge
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff Robert Williams's ("Plaintiff" or "Mr. Williams") (Doc. 28) and Defendant Ricoh Americas, Corp.'s ("Defendant" or "Ricoh") (Doc. 36) cross Motions for Summary Judgment. This case concerns a former employee of Defendant Ricoh Americas, Corp., who filed a four-count Amended Complaint against Defendant Ricoh alleging that he was the victim of race discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. , ("Title VII") and age discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq. , ("ADEA"). There are two issues before the Court. The first issue is whether summary judgment is appropriate for the Plaintiff on the grounds that no genuine dispute in material fact exists and that Plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII. The second issue is whether summary judgment is appropriate for the Defendant on the grounds that no genuine dispute in material fact exists, and that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of race discrimination or retaliation under Title VII, or age discrimination or retaliation under the ADEA. This Court DENIES Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 36) as to Counts I and II, and DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 28) as to Counts I and II because there is a genuine dispute in material fact concerning whether Defendant's series of disciplinary actions occurring after Plaintiff's June 2013 e-mail was a pretext for racial discrimination. This Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 36) as to Counts III and IV concerning age discrimination and retaliation under the ADEA because Plaintiff concedes that he cannot establish a prima facie case of age discrimination or retaliation.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Robert Williams claims that Ricoh, his employer, subjected him to race discrimination, age discrimination, and retaliation. In 2000, Mr. Williams, an African American man who is 58 years old, was hired by Ricoh as a Commercial Account Manager. (Doc. 22 at 1). He served as a Commercial Account Manager from 2000 to 2004, and in 2004, changed his position to Federal Accounts Manager. As a sales representative for Ricoh, Mr. Williams was responsible for selling products, services and software, and achieving certain periodic sales quota. (Doc. 37 at 2). All sales representatives are expected to meet certain administrative obligations, including attending meetings, client events, and reporting prospective sales activity through its rForce system. Id. at 2. Prior to his change in supervisors, Mr. Williams's job evaluations rated his as a "good performer" with respect to his sales performance, and he was considered by his supervisors as being among the "middle to top" performers, averaging nearly 85 percent of his sales quota. (Glancey Dep. at 59: 8-12; 60:20-21).
On June 1, 2012, Thomas Glancey ("Glancey"), a Caucasian male younger than Mr. Williams, became Mr. Williams's supervisor, replacing Mr. Williams's former supervisor, Jackie Parks ("Parks"). (Doc. 28 at 3). Glancey was and is employed by Ricoh as Region Sales Manager, and supervised nine employees, including Williams. Doc. 28 at 4; Doc. 37 at 4. Glancey's team was composed of four Caucasian employees and five African American employees (Doc. 37 at 4-5).
Mr. Williams alleges that shortly after Glancey was hired, Glancey began to treat Williams unfairly as compared to other non-African American employees (Doc. 28 at 4). Mr. Williams claims that he developed the belief that Glancey was racist based on the tone of voice that Williams perceived Glancey to use with him and other African Americans as compared to white employees. (Williams Dep. at 169). Mr. Williams alleges that this unfair treatment was rooted in Glancey's "slave master mentality" with respect to African American employees (Doc. 28 at 4).
Between April and May 2013, Mr. Williams missed a number of meetings for a variety of reasons. (Doc. 37 at 6). His negative job performance was noted in Glancey's April 2013 monthly assessment, which noted that Mr. Williams had issues "utilizing rForce...[and] attending meetings." (Doc. 37 at 6).
In April 2013, Glancey set as one of Mr. Williams's "priorities" for the subsequent 90 days as "win[ning] the [Request for Quotes] with FERC ("FERC RFQ Response"). (Doc. 37 at 6). The FERC FRQ Response was due Tuesday, June 18, 2013. From late May 2013 to early June 2013, Glancey and Mr. Williams had an ongoing dialogue about Mr. Williams completing the FERC FRQ Response, and submitting a draft for Glancey's review. (Doc. 37 at 7). Glancey asked for a draft on several occasions. (Glancey Dep. at 113). However, by the evening of Thursday, June 13, 2013, five days before the project was due, Mr. Williams had not submitted a draft to the Glancey. (Doc. 37 at 7). Thus, on the evening of Thursday, June 13, 2013, Glancey sent an e-mail to Mr. Williams requesting the FERC FRQ Response. Mr. Williams responded that he had been waiting for certain configurations and other information that had just arrived, and planned to have a draft for Glancey's review by Monday, June 17, 2013.
On Friday, June 14,2013, in response to Mr. Williams's e-mail, Glancey wrote:
"I cannot help you develop a winning proposal by seeing it for the first time the day before its due. We identified this opportunity over a year ago & you have had more than 2 weeks to begin crafting your response. I want to see your draft by 9am [sic] this morning. If you want to learn how to do a complete & professional job, as you indicate, I suggest you start following my direction instead of ignoring it"
(Doc. 37 at 7).
In the same morning of Friday, June 14, 2013, Williams responded to Glancey's e-mail to both oppose the alleged discriminatory actions taken against him, and to request a meeting with Ricoh's Human Resources department. (Doc. 28 at 4). The e-mail reads in part that "I am not going to allow you to treat me with a "Master" mentality . I am not your slave . I am a professional sales person and expect to be treated (sic) as such." (Doc. 28-1) (emphasis added).
Glancey viewed the e-mail as "incredibly offensive" (Glancey Dep. at 100). Glancey forwarded the e-mail on to Courtnie Wilford, Director of U.S. Workforce Planning, and Joseph Campanella, Vice-President, Federal at Ricoh. (Doc. 28 at 5). On Saturday, June 15, 2013, Glancey also forwarded the e-mail to Senior HR Generalist at Ricoh, Megan Coggins ("Coggins"). (Doc. 28 at 5).
Ricoh has an EEO policy requiring HR to investigate all claims of discrimination. (Doc. 28 at 5). A phone call was held between Mr. Williams, Coggins and Wilford. (Doc. 28 at 6). Wilford questioned Williams on what he meant by the "slave" comment, to which Williams responded that he felt "micro-managed" by Glancey. (Doc. 37 at 8). Williams also indicated to Wilford that "he [thought Glancey was] a racist." (Williams, Dep. Tr. 176:6-13). Wilford instructed Williams to apologize to Glancey for his behavior (Doc. 28 at 8). On Monday, June 17, 2013, Mr. Williams sent an e-mail apologizing to Glancey. (Doc. 37 at 8). Neither Coggins, Wilford, nor any other HR specialist investigated Williams's discrimination complaint. (Doc. 28 at 6).
On that Monday, June 17, 2013, Mr. Williams submitted the first draft of the FERC FRQ Response due the following day. (Doc. 37 at 9). The RFQ Response was rejected by FERC because it exceeded the page limit set forth in the FRQ rules (Doc. 37 at 9). The opportunity was worth around $100,000 to Ricoh. (Doc. 37 at 9). On June 20, 2013, Glancey issued Mr. Williams his first formal written Employee Counseling Report (ECR) he had received in his thirteen years of employment, reprimanding and disciplining Williams for accusing Glancey of having a "master mentality," as well as other performance, absenteeism, insubordination and other behavioral issues (Doc. 28 at 6).
Glancey viewed the June 20, 2013 e-mail as an "enough is enough" moment with Mr. Williams's behavior, specifically choosing to issue a written warning instead of a verbal warning (Glancey Dep. 114:6-11). Glancey also testified that after the June 20, 2013 e-mail, he "made the decision at [that] moment that [he] would document significant issues." (Glancey Dep. 114:15-16).
Between June 2013 and July 2015, Mr. Williams was subject to discipline for repeated work performance issues. On August 8, 2013, Glancey issued Mr. Williams a second written ECR for missing work. (Doc. 28 at 8). Specifically, Mr. Williams missed meetings and work without first notifying Glancey (Doc. 37 at 10). On December 11, 2013, Glancey issued Mr. Williams a third written ECR, threatening termination after he annotated a work order that had already been signed by a customer in violation of Ricoh policy. Doc. 28 at 8; Doc. 37 at 10.
Between March and May 2014, Mr. Williams failed to show up to Ricoh business partner events, failed to communicate absences and tardiness ahead of time to Glancey and failed to adhere to corporate administrative policy in his recordation of sales. On May 2, 2014, Glancey wrote another ECR to upper management recommending Williams for termination, a request management did not approve. (Doc. 28 at 8). Again, on September 11, 2014, Glancey issued Mr. Williams a verbal warning for "unexcused absences. (Doc. 28 at 9). Thus, in late October 2014, Glancey, Wilford and Mr. Williams's third-level supervisor, Thomas Brown, met with Williams regarding his job performance and behavior. (Doc. 37 at 12). Glancey issued a warning to Mr. Williams for his behavior. (Doc. 37 at 12).
Finally, on January 14, 2015, Mr. Williams missed a Ricoh customer sponsored event without prior communication to Glancey. Id. Mr. Williams was allegedly unable to attend the event because he needed to attend a funeral on the morning of January 14, 2015, and because his mother was admitted to the hospital that same morning. (Doc. 28 at 9).
On January 20, 2015, Defendant terminated Mr. Williams's employment. (Doc. 37 at 13).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standards of Review
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the Court must grant summary judgment if the moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Boitnott v. Corning, Inc. , 669 F.3d 172, 175 (4th Cir.2012) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ). Once a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, the opposing party has the burden of showing that a genuine dispute exists. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ; Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc. , 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir.2003). "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Emmett v. Johnson , 532 F.3d 291, 297 (4th Cir.2008) (quoting Anderson , 477 U.S. at 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ).
A "material fact" is a fact that might affect the outcome of a party's case. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; JKC Holding Co. v. Wash. Sports Ventures , Inc., 264 F.3d 459, 465 (4th Cir.2001). Whether a fact is considered to be "material" is determined by the substantive law, and "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; Hooven – Lewis v. Caldera , 249 F.3d 259, 265 (4th Cir.2001).
A "genuine" issue concerning a "material" fact arises when the evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict in the nonmoving party's favor. Resource Bankshares Corp. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. , 407 F.3d 631, 635 (4th Cir.2005) (quoting Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ). Rule 56(e) requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by its own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
B. Analysis
This Court DENIES cross motions for summary judgment for either party (Docs. 28 and 36) as to Counts I and II because there is a genuine dispute in material fact regarding whether Defendant's series of disciplinary actions occurring after Plaintiff's protected activity amounted to pretext for racial discrimination and retaliation. Because Plaintiff failed to allege any facts or law to support his claims of age discrimination and retaliation under the ADEA, and because Plaintiff concedes that summary judgment is appropriate, this Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 36) as to Counts III and IV.
To establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) membership in a protected class; (2) satisfactory job performance; (3) adverse employment action; and (4) different treatment from similarly situated employees outside the protected class. See Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, Inc. , 807 F.3d 619, 626 (4th Cir.2015) ; Freeman v. N. State Bank , 282 Fed.Appx. 211, 216 (4th Cir.2008).
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that he engaged in protected activity, (2) that the Defendant took an adverse employment action against him, and (3) that the adverse action was causally connected to his protected activity. See S.B. v. Bd. of Educ. , 819 F.3d 69 (4th Cir.2016) ; see also Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. , 149 F.3d 253, 258 (4th Cir.1998).
A plaintiff may survive a motion for summary judgment on a discrimination or retaliation claim under Title VII by presenting direct of circumstantial evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether an impermissible factor such as race motivated the employer's adverse employment decision. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co. , 416 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir.2005). Alternatively, a plaintiff may proceed under the Mc D onnell Douglas "pretext" framework, by arguing that a genuine issue in material fact exists with respect to the existence of pretext in an employer's adverse action. Id. Under the Mc D onnell Douglas framework, if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case for discrimination or retaliation, the burden shifts to the employer to produce a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. Smith v. First Union Nat. Bank , 202 F.3d 234, 248 (4th Cir.2000). The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff, who must demonstrate that the employer's reason was mere pretext for discrimination or retaliation, by showing both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason for the challenged conduct. Id. ; Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. , 530 U.S. 133, 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (plaintiff must be afforded the "opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination."); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks , 509 U.S. 502, 507, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (noting that the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that he has been the victim of intentional discrimination remains with the plaintiff); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 802–03, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) ; Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts , 780 F.3d 562, 575 (4th Cir.2015) ("[a]n employer's provision of shifting and inconsistent justifications for taking an adverse employment decision is, in and of itself, probative of pretext"); E.E.O.C. v. Sears Roebuck and Co. , 243 F.3d 846, 852 (4th Cir.2001).
Here, there is a genuine dispute in material fact whether Defendant's disciplinary actions subsequent to Plaintiff's June 20, 2013 e-mail amounted to pretext under Title VII. In Wheat v. Florida Parish Juvenile Justice Commission , the Fifth Circuit held that that there was a "genuine issue of material fact as to whether [the employee's] discharge would have occurred ‘but for’ exercising her protected rights." 811 F.3d 702, 711 (5th Cir.2016). The Fifth Circuit found a genuine dispute in material fact because an employee was subject to adverse employer treatment only after engaging in protecting activity, even though she had not been disciplined for engaging in similar activity prior to her protected activity. Id. (emphasis added).
Like the employee in Wheat , Mr. Williams's increased level of discipline occurred only after sending his June 2013 e-mail. The record indicates that Mr. Williams was a satisfactory sales employee with respect to his sales performance. Glancey indicated in his deposition that "[Mr. Williams] was a good performer. Compared to the rest he was in the ... middle to top ... [hovering around] 85 percent of his quota" (Glancey Dep. at 59: 8-12; 60:20-21). Although Mr. Williams received a reputation from his supervisors for being a problematic employee who "disappear[ed] at times and [went] ... AWOL" (Glancey Dep. at 38), and had received weak monthly employer assessments prior to June 2013 based on his "issues [with] utilizing rForce, forecasting accurately, [and] attending meetings," it was not until after his June 2013 e-mail that began to receive an increased volume of written warnings and disciplines in the form of Employee Counseling Reports. In the deposition of Mr. Williams's supervisor, Glancey, he refers to the June 2013 e-mail as an "enough is enough moment ... with [Mr. Williams's] behavior" (Glancey Dep. at 114:5-7). Glancey stated that because of the circumstances surrounding the June 2013 e-mail, he "made the decision at [that] moment that [he] would document significant issues" (Glancey Dep. at 114:15-19). Like the employee in Wheat, even though Mr. Williams had never been previously disciplined in his thirteen-year career with Ricoh, and was engaging in much of the same activity as before his June 2013 e-mail, Mr. Williams was subjected to increased scrutiny and discipline only after his June 2013 e-mail. See Wheat , 811 F.3d at 711.
Defendant Ricoh fails to provide evidence showing a lack of pretext in Mr. Williams's increased discipline. While such evidence could have been produced with a proper EEO investigation, Defendant apparently failed to implement its own EEO policy by neglecting to fully investigate the circumstances surrounding Mr. Williams's complaint of discrimination contained in his June 2013 e-mail, or interview other African-American employees or white employees concerning Glancey's alleged discriminatory actions toward the employees he managed. Therefore, the Court finds that a genuine issue of material fact exists on the issue of whether the disciplinary actions taken by Defendant following Plaintiff's June 2013 email—for workplace behavior that had not resulted in disciplinary action before the incident with Glancey—was pretext for discrimination or retaliation under Title VII. Accordingly, this Court DENIES both parties' Motions for Summary Judgment on Counts I and II.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 36) as to Counts I and II. and DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 28) as to Counts I and II because there is a genuine dispute in material fact whether Defendant's disciplinary actions occurring after Plaintiff's June 2013 e-mail amounted to pretext for racial discrimination and retaliation. The Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 36) as to Counts III and IV concerning age discrimination and retaliation under the ADEA because Plaintiff concedes that he cannot establish a prima facie case of age discrimination or retaliation.
SO ORDERED .
The Clerk is directed to forward a copy of this Order to counsel.