Opinion
1:17-cv-251
06-06-2023
MARK-ALONZO WILLIAMS, Plaintiff v. MICHAEL D. OVERMYER, et al, Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER, United States District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
RICHARD A. LANZILLO, Chief United States Magistrate Judge
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint [ECF No. 61] be dismissed, in part, for failure to properly exhaust his administrative remedies. It is further recommended that Plaintiffs claims related to Administrative Custody Grievance B978002 be scheduled for trial.
II. Report
A. Introduction
On September 18, 2017, Plaintiff Mark-Alonzo Williams initiated this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on events that allegedly occurred during his confinement at the State Correctional Institution at Forest (“SCI-Forest”). ECF No. 1. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on January 3, 2018, and a second amended complaint on March 27, 2018. ECF Nos. 41,61. As Defendants, Plaintiff named the following individuals: Superintendent Michael D. Overmyer (“Overmyer”); Deputy Superintendent John W. Sawtelle (“Sawtelle”); Deputy Superintendent Derek F. Oberlander (“Oberlander”); Corrections Officer Donald Conrad (“Conrad”); Major John M. Blitcha (“Blitcha”); Corrections Officer Justin Davis (“Davis”); Corrections Officer Smead (“Smead”); Corrections Officer Jacob Barnes (“Barnes”); Corrections Officer David Reddinger (“Reddinger”); Disciplinary Hearing Officer Tracy Williams (“Williams”); Director of Special Investigations James C. Barnacle (“Barnacle”); and Licensed Practicing Nurse Bradley Avenali (“Avenali”). Plaintiff asserted violations of the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Plaintiff also sued Mark Sutherland, a registered nurse employed by the private entity contracted to provide medical services to inmates at SCI-Forest. Sutherland has since been dismissed from this action. See ECF No. 374.
From the outset of this litigation, Defendants challenged most or all of Plaintiff s claims on the basis that he failed to properly exhaust them at the administrative level. On two occasions, the undersigned issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R) that summary judgment be granted in favor of the Defendants based on Plaintiffs failure to administratively exhaust any of his claims. ECF Nos. 148, 184. In each instance, United States District Judge Susan Paradise Baxter declined to adopt the R&R because of new information presented to the Court for the first time in Plaintiff s Objections. ECF No. 155 at 3 (“[T]his Court must respectfully reject the Report and Recommendation noting that Magistrate Judge Lanzillo was unaware that Plaintiff had not received [a] critical affidavit when he issued his Recommendation”); ECF No. 203 at 6 (“Information not given to the Magistrate Judge and therefore not part of the R&R being reviewed is not appropriately before the District Judge here”). Because her decisions were based entirely on procedural grounds rather than because the underlying legal conclusions were erroneous, Judge Baxter left it to the discretion of the undersigned to determine how ultimately to resolve the threshold issue of exhaustion. See ECF No. 155 at 3 (“It will be Magistrate Judge Lanzillo's decision as to whether to allow Defendants the opportunity to re-file motions [for summary judgment] based on the failure to exhaust”); ECF No. 203 at 6 (“This issue of whether Plaintiff fully and properly exhausted [certain grievances is] one that needs to be determined in this matter”).
A thorough explanation of this case's procedural history is available at ECF No. 380.
Specifically, Plaintiff objected to the first R&R by noting that he had not received a critical exhibit relied upon by Defendants in their motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 155 at 3, and to the second by presenting arguments and evidence that had not previously been presented to the undersigned. ECF No. 203 at 6.
The case proceeded to discovery. Despite receiving an extension of time to do so, Defendants failed to file a post-discovery summary judgment motion challenging Plaintiffs claim. Nevertheless, mindful of the fact that “exhaustion is a mandatory prerequisite to filing a civil rights action in federal court,” and noting the existence of “serious questions as to whether Plaintiff properly exhausted any of his claims,” the undersigned scheduled an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Smalls v. Camden County, 728 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2013), to determine - once and for all - whether Plaintiffs claims had been properly exhausted. See ECF No. 380.
The hearing took place on January 17,2023. See ECF No. 412. After placing Plaintiff under oath, the Court exhaustively reviewed the entire administrative record, document by document, and queried Plaintiff as to whether each grievance had been properly exhausted. See ECF No. 416 at 8-17. Plaintiff conceded that the following grievances referenced in his prior filings had not been exhausted and, accordingly, could not form the basis for any claims in this action:656650;657663;661328; 679757; 670946; 712792; 662419; 667694; 675466; 661475; 668427; 654478; 672309; 680506; 648641; 678677; 678162; 657667; 660333; 661960; 662345; 662349; 662428;667910;668312;670941;652347; 675433; 651561; 663485; 671176; 674336; 678694; 685558; 682574; and 682577. Id. In response to the Court's questioning, Plaintiff explicitly agreed to the dismissal of all claims based on any of those grievances. Id. at 8-18. Plaintiff maintained, however, that two other grievances had been properly exhausted: DC-ADM 804 Grievance No. 661328, and DC-ADM 802 Administrative Custody Grievance No. B978002. ECF No. 416 at 7, 18. During a brief cross-examination, defense counsel confirmed that Plaintiff was “waiving any objection to grievances other than 661328 and B978002.” ECF No. 416 at 30.
The full transcript of those proceedings has been docketed at ECF No. 416.
The scope of this action having been narrowed considerably, the Court invited the parties to submit supplemental briefs, at their discretion, addressing those two remaining grievances. Id. at 33. Plaintiff submitted his supplemental brief on February 1,2023. ECF No. 413. Defendants declined to submit a supplemental brief. Accordingly, this matter is ripe for disposition.
B. Standards
1. The Prison Litigation Reform Act
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires a prisoner to exhaust any available administrative remedies before he may bring an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the conditions of his confinement. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is a “threshold issue that courts must address to determine whether litigation is being conducted in the right forum at the right time.” Small, 728 F.3d 270 (emphasis in original) (quoting Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 272 (3d Cir. 2010)). Because exhaustion “is a question of law to be determined by a judge, even if that determination requires the resolution of disputed facts,” Small, 728 F.3d at 270-71, the court serves as “the finder of fact with respect to the defense that a plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies as required by PLRA.” Jackson v. Shouppe, 2020 WL 3574645, at *2 (W.D. Pa. June 30, 2020). An evidentiary hearing is the appropriate mechanism to resolve factual disputes and decide the threshold issue of whether the plaintiffs claims are procedurally defaulted for failure to exhaust. Small, 728 F.3d at 270-271. See also Fahey v. Sacks, 2019 WL 266336, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2019).
The PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to all claims relating to prison life which do not implicate the duration of the prisoner's sentence. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Critically, the statute requires “proper exhaustion,” meaning that a prisoner's completion of the administrative review process must also satisfy the applicable procedural rules of the prison's grievance system. Fennell v. Cambria County Prison, 607 Fed.Appx. 145, 149 (3d Cir. 2015). A procedurally defective administrative grievance, even if pursued to final review, precludes action in federal court. Id. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and proven by defendants. Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 295 (3d Cir. 2002).
2. The DOC's administrative remedy process
The DOC has implemented several distinct administrative remedy processes that collectively provide an inmate a route to challenge every aspect of confinement. Eley v. Brittain, 2023 WL 2142969, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 21, 2023). Those policies are: (1) the Inmate Grievance Policy, DC-ADM 804; (2) the Inmate Discipline Policy, DC-ADM 801; and (3) the Administrative Custody Policy, DC-ADM 802. Id. (citing Pa. Dep't of Corr., Policies, https://www.cor.pa.gov/About% 20Us/Pages/DOC-Policies.aspx (last visited February 18, 2023)). These “mutually exclusive procedural avenues” are each intended to address a “specific issue[] which may arise in connection with an inmate's confinement.” Williams v. Overmyer, 2020 WL 1329155, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 2020). Accordingly, one administrative remedy may not be substituted for the other. Id. (citing Washington-El v. Beard, 2013 WL 1314528, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 2013)). Rather, each policy applies in a specific circumstance “depend[ing] on the subject matter of the inmate's grievance and his or her custody classification.” Hobson v. Tiller, 2021 WL 2191282, at *4 (W.D. Pa. May 6, 2021). Two of these policies are at issue in the instant case: DC-ADM 804 and DC-ADM 802.
3. DC-ADM 804
For most issues that arise during an inmate's confinement, the appropriate procedural avenue for review is the three-step grievance and appeal process outlined in DC-ADM 804. See Grievance System Policy DC ADM-804; Smith v. Sec. of Pa. Dept, of Corrections, 2018 WL 279363, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2018). First, the inmate must “legibly set forth all facts and identify all persons relevant to his claim in a grievance which will then be subject to ‘initial review.'” Smith, 2018 WL 279363, at *2 (citing Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 233 (3d Cir. 2004)). Second, the initial review must be appealed to the Facility Administrator for a second level of review. Id. Finally, “the inmate is required to file an appeal to the Secretary's Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals (“the Secretary's Office”).” Id. Once these three steps have been satisfied, a grievance has ordinarily been administratively exhausted for purposes of the PLRA.
Notably, DC-ADM 804 contains an additional requirement when an inmate seeks “compensation or other legal relief' normally available from a court: the inmate must “request the relief with specificity in his/her initial grievance.” See Wright v. Sauers, 2017 WL 3731957 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2017); Spruill, 372 F.3d 218. Courts characterize the satisfaction of this requirement as “proper exhaustion.” Smith, 2018 WL 279363, at *3 (noting that a grievance must be fully exhausted to final review and “properly exhausted” with respect to remedy).Pursuant to this requirement, an inmate is precluded from seeking legal relief in a lawsuit, including monetary damages, if the inmate did not request that same relief in his grievances (even if he appealed those grievances to the Secretary's Office for final review). See, e.g., Wright, 2017 WL 3731957, at *7 (finding lack of proper exhaustion where plaintiff failed to set forth desired monetary relief on his initial grievance form as required by DC-ADM 804); Camacho v. Beers, 2018 WL 6618410, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 18, 2018) (holding that, because “Plaintiff failed to request the specific relief of monetary compensation in the grievances he filed as to the subjects of this lawsuit... he did not exhaust all administrative remedies with regard to such claims ... [and] may not pursue an action in federal court based on the claims raised in his procedurally defective grievances.”); Sanders v. Beard, 2013 WL 1703582, at *6-7 (M.D. Pa. Apr 19, 2013) (dismissing claims for monetary damages brought by plaintiffs who did not request monetary damages in their initial grievances as required by DC-ADM 804).
Conversely, courts in this district have occasionally characterized an inmate's failure to properly exhaust as a form of procedural default. See, e.g., Wright, 3731957, at *6 (characterizing a failure to specifically request monetary damages in an otherwise fully-exhausted grievance as “giv[ing] rise to procedural default”).
4. DC-ADM 802
While DC-ADM 804 offers a general avenue for review, DC-ADM 801 and 802 apply in more specific circumstances. Apropos to the instant case, DC-ADM 802 provides the exclusive mechanism for an inmate to challenge his placement in administrative custody. Eley, 2023 2142969, at *4. The version of DC-ADM 802 in effect at the time of Plaintiffs incarceration set forth the following requirements:
An inmate is required to raise any issue concerning the reason for or the duration of his/her AC custody during the regularly scheduled PRC review. The PRC's decision may be appealed through the procedures set forth in Subsection C. above. Issues concerning the failure of the PRC
to conduct a timely initial AC placement hearing or a regularly scheduled review may be appealed to the Facility Manager and then to the Chief Hearing Examiner under the procedures set forth in Subsection C. above. The granting or denial of privileges may not be appealed.Id. (citing DC-ADM 802) (emphasis in original). Pursuant to Subsection C, an inmate “may appeal the decision of the PRC concerning his/her initial confinement in AC to the Facility Manager/designee within two work days of the completion of the hearing,” and “may appeal the initial decision of the Facility Manager/designee to the Office of the Chief Hearing Examiner” within seven calendar days of the receipt of the Facility Manager's/designee's decision. Id. Notably, while “all issues concerning the reason for an inmate's placement in AC or the duration of his custody must be addressed through the procedures set forth [in] DC-ADM 802” rather than through DC-ADM 804, the DC-ADM 802 procedure does not contain the requirement that an inmate state a request for monetary relief. Id. See also Pirl v. Ringling, 2021 WL 1964461, at *12 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 29,2021).
C. Analysis
1. Unexhausted grievances
As recounted above, and as more fully discussed at the evidentiary hearing held on January 17, 2023, Plaintiff acknowledged that the following grievances have not been properly exhausted pursuant to the requirements of DC-ADM 804: 656650; 657663; 661328; 679757; 670946; 712792; 662419;667694; 675466; 661475; 668427; 654478; 672309; 680506; 648641; 678677; 678162; 657667; 660333;661960;662345; 662349; 662428; 667910; 668312; 670941; 652347; 675433; 651561; 663485; 671176; 674336; 678694; 685558; 682574; and 682577. Plaintiff explicitly conceded at the hearing that each of these grievances was either not appealed to final review, sought injunctive relief that has been rendered moot by Plaintiffs release from prison, pertained to individuals or claims that are not relevant to this action, or failed to request any form of monetary relief. The Court should dismiss, with prejudice, any claims in the Second Amended Complaint based on these grievances.
Plaintiffs concessions in this regard mirror the Court's findings in each of its prior R&Rs. See ECF Nos. 148, 184.
2. Grievance 661328
Plaintiff initially submitted grievance 661328 on January 19, 2017. ECF No. 92-1 at 51. In the original version of the grievance, Plaintiff alleged that Sawtelle, Conrad, Overmyer, and several non-defendants violated prison policy DC-ADM 801 by failing to respond to a misconduct appeal within seven days. Id. Plaintiff contended that this was an “egregious error” because the misconduct at issue was “bogus” and “specious.” Id. He also suggested that the misconduct had been issued in retaliation for a preliminary injunction request he had filed against another prison a few weeks prior. Id. He concluded that this proved “the cabal and collusion and retaliatory transfer.” Id.
On January 20, 2017, Lisa Reeher, a non-defendant, rejected grievance 661328 on the basis that “[g]rievances based upon different events must be presented separately.” Id. at 50. Plaintiff promptly resubmitted grievance 661328 “to meet the criteria of one issue per grievance.” Id. at 49. However, the resubmitted version of Plaintiff s grievance omitted his initial claims and raised an entirely new issue: that Overmyer, Sawtelle, T. Williams, Barnes, Smead and Davis had “act[ed] as one to deny the rights of [Plaintiff] when they ORDERED Grievance Coordinator Mr. Reeher on 20th January 2017 to reject [the initial version of] Grievance 661328.” Id. In other words, the resubmitted version of Grievance 661328 complained only of the fact that the initial version of Grievance 661328 had been rejected. Plaintiff alleged that this was done “[t]o deflect from accountability [for] failure to meet policy DC-ADM 801” and the denial of Plaintiff s right to a fair hearing and an appeal. Id. Deputy Warden Derek Oberlander denied Plaintiffs grievance after interviewing Reeher and determining that “she was never directed by anyone to reject [Plaintiffs] grievance.” ECF No. 268-16.
Although Plaintiff generally alleges throughout his pleading that the defendants acted as a “cabal” to torture him and suppress his rights, the conduct challenged in the updated version of Grievance 661328 - specifically, the denial of the initial version of Grievance 661328 - does not appear anywhere in the Second Amended Complaint. While the allegations in the initial version of that grievance - the issuance of Misconduct B977118 in retaliation for Plaintiffs litigation against his previous prison - do appear in his pleading, those allegations were dropped from the “resubmitted” version of Grievance 661328 and never fully exhausted to final review. ECF No. 61 ¶ 21. Consequently, neither version of Grievance 661328 satisfies the exhaustion requirement with respect to any of the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint. The Court should dismiss any claims based on that grievance.
3. Administrative Custody Grievance B978002
The final administrative document at issue is Plaintiffs appeal of Administrative Custody Grievance B978002. See ECF No. 121-11. The exhibits submitted by the parties reflect that the Program Review Committee (PRC) conducted an administrative review of Plaintiff s custody status on June 9, 2017, based on a report that he “[was] a danger to some other person(s) in the facility and [could] not be protected by alternate measures.” Id. The PRC met with Plaintiff and informed him that he had been placed on Administrative Custody (AC) status pending placement in the Special Management Unit (SMU). Id. The document was signed by Defendants Sawtelle, Conrad, and Blitcha, as well as several non-Defendants. Id. Plaintiffs appeal of that decision was denied at both the facility manager and final review levels. Id.
There does not appear to be any dispute that Plaintiff properly exhausted Administrative Custody Grievance B978002 in the manner specified by DC-ADM 802. Although Plaintiff did not request monetary relief at any point during that process, he correctly notes that DC-ADM 802 does not, by its own terms, require an inmate to request monetary relief. Rather, it states only that an inmate must “raise any issue concerning the reason for or duration of his/her AC custody during the regularly scheduled PRC review” and may appeal that decision “to the Facility Manager and then to the Chief Hearing Examiner.” Because he completed the DC-ADM 802 process, Plaintiff contends that his challenge to the “conditions of his solitary confinement for a term of three years, which caused actual injury, and/or irreparable harm,” have been properly exhausted. The Court agrees.
Although the Court has been unable to locate a decision directly addressing whether an inmate may seek monetary relief in federal court for a claim that has been exhausted through the DC-ADM 802 process, District Courts in Pennsylvania have widely held that similar provisions, such as DC-ADM 801 and DC-ADM 001, “provide[] an alternative means” for a plaintiff to exhaust claims falling under those provisions. Pirl, 2021 WL 1964461, at *11 (collecting cases). In Pirl, for example, the plaintiff alleged that corrections officers had encouraged other inmates to physically attack him by labeling him a snitch. Id. at * 1. In addition to filing several DC-ADM 804 grievances, the plaintiff verbally reported the attack to a staff member pursuant to the abuse-reporting procedure set forth in DC-ADM 001. Id. at * 11. Because plaintiff complied with the terms of DC-ADM 001, and because that provision does not require a plaintiff to include a request for monetary relief in an abuse claim, the court held that plaintiff had “properly” exhausted his claim and could seek monetary damages in federal court. Id. (“Unlike the provisions of DC-ADM 804, [DC-ADM 001] does not expressly require inmates to include requests for monetary relief, or to identify particular issues or individuals with specificity.”).
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed a similar situation in Downey v. Pa. Dep't Corr., 968 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2020). In Downey, the plaintiff-inmate repeatedly approached staff members seeking eye surgery to correct his glaucoma. Id. at 302. Prison officials ignored his requests, causing him to go blind. Id. He then initiated a § 1983 action seeking monetary relief despite failing to request damages in any properly exhausted DC-ADM 804 grievance. Id. Noting that the “general [DC-ADM 804] grievance procedures do not apply to every situation,” the Third Circuit held that the plaintiffs claim for monetary relief was not barred, despite his failure to properly utilize the DC-ADM 804 procedure, because the DC-ADM 804 provision requiring a request for monetary relief in the initial grievance was, by its own terms, “inapplicable” to incidents of an “urgent or emergency nature.” Id.
Like the provisions addressed in Downey and Pirl, DC-ADM 802 does not require a plaintiff to request monetary relief in a grievance. Defendants, despite several opportunities to do so, have failed to supply any argument or authority suggesting that Plaintiffs use of the DC-ADM 802 procedure to exhaust his claim was improper. Accordingly, the Court should conclude that Plaintiffs challenge to his placement in administrative segregation, as set forth in Grievance B978002, has been properly exhausted. Moreover, because no other matters remain for determination, this claim should be scheduled for trial.
Although the Court granted several extensions of time, see ECF Nos. 348 and 352, Defendants never moved for summary judgment following discovery. See ECF No. 370 (noting that “the DOC Defendants did not file a motion for summary judgment by the October I, 2021 deadline (or at any point thereafter)”). Defendants also disregarded a direct order from Judge Baxter to file a response to several arguments raised in Plaintiffs objections to the undersigned's prior R&R, see ECF No. 189, including the argument that he exhausted certain claims by filing “DC-ADM 802 ‘Conditions of Confinement' Grievance B978002.” See ECF No. 203 at 3 (“Despite being ordered to do so by this Court, the Attorney General's office has failed to file a Response to the Objections on behalf of the Department of Corrections.”) (emphasis in original). Finally, the DOC declined to file a supplemental brief (or otherwise articulate a response to Plaintiffs DC-ADM 802 argument following the January 17, 2023 evidentiary hearing.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint [ECF No. 61] be dismissed, in part, for failure to properly exhaust his administrative remedies. Specifically, all claims based on any administrative grievance other than Administrative Custody Grievance B978002 should be dismissed, with prejudice. The following Defendants should be terminated from this action: Michael Overmyer, David Reddinger, Jacob Barnes, Tracy Williams, Bradley Avenali, (John Doe) Smead, James Barnacle, and Justin Davis.
It is further recommended that Plaintiffs claims related to Administrative Custody Grievance B978002 be scheduled for trial against the remaining Defendants: Sawtelle, Conrad, Blicha, and Oberlander.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties must seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).