Opinion
22-CV-6838 (LTS)
11-14-2022
VALERIE WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. LONG BEACH MORTGAGE COMPANY; DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, as Trustee for Long Beach Mortgage Trust 2006-2; STEPHEN J. BAUM; JOHN DOE; JANE ROE, Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Valerie Williams, who is appearing pro se, filed this action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d)(3), seeking to vacate a state court judgment of foreclosure. By order dated August 15, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the complaint but grants Plaintiff 30 days' leave to replead her claims.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
BACKGROUND
This complaint arises from a foreclosure action, held in New York State Supreme Court, Westchester County, related to property located at 26 West Devonia Avenue, in Mt. Vernon, New York. Named as Defendants are: (1) Long Beach Mortgage Company (LBMC); (2) Deutsche Bank National Trust Company as Trustee for Long Beach Mortgage Trust 2006-2; (3) Stephen J. Baum, an attorney residing in Buffalo, New York; and (4) unknown “John and Jane Does” defendants. Plaintiff challenges the validity of the judgment of foreclosure on the following grounds: (1) the mortgage “was not deposited into the Mortgagee's Pooling and Servicing Agreement Trust at the time of the Closing Date of said Trust and therefore, [Defendants] had no Standing to sue for foreclosure because to do so would have violated New York State Trust Law and SEC guidelines . . .”; and (2) Baum is “known for perpetrating unscrupulous acts” in court. (Id. at 1-2.)
Plaintiff moves, invoking Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d)(3), to present “newly discovered irrefutable proof” that attorney Baum committed fraud in obtaining the judgment of foreclosure in state court. (ECF 2 at 1-2.) She asserts that “Federal Courts have the power under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside judgments entered years earlier that were obtained by “‘fraud on the court.”' (Id.) Plaintiff also invokes: (1) the Court's federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1337; and (2) the Court's supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, under which she asserts claims of fraud, fraud on the court, and violations of N.Y. Penal Law § 187; N.Y. Banking Law Article 2 § 30; New York Civil Practice Law and Rules Article 63; and New York Business Law § 349.
Plaintiff filed two prior actions in this court arising out of the same foreclosure case regarding the West Devonia Avenue property. In Williams v Long Beach Mortg. Co., No. 15-CV-5952 (KMK), 2016 WL 5720810 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2016), aff'd, 709 Fed.Appx. 92 (2d Cir. Feb.13, 2018) (Williams I), the court dismissed, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Plaintiff's complaint against, among others, LBMC, Deutsche Bank, and Baum.In Williams v. Long Beach Mortg. Co., ECF 7:19-CV-0970, 69 (NSR) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2020) (Williams II), the court dismissed the complaint under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, for failure to state a claim, and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.According to the docket in Williams II, the state court judgment of foreclosure was entered on March 4, 2008, and the property was sold at auction on October 27, 2009. See Williams II, ECF 7:19-CV-0970, 69.
In Williams I, the court noted that the complaint contained “a passing reference to other federal statutes,” including 28 U.S.C. § 1337, but that it did “not refer to this statute again, nor . . . contain any specific allegations or facts as to how [the] [d]efendant violated” that statute. Williams I, No. 15-CV-5952, 2016 WL 5720810, at *7.
As discussed in that order, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts lack authority to review final state-court orders and judgments. SeeExxon Mobil Corp. v. SaudiBasic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 292 (2005); Dorce v. City of New York, 2 F.4th 82, 101 (2d Cir. 2021) (The Rooker-Feldman doctrine “bars federal district courts from hearing cases that in effect are appeals from state court judgments, because the Supreme Court [of the United States] is the only federal court with jurisdiction over such cases.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1257)); Kropelnicki v. Siegel, 290 F.3d 118, 128 (2d Cir. 2002) (“The [Rooker-Feldman] doctrine reflects the principle set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1257 that the Supreme Court [of the United States] is the only federal court that has jurisdiction to review state court judgments, . . . unless otherwise provided by Congress, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (habeas corpus review).”). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine “precludes a United States district court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction....” Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 291. District-court review of claims is barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine when four requirements are met: (1) the plaintiff must have lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff must complain of injuries caused by a state court judgment; (3) the plaintiff must invite district court review and rejection of the state court judgment; and (4) the state court judgment must have been rendered before the district court proceedings commenced. Dorce, 2 F.4th at 101 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
To invoke federal question jurisdiction, a plaintiff's claims must arise “under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A case arises under federal law if the complaint “establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Kain, 485 F.3d 730, 734-35 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Empire Healthchoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 690 (2006)). Mere invocation of subject matter jurisdiction, without any facts demonstrating subject matter jurisdiction, does not create subject matter jurisdiction. See Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1188-89 (2d Cir. 1996). There are no allegations in the complaint suggesting that the Court can consider this action under its federal question jurisdiction.
Section 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1337 are general jurisdictional statutes that do not create a cause of action, but “rather depend[ ] upon an action arising under a separate federal law before a district court's jurisdiction is proper.” 325 Bleecker, Inc. v. Local Union No. 747, 500 F.Supp.2d 110, 119 (N.D.N.Y. 2007); see also W. 14th St. Commercial Corp. v. 5 W. 14th Owners Corp., 815 F.2d 188, 192 (2d Cir. 1987). Section 1337 only operates where there is a “civil action or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and commerce against restraints and monopolies,” 28 U.S.C. § 1337(a), and may not be invoked “on the bare assertion that a right under an act regulating commerce is infringed,” Russo v. Kirby, 453 F.2d 548, 551 (2d Cir. 1971). Rather, “[f]acts must be alleged to show that federal law in the particular case creates a duty or a remedy.” Id. (citations omitted).
The order of dismissal in Williams I noted that, although Plaintiff's complaint contained “a passing reference to . . . federal statutes,” including Section 1337, that her pleading did “not refer to this statute again, nor . . . contain any specific allegations or facts as to how [the] [d]efendant violated” that statute. Williams I, No. 15-CV-5952, 2016 WL 5720810, at *7. As in Williams I, this complaint refers to Sections 1331 and 1337, but contains no facts suggesting that she can state any viable federal claims.
Plaintiff also invokes Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, under which a federal district court may relieve a party from a judgment or order obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct by an opposing party. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60. Under Rule 60(d), a federal court may “set aside a judgment for fraud on the court,” or entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(d)(1) & (3). See United States v. Buck, 281 F.3d 1336, 1341 (10th Cir. 2002). Fraud on the court constitutes “(1) an intentional fraud; (2) by an officer of the court; (3) which is directed at the court itself; and (4) that in fact deceives the court.” Herring v. United States, 424 F.3d 384, 390 (3d Cir. 2005).
Rule 60 only authorizes a federal district court to set aside one of its own judgments or orders only, and not a judgment or order of a state court or other federal court. See Burnett v. Amrein, 243 Fed.Appx. 393, 395 (10th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); Gochenaur v. Juniata Valley Bank, No. 17-CV-743, 2017 WL 3405114, at *3 (M.D. Pa. June 22, 2017) (“Rule 60 simply does not provide a vehicle for vacating a state court judgment in” federal court.) Any such action would violate the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Bolden v. City of Topeka, 441 F.3d 1129, 1139 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “prohibits federal suits that amount to appeals of state court judgments.”); Mina v. ENET Advert., 616 Fed.Appx. 49, 50 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (“[A] federal district court cannot overturn a state court judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b). Moreover, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Mina's attempt invalidate the Court of Common Pleas' judgment dismissing his case.”); Lee v. Driscoll, No. 18-CV-1478, 2019 WL 4450679, at *10 (D. Conn. Sept. 17, 2019) (“[P]ursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff's Rule 60(d)(3) claim, which asks the Court to ‘set aside a judgment for fraud on the court.' Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(d)(3). Likewise, the Court lacks jurisdiction to vacate or declare void and unenforceable the state court judgment or to enjoin Defendants from enforcing that judgment against Plaintiff.”) (quoting Heriveaux v. Lopez-Reyes, No. 17-cv-9610 (AJN), 2018 WL 3364391, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2018)).
Also, as discussed above, in the order of dismissal in Williams II, the court dismissed the complaint under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Here, Plaintiff again seeks to invalidate the same state court order or judgment on the ground that it was fraudulently obtained. Rule 60, however, only authorizes this Court to invalidate one of its own orders or judgments. Plaintiff has therefore failed to show that she is entitled to any relief under Rule 60.
For these reasons, the Court must dismiss Plaintiff's purported federal claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
A. Supplemental jurisdiction
A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Generally, “when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988)). Having determined that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of any federal claims of which the Court has original jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction of Plaintiff's state-law claims. See Kolari v. New York-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Subsection (c) of § 1367 ‘confirms the discretionary nature of supplemental jurisdiction by enumerating the circumstances in which district courts can refuse its exercise.'”) (quoting City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997)).
B. Leave to replead
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). In an abundance of caution, the Court grants Plaintiff 30 days' leave to replead her claims.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's complaint, filed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
Plaintiff is granted 30 days' leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit, caption the document as an “Amended Complaint,” and label the document with docket number 22-CV-6838 (LTS). An Amended Complaint form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and she cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the Court will direct the Clerk of Court to enter judgment consistent with this order.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).
SO ORDERED.