Opinion
8:23-cv-1046-JFA-JDA
06-15-2023
Danny Mark Williams, Petitioner, v. Warden Janson, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Jacquelyn D. Austin United States Magistrate Judge
Danny Mark Williams (“Petitioner”) is a prisoner in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) and is currently incarcerated in South Carolina at the Edgefield Federal Correctional Institution (“FCI Edgefield”). Proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, Petitioner brings this habeas corpus action under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. [Doc. 1.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review such petitions for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. For the reasons below, the Petition filed in this matter is subject to summary dismissal.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner brings this action to challenge the BOP's calculation of his sentence.[Doc. 1 at 8-10.] Petitioner alleges he was sentenced on September 30, 2021, in the “South East District of Georgia” at case number “CR-120-9-2” to a term of 152 months' imprisonment to run concurrently with his state sentences. [Id. at 2-3.]
Petitioner commenced this action by filing a Petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia at case number 1:23-cv-00024. [Doc. 1.] By Order dated March 15, 2023, the Honorable Brian K. Epps transferred the action to this Court because Petitioner is presently confined at FCI Edgefield. [Doc. 3.]
Petitioner asserts the following grounds for relief:
GROUND ONE: My Federal Sentencing Judge ordered my sentence of 152 months to be served concurrently with “the State terms of confinement” that I was “currently serving.” The BOP interpreted this to be that I am due ZERO (0) days Prior Jail Credit.
GROUND TWO: I was in Federal Custody from February 2020 until September 30, 2021, waiting to be sentenced. 3 years is the total that the Judge ordered to run concurrently with the State.[Id. at 8.] For his relief, Petitioner requests that the Court adjust his sentence “to reflect any period of imprisonment already served.” [Id. at 9.]
APPLICABLE LAW
Liberal Construction of Pro Se Petition
Petitioner brought this action pro se, which requires the Court to liberally construe his pleadings. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. Even under this less stringent standard, however, the pro se petition is still subject to summary dismissal. Id. at 520-21. The mandated liberal construction means only that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the petitioner could prevail, it should do so. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999). A court may not construct the petitioner's legal arguments for him. Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993). Nor should a court “conjure up questions never squarely presented.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Further, this Court is charged with screening Petitioner's lawsuit to determine if “it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rule 4 of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts; see also Rule 1(b) Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the U.S. District Courts (2012) (a district court may apply these rules to a habeas corpus petition not filed pursuant to § 2254).
Habeas Corpus
Generally
Habeas corpus proceedings are the proper mechanism for a prisoner to challenge the legality or duration of his custody. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). The primary means of attacking the validity of a federal conviction and sentence is through a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, while a petition for habeas corpus under § 2241 is the proper method to challenge the computation or execution of a federal sentence. See United States v. Little, 392 F.3d 671, 678-79 (4th Cir. 2004).
A petitioner may bring a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under § 2241 if he is “attack[ing] the computation and execution of the sentence rather than the sentence itself.” U.S. v. Miller, 871 F.2d 488, 490 (4th Cir. 1989); Diaz v. Warden, FCI Edgefield, No. 4:17-cv-00093-RBH, 2017 WL 2985974, at *2 (D.S.C. July 13, 2017) (noting a § 2241 petition “is the proper means for a federal prisoner to challenge the BOP's sentencing calculations”). A petition pursuant to § 2241 challenging the execution of a federal prisoner's sentence generally addresses “such matters as the administration of parole, computation of a prisoner's sentence by prison officials, prison disciplinary actions, prison transfers, type of detention and prison conditions.” Jiminian v. Nash, 245 F.3d 144, 146 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Manigault v. Lamanna, No. 8:06-cv-047-JFA-BHH, 2006 WL 1328780, at *1 (D.S.C. May 11, 2006) (“A motion pursuant to § 2241 generally challenges the execution of a federal prisoner's sentence, such as parole matters, computation of sentence by prison officials, prison disciplinary actions, and prison transfers.”). A petition under § 2241 must be brought against the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held, 28 U.S.C. § 2242; Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 434-35 (2004), and “in the district of confinement rather than in the sentencing court,” Miller, 871 F.2d at 490.
Exhaustion
Executing sentences and computing jail time are administrative functions under the authority of the Attorney General, who has delegated these tasks to the BOP, including the responsibility for computing time credits and determining a sentence termination date once defendants actually commence serving their sentences. United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 334-35 (1992). Accordingly, the Attorney General, through the BOP, must make the initial determination to award sentence credit for time spent in official detention; a district court does not have the jurisdiction to make an initial determination. U.S. v. Jeter, 161 F.3d 4, at *1 (4th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision). As a result, prior to filing a § 2241 habeas petition, a petitioner must exhaust his administrative remedies. McClung v. Shearin, 90 Fed.Appx. 444, 445 (4th Cir. 2004). The requirement to exhaust administrative remedies is not waivable. Jeter, 161 F.3d 4, at *2. Further, a petitioner's failure to exhaust administrative remedies is excused only upon a showing of cause and prejudice. McClung, 90 Fed.Appx. at 445.
The BOP's Administrative Remedy Program is found at 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10 through 542.19. The grievance process consists of three levels of review: institutional, regional, and national. See id. First, an inmate must seek to informally resolve any complaint relating to his confinement. Id. § 542.13. Next, if the complaint cannot be resolved informally, the inmate may file a formal written Administrative Remedy Request; Requests must be filed within twenty days of the incident giving rise to the complaint. Id. § 542.14. Then, if the inmate is dissatisfied with the response, he may appeal to the Regional Director; appeals to the Regional Director must be submitted within twenty days of the date the warden signed his response. Id. § 542.15(a). Finally, if the inmate is dissatisfied with the Regional Director's response, the inmate may appeal to the General Counsel; appeals to the General Counsel must be submitted within thirty days of the date the Regional Director signed his response. Id.
Although 28 U.S.C. § 2241 does not contain a statutory exhaustion requirement, courts have required prisoners to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to seeking habeas review under § 2241. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 490-91 (1973) (requiring exhaustion in a § 2241 matter); Timms v. Johns, 627 F.3d 525, 531 (4th Cir. 2010) (noting courts require “exhaustion of alternative remedies before a prisoner can seek federal habeas relief” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Exhaustion allows prison officials to develop a factual record and provides “an opportunity to resolve disputes concerning the exercise of their responsibilities before being haled into court.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007). Any arguments not advanced at each step of the administrative appeal are procedurally defaulted. See Moffat v. Broyles, 288 F.3d 978, 981-82 (7th Cir. 2002). Moreover, if a prisoner cannot obtain an administrative remedy because of his failure to timely appeal at the administrative level, then the prisoner has procedurally defaulted his § 2241 claim, unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause and prejudice for the failure. See, e.g., Moscato v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1996), cited with approval in Watkins v. Compton, 126 Fed.Appx. 621, 622 (4th Cir. 2005); Nigro v. Sullivan, 40 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 1994). Additionally, “[w]here a petition for writ of habeas corpus is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the exhaustion of administrative remedies is jurisdictional.” Hicks v. Jordan, 165 Fed.Appx. 797, 798 (11th Cir. 2006); see Timms, 627 F.3d at 533. Although the exhaustion of administrative remedies is not waivable, Jeter, 161 F.3d at *2, some courts have held that the judicial exhaustion requirement of § 2241 may be excused by courts for discretionary reasons, such as where requiring exhaustion would be futile. See, e.g., Dunkley v. Hamidullah, No. 6:06-cv-2139-JFA-WMC, 2007 WL 2572256, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 31, 2007). However, courts have emphasized a petitioner's failure to exhaust administrative remedies may be excused only upon a showing of cause and prejudice. McClung, 90 Fed.Appx. at 445 (citing Carmona, 243 F.3d at 634-35).
DISCUSSION
As noted, Petitioner commenced this action to challenge the BOP's calculation of his sentence, and he asks this Court to order the BOP to award him credit for time served. However, this action is subject to summary dismissal because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies, and he has failed to demonstrate any cause or prejudice to show that the exhaustion requirement should be waived.
As to the questions on the standard form Petition that Petitioner completed, he notes that he sought informal resolution of his claims at the initial step but he did not file a BP-9, BP-10, or a final administrative appeal concerning the BOP's decision. [Doc. 1 at 6.] Petitioner further explained as follows:
I contacted R&D at FCI Edgefield, as instructed by Unit Team. They offered no resolution. I was then told that the final step for Jail Credit was to contact Grand Prairie, the Designation & Security Classification Center (DSCC). These steps are the available remedies for Jail Credit issues.[Id.]
Because Petitioner is challenging the BOP's calculation of his release date, he must first exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing an action in this Court. However, Petitioner has not done so. Although Petitioner contends he attempted to resolve the issue with the BOP's calculation of his sentence by contacting R&D at FCI Edgefield, he acknowledges that he did not complete each of the required steps explained in the applicable law section above. As such, this Petition is subject to dismissal because it is clear from the face of the Petition that Petitioner did not exhaust his administrative remedies. See, e.g., Dowd v. Smith, No. 5:18-HC-2084-FL, 2018 WL 6492951, at *2 (E.D. N.C. Dec. 10, 2018) (“The face of the petition thus makes clear that petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit.”); Mejia-Ramirez v. Zych, No. 7:12-cv-248, 2013 WL 1352597, at *2 (W.D. Va. Apr. 3, 2013) (finding the court could not reach the merits of the § 2241 petition because the petitioner had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies).
Indeed, this is precisely the type of case which requires a fully developed administrative record so that the Court may evaluate the BOP's calculation of time to be credited to Petitioner's sentence. See Mero v. Phelps, No. 4:20-cv-3615-MGL-TER, 2020 WL 7774378, at *2 (D.S.C. Nov. 2, 2020) (“The BOP should be afforded the opportunity to correct any alleged errors, to develop its factual record, and apply its expertise to the situation.”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2020 WL 7769784 (D.S.C. Dec. 30, 2020). Therefore, because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies, the Petition should be dismissed. See Rodgers v. Glenn, No. 1:16-cv-16-RMG, 2017 WL 1051011, at *3 (D.S.C. Mar. 20, 2017) (“Because [Petitioner] admits he did not [exhaust his administrative remedies], his lawsuit is barred by statute.”).
Further, Petitioner has not alleged facts showing any cause or prejudice to demonstrate that the exhaustion requirement should be waived. Until the BOP is able to resolve Petitioner's administrative grievance and make a determination concerning the proper calculation of credit due to Petitioner for the time he spent in state custody for his state sentence, this Court should not consider this Petition.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is recommended that the § 2241 Petition be DISMISSED without prejudice and without requiring the Respondent to file an answer or return.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Petitioner's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 250 East North Street, Suite 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).