Opinion
CAUSE NO. 3:02-CV-1229-K.
July 15, 2003.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Dallas Independent School District's ("DISD") motion for summary judgment. Having reviewed the motion, the response, the summary judgment evidence and all related filings, this Court finds the motion has merit and should be GRANTED.
Factual Background
Rebecca Williams, an African-American, was employed by DISD for approximately ten months. She sued DISD, asserting causes of action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq. Specifically, Williams alleged that a white co-worker created a hostile work environment by making racially derogatory comments, exhibiting racially derogatory literature, and playing racially derogatory music to her and other African-American employees.The factual allegations Williams alleged in both her EEOC charge and her original complaint consist of two incidents. Williams claims a white co-worker, Carolyn Williams, gave her a "racially derogatory thank-you card," and that the same co-worker displayed a jungle screen saver on the computer next to Williams that was offensive to Williams.
According to the evidence, Williams had given Carolyn a Minnie Mouse keychain. Carolyn responded by giving Williams a card with a folk art picture of a mandrill on the cover. The message inside the card read, "Dear Rebecca, Thank you so much for Minnie! She is now the official guardian of my house key. Have a good break! XOXO, Carolyn." According to Williams, she was offended by the picture of the monkey on the cover of the card, and complained to her supervisor about the incident.
Williams also alleges that on another occasion Carolyn left a screen saver playing on her computer with "jungle sounds" and a picture of a monkey swinging through trees "screaming his fool head off." According to Williams, she turned the computer off because it offended her.
Williams also alleged in deposition testimony that Carolyn, the same co-worker, made two racially derogatory comments to her. According to Williams, the first statement Carolyn made had to do with Carolyn's family once "owning" Williams' family, thus explaining the same last name. The second statement Carolyn allegedly made was that African-American children had a harder time reading than white children.
Based on these allegations, Williams contends she was discriminated against and subjected to a hostile working environment. DISD moved for summary judgment on her claims.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, affidavits and other summary judgment evidence show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of identifying those portions of the record it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-25. Once a movant makes a properly supported motion, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to show that summary judgment should not be granted; the nonmovant may not rest upon allegations in the pleadings, but must support the response to the motion with summary judgment evidence showing the existence of a genuine fact issue for trial. Id. at 321-25; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255-57 (1986). All evidence and reasonable inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
Hostile Work Environment
Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against an employee because of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). To prevail on her Title VII claim, Williams must show that: (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on race; (4) the harassment was so severe and pervasive that it altered the terms of her employment; and (5) her employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action. Ramsey v. Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 2002).
To establish that a working environment is hostile or abusive, the plaintiff must show that the alleged harassment was so severe and pervasive that it altered the conditions of the workplace and constituted an abusive working environment. Padilla v. Carrier Air Conditioning, 67 F. Supp.2d 650, 659 (E. D. Tex. 1999). In making this determination, all circumstances must be considered, including "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S.Ct. 367, 371 (1993), Walker v. Thompson, 214 F.3d 615, 625 (5th Cir. 2000). This requires proof, not of a "few isolated incidents of racial enmity," but a "steady barrage of opprobrious racial comments." Padilla, 67 F. Supp.2d at 659. Sporadic racial comments during casual conversation do not establish the necessary elements for a prima facie case. Id. at 659-60. An actionable hostile environment claim requires "a long pattern of extensive, unredressed threats or conduct that permeates the work environment." Jeffery v. Dallas County Medical Examiner, 37 F. Supp.2d 525, 531 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
Prima Facie Case
DISD first contends Williams fails to present a prima facie case of discrimination, because the alleged harassment was not so severe and pervasive that it altered the conditions of the workplace and constituted an abusive working environment. See Padilla, 67 F. Supp.2d at 659. This Court agrees.
First, Williams presented no evidence except her own speculation that Carolyn's actions in giving her the card and/or playing the jungle screensaver were based on William's race. Carolyn testified by affidavit that neither action was motivated by racial animus; in fact, she states she never thought either action would be offensive to Williams. Carolyn also testified she gave the same card to her supervisor, who is also African-American. The supervisor testified by affidavit that she was not offended by the card. See Jeffery, 37 F. Supp.2d at 531 (court did not find hostile work environment when employee failed to show environment was "both objectively offensive, meaning that a reasonable person would see it was hostile or abusive, and that he in fact perceived it as so").
In addition to the card and the screensaver, Williams also alleges Carolyn made comments about her family "owning" Williams' family and about African-American children not learning as quickly as others. Assuming Williams' allegations are true, the incidents, all taken together, do not rise to the level of "severe and pervasive" conduct sufficient to warrant Title VII relief. "Isolated, offhand comments, discourtesy, and rudeness do not meet this standard. . . . An actionable hostile environment claim requires a long pattern of extensive, unredressed threats or conduct that `permeates' the work environment." Jeffrey, 37 F. Supp.2d at 531 (N.D. Tex. 1999). Here, there is no summary judgment evidence that the harassment alleged by Williams was "severe and pervasive" enough to alter the terms of her employment with DISD. Cf. Walker, 214 F.3d at 625 (plaintiffs presented evidence of a four-year barrage of highly offensive racial remarks and insults and denials of promotions amounting to clear "alteration of the terms of employment").
Because Williams failed to present competent summary judgment evidence of a prima facie case of hostile work environment, DISD is entitled to summary judgment on Williams' claims against it. Defendant's motion for summary judgment is therefore GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.