Opinion
CIVIL ACTION, NO: 01-2838, SECTION: "R"(4).
April 22, 2002
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is defendants' motion for summary judgment against Judy Williams' claims. For the following reasons, the Court grants defendants' motion.
I. Background
This case arises from an accident aboard the M/V TRITON. On or about April 5, 1999, the floor of the vessel's engine room collapsed. Williams alleges that he suffered multiple injuries as a result of the accident. He sued his employer, King Shipping Company, Inc., and a third party, Chemoil Corporation, for damages for negligence and unseaworthiness under the Jones Act and general maritime law respectively and for maintenance and cure. Plaintiff's wife, Judy, also sued defendants for loss of consortium, services and support. Defendants seek summary judgment to dismiss the claims of Judy Williams.
II. Discussion
A. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues as to any material facts, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). A court must be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party or, in other words, "that the evidence favoring the nonmoving party is insufficient to enable a reasonable jury to return a verdict in her favor." Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 178 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 u.s. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986)). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing out that the evidence in the record contains insufficient proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2554; see also Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 178. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, by submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. The nonmovant may not rest upon the pleadings, but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue exists for trial. See id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2553-54; Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1996)
B. Loss of Consortium
Defendants claim that under the current state of the law, there is no cause of action under the Jones Act or general maritime law for loss of consortium against either an employer or a nonemployer. Plaintiffs concede that the Fifth Circuit has precluded such a cause of action against employers. See Michel v. Total Transportation, Inc., 957 F.2d 186, 191 (5th Cir. 1992) They argue, however, that the Fifth Circuit's rulings do not extend to causes of action against nonemployers such as Chemoil or to claims for pecuniary damages. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that there is no cause of action for loss of consortium under the general maritime law against nonemployers and that Ms. Williams' pecuniary damage claims are subsumed by her husband's claims.
In Miles v. Apex Marine Corporation, 498 U.S. 19, 111 S.Ct. 317, (1990), the United States Supreme Court held that a deceased seaman's surviving parent could not recover nonpecuniary damages for loss of society for the wrongful death of a seaman under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688. In reaching its decision, the Court noted that Congress, in the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 761, et seq. ("DOSHA"), explicitly limited recoverable damages in suits for wrongful death on the high seas to pecuniary losses. The Court found that although the Jones Act does not have an explicit provision limiting recoverable losses to pecuniary losses, Congress made its intent to incorporate a pecuniary limitation on damages clear when it incorporated the substantive provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51-59, into the Jones Act. Miles, 498 U.S. at 31, 111 S.Ct. at 325. In light of this Congressional intent, the Court concluded that "[t]here is no recovery for loss of society in a Jones Act wrongful death action." Id. The Court also went on to apply this same principle to the general maritime law, reasoning that "[i]t would be inconsistent with our place in the constitutional scheme were we to sanction more expansive remedies in a judicially-created cause of action in which liability is without fault than Congress has allowed in cases of death resulting from negligence." Id. at 32-33, 111 S.Ct. at 326. The intent of the Miles court was to impose a uniform rule on all actions for the wrongful death of a seaman, whether brought under DOSHA, the Jones Act, or the general maritime law. See id.
In Michel v. Total Transportation, Inc., the Fifth Circuit extended the reasoning of Miles to conclude that "damages recoverable in general maritime causes of action for personal injury of a Jones Act seaman do not include loss of consortium." 957 F.2d at 191. That case, like Miles, involved an action against the seaman's employer. Another panel of the Fifth Circuit confirmed the holding of Michel in Murray v. Anthony J. Bertucci Construction Company, Inc., 958 F.2d 127 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 865, 113 S.Ct. 190 (1992). In Murray, the Fifth Circuit held that Miles precluded the wife of an injured seaman from recovering for loss of society from the seaman's employer. The court reasoned that:
The Supreme Court's emphasis in Miles on the importance of uniformity in remedies in maritime death cases must apply equally to injury actions. If we recognize Ms. Murray's loss of society claim, we would create the very sort of anomaly Miles sought to avoid. Therefore, we follow the Supreme Court's lead in Miles and hold that the spouse of an injured seaman has no cause of action for loss of society under the general maritime law. Murray, 958 F.2d at 132; see also Turley v. Co-Mar Offshore Marine Corp., 766 F. Supp. 501, 502 (E.D. La. 1991)
Plaintiffs argue that Miles, Michel, and Murray do not control the outcome of defendant's motion because those cases were brought against the seaman's employer, whereas this action against Chemoil is not against plaintiff's employer. Plaintiffs further contend that Miles, Michel, and Murray do not preclude Ms. Williams from asserting claims against both defendants for loss of support and for loss of services because these claims are pecuniary in nature. The Court is unpersuaded by plaintiffs' arguments.
The Court agrees with the overwhelming majority of cases, which have found that the reasoning of Miles extends to loss of consortium claims against nonemployers as well as against employers. See, e.g., In re Diamond B Marine Services, Inc., 2000 WL 805235 at *3; Mastrodonato, 2000 WL 739284 at *1; Trident Marine, Inc. v. M/V ATTICOS, 876 F. Supp. 832, 837 (E.D. La. 1994); Earhart v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 852 F. Supp. 515, 516 (E.D. La. 1993); Ellender v. John E. Graham Co., 821 F. Supp. 1136, 1136-37 (E.D. La. 1992); Duplantis v. Texaco, Inc., 771 F. Supp. 787 (E.D. La. 1991); see also Trahan v. Texaxo, Inc., 625 So.2d 295, 297 (La.Ct.App. 4th Cir. 1993) (wife of injured seaman has no cause of action for loss of consortium against nonemployer under general maritime law); Phillips v. Water Towing, Inc., D.W., 620 So.2d 1387, 1390 (La.Ct.App. 4th Cir. 1993) (same) To make a distinction between employer and non-employer defendants, as plaintiffs suggest, would result in exactly the kind of inconsistency that the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit sought to avoid in Miles, Michel, and Murray.See Mastrodonato, 2000 WL 739284 at *1 ("the uniformity sought by the [Supreme] Court in Miles is best served by a rule that denies loss of consortium damages against a third party . . . just as they are denied against a seaman's employer."); Lishka v. Tidewater Services, Inc., 1997 WL 27066, *9 (E.D. La. 1997) (citing Dixon v. Cliffs Drilling Company, 633 So.2d 277, 279-80 (La.Ct.App. 1st Cir. 1993) ("As stated in Miles and reiterated in Murray and Michel, the holding in Miles stemmed from a desire for consistency under DOSHA, the Jones Act and general maritime law. To . . . allow consortium claims against non-employer defendants, but not against employer defendants would result in the antithesis of consistency."). In all, the Court finds that Miles, Michel, and Murray compel a finding that there is no loss of consortium claim against nonemployers under general maritime law. Accordingly, the Court finds that Ms. Williams claim against Chemoil is without merit.
Plaintiffs rely solely on the decision in In re Denet Towing Service, Inc., 1999 WL 329698 (E.D. La. 1999), for the proposition that Miles should be narrowly construed so as to allow loss of consortium claims against a nonemployer defendant under general maritime law. In the absence of any justification for why the Court should not follow its earlier ruling and the reasoning of the majority of courts in this district, the Court finds plaintiffs' reliance on Denet unpersuasive. See In re Diamond B Marine Services, Inc., 2000 WL 805235, *3 (E.D. La. 2000) (respectfully disagreeing with Denet); Mastrodonato v. Sea Mar, Inc., 2000 WL 739284, *1 n. 2 (E.D. La. 2000) (noting disagreement with Denet).
Plaintiffs maintain that the doctrine of Miles, Michel, and Murray does not extend to pecuniary damages, and therefore, Ms. Williams presents viable claims for loss of services and support. This argument is misplaced because traditional tort law damage principles foreclose Ms. Williams from bringing her remaining claims. Ms. Williams' claim for loss of support is improper because Mr. Williams is entitled to recover the loss of future wages and those future wages are available for Ms. Williams' support. See Cruz v. Hendy International Co., 638 F.2d 719, 722 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1981) (Rubin, J.), rev'd on other grounds by Michel, 957 F.2d at 191 (because injured husband may recover for loss of his earning power, wife may not recover for loss of support in her consortium action) (citing W. Prosser, The Law of Torts s 125, at 894 (4th ed. 1971)). Similarly, Ms. Williams' loss of services claim is improper because the services that would have been provided to the marital partnership are likewise embraced by the injured spouse's claim. See id. at 727. Accordingly, the Court finds that Ms. Williams' claims for loss of support and for loss of services are without merit.
Ms. Williams also argued that if the Court does not afford her husband seaman status under the Jones Act, she would have a cause of action for loss of consortium under state law under the doctrine of Yamaha Motor Corporation, U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 116 S.Ct. 619 (1996). Since Mr. Williams' status as a Jones Act seaman is undisputed (see Defendants' Reply at 1-2), the Court need not reach this argument.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendants' motion for summary judgment to dismiss Ms. Williams' claims.