Summary
In Williams, the Fifth Circuit noted: "This court need not reach the issue of the status of [petitioner's] application under section 2244(d)(2) had the Louisiana Supreme Court considered the untimely application and denied it on substantive grounds."
Summary of this case from Luckett v. CainOpinion
Civil Action No. 00-536, Section "R" (4)
June 26, 2000
ORDER AND REASONS
This matter was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for the purpose of conducting a hearing, if necessary, and submission of proposed findings of fact and recommendations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and, as applicable, Rule 8(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Before the Court are plaintiff's objections to the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation. Having reviewed de nova the complaint, the record, the applicable law, the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge, and the plaintiff's objections to the Report and Recommendation, the Court agrees that plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed with prejudice as time-barred.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Willie Williams, is a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the Louisiana State Penitentiary in Angola, Louisiana. The trial court convicted Williams of aggravated rape in violation of LA. Rsv. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 on November 17, 1978. ( See State Rec., Vol. 1.) The judge subsequently sentenced Williams to life at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. ( See Id.)
Williams appealed his conviction to the Louisiana Supreme Court. On October 15, 1980, that Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. Williams's conviction became final on November 10, 1980, when the Louisiana Supreme Court denied his application for rehearing. See State v. Williams, 391 So.2d 1182 (La. 1980); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 922(C) (West 2000).
On November 31, 1991, Williams filed a motion with the state trial court seeking a ruling on the application for post-conviction relief he claimed to have filed on September 24, 1991. ( See State Rec., Vol. II.) On December 6, 1991, the trial court found no evidence that Williams's application was ever filed and, alternatively, that any application was untimely under LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 930.8. ( See Id.) Williams did not appeal this ruling.
On April 13, 1999, Williams filed an application for post-conviction relief. The state trial court denied relief on May 12, 1999. ( See Id.) On June 2, 1999, Williams filed a writ application with the Louisiana Supreme Court, which that court denied on November 5, 1999. ( See Id.)
Williams's petition for habeas corpus relief in this Court was signed on November 20 and December 3, 1999, and notarized on December 6, 1999. Under the mailbox rule, December 6, 1999 represents the earliest date Williams could have presented his petition to prison officials for mailing and thus the earliest date his petition could have been filed for statute of limitations purposes. See Cooper v. Brookshire, 70 F.2d 377, 379 (5th Cir. 1995). For the following reasons, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Williams's petition is untimely.
II. DISCUSSION
Congress enacted a strict statute of limitations for habeas corpus proceedings as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). Under the Act, "[a] 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The limitations period runs from the "date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).
For petitioners whose convictions became final prior to AEDPA's effective date, the Fifth Circuit has held that the one-year limitation period runs from the April 24, 1996 effective date of the AEDPA, and not from the date the state court judgment became final. See Flanagan v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 196, 202 (5th Cir. 1998). Here, Williams qualifies for the one-year grace period because his judgment became final on November 10, 1980, 1994, approximately sixteen years before the AEDPA became effective. Therefore, he had until April 24, 1997 to petition for habeas relief. He filed this petition on December 6, 1999, more than two years past the deadline.
Under the AEDPA, the one-year statute of limitations for filing a petition is tolled if any properly filed application for post-conviction relief is pending in state court. See Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding petitioners whose convictions became final prior to the enactment of AEDPA may rely on tolling provision). Specifically, the Act provides that "[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). A "properly filed application" is one submitted according to the state's procedural requirements, such as rules governing the time and place of filing. See Villegas v. Johnson, 184 F.3d 467, 469-70 (5th Cir. 1999) ( citing Lovasz v. Vaughn, 134 F.3d 146, 148 (3d Cir. 1998)); Williams v. Cain, 66 F. Supp.2d 816, 817 (E.D.La. 1999).
Because Williams did not have a properly filed application for post-conviction relief pending in state court from April 26, 1996 to April 26, 1997, the AEDPA one-year statute of limitations was not tolled. The AEDPA statute of limitations had already expired on April 26, 1997, when Williams filed his application for post-conviction relief with the state trial court on April 13, 1999. "Once the one year statute of limitations has expired, it cannot thereafter be tolled by a motion for post-conviction relief." See Bogan v. Moore, 55 F. Supp.2d 597, 599-600 (S.D. Miss. 1999).
The Court also agrees with the Magistrate Judge that this case does not present the rare and exceptional circumstances that would justify equitably tolling the one-year statute of limitations. See Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1474(1999). See also Coleman v. Johnson, 184 F.3d 398, 402 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1564(2000) ("Equitable tolling applies principally where the plaintiff is actively misled by the defendant about the cause of action or is prevented in some extraordinary way from asserting his rights.") ( quoting Rashidi v. American Pres. Lines, 96 F.3d 124, 128 (5th Cir. 1996)). Accordingly, because Williams did not filed his petition for federal habeas corpus relief until more than two years after the limitations period had expired, his petition must be dismissed as untimely.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby approves the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge and adopts it as its opinion in this matter. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff's complaint be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.