Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:01-CV-2151-D
January 16, 2003
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to the District Court's Order of Reference, entered November 14, 2002, "Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment," filed October 7, 2002, has been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for hearing, if necessary, and for recommendation. Having considered the evidence of the parties in connection with the pleadings, the Court RECOMMENDS that the motion for summary judgment be GRANTED and that the case be DISMISSED with prejudice. I. Background
The background information comes from Plaintiff's "Complaint," filed October 25, 2001; from Plaintiff's Answers to the Magistrate Judge's Questionnaire, filed December 5, 2001; from "Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment," filed October 7, 2002; from the "Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment," filed October 7, 2002; from the "Amended Appendix in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment," filed October 21, 2002; from "Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment," filed November 5, 2002; from "Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment," filed November 15, 2002; and from "Defendant's Supplemental Appendix in Support of Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment," filed December 19, 2002.
On October 25, 2001, Plaintiff Arthur Williams ("Williams") filed the instant employment discrimination suit against his former employer, Defendant Aviall Services, Inc. ("Aviall"). (P.'s Compl. at 1.) Specifically, Williams alleges that Aviall terminated his employment due to his race-African American-in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. (P.'s Ans. to Mag. J. Quest. at 2, 3-4.)
Aviall, a distributor of replacement airplane parts, hired Williams effective November 22, 1999, to the position of warehouse clerk. (D.'s Br. at 2, 3; D.'s Am. App. at 2, 68, 82.) As a warehouse clerk, Williams was responsible for "pulling orders after a request came in on the Pick Ticket Machine and for stocking parts in the warehouse." (D.'s Br. at 3; D.'s Am. App. at 2, 3-4, 5, 82, 86.) The warehouse supervisor was Paul Stange ("Stange"), the small shipping supervisor was Eddie Puente ("Puente"), and the warehouse manager was Ken Abercrombie ("Abercrombie"). (D.'s Br. at 3-4; D.'s Am. App. at 7, 8, 9, 68, 78, 82.)
During the course of approximately one and a half years, Stange documented multiple instances of poor attendance, poor performance, and poor workplace behavior on the part of Williams. (D.'s Br. at 4-8; D.'s Am. App. at 82-84, 94, 95, 96-97, 99, 100, 101.) Ultimately, on July 2, 2001, after an investigation by Abercrombie into a verbal confrontation between Williams and Puente, Aviall terminated Williams' employment. (D.'s Br. at 7-11; D.'s Am. App. at 70-72, 78-80, 106.) Aviall cited insubordination, inappropriate personal conduct, and violation of company rules as the grounds for the employment termination. (D.'s Br. at 11; D.'s Am. App. at 31-33, 106.)
Aviall now moves for summary judgment on all of Williams' claims. Specifically, Aviall contends that: (1) Aviall had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Williams' employment and (2) Williams cannot show that Aviall's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason was a pretext for race discrimination. (D's Br. at 12-18; D.'s Reply at 5-9.) Williams, on the other hand, contends that: (1) the Texas Workforce Commission found that Aviall had terminated his employment "for a reason that [was] not misconduct"; (2) he was a "good employee"; (3) similarly-situated, white employees were treated more favorably than he was treated; and (4) Aviall has presented false affidavit statements and falsified documents. (P.'s Resp. at 1-3.)
The Court now turns to address the legal standards that will guide its analysis.
II. Legal Standards
For employment discrimination claims, the Fifth Circuit applies the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Blow v. City of San Antonio, 236 F.3d 293, 296 (5th Cir. 2001); Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 222 (5th Cir. 2000). First, the plaintiff is required to establish a prima facie case for the particular type of discrimination he is alleging. Russell, 235 F.3d at 222. Upon meeting this requirement, a presumption of discrimination arises which the employer must then rebut by setting forth a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action. Id. Once the employer meets this burden, the presumption of discrimination raised by the prima facie case disappears, and the plaintiff must then prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the employer's proffered reason is a pretext for the alleged discrimination. Id. At the "pretext stage, `the only question on summary judgment is whether there is a conflict in substantial evidence to create a jury question regarding discrimination.'" Celestine v. Petroleos de Venezuella SA, 266 F.3d 343, 355 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Haynes v. Pennzoil Co., 207 F.3d 296, 300 (5th Cir. 2000).
The Supreme Court clarified the plaintiff's burden in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000). In Reeves, the Court explained that "a plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated." Reeves, 530 U.S. at 146. Nevertheless, "[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); Rubinstein v. Adm'rs of the Tulane Educ. fund, 218 F.3d 392, 400 (5th Cir. 2000) ("While we are mindful of the Supreme Court's recent admonition that Title VII plaintiffs need not always present evidence above and beyond the prima facie case and pretext, discrimination suits still require evidence of discrimination.") (citation to Reeves omitted).
The Court now turns to the merits of the motion.
III. Analysis
As noted above, Aviall contends that: (1) Aviall had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Williams' employment and (2) Williams cannot show that Aviall's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason was a pretext for race discrimination. (D.'s Br. at 12-18; D.'s Reply at 5-9.) Williams, on the other hand, contends that: (1) the Texas Workforce Commission found that Aviall had terminated his employment "for a reason that [was] not misconduct"; (2) he was a "good employee"; (3) similarly-situated, white employees were treated more favorably than he was treated; and (4) Aviall has presented false affidavit statements and falsified documents. (P's Resp. at 1-3.)
As an initial matter, Aviall does not dispute that Williams has met his initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of race discrimination. Russell, 235 F.3d at 222. As such, the burden shifts to Aviall to set forth a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Williams' employment. Id. To this end, Aviall presents several pieces of evidence.
First, Aviall presents excerpts from its employee handbook regarding its progressive discipline policy, its attendance policy, and its workplace violence policy. (D.'s Am. App. at 87, 89-90, 91-92.) Aviall also presents the affidavit of Lou Koch ("Koch"), the Director of Human Resources for Aviall, which confirms that Aviall has a progressive discipline policy, an attendance policy, a workplace violence policy, and a restricted parking policy. ( Id. at 74-75.) With respect to the progressive discipline policy, Aviall may impose forms of discipline ranging from informal counseling to discharge. ( Id. at 74-75, 87.) Furthermore, in determining the form of discipline to impose, Aviall "will consider the employee's past work record, the totality of the circumstances surrounding the incident, and the seriousness of the infraction." ( Id. at 87.) With respect to the attendance policy, Aviall maintains that "[e]mployee[s] who are excessively absent or fail to comply with absence reporting procedures are subject to disciplinary action up to and including termination." ( Id. at 90. See also id. at 75.) With respect to the workplace violence policy, Aviall maintains that it
is committed to a policy of "zero tolerance" regarding all forms of workplace violence, including verbal/non-verbal threats, intimidation, harassment, coercion, shouting, brandishing weapons[,] and any type of physical abuse or harm. Any individual displaying such behavior in the workplace may be subject to disciplinary action up to and including termination.
( Id. at 92. See also id. at 75.) Finally, with respect to the restricted parking policy, Aviall "prohibits employees from parking in the handicapped parking spaces and the visitors' section of the Aviall parking lot without permission. . . . Aviall enforces this policy against all employees." ( Id. at 75.)
Second, Aviall presents competent summary judgment evidence that Williams received a copy of the employee handbook. Most importantly, Aviall presents a "Handbook Acknowledgment" form that is signed by Williams and that is dated March 6, 2000. ( Id. at 93.) The form states that "[m]y signature below acknowledges that I have received a handbook, read and understand Aviall's employment-at-will relationship[,] and . . . shall comply with the policies set forth in this handbook." ( Id.) Aviall also points to Williams' deposition statement that he believes he received a copy of the employee handbook. ( Id. at 11.) Finally, Aviall presents the affidavit of Koch, confirming that Williams received a copy of the employee handbook. ( Id. at 75.)
Third, Aviall presents competent summary judgment evidence that Williams failed to comply with certain policies described in the employee handbook. On January 25, 2000, Stange issued Williams a counseling notice for absenteeism and informed Williams that his attendance must improve. ( Id. at 94.) On September 14, 2000, Stange issued Williams a written warning for absenteeism and notified Williams that failure to improve attendance would result in "disciplinary actions up to and including discharge." ( Id. at 95.) In March of 2001, during a performance review, Stange and Abercrombie rated Williams as "unsatisfactory" in interpersonal skills and as "fair" in quantity of work, in job knowledge and skills, and in reliability. ( Id. at 96-97.) As a result of the performance review, Stange and Abercrombie implemented an "Improvement Plan" with a 90-day probation period for Williams. ( Id. at 98.) On May 8, 2001, Stange issued Williams a written warning for absenteeism and notified Williams that "failure to correct the above incident, behavior[,] or situation, will lead to disciplinary action up to and including termination." ( Id. at 99.) On May 30, 2001, Stange issued Williams a written warning for insubordination and warned Williams that "[c]ontinued behavior of this magnitude will not be tolerated further." ( Id. at 100.) According to the written warning and to the affidavit of Stange, Stange had instructed Williams on three different occasions "to assist with putting away merchandise in the upstairs area of the warehouse." ( Id. at 84, 100.) On each occasion, according to the written warning and to the affidavit of Stange, Williams had failed to follow Stange's instructions. ( Id.)
Fourth, Aviall presents competent summary judgment evidence regarding the incident that directly resulted in Aviall's termination of Williams' employment. On June 29, 2001, Puente issued Williams a suspension notice for insubordination, inappropriate personal conduct, and violation of company rules. ( Id. at 101.) According to the affidavit of Puente, Williams had parked his car in a handicapped parking space, and Puente had asked him to move it. ( Id. at 78-79.) However, according to the affidavit of Puente and to the statements of three witnesses, Williams had initially refused to move his car and had insisted that Puente tell him who wanted his car moved and why he needed to move it. ( Id. at 79, 103, 104-05.) Furthermore, according to the affidavit of Puente, Williams had raised his voice and had demanded at least three times that Puente remove his hand from Williams' face. ( Id. at 79.) However, according to the affidavit of Puente and to the statements of three witnesses, Puente had never positioned his hand near Williams' face. ( Id. at 79, 103, 104-05.) Finally, according to the affidavits of Abercrombie and Koch, Aviall decided to terminate Williams' employment effective July 2, 2001, following an investigation by Abercrombie into the verbal confrontation between Williams and Puente. ( Id. at 71-72, 75-76.) According to the affidavit of Abercrombie, Abercrombie's investigation had included taking Williams' statement regarding the confrontation, comparing witness statements to the statement of Puente, and reviewing Williams' employment record with Aviall. ( Id. at 71.)
Finally, Aviall presents a copy of Williams' discharge notice. ( Id. at 106.) The discharge notice explains that Aviall terminated Williams' employment due to insubordination, inappropriate personal conduct, and violation of company rules. ( Id.) With respect to insubordination, the discharge notice describes an "unwillingness to accept supervisory or management authority." ( Id.) With respect to inappropriate personal conduct, the discharge notice cites "unbusiness-like conduct which is offensive and is not in the interest of the company, management, fellow employees[,] or customers." ( Id.) With respect to violation of company rules, the discharge notice refers to Williams parking his car in a handicapped parking space. ( Id.)
The Court concludes that Aviall has met its burden of setting forth a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Williams' employment. Russell, 235 F.3d at 222. As such, the burden shifts to Williams to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Aviall's stated reason for terminating Williams' employment amounts to a pretext for race discrimination. Id. To this end, Williams proffers several arguments, which the Court will now address in turn.
First, Williams contends that the Texas Workforce Commission determined that Aviall had terminated Williams' employment "for a reason that [was] not misconduct connected with the work." (P.'s Resp. at 1.) In support of his contention, Williams presents a copy of the Texas Workforce Commission's "Determination on Payment of Unemployment Benefits," dated July 27, 2001. ( Id. at Ex. 1.) In that determination, the Texas Workforce Commission indeed found that Aviall had terminated Williams' employment for a reason other than misconduct. ( Id.) Nonetheless, the Court declines to rely on the determination of the Texas Workforce Commission as evidence of race discrimination. Most importantly, the determination does not purport to find that race discrimination played a role in Aviall's termination of Williams' employment. Furthermore, even if the Court were to interpret the determination of the Texas Workforce Commission as implicitly implicating race discrimination, an administrative agency's determination of discrimination does not, by itself, create a genuine issue of material fact regarding discrimination. Bynum v. Fort Worth Indep. Sch. Dist., 41 F. Supp.2d 641, 657 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (concluding that an EEOC determination of discrimination does not create a genuine issue of a material fact for the district court where all of the remaining summary judgment evidence establishes that there was no discrimination). As such, Williams' first argument is without merit.
Second, Williams contends that he was a "good employee." (P.'s Resp. at 2.) In support of his contention, Williams presents three earnings statements, all of which indicate that he received increased pay. ( Id. at Ex. 4.) Williams also presents a chart listing Aviall's discharged warehouse clerks as evidence that Aviall would have discharged him earlier if his attendance or work performance had been poor. ( Id. at Ex. 5.) The Court concludes that this evidence fails to create a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of race discrimination. Even if Williams were a "good employee," this fact alone does not rebut the overwhelming evidence that Aviall had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Williams' employment. See Ray v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 63 F.3d 429, 432, 434, 436 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that an employer had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating an employee's employment despite the employee's history of company recognition and awards); Guthrie v. Tifco Industries, 941 F.2d 374, 376, 378 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that an employer had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for demoting an employee despite the employee's history of promotions and salary increases). As such, Williams' second argument is without merit.
Third, Williams alleges that similarly-situated, white employees have not been discharged after parking in a restricted parking space or after speaking in a loud voice. (P.'s Resp. at 2.) However, Williams presents no evidence to support his allegation. In fact, during his deposition, Williams admitted that he could not name any white employees who had parked in a restricted parking space. (D.'s Am. App. at 54.) He also admitted that he did not know whether any of the white employees who had allegedly parked in a restricted parking space had been reprimanded by a supervisor or whether they had engaged in a verbal altercation with a supervisor. ( Id. at 34, 55.) Furthermore, during his deposition, Williams admitted that he could not name any black employees who had been treated less favorably than white employees due to race. ( Id. at 34.) Finally, although Williams named one white employee whom he believed had been treated more favorably due to his race, Williams admitted that he did not know whether that white employee had been reprimanded for the alleged poor conduct that Williams had observed. ( Id. at 49.) A genuine issue of material fact is not created by conclusory allegations or by unsubstantiated assertions. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). As such, Williams' third argument is without merit.
Fourth, Williams alleges that various statements in the affidavits of Koch, Stange, and Abercrombie are false. (P.'s Resp. at 1-2.) He further alleges that certain documents submitted by Aviall have been falsified. ( Id. at 2-3.) These allegations fail to create a genuine issue of material fact as to race discrimination. Williams' statements are conclusory; are not supported by the evidence of record; and, in some cases, are contradicted by his own sworn deposition testimony. See Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (holding that a genuine issue of material fact is not created by conclusory allegations or by unsubstantiated assertions); Thurman v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 952 F.2d 128, 137 n. 23 (5th Cir. 1992) (concluding that a genuine issue of material fact is not created by a plaintiff's statements that inexplicably contradict the plaintiff's previous deposition testimony). As such, Williams' fourth argument is without merit.
As a final matter, the Court declines to analyze Williams' apparent allegation that Aviall caused him to be discharged from two subsequent jobs by informing his employers that he had filed suit against Aviall. This allegation is not contained in Williams' Complaint, nor is it raised in Williams' Answers to the Magistrate Judge's Questionnaire. As such, Williams has brought no such claim against Aviall.
This claim appears to have been raised for the first time in Williams' deposition testimony. (D.'s Am. App. at 56-64.)
The Court notes that even if it were to consider this claim with respect to the motion for summary judgment, Aviall has submitted significant evidence that Williams' subsequent employers terminated his employment for reasons other than Aviall's alleged interference. (D's Am. App. at 107-20.) The Court also notes that Williams did not address this claim in his response to the motion for summary judgment. (P.'s Resp. at 1-3.)
In sum, Williams has entirely failed to meet his burden of presenting evidence that Aviall terminated his employment due to race discrimination. See Rubinstein v. Adm'rs of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 400 (5th Cir. 2000) ("While we are mindful of the Supreme Court's recent admonition that Title VII plaintiffs need not always present evidence above and beyond the prima facie case and pretext, discrimination suits still require evidence of discrimination.") (citation to Reeves omitted). Rather, the overwhelming evidence before this Court suggests that Aviall terminated Williams' employment due to Williams' misconduct. Accordingly, Aviall's motion for summary judgment should be GRANTED in full.
IV. Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendant's motion for summary judgment be GRANTED and that the case be DISMISSED with prejudice.