Opinion
C. A. PC-2015-4900
07-08-2021
CAROL WILLIAMS, Individually, and for and on Behalf of the Estate and the Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Anthony David Williams, Deceased; and WILLIAM GREGORY YOUNG and DEBRA ANNE THIGPEN, Individually, and for and on Behalf of the Estate and Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of William Clayton Young, Deceased v. AVCO CORPORATION
For Plaintiff: Stephen E. Breggia, Esq.; Cynthia M. Devers, Esq. For Defendant: John A. Tarantino, Esq.; Nicole J. Benjamin, Esq.; Daniel J. Procaccini, Esq.
PROVIDENCE COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT
For Plaintiff: Stephen E. Breggia, Esq.; Cynthia M. Devers, Esq.
For Defendant: John A. Tarantino, Esq.; Nicole J. Benjamin, Esq.; Daniel J. Procaccini, Esq.
DECISION
LICHT, J.
There are two discovery motions before the Court: (1) Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Objections and to Compel Defendant Avco Corporation to Provide Responses and Documents to Plaintiffs' First Request for Production of Documents: and (2) Defendant's Motion to Strike Certain Objections and Answers to its Discovery Requests and Motion to Compel More Responsive Answers and Documents. Defendant objects to Plaintiffs' motion, arguing in pertinent part that Plaintiffs' failure to adhere to the General Aviation Revitalization Act's fraud pleading requirement precludes them from obtaining discovery. As to Defendant's Motion, the Court believes it was resolved at the hearing on these motions, but the Court will, in this Decision, summarize what it believes transpired at that hearing.
I
Facts and Travel
On November 13, 2012, Anthony David Williams, William Clayton Young, and John Tilton, Jr. (Decedents) boarded a Piper PA-32-300 Cherokee 6 aircraft (Aircraft) in Jackson, Mississippi with a destination of Raymond, Mississippi. Amended Compl. ¶ 9. The Aircraft was powered by a single Lycoming IO-540-K1A5 fuel injected engine, which was designed, manufactured, sold, supplied, overhauled, and/or rebuilt by Avco Corporation (Defendant). Id. ¶ 33. Prior to departure, the Aircraft was taken out of the hangar, the main fuel tanks were topped off, a pre-flight inspection was performed, and the Aircraft was cleared for takeoff. Id. ¶ 18, 19. While in flight, Air Traffic Control received a message indicating that the Decedents were experiencing some engine difficulties and were returning back. Id. ¶¶ 20-22.
Unfortunately, the Aircraft impacted approximately 0.8 nautical miles south of the departure end of Runway 16 in Jackson, Mississippi, and erupted into flames and smoke. Id. ¶ 26. As a result of the accident, the Decedents were fatally injured due to the "inhalation of products of combustion." Id. ¶ 27. Carol Williams, wife and statutory beneficiary of decedent Anthony David Williams, along with William Gregory Young and Debra Anne Thigpen, children and statutory beneficiaries of decedent William Clayton Young (hereinafter referred to collectively as Plaintiffs) brought this action against Defendant. Id. ¶¶ 1-3. Plaintiffs filed an original complaint in November of 2015 to which Defendant answered and asserted as a defense the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA). Plaintiffs subsequently submitted an amended complaint in May of 2020, informing this Court that they intended to rely on the exceptions to GARA.
Currently before this Court are two discovery motions, one filed by each party. The first motion is Defendant's Motion to Strike certain objections and answers to its discovery requests and to compel more responsive answers and documents. The second motion is Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike objections made by Defendant and to compel Defendant to provide responses and documents to Plaintiffs' first request for production of documents. Following a hearing on April 15, 2021 regarding the discovery issues, both Defendant and Plaintiffs filed legal memoranda regarding Defendant's GARA defense on April 22, 2021 and April 23, 2021, respectively.
II
Standard of Review
Rhode Island law allows litigants to obtain information "regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter" of the pending action by allowing the parties to participate in discovery. Super. R. Civ. P. 26(b). Rule 34 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes any party to serve on another party a request to produce any designated documents which are within the other party's "possession, custody or control" and are relevant to the subject of the litigation. Super. R. Civ. P. 34. When a party objects to a request for production of documents or fails to respond adequately, the party seeking discovery may move for an order compelling production pursuant to Rule 37 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. Super. R. Civ. P. 37. The party resisting discovery bears the burden of persuasion as to its objections. See Vázquez-Fernández v. Cambridge College, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 150, 155-56 (D.P.R. 2010).
In situations involving a motion to compel, this Court has "broad discretion" in its approach to resolving discovery disputes based on "the principle that Rhode Island's discovery rules are 'liberal [and] designed to promote broad discovery among parties.'" Corvese v. Medco Containment Services, Inc., 687 A.2d 880, 881-82 (R.I. 1997); Lefore v. A.O. Smith Corp., No. PC121469, 2014 WL 2441477, at *2 (R.I. Super. May 23, 2014) (citing Colvin v. Lekas, 731 A.2d 718, 720 (R.I. 1999)). Despite this freedom, however, the discovery rules also empower the Court to restrict a discovery request on the grounds that it is "unduly burdensome" to the opposing party. Super. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), (c). Likewise, if a party fails to cooperate with legitimate discovery requests, the Court may, on motion from the discovering party, issue an order compelling the opposing party to respond. Super. R. Civ. P. 37(a).
III
Plaintiffs' Motion - GARA
A
Parties' Arguments
1
Defendant's Argument
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' right to discovery is significantly limited under GARA. Def.'s Suppl. Mem. at 1. Notably, GARA establishes a statute of repose under which no civil action may be brought against a manufacturer of an aircraft or aircraft components after eighteen years in connection with the "death or injury to persons or damage to property arising out of an accident involving a general aviation aircraft." 49 U.S.C. § 40101(2)(a). GARA does, however, provide two exceptions to the eighteen-year limit, (1) cases of fraud or misrepresentation (Fraud Exception) and (2) cases involving new or replacement parts (New Parts Exception). 49 U.S.C. § 40101(2); see also 49 U.S.C. § 40101(b)(1).
As to Plaintiffs' reliance on the Fraud Exception outlined in GARA, Defendant argues that GARA's statute of repose bars Plaintiffs' claim as they have failed to plead with specificity the facts necessary to prove that Defendant knowingly misrepresented to, or knowingly concealed from, the Federal Aviation Association (FAA) certain required information. Def.'s Suppl. Mem. at 2. Defendant asserts that the pleading standard set forth in GARA is akin to Rule 9(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that parties plead fraud with particularity and cites to Rickert v. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd., 923 F.Supp. 1453, 1456 (D. Wyo. 1996) to support this assertion. Accordingly, Defendant argues that because Plaintiffs have not pled any specific facts giving rise to a claim of misrepresentation or concealment under § 2(b) of GARA, Plaintiffs should not be entitled to discovery until such facts are pled. Id. at 3-4. Defendant relies on Schwartz v. Hawkins & Powers Aviation, Inc., No. 04-CV-195-D, 2005 WL 3776351, at *5, 6 (D. Wyo. 2005) (dismissing plaintiffs' claims with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6) where plaintiffs failed to aver facts supporting the elements of a knowing misrepresentation with specificity) as well as other cases to supports its contention.
As to Plaintiffs' reliance on the New Parts Exception, Defendant similarly asserts that Plaintiffs have failed to identify the parts or components they maintain were defective. Def.'s Suppl. Mem. at 5. Accordingly, Defendant contends that discovery should be contingent on Plaintiffs identifying each allegedly new and/or replaced part and, to the extent that Plaintiffs can do so, discovery should be limited to the identified new or replaced part. Id.
2 Plaintiffs' Argument
Plaintiffs do not dispute that the engine at issue was installed more than eighteen years prior to the accident at issue. Id. at 1-2. Rather, Plaintiffs rely on the two exceptions to GARA and assert that nothing in the legislative history of the Act suggests that Plaintiffs must prove that GARA does not apply before being able to obtain discovery. Pls.' Suppl. Mem. at 5. To that extent, Plaintiffs respond to Defendant's argument by highlighting that their Amended Complaint satisfies the pleading standard set forth in GARA and avers specific facts with respect to both the Fraud Exception and the New Parts Exception. Id. at 1-2. Therefore, Plaintiffs posit that Defendant's challenge is without merit. Id. at 2.
Plaintiffs further argue that the legislative history of GARA indicates "a careful Congressional balancing of the competing interests of aviation manufacturers and accident victims." Id. Plaintiffs reference proposed bills presented during the 99th, 100th, 101st, and 102nd Congressional terms which "would have marked a wholesale vindication of the rights of manufactures over accident victims." Id. These bills were later rejected by Congress, which chose instead to enact GARA in the 103rd term. Id. Citing to the House Reports by the 103rd Congressional term and a Senate Report, Plaintiffs maintain that the legislative intent behind GARA was to be "interest-balancing," containing provisions that both benefit aircraft manufacturers and accident victims alike. Id. at 4.
Lastly, Plaintiffs assert that GARA does not preempt their ability to obtain discovery pursuant to the Rhode Island Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. Plaintiffs rely on Johnson v. Precision Airmotive, LLC, No. 4:07CV1695 CDP., 2008 WL 2570825, at *3 (E.D. Mo. June 26, 2008) and LeBlanc v. Panther Helicopters, Inc., CIVIL ACTION NOS: 14-1617, 14-1772, 14-1791, 14-1875, 14-2326, 2016 WL 1161274, at *5 (E.D. La. Mar. 23, 2016) to substantiate their contention. Notably, each of these cases denied a defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and allowed discovery on the grounds that discovery could be helpful to determine if an exception to GARA does apply.
B
Analysis
Plaintiffs' investigation confirmed that the accident at issue was caused by the failure of the Lycoming IO-540 engine. Pl.'s Mot. Strike at 2. The investigation further concluded the following: the plunger in the flow divider of the Lycoming fuel system was extremely loose, which allowed fuel to enter the airside, leak out of the vent hole, and cause large quantities of fuel to spew onto the engine while in flight; the Lycoming engine lacked an overboard line to collect and redirect the fuel, which other model engines manufactured by competitors had; the fuel servo bellows was fractured; and number four and number six exhaust valves were stuck. Id. Accordingly, Plaintiffs seek to discover the following documents relating to the design, certification, and continuing airworthiness of the Lycoming IO-540-K1A5 engine, its fuel system, fuel servo, flow divider, and their parts and components:
▪ engineering drawings (RFP 24);
▪ materials specifications (RFP 25);
▪ design specification (RFP 26);
▪ build specifications (RFP 27);
▪ engineering change orders (RFP 28);
▪ engineering reports (RFP 29);
▪ test reports (RFP 30);
▪ data recorded during flight testing (RFP 31);
▪ type design (RFP 32);
▪ meeting minutes, emails, correspondence, contracts, or other documents exchanged between Lycoming and the manufacturer of the fuel servo (RFP 35);
▪ correspondence, emails, and other documents exchanged with the FAA (RFP 37);
▪ warranty claims (RFP 39);
▪ SIR Reports (RFP 40);
▪ reports or communications discussing Lycoming's evaluation of products returned from the field for functional evaluation (RFP 41);
▪ accident reports (RFP 42);
▪ reports, photographs, videos, data, and other documents discussing other accidents or incidents (RFP 43);
▪ expert reports, discovery responses, and depositions discussing other accidents or incidents (RFP 44);
▪ documents submitted to the FAA pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 21.3 (RFP 46); and
▪ FAA Special Certification Review Teams (RFP 47). Id. at 11.
Fraud Exception
GARA imposes a statute of repose which "generally bars suits against airplane manufacturers brought more than eighteen years after the delivery date to an initial purchaser of the aircraft." Robinson v. Hartzell Propeller, Inc., 454 F.3d 163, 165 (3d Cir. 2006); see also 49 U.S.C. § 40101. As explained above, there are two exceptions to GARA. The Fraud Exception provides that GARA will not apply "if the claimant pleads with specificity the facts necessary to prove . . . that the manufacturer . . . knowingly misrepresented . . . or concealed or withheld from the [FAA], required information that is material and relevant to the performance or the maintenance or operation of such aircraft, or the component." 49 U.S.C. § 40101(b)(1).
Defendant contends that Plaintiffs have failed to meet the pleading requirement under GARA and, therefore, should be restricted from discovery. Def.'s Mem. at 5. Specifically, Defendant asserts that the pleading standard set forth under GARA is "an obvious analog to" Rule 9(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that parties plead fraud with particularity. See Rickert, 923 F.Supp. at 1456. Accordingly, to bring a claim under the Fraud Exception to GARA and obtain discovery, Plaintiffs must aver specific facts regarding the basis of knowledge for the exception. Def.'s Mem. at 2-3.
In Schwartz, 2005 WL 3776351, at *5, the Court held that the plaintiffs failed to meet the pleading standard outlined in the Fraud Exception of GARA and, therefore, the exception did not apply. In that case, the plaintiffs' complaint contained conclusory statements such as "[c]orporate defendants willfully and wantonly failed to properly update the maintenance required on this H&P plane . . ." and that the defendant "knowingly withheld information about the modifications performed on the aircraft." Id. at *5. Accordingly, the Court explained that in both instances, the plaintiffs failed to plead "specific facts . . . sufficient to show that the corporate defendants knew of modifications to the aircraft [or] concealed information from the FAA . . . ." Id.
To that end, knowledge of previous accidents involving the same or similar aircraft or aircraft components is not enough to satisfy the requirements of the misrepresentation exception. See Theobald v. Piper Aircraft, Inc., 309 F.Supp.3d 1253, 1263 (S.D. Fla. 2018). In Theobald, the plaintiffs asserted that the defendant was not entitled to protection under GARA because of its "concealment and withholding of the cause of this accident and other similar ones." Id. at 1261. Specifically, the plaintiffs relied heavily on expert reports which concluded that defendants should have "been on notice" of the problem that caused the accident because it had occurred in other accidents. Id. at 1262. However, the Court reasoned that such conclusory statements are not enough to invoke the Fraud Exception without further evidence to support the statement. Id. at 1263. The Court explained:
"Stating simply that prior accidents should have put Piper on notice of a problem with its aircrafts or that Piper could have conducted better tests of its aircrafts is insufficient to meet the requirements of the Misrepresentation Exception to GARA, as Plaintiffs do not point to a single instance where Piper had to disclose information and either did not or misrepresented that information to the FAA." Id.
Cases involving a GARA defense are not always absolutely barred from discovery. In Johnson, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri dealt with an airplane crash that resulted in the deaths of four passengers. Id. at *1. The defendants in that case asserted that GARA establishes an "absolute right not to stand trial," an argument which likened the defendants' defense to a theory of absolute immunity. Id. at *2. The Court rejected such an argument, holding that:
"GARA does not say anything about discovery. It does not establish any procedure for litigating airplane crash cases, nor does it restrict the types of evidence discoverable by plaintiffs. GARA merely sets forth a defense to liability in cases where the relevant airplane parts are more than eighteen years old . . . There is no reason plaintiffs should be denied discovery merely because defendants have filed a motion under GARA." Id. at *2.
To that end, the defendants in that case additionally requested that if discovery is allowed, that it be "strictly limited to GARA issues." Id. In response, the Court concluded that while a reasonable request, the process of determining what kind of discovery is "strictly limited" is likely "workable in practice" and, therefore, denied the defendants' request. Id. Moreover, the Court supplemented its reasoning behind allowing discovery on the grounds that "discovery is also required to determine whether plaintiffs' claims fit within the misrepresentation exception to GARA." Id.
However, while discovery is not completely barred in situations involving a GARA defense, the plaintiff must still satisfy the pleading standard to obtain discovery. See Clark v. PHI, Inc., Civil Action No. 12-411, 2012 WL 3065429, at *3-4 (E.D. La. 2012). In Clark, the defendants raised GARA as a defense to which the plaintiff responded, asserting that discovery would be helpful to determine if the knowing misrepresentation exception applies in the instant case. Id. at *4. The Court, however, rejected the plaintiff's argument and found that the potential discovery that could unveil evidence which would prevent the application of GARA "does not excuse Plaintiff's neglect of GARA's pleading standard for the knowing misrepresentation exception." Id. at *5 (emphasis added).
In this case, the Court finds that Plaintiffs must, from the outset, meet the pleading requirement under GARA to properly invoke the Fraud Exception. See Tillman v. Raytheon Co., 430 S.W.3d 698, 704 (Ark. 2013) (concluding that a claimant must set out facts to show that the fraud exception applies and must do so with specificity). While Plaintiffs are correct in asserting that courts have allowed discovery to occur in cases where a GARA defense is raised, the cases cited by Plaintiffs cannot be reconciled with the facts in this case as none address the issue of the pleading requirement. Furthermore, Plaintiffs focus their attention on the legislative intent behind enacting GARA and the "Congressional balancing" of protecting both the manufacturers and accident victims. While a valid argument, this Court is unable to locate anything in the law that supports Plaintiffs' inference that the policy of protecting accident victims somehow supersedes the plain language of the statute. Moreover, as outlined above, courts—in keeping the policy behind GARA in mind—have been reluctant to allow discovery even in situations where discovery may aid the plaintiff in avoiding the application of GARA.
Looking at the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs fail to plead with particularity facts sufficient to show that Defendants knowingly misrepresented or willingly withheld information from the FAA. Notably, Plaintiffs assert detailed information stemming from a post-accident investigation in which they identify problems with various components of the aircraft such as the plunger in the flow divider, the lack of overboard line, the fuel servo, and exhaust valves four and six. See Amended Compl. ¶¶ 51-52, 55-56. However, like the plaintiffs in Theobald, Plaintiffs in this case merely assert that:
"A review of the prior failures set forth in Service Difficulty Reports, and, other accidents, and incidents and other litigation involving the 540 series engines and similar models make it clear that Lycoming was well aware of the havoc that fuel spilling over the hot engine cases." Id. ¶ 58.
Plaintiffs further claimed that despite this information, Defendant failed to notify the FAA of the extent of the problems, specifically, by failing to redesign the fuel delivery system and fix the underlying problem. Id. ¶¶ 67-68. While Plaintiffs undoubtedly provided more detailed information in their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs have still failed to demonstrate specific facts that show Defendant knowingly misrepresented, concealed, or withheld any information from the FAA. See Theobald, 309 F.Supp.3d at 1263. Because Plaintiffs have failed to plead with the requisite specificity, the Fraud Exception to GARA does not apply and Plaintiffs are not now entitled to discovery.
New Parts Exception
Although Plaintiffs have not met the requirements to satisfy the Fraud Exception to GARA, they may be able to overcome GARA's statute of repose through the New Parts Exception. This exception establishes a new period of repose for situations involving new and/or replacement parts and provides that the statute of repose will restart "beginning on the date of completion of the replacement or addition." 49 U.S.C. § 40101(a)(2). Of note, courts have held that based on the legislative history of GARA, this exception only applies against the manufacturer of the new component part installed after delivery as opposed to the original manufacturer of the aircraft. Theobald, 309 F.Supp.3d at 1256. In other words, one cannot try to hold the manufacturer of the whole aircraft liable for a new part but rather, the action must be against the manufacturer of the new part directly.
Defendant similarly maintains that Plaintiffs have failed to adequately identify which components of the Aircraft were defective for the New Parts Exception to apply. Def.'s Suppl. Mem. at 5. As explained above, the New Parts Exception applies only against the entity that manufactured the replacement part and not the manufacturer of the aircraft. Theobald, 309 F.Supp.3d at 1265; Hiser v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 111 Cal.App.4th 640, 651 (Cal.Ct.App. 2003). Accordingly, Defendant argues that it is "critically important that Plaintiffs identify each allegedly new part and, even if this Court were to allow discovery, it should be specifically limited to that new part because Plaintiffs' claims against Avco for any other part remains barred by GARA." Def.'s Suppl. Mem. at 5.
To that effect, because the New Parts Exception does not require Plaintiffs to satisfy a pleading standard like in the Fraud Exception, this Court may find that they are entitled to discover, in part, the requested documents in order to determine whether the New Parts Exception applies. See Leblanc, 2016 WL 1161274, at *5 ("Discovery will be necessary to determine what was done to the helicopter and when, and which parties may have manufactured parts of the helicopter that were less than eighteen years old."); see also Johnson, 2008 WL 2570825, at *3; Clark, 2012 WL 3065429, at *3.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana dealt with a related set of facts in Leblanc which involved a helicopter crash resulting in the death of one person and severe injuries to three passengers. Id. at *1. In that case, the defendants similarly raised GARA as a defense and moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the helicopter was delivered to the original purchaser in May 1991 and, therefore, the plaintiffs' claim is barred. Id. at *2. On the other hand, the plaintiffs asserted that discovery would "disclose defects to components of the helicopter that were delivered within the last eighteen years" which would, therefore, bar the application of GARA. Id. at *2.
The Court decided in favor of the plaintiffs and denied summary judgment on the grounds that the defendants' motion for summary judgment was premature as it had been "filed . . . two weeks before the Court entered a scheduling order. Initial disclosures have not been completed and almost no discovery has been conducted." Id. at *5. The Court further reiterated the reasoning outlined in Johnson, explaining that "[d]iscovery will be necessary to determine what was done to the helicopter and when, and which parties have manufactured parts of the helicopter that were less than eighteen years old." Id.
In this case, Plaintiffs assert that the Aircraft was equipped with a Lycoming IO-540-K1A5 engine and that the accident was caused by the failure of such engine. Pl.'s Mot. Strike at 1-2. As described above, Plaintiffs also identified four components (e.g., the plunger in the flow divider of the fuel system, the lack of an overboard line, the fuel servo bellows, and exhaust valves four and six) of the engine that could have contributed to the engine failure. Id. Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiffs have identified specific parts that allegedly caused the accident, they should be allowed to discover documents pertaining to those four parts to determine whether those parts fall under the New Parts Exception.
IV
Defendant's Motion
As a separate issue, also before this Court is Defendant's Motion to Strike certain objections and answers to its discovery requests and to compel more responsive answers and documents. Defendant's argument is primarily based on (1) Plaintiffs' objections to Defendant's interrogatories and requests for production of documents and (2) Plaintiffs' incomplete and non-responsive interrogatory responses. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, assert that they have given all the facts, factual averments, and allegations as well as the support for such averments and allegations to Defendant in their response. Moreover, Plaintiffs assert that when they had responsive documents in their possession, custody, and control, they have been provided. Accordingly, this Court finds that if it is Plaintiffs' position that they have produced all of the documents and information they have, then they can do no more. Accordingly, this Court holds that Plaintiffs are bound by the representations they have made and the answers they have provided thus far. Plaintiffs are expected to supplement their answers and produce additional documents if new facts and documents are unveiled during the discovery process.
Defendant additionally requests that the Court strike Plaintiffs' answers to interrogatories seeking the factual bases for Plaintiffs' allegations in the Mississippi Litigation and compel more responsive answers. As to this issue, this Court grants Defendant's request, and Plaintiffs must provide answers as to what their theory is against the defendant in the Mississippi Litigation. Lastly, Defendant requested that Plaintiffs produce documents relating to their settlements with other parties concerning the Accident, to which Plaintiffs have objected on the basis that such documents are confidential. As discussed at oral argument, upon the Court entering a Protective Order, Plaintiffs will produce any documents concerning settlements with parties regarding the Accident.
V
Conclusion
In conclusion, this Court denies, in part, Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike objections made by Defendant and to compel Defendant to provide responses and documents to Plaintiffs' first request for production of documents because Plaintiffs have failed to meet the pleading requirement set out in the Fraud Exception of GARA. However, this Court grants, in part, Plaintiffs' motion based on the New Parts Exception but limits Plaintiffs' discovery to documents regarding the plunger in the flow divider of the fuel system, the lack of an overboard line, the fuel servo bellows, and exhaust valves four and six. In addition, this Court grants in part and denies in part Defendant's Motion to Strike certain objections and answers to its discovery requests and to compel more responsive answers and documents. Counsel shall confer and submit an Order.