Opinion
5:22-CV-189-FL
08-23-2022
MAQUARY DEL'SHAWN WILLIAMS-GROGANS, Plaintiff, v. LOUIS DEJOY, Postmaster General, et al., Defendants.
ORDER AND MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
ROBERT B. JONES, JR. UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter is before the court on the pro se Plaintiff's amended motion to proceed in forma pauperis [DE-4] and for frivolity review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff has demonstrated appropriate evidence of inability to pay the required court costs, and the application to proceed in forma pauperis is allowed. Furthermore, it is recommended that Plaintiff's complaint be allowed to proceed in part and be dismissed in part.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
After allowing an application to proceed in forma pauperis, the court must still review the allegations of the complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), and shall dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks money damages from a defendant immune from such recovery. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii); see Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994) (explaining Congress enacted predecessor statute 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) “to prevent abuse of the judicial system by parties who bear none of the ordinary financial disincentives to filing meritless claims”). A case is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Examples of frivolous claims include those whose factual allegations are ‘so nutty,' ‘delusional,' or ‘wholly fanciful' as to be simply ‘unbelievable.'”). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. A claim lacks an arguable basis in fact when it describes “fantastic or delusional scenarios.” Id. at 327-28.
In order to state a claim on which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, the plaintiff must allege more than labels and conclusions. Id.
In the present case, Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, and pleadings drafted by a pro se litigant are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). This court is charged with liberally construing a pleading filed by a pro se litigant to allow for the development of a potentially meritorious claim. See id.; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Noble v. Barnett, 24 F.3d 582, 587 n.6 (4th Cir. 1994). However, the principles requiring generous construction of pro se complaints are not without limits; the district courts are not required “to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
IL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs initial motion to proceed in forma pauperis and proposed complaint were filed on May 9, 2022. [DE-1, -1-1]. The court issued a deficiency notice, [DE-3], and Plaintiff responded by filing an amended motion, proposed complaint, and the Final Agency Decision regarding Plaintiffs Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) claim filed with the United States Postal Service (“USPS”), [DE-4, -4-1, -4-5], Plaintiff, a former employee of the USPS, brings this action pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (“PDA”), against Louis De Joy, Postmaster General; Angelene Rainey, Manager of the Fort Bragg Plant; Danielle Hargrove, Arbitrator; Antoine Echols, USPS Postmaster; and Alisa Bassa, Senior Labor Relations Specialist. Compl. [DE-4-1] at 2, 9.
Plaintiff asserts the following allegations in her complaint. Plaintiff was awarded a Level 7 Lead Sales and Services Clerk position on February 1, 2021, and at the time she was seven months pregnant. Id. at 7. Plaintiff fell ill the same day and was hospitalized from February 1 through February 5, then was rehospitalized from February 7 through February 10, during which time her child was stillborn. Id. On February 8, Angelene Rainey, the plant manager where Plaintiff was employed, told Plaintiffs mother via a phone conversation that “the position is not for [Plaintiff] after suffering stillbirth and loss of [her] child,” and Rainey suggested that Plaintiff work at the Downing Road Annex instead. Id. at 12. Plaintiffs doctor placed her on maternity leave and bedrest because she was incapacitated from February through April 2, and her doctor specified in her FMLA package that she was to return to work on April 2. Id. at 7. Plaintiff alleges that Rainey prevented her return to work by forwarding incorrect occupational nurse information. Id. at 12. Plaintiff claims she was not promoted to Lead Sales and Services Clerk and terminated due to sex and pregnancy discrimination, retaliation, and diabetes and depression discrimination. Id. at 11. Plaintiff filed an EEO complaint on July 20,2021, and the USPS issued its Final Agency Decision finding no discrimination and closing her complaint on February 17,2022. [DE-4-5]. In this action, Plaintiff seeks recovery of back pay and reinstatement to her former job.
III. ANALYSIS
The ADA broadly protects the employment rights of the disabled and prohibits employers from “discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The PDA amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit sex discrimination based on pregnancy. See Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. E.E.O.C., 462 U.S. 669, 670 (1983). However, the ADA and Title VII authorize remedies against employers, not individuals. See Lissau v. S. Food Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 180 (4th Cir. 1998) (concluding Title VII forecloses individual liability); Baird ex rel. Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 472 (4th Cir. 1999) (concluding the ADA does not permit actions against individual defendants). Accordingly, it is recommended that Plaintiffs claims against Defendants Rainey, Hargrove, Bassa, and Echols be dismissed and that any individual capacity claims against Defendant DeJoy . be dismissed. The court liberally construes the pro se Plaintiffs claims against DeJoy as official capacity claims against her employer, the United States Postal Service, and recommends that Plaintiff s ADA and Title VII claims against her employer be allowed to proceed at this time.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiffs application to proceed in forma pauperis is ALLOWED, and it is RECOMMENDED that the complaint be dismissed in part and allowed to proceed in part.
IT IS DIRECTED that a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation be served on Plaintiff. You shall have until September 6, 2022 to file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation. The presiding district judge must conduct his or her own review (that is, make a de novo determination) of those portions of the Memorandum and Recommendation to which objection is properly made and may accept, reject, or modify the determinations in the Memorandum and Recommendation; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. See, e.g, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3); Local Civ. R. 1.1 (permitting modification of deadlines specified in local rules), 72.4(b), E.D. N.C.
If you do not file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation by the foregoing deadline, you will be giving up the right to review of the Memorandum and Recommendation by the presiding district judge as described above, and the presiding district judge may enter an order or judgment based on the Memorandum and Recommendation without such review. In addition, your failure to file written objections by the foregoing deadline will bar you from appealing to the Court of Appeals from an order or judgment of the presiding district judge based on the Memorandum and Recommendation. See Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 846-47 (4th Cir. 1985).