Wilkins v. Yale University

Full title: MATTHEW WILKINS v. YALE UNIVERSITY

Court: Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of New Haven at New Haven

Date published: Feb 25, 2011

2011 Ct. Sup. 5760 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2011)

Opinion

No. CV 10 6014646S

February 25, 2011

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION IN RE MOTION TO STRIKE (#102)

WILSON, J.

FACTS

The plaintiff, Matthew Wilkins, commenced this action by service of process on the defendant, Yale University, on September 17, 2010. The plaintiff's complaint, filed September 21, 2010, alleges the following facts. In September 2007, the plaintiff was enrolled in the defendant's divinity school. When the plaintiff applied to the divinity school, and thereafter, the defendant represented to its students that it had a medical leave and readmission policy. That policy entailed the student submitting an application for readmission along with an accompanying letter from the health care provider who recommended the leave stating that the student had been treated and was prepared to resume full-time study. "The defendant's policy and practice, without exception, provided that upon receipt of the health care provider's aforesaid letter, `the case can go to the PSC, which always takes favorable action on it.'" (Compl. ¶ 7.) The plaintiff was aware of the procedures. On September 14, 2007, the plaintiff relied on the defendant's policy and submitted the written opinion of a doctor that he should take a medical leave of one year. On September 18, 2007, the defendant approved the plaintiff's medical leave. On March 27, 2008, the plaintiff applied for readmission to the divinity school in accordance with the terms of the defendant's policy. On December 9, 2008, the plaintiff advised the defendant that his application for readmission was for the academic year commencing in the fall 2009. On July 28, 2009, the plaintiff provided the written opinion of his doctor that he had been successfully treated and was prepared to resume full-time study. On the same day, the defendant advised the plaintiff that he was further required to meet with a medical professional employed by the defendant for an evaluation. The plaintiff contacted that medical professional on July 29, 2009. On August 3, 2009, the defendant notified the plaintiff that all applications for the fall, 2009, semester had been processed. On August 4, 2009, the defendant falsely stated to the plaintiff that "[i]t is not possible to convene another PSC meeting this summer."

The plaintiff's complaint then alleges that the plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the defendant's actions. The complaint alleges a claim for promissory estoppel in count one. In count two, the complaint alleges a claim for negligent misrepresentation and alleges the additional fact that the defendant was negligent in its communications with the plaintiff. In count three, the complaint alleges a claim for a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA).

On October 10, 2010, the defendant filed a motion for extension of time to respond to the plaintiff's complaint. The court granted the defendant's motion on October 12, 2010. On November 29, 2010, the defendant filed a motion to strike counts two and three from the plaintiff's complaint on the grounds that count two fails to allege a false representation by the defendant, and that count three fails to allege sufficient facts to satisfy the cigarette rule. The defendant filed an accompanying memorandum of law on the same day. On December 15, 2010, the plaintiff filed an objection to the defendant's motion to strike counts two and three, and filed an accompanying memorandum of law. On January 3, 2011, the defendant filed a reply memorandum. The court heard oral argument at short calendar on January 18, 2011.

DISCUSSION

"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). "We take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint that has been stricken and we construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency . . . Thus [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied . . . Moreover, we note that [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged . . . It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted . . . Indeed, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 295 Conn. 240, 252-53, 990 A.2d 206 (2010).

A The Plaintiff's Second Count Negligent Misrepresentation

The defendant argues that the plaintiff's complaint does not allege any false representation on the part of the defendant on which the plaintiff could have relied in taking the actions described in the complaint. The defendant characterizes the statements contained in its written policy as accurate, but improperly followed in this case. The defendant argues that all the false statements alleged in the plaintiff's complaint came well after the plaintiff's decision to take a medical leave, so he could not have relied on those false statements in taking the leave. The plaintiff counters that the complaint alleges that the statement made to the plaintiff by the defendant on August 4, 2009, was false. Furthermore, the plaintiff argues that the defendant falsely informed him that it was necessary for him to meet with a doctor employed by the defendant in order to be reinstated as a student.

"The governing principles [of negligent misrepresentation] are set forth in . . . § 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977): One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment . . . supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information . . . Traditionally, an action for negligent misrepresentation requires the plaintiff to establish (1) that the defendant made a misrepresentation of fact (2) that the defendant knew or should have known was false, and (3) that the plaintiff reasonably relied on the misrepresentation, and (4) suffered pecuniary harm as a result." (Citation omitted.) Sovereign Bank v. Licata, 116 Conn.App. 483, 502-03, 977 A.2d 228, cert. granted in part, 293 Conn. 935, 981 A.2d 1080 (2009).

In this case, reading the facts of the plaintiff's complaint in a manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency, the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for negligent misrepresentation. The defendant correctly points out that the plaintiff could not have relied on its communications to the plaintiff in July and August of 2009 in deciding to take a medical leave of absence in September of 2007. The plaintiff's complaint, however, is broader than that. Paragraph twenty of the complaint alleges that "[t]he defendant failed to exercise reasonable care or competence in its aforesaid communications to the plaintiff, knowing that the plaintiff would reasonably rely upon them to his detriment, and thereby causing the plaintiff injury as herein described." Reading that paragraph in the light most favorable to sustaining the negligent misrepresentation claim, that allegation could be read as referring to the defendant's statements in July and August of 2009. The complaint alleges that those statements were false. The plaintiff's complaint therefore satisfies the first element.

Paragraph seventeen of the complaint alleges that the plaintiff, in an effort to avoid confrontation, "contacted [the defendant's doctor] and requested [an examination]." That allegation, taken in the light most favorable to sustaining the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's negligent misrepresentation claim, is an allegation of the plaintiff's reliance on the defendant's statement. The plaintiff's complaint therefore satisfies the second element.

Reading the complaint in the light most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency, and taking all reasonable inferences from the factual allegations of the complaint, the court can infer that the plaintiff reasonably relied on the alleged misrepresentation of the defendant. The complaint alleges in paragraph thirteen that "on March 27, 2008, the plaintiff applied for readmission in accordance with the aforesaid terms." It alleges that the defendant's misrepresentation occurred on July 28, 2009, and August 3, 2009, and that the plaintiff, "in an effort to avoid confrontation," attempted to set up an appointment with the doctor employed by the defendant. It may be inferred from the plaintiff's complaint that he took that action instead of pursuing his readmission application. The plaintiff's complaint therefore satisfies the third element.

The plaintiff's complaint alleges that as a result of his reliance on the defendant's misrepresentation regarding its readmission policy, he suffered pecuniary harm in that he has suffered economic loss. The plaintiff's complaint therefore satisfies the fourth element.

Since the plaintiff's complaint, read in the light most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency and taking all reasonable inferences therefrom, satisfies the four elements outlined in CT Page 5764 Sovereign Bank, the plaintiff's complaint states a legally sufficient claim for negligent misrepresentation. The court therefore denies the defendant's motion to strike count two of the plaintiff's complaint.

B The Plaintiff's Third Count The Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act

The defendant argues that count three of the plaintiff's complaint, a claim for a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) is legally insufficient and should therefore be stricken. The defendant argues that the plaintiff's complaint only alleges sufficient facts to satisfy the first prong of the "cigarette rule," and therefore has not stated a legally sufficient claim for a violation of CUTPA. The plaintiff counters that the defendant admits that its acts were offensive to public policy, that the defendant's actions were a "deceptive practice," and that the defendant's deception was intentional.

"Section 42-110b(a) provides: `No person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.' In determining whether a practice violates CUTPA, we are guided by the criteria set out in the Federal Trade Commission's so-called cigarette rule: (1) [W]hether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise — in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers, [competitors or other businesspersons] . . . All three criteria do not need to be satisfied to support a finding of unfairness. A practice may be unfair because of the degree to which it meets one of the criteria or because to a lesser extent it meets all three." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Blackwell v. Mahmood, 120 Conn.App. 690, 703-04, 992 A.2d 1219 (2010).

A subset of unfair practices, recognized by our Supreme Court, is deceptive practices. Daddona v. Liberty Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 209 Conn 243, 254, 550 A.2d 1061 (1988) ("a violation of CUTPA may be established by showing either an actual deceptive practice . . . or a practice amounting to a violation of public policy" [Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted]). In order to state a legally sufficient claim under CUTPA for a deceptive practice, the plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to support three elements: "First, there must be a representation, omission, or other practice likely to mislead consumers. Second, the consumers must interpret the message reasonably under the circumstances. Third, the misleading representation, omission, or practice must be material — that is, likely to affect consumer decisions or conduct." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Caldor, Inc. v. Heslin, 215 Conn. 590, 597, 577 A.2d 1009 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1088, 111 S.Ct. 966 (1991). "CUTPA embraces a broader standard of conduct more flexible than traditional common-law claims [of fraud or misrepresentation] and does not require proof of intent to deceive, to mislead or to defraud." Muniz v. Kravis, 59 Conn.App. 704, 713, 757 A.2d 1207 (2000).

In this case, the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to support a cause of action for a CUTPA violation under either the deception standard or the unfairness standard. Under the deception standard, the facts alleged by the plaintiff that were sufficient to state a claim for negligent misrepresentation are sufficient to state a claim under CUTPA.

As to the first element under the deception standard, paragraph twenty of the complaint alleges that "[t]he defendant failed to exercise reasonable care or competence in its aforesaid communications to the plaintiff, knowing that the plaintiff would reasonably rely upon them to his detriment, and thereby causing the plaintiff injury as herein described." Reading that paragraph in the light most favorable to sustaining the CUTPA claim, that allegation could be read as referring to the defendant's statements in July and August of 2009. The complaint alleges that those statements were false. The complaint therefore satisfies the first element of the deception standard because the defendant made a representation likely to mislead consumers.

As to the second element of the deception standard, the plaintiff's complaint alleges sufficient facts to infer that his interpretation of the representations were reasonable under the circumstances. The complaint alleges, in paragraph seventeen, that the plaintiff, in an effort to avoid confrontation, attempted to make an appointment with the defendant's doctor. Taking the plaintiff's allegation in the light most favorable to sustaining the CUTPA claim, and taking all reasonable inferences therefrom, a jury could find that the plaintiff's interpretation of, and reliance on, the defendant's instructions was reasonable.

Finally, as to the third element of the deception standard, the plaintiff's complaint alleges sufficient facts to infer that the misrepresentation was material. Reading the complaint in the light most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency, and taking all reasonable inferences from the factual allegations of the complaint, the court can infer that the plaintiff acted to avoid confrontation instead of pursuing his readmission application. The plaintiff's complaint therefore satisfies the third element of the deception standard because the complaint alleges that the plaintiff's reliance on the defendant's instructions ultimately prevented him from enrolling in the defendant's program in the fall of 2009.

Moreover, the plaintiff's third count is legally sufficient under the more general unfairness standard. A practice may be considered unfair because of the degree to which it meets any one of the three criteria of the cigarette rule. The case on which the defendant relies; Williams Ford, Inc. v. Hartford Courant Co., 232 Conn. 559, 593, 657 A.2d 212 (1995); is inapposite. In Williams Ford, our Supreme Court ruled that a plaintiff could not survive a motion to set aside a CUTPA verdict where the plaintiff's CUTPA claim was based solely on an allegation of negligence and the plaintiff itself was found ten percent negligent by the jury. But, the court expressly declined to extend that ruling beyond the context of a finding of contributory negligence, ruling: "We . . . need not decide whether negligence of the defendant alone, unaccompanied by contributory negligence of the plaintiff, will establish a CUTPA violation." Id., 591 n. 25.

Here, in the context of a motion to strike, the Williams Ford ruling does not affect the court's examination of whether the plaintiff's complaint is legally sufficient. The plaintiff's complaint alleges sufficient facts to satisfy the first prong of the cigarette rule under CUTPA. The practice, misrepresenting a material fact to the plaintiff, offends public policy as established by the common-law tort of negligent misrepresentation. Since the plaintiff's negligent misrepresentation claim is legally sufficient, as discussed supra, the plaintiff's CUTPA claim is sufficient to survive a motion to strike under the first prong of the cigarette rule. Since the plaintiff's CUTPA claim satisfies the first prong of the cigarette rule, it is legally sufficient under the unfairness standard.

The plaintiff's complaint states a legally sufficient cause of action under CUTPA under both the deception standard and the unfairness standard. Therefore the court denies the defendant's motion to strike count three of the plaintiff's complaint.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, since the plaintiff's second count, for negligent misrepresentation, alleges sufficient facts from which the court can infer the elements of a negligent misrepresentation claim and the plaintiff's third count, for a violation of CUTPA, alleges sufficient facts from which the court can infer a violation of CUTPA under either the unfairness standard or the deception standard, the defendant's motion to strike counts two and three of the plaintiff's complaint is denied.