Opinion
Case No. 1:03-cv-0576-DFH-VSS.
September 7, 2004
ENTRY ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND RELATED MATTERS
Plaintiffs Michael Wilkerson and William Suddarth are journeymen mechanics employed by defendant General Motors Corporation and represented by defendant Local 933 of the United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America ("the union"). Plaintiffs allege that General Motors improperly refused to assign them to skilled trade positions at the Experimental Test Department of the Allison Transmission facility in Indianapolis, and that General Motors improperly assigned apprentices with less seniority to the desired positions. Plaintiffs allege that General Motors' denials of their requests for those positions breached the applicable collective bargaining agreement (Count One), and that the union breached its duty of fair representation to them (Count Two). Both claims in this so-called hybrid action arise under Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
Both General Motors and the union have moved for summary judgment, primarily on the ground that plaintiffs filed their lawsuit too late, after the applicable six-month statute of limitations had run. See DelCostello v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983) (holding that case under § 301(a) is subject to borrowed statute of limitations from 29 U.S.C. § 160(b)). Plaintiffs have not filed any direct opposition to the motions for summary judgment. As a result, the court treats as undisputed those facts asserted by defendants in those motions. See Local Rule 56.1(e). Plaintiffs have instead moved for leave to file a second amended complaint. That amended pleading would add a new Count Three alleging that General Motors failed to act in good faith toward plaintiffs during collective bargaining that occurred in the autumn of 2003 regarding a new labor agreement.
The undisputed facts show that the six-month statute of limitations expired before plaintiffs filed this action. In correspondence dated July 23, 2002, plaintiffs' counsel complained to defendants General Motors and the union about General Motors' refusal to place plaintiffs in the Experimental Test Assembly Area and the union's refusal to seek such placement for them. The undisputed facts show that General Motors rejected plaintiffs' request for relief in correspondence sent to plaintiffs' counsel on August 7, 2002, and that the union rejected their request in correspondence sent to plaintiffs' counsel on September 27, 2002. Plaintiffs did not file their complaint in this action until April 22, 2003, more than six months after the latter of the two letters rejecting their requests for relief.
"The six-month period begins to run `when the claimant discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the acts constituting the alleged [breach of duty].'" Steffens v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline and Steamship Clerks, 797 F.2d 442, 446 (7th Cir. 1986), quoting Dozier v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 760 F.2d 849, 851 (7th Cir. 1985). In this case, the court need not determine exactly when the statute of limitations began to run. It had to begin running no later than the receipt of the August 7, 2002 and September 27, 2002 letters to plaintiffs' counsel, both of which were more than six months before this action was filed. General Motors and the union are entitled to summary judgment on Counts One and Two, respectively, and their motions for summary judgment are therefore granted.
The court does not reach the union's alternative basis for summary judgment, the failure to exhaust internal union remedies before filing suit.
The plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a second amended complaint is denied. The claim alleged in the new proposed Count Three did not even arise until the autumn of 2003, well after the events that were the basis for Counts One and Two. Also, the proposed Count Three seems to be pled as a state law claim for breach by General Motors of an alleged duty of good faith toward plaintiffs in the bargaining over a new collective bargaining agreement. Such a claim under state law would be preempted by federal labor law. E.g., Mitchell v. Pepsi-Cola Bottlers, Inc., 772 F.2d 342, 345 (7th Cir. 1985) (former represented employee's claim for tortious conduct in procuring his resignation was subject of collective bargaining agreement and preempted by federal labor law), following Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 209-12, 220 (1985) (represented employee's claim under state law against employer for breach of duty of good faith was preempted by federal labor law). Proposed Count Three also arises from new facts distinct from those in the time-barred Counts One and Two. Count Three should be the subject of a new and separate lawsuit if plaintiffs reasonably believe the claim is viable. See, e.g., Chaveriat v. Williams Pipe Line Co., 11 F.3d 1420, 1429 (7th Cir. 1993) (affirming denial of leave to amend complaint to add new and separate claim to case in which existing claims were barred by statute of limitations).
One other issue deserves attention. The proposed Second Amended Complaint alleges that plaintiffs asked the union to file a grievance on January 7, 2004 concerning General Motors' refusal to place them in the position of Experimental Transmission Mechanic, and that the union denied their request in a letter dated January 16, 2004. By January 7, 2004, both General Motors and the union had already moved for summary judgment on Counts One and Two based on the six-month statute of limitations. If the January 7, 2004 request was merely a renewal of the request that had been rejected back in September 2002, the fresh request could not revive the claim. See Sosbe v. Delco Electronics Div. of General Motors Corp., 830 F.2d 83, 87 (7th Cir. 1987) (continued correspondence with the union would not toll the six-month time limit; "Otherwise, a plaintiff could indefinitely delay resolution of labor disputes merely by bombarding his union with tiresome requests. . . ."), quoting Dozier, 760 F.2d at 852. If the January 7, 2004 request stemmed from the alleged wrongdoing in connection with the new collective bargaining agreement, then such a claim should be the subject of a separate lawsuit, if plaintiffs have exhausted the available internal union remedies.
Accordingly, the motions for summary judgment filed by defendants General Motors and the union are granted, and plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a second amended complaint is denied. Final judgment shall be entered in favor of defendants.
So ordered.